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This dissertation set out to establish why it was that East Asian regional organizations were 
proliferating even under the condition of a Sino-Japanese rivalry. In particular, it examined the 
effects of the rise of China on Japan‘s regional policy and its outcomes.  
 
To do so, the dissertation adopted an eclectic approach, testing each of the main international 
relations  theories  against  the  story  of  Sino-Japanese  relations  within  the  studied  regional 
institutions of East Asia. It adopted such an approach because no one theory of international 
relations was able to explain both the cause of and actual outcomes of institution building.  
 
Throughout all the regional institutions examined, one trend emerged. Whether in trade, finance, 
security  or  development,  East  Asian  regionalism  has  become  ‗networked.‘  This  networked 
outcome is more flexible than European or American-type regionalism, allowing for any dyad to 
calibrate their commitments as they please without reference to a regional standard. But as long 
as agreement on common rules for East Asia remains unforthcoming, this networked regionalism 
will not lead into more formalistic, deeper cooperation.   
 
This trend toward a ‗networked‘ or bilateral-type of regionalism was traceable back to Japan‘s 
response to China‘s rise. Rather than trying to build a regionally hegemonic core around which 
institutions for trade, finance, aid and security might be built, Japan has sought to go it alone. In 
the  field  of  security,  this  was  understandable  from  a  realist  perceptive,  but  only  after  a 
constructivist strategy had failed earlier. In the field of aid, Japan was better able to coordinate 
with China in a manner that liberalism suggests, but even here Japan was building up alternative 
bilateral structures. In the field of finance, Japan has competed with China in a manner realism 
would predict, but due to world level factors this has in fact spilled over into greater regional 
cooperation. Likewise in the field of trade, Japan has competed with China, giving rise to a 
situation in which institution building is actually harmed.  
 
In  conclusion,  this  dissertation  was  able  to  contribute  to  the  literature  by  revealing  the 
mechanisms by which a bilateral relationship impacts on institution building and to theorize about 
some of the likely institutional outcomes in the various fields. 




This work contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or 
diploma in any university or other tertiary institution to Joel Rathus and, to the best Adelaide 
Graduate  Centre  of  my  knowledge  and  belief,  contains  no  material  previously  published  or 
written by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text.  
 
I give consent to this copy of my thesis, when deposited in the University Library, being made 
available for loan and photocopying, subject to the provisions of the Copyright Act 1968. 
 
I also give permission for the digital version of my thesis to be made available on the web, via the 
University‘s digital research repository, the Library catalogue, the Australasian Digital Theses 
Program (ADTP) and also through web search engines, unless permission has been granted by 






This dissertation is dedicated to Yuri Ishitobi. Osewa ni narimashita. 
 
I would also like to thank my parents, Carl Rathus and Heather Matthews, without whose support 
this dissertation would not be realized.  
 
Additionally, I would like thank my principal supervisor Purnendra Jain, under whom it has been a 
real pleasure to study Japanese foreign policy and politics. Thanks also Gerry Groot, I could not 
have hoped for a better second super encouraging me all the way. 
  




In this dissertation Japanese name order is used when referring to Japanese, i.e. ‗Surname First-
name.‘ Thus the current PM of Japan will be written as Hatoyama Yukio. Chuu, Tsuu and Chou 
sounds in Japanese are rendered chū, tsū and chō in the English.  
 
Similarly, Chinese name order is used when referring to Chinese, i.e. ‗Surname First-name.‘ Thus 
the current General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party of Japan will be written as Hu 
Jintao.  
 
A partial exception to this rule applies to Japanese or Chinese people who are published in 
English; in that case the citation will read as per Western name order.  
 
In this dissertation the first person ‗I‘ is used throughout. While not standard in Academic writing 
per se, as discussed in the Theory chapter, I am leery of presenting myself as a scientist with 
some objectively testable claims. Thus the use of I is a signal to you, the gentle reader, that this 
is my informed opinion. 
 
Unless otherwise noted, $ refers to US dollars. An effort is made to always label amounts as 
US$ in any case. Yen and  RMB are called as such without using notation (¥) to avoid any 
confusion.     1 
 
1  Introduction 
 
1.1  The Puzzle 
 
Asia, however it is constructed, is the most economically dynamic region in the world and 
increasingly important strategically. This shift has given rise to a literature which describes 
Asia as the pilot of great power rivalry, and even conflict, in the current era.
1 What has also 
posed  a  puzzle  to  traditional  international  relations  theory   is  the  so -called  ‗anaemic‘ 
development of its regional institutions.
2 Asian regional institutions are regarded  by some 
academics  as  ‗different‘  from  their  counterparts,  particularly  when  compared  to  the 
European  experience.
3 However, with the passing of time, the push towards regional 
organizations in East Asia has strengthened together with growing East Asian regionalism. 
However images of what the region ought to look like are not held in common in the region. 
In particular the two ‗big players‘, Japan and China appear to be championing rival views.
4  
 
In the case of post-War Europe, it took France and Germany working together to drive the 
regional agenda. The circumstances were more favourable for cooperation between France 
and Germany, as both were allied with the US and in opposition to the Soviets in the Cold 
War period.
5 In the post-Cold War period they grew even closer, both economically and 
politically, resulting in a European common currency and the beginnings of a Eu ropean 
common foreign policy. Japan and China on the other hand spent more than three decades 
in opposing camps, with little communication and no intention to cooperate in fostering East 
Asian regionalism. And, despite a brief respite in the 1980s, the pol itical relationship 
between Japan and China has in general continued to worsen in the post-Cold War period.  
 
                                                   
1  Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry," International Security 18, no. 3 (1994)., In particular for Sino-Japanese relations 
see, Gerald Segal, "The Coming Confrontation between China and Japan," World Policy Journal 10, no. 2 (1993). And 
later, June Dreyer, "Sino-Japanese Relations:," Journal of Contemporary China 10, no. 28 (2001); Kent Calder, "China 
and Japan's Simmering Rivalry," Foreign Affairs March/April(2006). And Daniel Kliman, "China: Japan's Rising Power 
Conundrum," in Japan Chair Platform (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009).  
2 Markus Hund, "Asean + 3: Towards a New Age of Pan East Asian Regionalism. A Skeptics View.," The Pacific Review 
16,  no.  3  (2003).  David  Jones  and  M  Smith,  Asean  and  East  Asian  International  Relations:  Regional  Delusion 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006). Gilbert Rozman, North East Asia's Stunted Regionalism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
3 Aaron Friedberg, "Will Europe's Past Be Asia's Future?," Survival 42, no. 3 (2000)., Giovanni Capannelli, "East Asian 
and  European  Economic  Integration:  A  Comparative  Analysis,"  in  Working  Paper  Series  on  Regional  Economic 
Integration (Manila: Asian Development Bank 2009). 
4 Takashi Terada, "Forming an East Asian Community: A Site for Japan-China Power Struggles," Japanese Studies 26, 
no. 1 (2006). 
5 Christopher Hemmer and Peter J Katzenstein, "Why Is There No Nato in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism and the 
Origins of Multilateralism.," International Organisation 56, no. 3 (2002). 2 
 
Over  this  same  period  however,  regional  organizations  in  East  Asia  have  expanded  in 
number, scope and prominence in the region‘s international affairs. But with the European 
experience in mind, we might reasonably have expected that the lack of a Sino-Japanese 
axis would fatally undermine regionalist efforts in East Asia. Indeed, we might expect that 
Sino-Japanese rivalry and competitive regionalism would be played out in Southeast Asia, 
with the smaller countries in the region becoming caught up in either Japanese or Chinese 
designs.
6 And yet, in spite of this tense bilateral relationship of the region‘s great powers, 
regionalism (or least the appearance thereof) is on the rise in East Asia as testified to by 
the explosion of regional institutions in post-Cold War era.  
 
1.2  The Arguments 
 
There are broadly two hypotheses that might explain this puzzle of why despite the tense 
Sino-Japanese  relationship  regionalism  appears  to  be  progressing  nevertheless.  Firstly, 
that some other, higher order variable is at work driving East Asian regionalism, and the 
Sino-Japanese bilateral is not so important. This argument would typically suggest that the 
United  States  provides  the  extra-regional  muscle  required  to  even  out  the  differences 
between Japan and China, thereby allowing the regionalist project to advance.
7 The second 
possible  hypothesis  is  that  the  Sino -Japanese  bilateral  relationship  is  important  for 
understanding the developments of East Asian regionalism.
8 This argument would suggest 
that East Asian regionalism is somehow being driven forward by the Sino-Japanese rivalry.  
 
                                                   
6 Michael Wesley, "Jealous Suitors: Sino/Japanese Competitive Regionalism and the Future of East Asia," in China-
Japan Relations in the Twenty-First Century: Creating a Future Past?, ed. Michael Heazle and Nick Knight (UK: Edward 
Elgar  Publishing  2007);  Masafumi  Iida,  "Japan-China  Relations  in  East  Asia:  Rivals  or  Partners?,"  in  Nids  Joint 
Research Series No.3 China’s Shift: Global Strategy of the Rising Power ed. Masafumi IIDA (Tokyo: National Institute 
for Defence Studies, 2006); Jian Yang, "Sino-Japanese Relations: Implications for South East Asia,"  Contemporary 
South East Asia 24, no. 2 (2003); Takashi Terada, "Forming an East Asian Community: A Site for Japan-China Power 
Struggles," Japanese Studies 26, no. 1 (2006). 
7 Usually couched in terms of the US providing the stable political base on which regional technic al cooperation can 
occur, such as ―the United States has played a pivotal role in shaping the political-economic arena in which East Asia‘s 
putative regionalism is being played out, but it is significant that the emerging ASEAN+3 agenda in particular is being 
driven by systemic issues—especially regulatory policy for the finance sector—rather than simply attempting to balance 
US power in a more conventional sense.‖ Mark Beeson and Mark Berger, "The Paradoxes of Paramountcy: Regional 
Rivalries and the Dynamics of American Hegemony in East Asia," Global Change, Peace and Security 15, no. 1 (2003). 
p. 41, this view is shared by Shiraishi Takashi see, Takashi Shiraishi, "Gaikō Meisō Wo Manaita Kokka No Mitorizu No 
Soushitsu," Chūo Kōron Feburary(2010).  
8Mie Oba, "Regional Arrangements for Trade in Northeast Asia: Cooperation and Competition between China and 
Japan," in Asia's New Institutional Architecture, ed. Vinod Aggarwal and Min Gyo Koo (Springer: Leipzig, 2008); Joel 
Rathus, "China, Japan and Regional Organisations: The Case of the Asian Development Bank," Japanese Studies 28, 
no. 1 (2008); Michael Heazle, "Sino-Japan Relations and Japan's Emerging Foreign Policy Crisis," (Brisbane: Griffith 
Asia Institute, 2005). 3 
 
The first of these hypotheses is perhaps the one most readily accepted due to its Ockham‘s 
razor-like directness, but it is far from satisfactory. In the first place, there is no reason why 
the US would loan its muscle to help Japan and China to build regional organizations which 
excluded, or might exclude, the US itself. And in the second instance, the role of the US in 
East Asia is itself arguably the largest and most important difference and source of distrust 
between the two. 
 
The second of these hypotheses, that East Asia‘s regionalism is somehow being driven by 
the tense (untrusting) nature of Sino-Japanese relations, presents its own set of problems. 
The  history  of  international  relations  suggests  that  bilateral  tensions  ought  to  weaken 
regional  cooperation,  not  be  a  cause  for  more  of  it.    However,  if  regional  institutions 
(despite their growth in number and scope) were in fact weak, and this weakness is due to 
the  poor  bilateral  relationship  between  China  and  Japan,  then  it  is  possible  we  can 
harmonize expectations with observations. With this explanation of how a poor bilateral 
relationship among the two big powers in a region might still be responsible for a form of 
regionalism in mind, it is worthwhile examining and testing this second hypothesis.   
 
This  thesis  further  develops  the  hypothesis  that  the  Sino-Japanese  relationship  is 
significant by proposing a two-step argument. The first argument focuses on how the tense 
Sino-Japanese relationship impacts on regionalism by proposing that it is Japan‘s efforts to 
maintain its influence in the region in the face of the rise of China which is the driver of 
much  of  this  regionalism  and  much  of  the  change  in  regional  institutions.  The  second 
argument deals with the implications arising from the first argument, and proposes that 
Japan‘s response of limited cooperation or competition with China is a major cause of the 
‗bilaterally-networked‘ regionalism currently on display in East Asia, which is suggestive of a 
basic weakness in the region‘s institutions. The causal chain can be pictorially represented 
as in the below figure;  
 
Figure 1 Flow of Argument 
 
 
As a logical argument, this thesis should be understood as follows; the worsening bilateral 
relationship between Japan and an increasingly powerful China is an important factor in 
causing Japan to look at regionalism and regional institutions as a means to hold onto its 
influence. And, Japan‘s turn to regionalism and regional institutions to preserve its influence 4 
 
is a major factor in the growth and development of regional institutions of a  bilaterally-
networked  variety.  Thus,  the  worsening  bilateral  relationship  between  Japan  and  an 
increasingly powerful China is a major factor in the emergence of a bilaterally-networked 
type of regional institutionalism.  
 
This argument is couched, or rather hedged, in terms of the Sino-Japanese relationship 
being a ‗major factor‘ in the development of regional institutions. This is an important point. 
As will be discussed in the theory section, there is no point in arguing that something is the 
only cause (or even the only major cause) of something else in international relations. The 
purpose of this line of argument is rather to show that Sino-Japanese relationship has had 
an impact, to quantify that impact, and to elucidate some of the mechanisms of that impact. 
Of course other factors, not least the role of the US, will be discussed along the way, but 
the focus remains on the China-Japan relationship. 
 
In order to do so, this thesis poses three questions, which guide and structure each of case 
study chapters, four through seven: What are the developments in said regional institutions; 
what is the meaning of these institutional developments for the regional influence of Japan 
relative to China; and how important a role has Japan played in these developments? 
 
Additionally,  this  thesis  will  develop  in  chapter  two  a  theoretical  framework  in  order  to 
explain the linkage between a bilateral relationship and regional institutional development. 
This theoretical framework is built-up from the three main schools of international relations, 
realism, liberalism and social constructivism in the eclectic manner advocated by Peter 
Katzenstein.  As  such,  in  the  conclusion  of  each  study,  the  thesis  will  explain  which 
variables were most important and show that more than mere power is determining the 
development of regional institutions in East Asia today. 
 
1.3  The Research: Method, Methodology and Limits 
 
This section addresses the problem of research method. It is not enough to argue the 
theoretical cause of why Japan‘s response to the rise of China occurred and the changes in 
regional organizations, one must demonstrate the link – i.e. how did it happen? The focus 
of  this  section,  therefore,  is  not  on  explaining  the  theoretical  ‗why‘  and  rather  towards 
explaining the concrete ‗how.‘  
 
To do so, this thesis will construct a research model aimed at explaining the development 
and  functioning of regional institutions. This is a descriptive task, and  as such a close 
inspection and  understanding of the history of the regional organizations‘ functioning is 5 
 
required. The literature on institutional change will be reviewed to construct a model for 
charting change in the functioning of regional organizations. In particular, the taxonomy of 
Michael Wesley will be examined. The model will need to be constructed to be able to 
answer these questions without filtering out or second guessing the answer (i.e. be biased 
towards a balance of power explanation). 
 
To do so, this thesis will adopt a  retrospective approach. It  will look at the institutional 
functioning and then trace back to Japan‘s foreign policy to the extent it is possible. The 
research method based on reading academic, journalistic and official documents and in 
interviewing officials of the various institutions or their handlers in the Government of Japan 
or other involved parties over the course of two years field work undertaken in Japan at 
Meiji University, with brief trips to Korea and China. This field work was made possible by a 
Monbukagakusho Scholarship. A list of interviews by affiliation can be found in Appendix 1.  
 
1.3.1  Definitions and taxonomy: Region, Regionalism, Regional Institutions 
This section is focused on regional institutions, how to define them and how to understand 
change within them. This section does not deal with the many possible causes of change, 
this will be addressed in the theory section, the focus remains squarely on understanding 
‗how (along what lines) do regional institutions change?‘ 
 
It is necessary, however, to first define the region which is to be examined. As has been 
noted, there is nothing natural about a region which marks itself out as such. Regions are 
politically constructed and not infrequently contested labels for a geographical area.
9 In the 
case of East Asia, as represented below in Figure 2, I define the region to be composed of 
the ten members of the Association for South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Burma, 
Cambodia, Brunei, Laos, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, 
plus  the  five  members  of  North  East  Asia  (Japan,  China,  North  and  South  Koreas, 
Mongolia). East Asia thus defined is the core group within the regional institutions to be 
examined. In its ow n category is Taiwan, where it is a member or quasi -member of a 
regional institutions, is also considered a ‗regional‘ member but due to its stateless status it 
cannot be ‗core‘ in same way as others. The next layer adds to this Australia-New Zealand 
and  their  Pacific  island  dependencies.  Also  included  is  South  Asia;  India,  Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan. These are the non-core members of the East Asian 
region.  Other  members  of  regional  organization  are  peripheral  members,  or  more 
accurately non-regional members. This out-group includes nations of Central and Western 
Asia as well as, importantly, United States.  
 
                                                   
9 Peter J Katzenstein, A World of Regions (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2005).  6 
 
Figure 2 East Asia 
 
Source: Generated by Author 
 
Regionalism,  at its most basic, refers to cooperation within a region, such as the East 
Asian region defined above. While early research on regionalism was carried out with a 
focus on Europe,
10 Christopher Dent provides a definition of regionalism in the East Asian 
context  as  ―structures,  processes  and  arrangements  that  are  working  towards  greater 
coherence within a specific international region in terms of economic, political, security, 
socio-cultural  and  other  kinds  of  linkages.‖
11 However,  many  authors  have  noted  these 
arrangements may arise from either non-official, usually market-related, or from official, 
governmental action.
12 In the literature the former is called regionalization, while the latter is 
called regionalism. This overlap has led to some confusion as the word regionalism carries 
two meanings; the general meaning of all regional cooperative activities both official and 
non-official (regionalization), and the specific meaning of regional cooperation at the official 
level. Additionally, further confusion can arise between ‗true‘ regionalism and bilaterally-
networked   (also sometimes called ‗hub-and-spoke‘) regionalism. In the case of  the 
                                                   
10 Perhaps most importantly from this school of early regionalists is Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration 
(Homewood: Irwin, 1961).. Also significant was Ernst Haas, Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International 
Organization (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964). Haas viewed regionalism as a response to regionalization via 
the spill-over process.    
11 Christopher Dent, East Asian Regionalism (London: Routledge, 2008). p. 7 
12 For the best discussion of these terms in relation to East Asia see  Paul Evans, "Between Regionalism and 
Regionalization," in Remapping East Asia, ed. T J Pempel (Ithaca: Cornell Uni. Press, 2005). 
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former, a single set of harmonized rules applies equally to all regional members. Whereas 
in  latter  case,  even  as  overall  regional  interdependence  and  cooperation  is  built  up, 
bilaterally-networked  regionalism  by  virtue  of  its  structure  does  not  promote  a  single, 
harmonized rule set. Instead, national sovereignty and the freedom to choose partners and 
to differentiate the level of cooperation within each partnership are preserved.  
 
This dissertation takes the definition of regionalism as exclusively formal government policy, 
while also considering that even within this definition different kinds of regionalism exist. 
Regionalism  is  held  to  be  ‗state-led,  government  level  policy  initiatives  such  as  inter-
governmental dialogues and treaties aimed at co-operation and integration at the regional 
level.‘
13 Regardless  of  the  type  of  regionalism,  there  is  a  close  link  therefore  between 
regionalism  and  regional  institutions,  with  regional  institutions  seen  as  the  successful 
output of regionalist projects.
14 
 
The definition of regional institution itself has been a subject of extensive debate. Liberal 
theorists have far from helped matters, Robert Keohane himself noting ruefully that the 
definition  of  an  international  institution  as  ―some  sort  of  establishment  of  relative 
permanence  of  a  distinctly  social  sort‖  is  grossly  unsatisfactory.
15 This  broad  definition 
would include such things as sovereignty and international law, even the balance of power, 
in addition to more obvious organizations such as the United Nations and International 
Monetary Fund - and would serve to prevent rather than facilitate discussion on the subject 
by confusing what it is exactly that is under examination. 
 
To clarify matters, the difference between ‗institution‘ and ‗organization‘ needs to be made 
explicit.  While  all  international  organizations  are  institutions,  being  semi-permanent 
establishments of a distinctly social sort, the reverse statement is not true. This is because 
institutions include formal and informal expectations, whereas organizations are limited only 
to the formal and explicit.
16  How far along the dimension of formal/informal, explicit/implicit 
one sets the limit for  an  institution affects directly the subject matter. My definition of 
regional  institution  is  based  on  Michael  Wesley‘s  definition  of  regional  organizations.
17 
Wesley‘s  definition  is  composed  of  five  elements:  regional  membership,  generalized 
ongoing commitments to cooperate in selected issue areas, internally consistent written 
                                                   
13 This definition is based on Christopher Dent, East Asian Regionalism (London: Routledge, 2008). p. 7 
14 Peter J Katzenstein, "Regionalism and Asia,"  New Political Economy 5, no. 3 (2000). p. 360, although Katzenstein 
notes that while ―Asian regionalism is an idea whose time has come…Yet Asian regionalism has yet to be described 
adequately in terms of formal institutions.‖ 
15 Robert Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," International Studies Quarterly 32, no. 4 (1988). p. 382 
16 Ibid. pp. 380-1 
17 Michael Wesley, ed. The Regional Organizations of the Asia-Pacific (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,2003). p. 5 8 
 
and unwritten rules or norms of acceptable action, formal and defined procedure for taking 
collective action, and regular meetings of members giving a ‗rolling‘ agenda. 
 
In East Asia, this definition would cover the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Chiang 
Mai Initiatives (CMI) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), but would have some difficulty 
including the East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA). In particular, this emergent trade area 
stumbles at point four, defined procedures for taking collective action. In order to include 
the EAFTA, I will accept informal and ad hoc procedures for taking collective action at the 
regional level.  This concession is further justified as the EAFTA is trending towards formal 
negotiations at the East Asia summit and ASEAN Plus Three (APT), and might therefore be 
considered as an agenda item of these larger institutions. Lastly, cutting out the EAFTA is 
simply not feasible in a study of East Asian regionalism, as the trade dimension looms large 
in official and academic discussions.  
    
It is also necessary to clarify some of these elements in light of the extant conditions of 
East  Asian  regional  institutions.  Firstly,  the  focus on  the  regional membership  of  these 
institutions  is  critical.  Sensitivity  to  the  unique  regional  structure,  as  opposed  to  global 
structures, allows a deeper understanding of the functioning and development of these 
institutions;  changes  in  the  regional  order  are  probably  more  significant  for  these 
organizations than global fluctuations.  
 
This  is  not  to  say  that  regional  institutions  must  possess  an  ‗exclusively‘  regional 
membership.  At  least  for  East  Asia,  and  elsewhere,  the  US  is  a  critical  non-regional 
member. Rather, the majority of membership should be regional and regional members 
should  be  somehow  favoured  in  the  decision  making  process.  If  the  majority  of  the 
membership  do  not  identify  with  the  region,  then  the  organization  should  be  better 
understood as inter-regional, not regional.
18  In principle, the headquarters or secretariat 
should be situated in a regional member country. While not necessarily a criterion of a 
regional organization, I will limit my examination to those regional organizations to wh ich 
China and Japan are both members.
 19  
 
With  regard  to  the  second  point,  ‗generalized  ongoing  commitments  to  cooperate  in 
selected issue areas‘; I would add that these selected issue areas should be limited to 
issues within the geographical scope of the region. A regional institution in principle deals 
with regional problems, or regional implications of extra-regional problems, exclusively.  
                                                   
18  Joseph  Camilleri,  "Communication:  East  Asia's  Emerging  Regionalism:  Tension  and  Potential  in  Design  and 
Architecture," Global Change, Peace and Security 17, no. 3 (2005). 
19 This excludes ASEAN itself, but brings in wider groupings which include Japan and China. It excludes the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) etc. 9 
 
 
Implied within the fourth and fifth criteria is level of representation. A regional institution, in 
order to be official and formally competent to undertake coordinated action ought to be 
attended  by  a  minister  or  a  ministerial-level  representative.  There  are  significant  non-
ministerial groupings, such as the Meeting of East Asian Central Bankers, or Heads of 
Defence Colleges meetings, which often occur on the sidelines of ministerial meetings. 
These are not considered regional institutions, as they do not occur at the government level. 
 
Taxonomy: Sites of change 
But what changes exactly are we looking for? Terms like functioning are far too broad to be 
of much use. Fortunately, Michael Wesley has provided a typology of the possible sites of 
change in regional institutions: Membership, Scope, Authority, Capability, and Diffusion.
20  
These categories are also generally ac cepted in the Rational Design of International 
Institutions project, which also singles out the ‗decision making procedure/rules‘ as a site of 
change to be examined.
21   
 
Membership  is  a  central  issue  when  discussing  regional  institutions.  By  their  nature 
regional institutions are exclusive – with membership available to those states that lie within 
the ‗region.‘ However, as has been noted ―regions are… not only geographically given but 
also politically made.‖
22  Membership is thus open to interpretation. Australia is particularly 
sensitive to such interpretations, and is constantly pressing its claim that Australia is part of 
the region (in hopes of gaining admittance to regional organizations under the ASEAN 
banner). Australian government‘s view membership as beneficial not merely for the political 
and economic advantages offered, but also because in Wesley‘s words, it moves Australia 
from being ‗in the region‘ to being ‗of the region.‘
23   
 
Geographical location is not enough though. Regional membership has to be politically won 
and  membership  in  regional  institutions  is  therefore  hotly  contested.  This  is  because 
membership in regional institutions is one of the clearest indications of the shape of a 
region. Apart from the material benefits one hopes to gain from being a member of an 
‗exclusive‘  grouping;  regional  institutions  provide  an  opportunity  to  build  community.
24  
                                                   
20 Michael Wesley, ed. The Regional Organizations of the Asia-Pacific (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,2003). Chapter 
10 
21 They called it control, and focussed more on vote weighting.  Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan   
Snidal, "The Rational Design of International Institutions," International Organization 55(2001)., p. 1 
22 Nobuo Okawara and Peter J Katzenstein, "Japan and Asia-Pacific Security: Regionalization, Entrenched Bilateralism 
and Incipient Multilateralism," The Pacific Review 14, no. 2 (2001). p. 166 
23 Michael Wesley, "The Politics of Exclusion: Australia, Turkey and Definitions of Regionalism.," Pacific Review 10, no. 
4 (1997). 
24 Robert Keohane, "Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research," International Journal 45(1990). 10 
 
Japan too is aware of this, and faces an uphill battle fighting ghosts of its imperial past to 
win the prize of regional acceptance and full regional membership.
 25  Japan is also aware 
that  as  a  core  member,  it  can  sponsor  other  states  who  are  candidates  for  regional 
institutions. As its position in region comes increasingly under the shadow of a rising China, 
Japan  is  indeed  looking  to  get  some  states  with  similar  interests  (including  managing 
China) involved in the region through such groups.  Membership is thus a possible site of 
contention between Japan and China which might have effects on regional institutions.  
 
One of the other sites of change Wesley identifies is Scope. This refers to the number of 
issue areas that an institution has the mandate to address. Thus when a regional institution 
such as ASEAN added to its declared areas of cooperation such elements as ‗food security‘ 
in the 1980s, or ‗pollution‘ in the 1990s, this is expansion of scope. An expansion of scope 
in regional institutions reflects an expansion of areas that regional states are willing to 
discuss, if not necessarily act on. Since changes in scope are largely undeclared, such as 
the ARF 1995 Concept Paper, tracking changes in scope is a matter of watching what the 
organization states it is willing to discuss. Tracking developments in this site is important, 
especially as Japan presses scope to expand even as China moves to slow said expansion.  
  
Most  important  for  any  institution  though  is  its  Authority.  Authority  refers  to  the 
organization‘s  ability  to  extract  compliance  from  its  membership  to  the  institutions‘ 
agreements  or  norms.  This  is  the  ‗action‘  part  of  regional  institutions  and  the  link  to 
causation.  It  is  also  therefore  the  most  difficult  to  measure.
26   Wesley identifies, with 
reference to Max Weber, two levels within authority; power and legitimacy.
27  
 
Power deals with the instrumental cost/gain analysis of decisions of states. The more 
powerful an  institution, the higher the costs  from defaulting on an agreement   and the 
greater the implications of exiting from  it. Legitimacy deals w ith  ―the  internalization  of 
regional perspectives and identifications that inform state decision-making.‖
28  Authority is a 
crucial variable because it rests among ideas of functioning and even ‗worth‘ of regional 
institutions.  However,  in  East  Asia  the  preference  for  non-powerful,  but  still  legitimate 
institutions  makes  investigations  into  state  compliance  more  difficult.  I  use  Authority  to 
mean  the  extent  to  which  regional  states  follow,  rather  than  default  from,  agreements 
reached. It is related to the concept of Diffusion discussed below. 
 
                                                   
25 Although its island geography has helped to create an identity of insulation for Japan, so called Shimakuni Konjō. 
26 Michael Wesley, ed. The Regional Organizations of the Asia-Pacific (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,2003). pp. 215-6, 
the case of APEC and differing judgments of authority.  
27 Ibid. p. 215  
28 Ibid. p. 208 11 
 
Diffusion  looks  at  the  rate  of  increase  and decrease in  number  of  regional institutions. 
There is some overlap with scope, as new institutions need not be formed if pre-existing 
ones can expand their scope to cover the  issue area competently. There is also some 
overlap with authority, as legitimate groupings will not attract competition from the creation 
of new ones.  
 
The key issue is when and why states decide to commit their resources to forming a new 
organization, or when and why states decide that an organization is unsatisfactory and 
ought to be discontinued. Fortunately, measuring the diffusion of regional organizations is a 
relatively easy task. A historical approach of looking when organizations come and go is all 
that is required. However, proposed organizations, even if they fail to materialize, can also 
count  as  a  significant  indication  of  the  shape  and  direction  regional  organizations  are 
heading, and should also be included.  
 
Capability deals with the increases and decreases of the material resources available to an 
organization, thus elements such as staff and funding are considered. However, this thesis 
uses the term resources as simpler shorthand for the same. Resources as a site of change 
is  somewhat  more  complex  than  first  impressions  might  suggest. While  it  would  seem 
obvious to look at the budgets, staffing and available resources of regional organizations, 
these figures are rarely made available to the public. Almost all regional organizations have 
been built out of a policy of minimalism, whereby all activities were run through each state‘s 
department of Foreign Affairs. This has meant that institutional capabilities, at least in East 
Asia, have started with low baselines – only one studied here began its existence with a 
centralized bureaucracy, like a secretariat.
29 
 
Japan has been one of the more prolific contributors to the purse of regional institutions. 
Resources are thus a site where we might see Japan‘s policy change towards regional 
organizations being clearly played out.  Where, how, and how much, Japan spends on 
boosting  the  capability  of  regional  institutions  has  significant  implications,  and  Japan‘s 
choices will be coloured by China‘s movements. These kinds of circumstance are able to 
show how regional organizations have changed in light of Japan‘s response to China, and 
are precisely the subject matter this thesis aims to investigate.  
 
The last element to be discussed is Rules. Wesley did not explicitly identify rules as a site 
of change in regional organizations, but his discussion around normative change makes it 
clear  that  formal  rule  change  is  significant.  The rules  surrounding  decision  making  are 
crucial. A change in formal voting weights indicates more about who is in control of an 
                                                   
29 Ibid. p. 222 12 
 
organization than perhaps any of the above factors and must therefore be considered. Also 
considered are rules about agenda setting and voice, i.e. who is able to speak, on whose 
behalf, and about what. Finally, rules might sometimes be used to control access on what 
terms to the regional public goods created. 
 
Lastly, as Wesley states,  ―identifying change is a subjective process: even if change is 
defined at its simplest as institutional variation over time, the definition of what constitutes 
significant institutional variation remains in contest.‖
30  As I will be examining these areas of 
institutional change to test other hypotheses, the significance of any change to regional 
politics is not addressed. Part of the reason is that most change in organizations is usually 
incremental rather than episodic, and simply not enough time has passed to make any sort 
of a judgment call.
31  
 
Not all of these categories of institutional change will be discussed in each case study 
chapter. 
 
1.3.2  Case Study Selection and Approach 
There are four case studies discussed in this thesis, and a word ought to be said on their 
selection. This section will first comment (in abstract) on case study selection, and then 
discuss the merits of the four case studies contained within this dissertation. 
 
While it may be theoretically possible to study all cases, practicality speaks for limiting the 
sample  size  to  something  that  is  both  manageable  and  from  which  we  might  usefully 
generalize. Formally, it is a question of large-n or small-n samples for case study. A large-n, 
or a large number of case studies, is useful when largely undifferentiated and relatively 
simple objects cases are being compared.
32  While a large-n case study may be statistically 
preferred,  regional  organizati ons  are  too  complex  for  this  approach.  Moreover,  the 
examination  of  Japan`s  policy  response  as  a  source  of  institutional  change  makes 
infeasible statistical approaches.  As Kenneth Walt notes, ―Statistical manipulations cannot 
provide direct evidence about the perceptions and motivations that inspired a particular 
…decision. Nor take into account novel contextual features of a given case.‖
 33  For this, the 
small-n case study approach is preferred. However, while the small-n approach is more 
manageable,  it  is  questionable  whether  the  findings  will  be  significant  –  i.e.  whether 
                                                   
30 Ibid. p. 6 
31 Ibid.. Six reasons for incrementalism in institutional change: long periods of stagnation because high-start cost and 
sunk cost dissuade people to change, also learning and cooperation effects, routine-ization and adaptive effect make 
judgment of success easier, the competency trap, and a desire not to learn another new system. p. 119, 143 
32 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997). 
33 Stephan Walt, The Origin of Alliance (New York: Cornell University Press, 1987). p. 11 13 
 
generalizations might be drawn from this study.
34  
 
Mill‘s method of difference would direct us to find, ideally, cases that are identical in all but 
one  independent  variable  and  which  differ  in  their  outcomes.  Unfortunately,  as  it  is 
impossible  to  find  perfectly  matched  cases,  the  challenge  is  to  demonstrate  that  the 
difference in outcomes (at these regional organization organizations) is due to changes of 
the  independent  variable  (Japanese  foreign  policy).  The  most  important  method  for 
demonstrating this is process tracing, to show how the independent variable affects the 
results,  outcomes  which  would  not  have  otherwise  occurred  due  to  other  background 
differences between the cases.
35  
 
Bearing in mind these problems, which may limit the significance and confidence of the 
findings, four case studies have been selected: the East Asian Free Trade Area, the Chiang 
Mai Initiatives, the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Asian Development Bank. I shall now 
discuss what they share, and how they differ and what other factors make the case useful 
or interesting.  
 
Firstly, these institutions share a core regional membership. While the title of the various 
grouping ‗Asian‘, ‗East Asian‘ or ASEAN-regional might suggest that these are operating in 
different geographical areas and with too diverse a membership to compare apples with 
apples, this is not the case. In each grouping, the dynamics of East Asian international 
relations are central. Moreover, in each grouping both Japan and China are key members, 
whether formally equal or otherwise. Thus, in each of these institutions we ought to be able 
to get an indication of how Japan‘s response to China is affecting the organization itself.  
 
Secondly, these institutions have differing mandates which might make comparing like units 
problematic. The four cases I have selected run the gamut from trade, finance, security, 
and  economic  development.  The  diversity  of  the  cases  will  only  help  in  reaching  a 
conclusion,  even  if  limited,  about  the  trend  in  regional  organization  development.  The 
apples-apples problem is not as significant as whether the barrel they are in is itself rotting; 
in other words, an examination of the same property in different objects. Since the interest 
in not in what these institutions are doing, so much how they are changing and how to 
describe  those  changes  theoretically,  the  like-units  problem  is  not  a  major  hurdle  to 
                                                   
34  Although,  as  discussed  above,  this  author  doubts  that  any  Grand  Unifying  Theory  of  IR  will  be  attained, 
philosophically such a theory would only occur with end of the enlightenment project and the final proof of determinism 
over free will. 
35 Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, "Case Study Method in the International Relations Subfield,"  Comparitive Political 
Studies 40, no. 2 (2007). pp. 174-5 14 
 
analysis.
 36  
 
I do not take a strict line to temporal limits. The examination of the bilateral relationship is 
focused on the period since the end of the Cold War (1989), this is in spite of the fact that 
China commenced rising a roughly decade prior to that. This is because it was in the early 
nineties the rise of China accelerated and took on a new significance for Japan. For the 
case studies, China‘s accession is generally taken to be the starting point in preference to 
an  arbitrary  fixed  time.  Although  some  discussion  of  the  organization  and  Japan‘s  role 
within it prior to China‘s membership is warranted to establish the background, Chinese 
accession to these organizations is a marker of its rise and usually the beginning of a new 
Japanese approach to said organization.  
 
1.4  The value of the research 
 
There have been dissertations written on respectively ‗the rise of China‘, ‗Japan‘s approach 
to China‘ and ‗Japan‘s approach to regional institutions.‘ While there has been discussion 
on what the rise of China means for regional institutions generally, there has yet to be a 
serious study of the response of other actors. Regional institutions are not formed in a 
vacuum, a cybernetic process of mutual construction and re-construction of the region is 
occurring in all the players. Japan has been selected as it is the most significant of these 
‗other‘ players because of its historical role in East Asian regionalism. While it is unlikely 
that the Japan response can be generalized to the rest of the region, it is immediately 
apparent that any successful East Asian regionalism must involve Japan. 
 
Although  solidly  within  the  general  field  of  international  relations,  this  study  crosscuts 
several sub-fields. In particular, as it is a look from bilateral to multilateral relations across 
diverse areas of cooperation, the study will by necessity have to draw from a broad range 
of international relations and other theories. The first part of chapter two will therefore focus 
on reviewing the available literature, and seek to extract from the vast body of work those 
elements which are useful to this study.  
 
The crux of the puzzle is this link between a bilateral relationship and multilateral relations. 
In international relations theory, bilateral relations and multilateral organizations are often 
discussed  in  isolation.  This  is  an  unfortunate  oversight,  and  one  which  limits  the 
development of international relations theory as a whole.  
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There are two advantages in studying the causal link via Japanese foreign policy. Firstly, by 
examining the casual link between the rise of China and regional organization development 
through  Japanese  foreign  policy,  it  is  possible  to  view  the  ‗feed-back‘  process  in 
international relations unfold. Rather than an [A⇒B] simplified billiard ball view of affairs, by 
following  the  impact  of  China  on  Japan,  then  Japan  on  regional  institutions  -  whereby 
[A⇒B⇒C(⇒A)] - though more convoluted, is also more valuable, both to practitioners and 
theorists alike. In short, it answers the mechanistic question about how (and why) the rise 
of China actually affects regional politics. Secondly, by approaching the issue in this way, 
we can observe and theorize about a still little understood area of international relations, 
namely the impact of bilateral relations on multilateral affairs. Put simply, what occurs to a 
self-defined group of state actors when two of the key members do not get along?   
 
1.5  The Structure of the thesis 
 
The  thesis  is  structured  as  follows.  Chapter  Two  deals  with  the  theoretical  part  of  the 
research.  It  will  explain  how  the  thesis  will  develop  an  analytical  toolkit  built  from  the 
relevant parts of the three major schools of international relations theory and explain how 
the eclectic approach can be used to weave a single story from the different theoretical 
perspectives. It also demonstrates the value of this approach over a traditional, one theory-
based approach. 
 
Chapter Three will deal with the impact of the rise of China on Japan. It will first discuss 
China‘s  rise  in  absolute  terms,  and  then  in  relative  terms  to  examine  how  this  rise  is 
impacting  on  Japan  and  Japanese  regional  leadership  across  the  spectrum  of  power, 
identity  and  interdependence.  It  demonstrates  that  according  to  international  relations 
theories  focusing  on  each  these  variables  Japan‘s  scope  for  regional  cooperation  with 
China is severely limited. Additionally, the chapter looks inside the black box of Japanese 
politics,  policy-making  and  society  to  demonstrate  that  internal  changes  have  occurred 
which also limit the scope for cooperation with China. 
 
Chapter Four will deal with one of the specific implications of the emerging East Asian 
community in the field of preferential trade liberalization deals, the East Asian Free Trade 
Area. It will show how Japan‘s decision not to cooperate with China has prevented the 
formation of a hub Free Trade Area in East Asia, which might function as a template for 
wider regional cooperation.  Indeed this decision encouraged Japan to pursue a bilateral 
strategy in its Free Trade Agreements ASEAN which has resulted in a bilaterally-networked 
type of trade regionalism.   
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Chapter Five will deal with another of the specific implications of the East Asian community 
in the field of monetary cooperation, the Chiang Mai Initiatives. It will show how Japan‘s 
distrust of China is fuelling a bidding war for the provision of financial stability – a game that 
has heated up as the world is rocked by a financial crisis. Japan‘s inability to reach an 
agreement  with  China  prior  to  the  financial  crisis  trapped  the  nascent  institution  of  the 
Chiang Mai Initiatives at the level of a network bilateral agreements.  Even after the crisis, 
the  so-called  ‗multilateralized‘  Chiang  Mai  Initiatives  still  suffers  from  stove-piping  and 
institutional weaknesses with can be linked to the Sino-Japanese relationship.  
 
Chapter Six will deal with the ASEAN Regional Forum. It will show how Japan‘s frustrations 
with expanding Chinese control of the agenda of the ARF has caused it to scale back its 
expectations and energies directed at the ARF. This in turn has caused Japan to look for 
new security partners to solve its security problem. Japan has responded by adopting a 
two-prong response; firstly, elevating the importance of bilateral and a mini-lateral security 
network of cooperation with US, Australia and India, and secondly, by continuing to press 
for a Confidence Building Measures regime at the ARF at a no cost signalling of Japan‘s 
benevolent intent in Southeast Asia.   
 
Chapter  Seven  analyses  the  Asian  Development  Bank.  It  will  show  how  China‘s  rising 
power at the regional level is not being translated into greater formal powers within the ADB. 
Rather  China  has  sought  to  increase  its  influence  through  informal  means.  While  this 
approach by China has allowed Japan to more confidently cooperate with China in the field 
of  regional  economic  development,  such  as  in  the  ADB‘s  Regional  Cooperation  and 
Integration Strategy, there remain tensions over leadership in the actual regional projects.  
At the same time, the ADB has been a site of competition between Japan and China over 
the geographical and sector distribution of ADB projects in China. Interestingly, even as the 
ADB has been  used to solve and coordinate such issues between, the institution itself 
remains robust and does not exhibit the same level of networked bilateralism as the other 
case studies.  
 
The  final  chapter,  the  Conclusion,  pulls  together  the  shared  themes  and  trends  which 
emerge  from  the  case  studies.  Specifically,  it  contributes  to  the  international  relations 
theoretical debate about Asian politics by noting that realism, while relevant in every case, 
is incapable of explaining fully the story of East Asian institution building.  Additionally, the 
conclusion also notes that the weakness of the Sino-Japanese bilateral relationship, and its 
consequent limits on Japan‘s ability to cooperate with China, is responsible for the trend 
across all the case studies towards a networked type of regionalism. 
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2  Theory and Method 
 
2.1  International Relations Theory 
 
This  section  discusses  the  various  international  relations  (IR)  theories.  However, 
establishing which theory is useful and which to ignore before the study is even undertaken 
is not good research method. To resolve this, the study takes an inductive approach based 
on the analytical eclecticism of Peter Katzenstein, and thus will build up an ‗analytical toolkit‘ 
tailored to the problem.  
 
This review will look at each of the major international relations theories, their assumptions 
and core ideas, and establish what significance and relevance each has to the thesis. Each 
theory will therefore be examined in light of what contribution it can make to explaining 
bilateral relationships and the impact, or link, to the development of regional institutions. 
The purpose of this review is also to develop an original theoretical argument, namely that 
no  one  theory  is  able  to  satisfactorily  capture  the  dynamics  of  East  Asian  regional 
institutionalization, and that an eclectic approach is more appropriate.  
 
2.1.1  International relations theory and East Asia’s institutions 
The rise of the ‗Rest‘ has implied questioning of the received knowledge from the West, and 
international relations theory is no exception. As Kishore Mahbubani writes,  
Western  thinkers  are  having  considerable  difficulty  finding  the  right  paradigm  to 
describe a world where non-Western powers are emerging…[they have] a tendency to 
extrapolate the future of East Asia and the Pacific as the past of Europe and maybe 
have not grasped that Asia has learnt from the West‘s mistakes and will develop to be 
the strongest economic force.
37  
 
Thus, it is not immediately apparent why theory developed in the West should apply in Asia, 
especially after considering learning effects.
38  
 
In particular, mainstream international relations theory has been challenged by East Asian 
regional  institutions. As Amitav Acharya notes in his discussion on Asian international 
institutions,  ―realist-liberal-constructivist  debates  in  international  relations  theory  are  not 
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always interesting or helpful.‖
39 Some are even more critical of the relevance of current 
international  relations  theory  to  Asia.  In  his  article,  ―Getting  Asia  Wrong‖,  David  Kang 
argues that because the dominant three international relations theories (but particularly 
realism) were formed in the West, they are simply not relevant to the unique circumstances 
found in contemporary Asia.
40 Specifically, Kang notes that, ―it is an open question whether 
Asia, with its very different political economy, history, culture, and demographics, will ever 
function like the European state system.‖
41 This cultural relativist view is generally taken up 
by  the  political  left.




Others believe that international relations theory need not adapt at all. Friedberg, for 
instance, has argued  for the continuing relevance of realism to Asia.
44 Even within the 
ranks  of  the  ‗Asianists‘  many  have  challenged  Kang‘s  claim  that  unique  Asian 
cultural/historical  factors  undermine  mainstream  international  relations  theory.  Acharya 
argues  against  Kang‘s  formulation,  by  stating  ―Western  realist  pessimism  need  not  be 
countered by Asian cultural historicism.‖
45 Indeed, most current research by Asian scholars 
makes  use  of  international  relations  theory,  even  while  adapting  it  to  regional 
circumstances.
46 It is clear that Asian political experience is different to that of the West, but 
it a case of a different mix of the same variables, and the language of international relations 
should therefore apply.  
 
2.1.2  The limits and validity of international relations theory 
Before pushing on to the vicissitudes of international relations theory, a word ought to be 
said about its limits and character. There are two key charges levelled against international 
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relations theory; that it is not ‗theory‘ and that it is of limited use in Asia. The first claim I will 
address by demonstrating that theory in the social sciences is different to that of the natural 
sciences, but that it still has value. I will refute the second claim by demonstrating the lack 
of dogmatism in current Asian international relations theory.  
 
From the outset, it is necessary to acknowledge that ‗theory‘ in international relations is not 
like ‗theory‘ in the natural sciences. The key difference is in the ability to conduct repeatable, 
‗fail-able‘  experiments  to  test  hypotheses  –  where  hypotheses  are  generally  about  the 
cause of an event. As Richard Lebow, a noted philosopher remarks about social science 
theory, ―a theory that convincingly explains a phenomenon that has occurred in the past, 
can  fail  to  predict  its  reoccurrence  even  when  the  constellation  of  seemingly  relevant 
variables  and  backgrounds  condition  are  the  same.‖
47  In  the  natural  sciences  an 
experiment can be repeated, while controlling for different variables, to test a hypothesis. In 
international relations, this ability to construct experiments does not exist.
48  For instance, it 
is impossible to remove Hitler from World War II, and test whether he was in fact the 
causative element or whether Germany would have waged war anyhow.  
 
Causation poses some serious problems to the researcher - although that has not stopped 
the term from being used. Walt, for example, introduces causation by writing, ―In simplest 
terms, a state‘s grand strategy is a theory explaining how it can ‗cause‘ security for itself‖, 
or that by doing XYZ the state will generate ABC. 
49 Another solution is to find so -called 
‗naturally  occurring‘  experiments,  such  as  that  of  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization  in 
Europe and South East Asian Treaty Organization in Asia and ask why did one fail and the 
other  not?
50   Steve  Smith  described  this  positivist  tradition,  belonging  to  the  natural 
sciences, as being a path that the social sciences should not take.
51 
 
This problem with causati on has meant that international relations grand theories have 
moved away  from trying to explain ‗why‘ things happened, and instead focus on ‗how‘ and 
‗how  was  it  possible‘  questions  aimed  at  generating  the  second  best  outcome, 
understanding.
52 Since demonstrating causal links is so difficult (indeed, since complexity 
theory has found its way into the mainstream many have ruled out ever understanding 
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causation  in  the  social  world  as  being  just  too  complex),
53 even  when  a  change  is 
demonstrated a debate can occur on its significance.
54 Far from throwing ones‘ hands in 
the air in defeat, an appreciation for the limited predictive power of theory is good thing, 
after all who saw the end of the Cold War coming?
55 
 
2.1.3  Analytical Eclecticism as the way forward  
Katzenstein‘s  pragmatic  approach  is  consciously  designed  as  an  alternative  to  the 
positivistic international relations tradition.
56 Instead, the focus of IR theory is moving to 
understanding the ‗constitutive parts‘ (significant factors) of an event.
57 The advantage is 
that each element as it is understood, can be re -integrated into our conceptual framework 
without any dogmatic grand theory getting in the way or imposing expectations on what 
ought to be important.
58 This process of identifying the factors pertinent to  a defined 
problem is the essence of Peter Katzenstein‘s approach, which he has called ‗analytical 
eclecticism.‘  
 
While Katzenstein‘s approach can be detected in his earlier work, the turning point in terms 
of formally laying down the gauntlet was his article, “Japan, Asian-Pacific Security, and the 
Case  for  Analytical  Eclecticism”  in  2001.
59 Unimpressed with the grand   debate about 
paradigmatic value occurring very publicly in the pages of renowned journals such as 
International Security during the mid-1990s, Katzenstein argued against ―the privileging of 
parsimony‖ and suggested that ―the complex links between power, interest, and norms defy 
analytical capture by any one paradigm.‖
60 It was apparent to Katzenstein and many others 
that nothing was going to be achieved by these debates. Indeed, the perverse situation 
arose where liberal and realist scholars were trying to claim the other‘s argument as a sub-
section of their own theory even as social constructivist railed against the very rationalistic 
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assumption  which  underpinned  both.
61  Katzenstein‘s  reformulation  is  even  more 
appropriate  as  leading  figures  within  the  various  paradigms  have  acknowledged  that 
analytical purity had resulted in theory becoming inbred, unable to adapt to the changing 
international  environment.  Even  the  arch-structural  realist  Kenneth  Waltz,  in  his  more 
recent work has written that ―systems populated by units of different sorts in some ways 
perform differently… more needs to be said about the status and role of units in neo-realist 




Recognizing  that  these  different  paradigms  were  based  on  different  assumptions  and 
geared toward tackling different problems, Katzenstein asserted that there was no point in 
trying to prove which of the theories was better – and, indeed that there may be more to 
gain  by  analytical  diversity  than  any  attempt  at  creating  an  grand  unifying  theory  of 
international relations.
63 This analytical diversity comes from the fact that each international 
relations  theory  is  working  on  one  (or  few  related)  modules  or  factors  in  explaining 
international relations. Katzenstein describes these as the modules of power, efficiency and 
identity. In this schema, the conceptual module of power corresponds to paradigm of 
realism, the module of efficiency to liberalism, and identity to social constructivist theory. 
And while these assumptions or variables do not fall exclusively within any one theo ry, a 
fact which has led some to characterize these theories more as ‗paradigms‘, the theories 
discussed  (realism,  liberalism  and  social  constructivism)  can  be  logically  differentiated 




When examining a specific problem, using any one theory to identify the significant or 
casual  factors  before  conducting  the  research  is  dangerous,  and  likely  to  cause 
confirmation bias. Instead, Katzenstein proposes that by   view one puzzle through the 
lenses  of  each  of  the  three  dominant  international  relations  theories   one  is  able   to 
‗triangulate‘ which of the factors are important in that instance.
65 Katzenstein also provides 
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an  example  of  how  to  conduct  an  analytical  eclectic  study  of  Japan‘s  security  policy 
(especially  vis-à-vis  China),  showing  how  applications  of  realism-liberalism,  realism-
constructivism, and liberalism-constructivism identify different facets of Japanese policy but 
can also connect these otherwise disparate threads together to reveal the major trend and 
major factors in Japan‘s policy.
66 Indeed, the relevance of the analytical eclectic approach 
is all the greater specifically because it was formulated with Japan and East Asia in mind.
67 
 
The purpose of this approach is to allow the analyst to look at the data and identify for 
themselves which of the factors identified by theory are significant and warrant further 
investigation.  Katzenstein‘s  analytical  eclecticism  is  thus  a  warning  about  trying  to  use 
grand theory to explain specific phenomena where instead we ought to be making theory to 
explain  observed  ‗puzzles‘  or  events,  what  Keohane  describes  simply  as  ―conditional, 
context specific generalizations.‖
68 This turn toward pragmatism in the field of international 
relations  has  been  a  long  time  coming,  but  is  increasingly  accepted  by  the  research 
community as valid.
69 For these reasons, relating first to the difficulties of unproblematically 
connecting theory developed in the West to Asia and secondly the prob lem arising in the 
international relations theory  literature  itself,  this  thesis  adopts  Katzenstein‘s  analytical 
eclecticism as a way forward. 
 
In order to make the eclectic approach work, however, it is important to understand the 
factors which each theory identifies as significant in explaining international relations. In 
order to build up this theoretical toolkit, each theory will be discussed in turn, in order to 
identify which factors are regarded as significant, how it is relevant to the puzzle at hand, 
and what the theory would then expect.  
 
2.2  The Relevance of Realism 
 
The dominant paradigm in international relations theory is realism. Its proud and lengthy 
service record not only lends it authority but also makes it the traditional, even default, 
starting  point  of  international  relations  analysis.  While  realism  can  cite  such  greats  of 
Western thinking as Machiavelli and Thucydides in its intellectual lineage, its precepts are 
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not uncontested; within the paradigm there are many different and competiting sub-theories. 
The classical realist position, as derived from Hans Morgenthau‘s ‗political realism‘, rests 
on the belief that statesmen define the national interest in terms of power, and that no other 
factor warrants serious consideration.
70 To a classical realist, the source of  international 
politics is human nature,  and the drive to control or  animus domanandi. Thus conflict is 
almost inevitable as states jostle for position. The development of Waltzian neo-realism (or 
structural  realism)  shifted  the  explanation  for  this  competition  to  the  structure  of  the 
international  system  while  remaining  pessimistic  about  cooperation.  For  Waltz,  the 
anarchical nature of world politics meant that the only rational behaviour for a state was to 
accumulate  power  in  order  to  purchase  its  security.  Neo-realism  thus  focuses  on  the 




Realism therefore stresses the primacy of the state, the pursuit of national survival and 
preference for self-help. For the Realist thinker, the state is the only actor in international 
relations worthy of attention as it alone possesses true agency, i.e. the ability to make 
decisions and act on them.
72 Further, realists believe that states prize their national security 
above everything else (or anyone else), as the state must survive  or else it is nothing. 
Lastly, because survival is too important to trust to other states, realists belie ve that self-
help is the dominant means of purchasing security. For realists, international relations are 
amoral, power-orientated affairs.  
 
Arguably the most important concept in realist thinking is the balance of power. There are 
several definitions of the balance of power, but all revolve around the distribution of power 
in the system.
73 The common understanding, based on the European experience, is that 
the balance of power is prescriptive. This means that power equilibrium between states is a 
situation which ought to be aimed for as it promotes peace. Thus, ‗to maintain the balance 
of power‘ means that states aim to prevent the rise of a hegemonic peer, more powerful 
than  the  society  of  states  can  tolerate.
74 There  are  basically  two  possible  strategies 
employed  to  achieve  these  ends,  ‗balancing‘  or  ‗band-wagoning.‘  Mearsheimer  also 
discusses  a  ‗buck  passing‘  strategy  and  others  have  theorized  ‗under-balancing‘  (both 
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terms  have  been  used  to  describe  Japan‘s  China  posture).
75 This  interpretation  of  the 
balance of power would see the current balance of power between the two as positive, 
since neither enjoys a decisive advantage in national power. 
 
Likewise, realists do not assume that power parity causes peace, and note that a security 
dilemma, whereby two (or more) states get drawn into a spiral of costly military build-up 
aiming  to  preserve  a  ‗balance‘  defined  differently  by  each,  is  always  a  possibility. 
Christensen  has  even  noted  the  likelihood  of  such  a  spiral  in  the  Sino-Japanese 
relationship.
76 However, these views are ahistorical and do not look at the trends in national 
power over time. For such a view one need not abandon realism, as Power Transition 
theory examines precisely this.  
 
2.2.1  …to the China-Japan relationship: Power Transition 
Power Transition theory is related to the balance of power, focusing on the movement of 
the  balance  of  power  over  time.  It  draws  different  and  startling  conclusions  from 
mainstream  realist  thinking  about  the  causes  of  tension  and  conflict  in  the  world.  
Developed by Abramo Organski in the aftermath of World War II, the key idea in power 
transition theory is that power parity leads to instability, and indeed can be a cause of war. 
As opposed to realists who generally focus on the international political factors, Organski 
posited that the most important changes to the balance of power in the system came not 
from  alliances  and  clever  diplomacy  but  from  internal  power  growth,  in  particular 
industrialization  –  although  the  theory  does  not  rule  out  the  role  of  alliances  as  an 
intervening factor.
77 Organski believed that industrialization brought with it not just much 
great material power, but also new willingness in the industrial countries to use this power 
to shape the world in their image (i.e. establish a world order). This willingness was based 
on a larger, better organized government and a popular nationalism which tended to occur 
in what he called the ‗stage of transitional growth in power.‘ 
 
As Organski understood it , the chief problem with world politics was that states entered 
this stage of transitional growth in power at different times; moreover it occurs at different 
speeds between and within counties. As he writes,  
Industrialization has proceeded unevenly throughout the world. The result has been 
that first one nation and then another has experienced a sudden spurt in power…it is 
these sudden sprints in power that keep upsetting the distribution of power in the world, 
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threatening the established order of the moment and disturbing world peace.
78   
These sprints are a reflection of what is called the S-curve.
79 The S-curve describes the 
rapid expansion of power when a country first enters industrialization, and the subsequent 
slowing of growth rates at the stage of power maturity. This pattern allows other powers 
further back a chance to ‗sprint‘ past (See Appendix 2). 
 
The Power Transition Model describes the position in which Japan finds itself in today vis-
à-vis China. The time when Chinese national power will surpass that of Japan is drawing 
closer, and both are aware that this fact will fundamentally change their relationship yet it is 
not clear Japan  would easily accept a Chinese redefinition of its role. Power transition 
theory  would  expect  that  the  bilateral  relationship  would  worsen  as  long  as  the  power 
balance remains at the cross over point (i.e. power parity). To secure its position from the 
rising  challenger,  power  transition  theory  (as  per  realism)  would  expect  Japan,  as  the 
incumbent, to attempt to increase its national power by building up its military and seeking 
allies with the possibility of war.    
 
However,  clearly  there  are  also  cases  of  peaceful  power  transition.  Zhu  Zhiqun,  who 
focuses on the power transition between China and the US, develops a model to explain 
such occurrences.  He believes that the chances of peaceful power transition are increased 
when the following occur: incorporation into the system of the challenger, respect for the 
dominant power‘s interests by the challenger, respect for the rising power‘s interests by the 
dominant power, societal links which are extensive and strong, and national leadership on 
both sides committed to peace.
80 
 
While Zhu does not discuss the relative weighting of these elements, the model is a starting 
point. I would suggest that Zhu has actually overlooked two elements of central importance; 
the speed of transition and the power potential of the challenger. All things being equal, 
power transition theory  would expect a rapid rise to be more destabilizing. But power 
transition theory would also expect that if the power potential of the challenger is either too 
small or ―so large that its dominance, once it becomes industrialized, is virtually guaranteed‖ 
then things are likely to be more stable.
 81 
 
                                                   
78 A F K Organski, "Power Transition," in International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. James Rosenau (New York: Free 
Press of Glencoe, 1961). p. 369 
79 For more on this thinking see, Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers (New York1987). Also, Peter Turchen, 
War and Peace and War: The Rise and Fall of Empires (United States: Plume, 2007). 
80 Zhiqun Zhu, Us-China Relations in the 21st Century (London: Routledge, 2006). p. 23 
81 A F K Organski, World Politics (New York: Knopf, 1958)., pp. 334-337 26 
 
Intriguingly, China‘s rise is both rapid and  seemingly endless, making predictions of its 
impact on regional stability more difficult. But even putting aside the speed and scale of the 
transition, it is clear that China satisfies (or certainly claims to satisfy in its rhetoric) most of 
these  conditions  identified  by  Zhu.  Indeed,  as  Levy  notes,  ―Power  Transition  theory  is 
correct to identify the rise of China as the leading problem of the coming decades, but 
applications of the theory place too much emphasis of its impact on the global hierarchy 
and not enough on the Asian regional hierarchy.‖
82 In other words, as Organski initially 
proposed, while regional order is subordinate to  the  global, historically wars arise from 
regional,  rather  than  global,  power  transitions.
83  A  peaceful  transition  may  include 
significant  tensions,  and  these  tensions  may  indeed  impact  o n  the  operations  of 
international institutions, in particular at the regional level. 
 
2.2.2  …to regional institutions: regional hegemony 
However, neither realism nor power transition theory speak directly to multilateral relations, 
and what little is said is dismissive of such organizations‘ significance. This view is most 
strongly  pressed  by  the  renowned  aggressive  realist  John  Mearsheimer,  who  believes 
―institutions  have  minimal  influence  on  state  behaviour.‖
84  This  pessimism  about 
international  institutions  is  a  characteristic  of  realists  of  all  stripes,  notwithstanding  the 
occasional  attempts  made  by  some  to  be  more  optimistic  about  the  relevance  of 
international institutions in understanding international relations.
85  
 
Realist analysis tends to relegate international institutions to a function of the balance of 
power. The development and functioning of such institu tions are functions of a changing 
balance the power between states, and not significant in and of themselves.
86 For the 
realist thinker, if an organization were to weaken it would be due to state rivalry, if it were to 
strengthen it would be due to a rise i n the amount of band -wagoning in the system. 
Specifically, realists tend to think that ‗strong‘ institutions are those which are underwritten 
by  a  hegemon.  However,  if  institutions  are  underwritten  by  hegemonic  power,  would  a 
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power transition necessarily involve the dissolution of all international institutions? Zhu has 
noted  the  surprising  dearth  of  research  linking  multilateralism  and  power  transition, 
―multilateralism in international relations offers a new and unique perspective for the study 
of  power  transition  and great  power  relations.‖
87 To  establish  the  link in  realist  thinking 
between  power  transition  and  regional  organizations,  an  understanding  of  the  role  of 
hegemony at various levels in institutional formation and maintenance is necessary. 
  
Hegemony is typically defined as ―being able to dictate, or at least dominate, the rules and 
arrangements by which international relations, political and economic, are conducted.‖
88 To 
exert  dominance,  a  hegemon  usually  must  possess  the  strongest  military  and  richest 
economy. The Hegemonic Stability theory, first put forward by Charles P. Kindleberger in 
the mid-1970s, suggested that only a hegemon has the requisite power to create/enforce 
such rules and in so doing bring about order and stability.
89 In other words, hegemony is a 
necessary  condition for international  institutions. From  this  perspective,  the  end  of  a 
hegemon would equal the end of its institutions. 
  
A regional hegemony? 
While balance of power concepts such as hegemony and power transition are typically 
discussed at the global level, the concepts are equally applicable at the regional level. In 
the realist camp, Hans Morgenthau has noted, ―we have spoken thus far of the balance of 
power  as  if  it  were  one  single  system  comprehending  all  nations  actively  engaged  in 
international politics. Closer observation, however, reveals that such a system is frequently 
composed of a number of subsystems which are interrelated with each other, but which 
maintain within themselves a balance of power of their own.‖
90 Mearsheimer too, has long 
discussed hegemony in terms of regional hegemony, describing global hegemony as a 
regional  hegemon  which  has  successfully  suppressed  the  emergence  of other  regional 
hegemons.
91 More recently, Destradi has developed systemic definitions of regional power, 
based on role and strategy in addition to simple political weight.
92 
 
There is, however, an important caveat when discussing ‗regional hegemony‘ and power 
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transition. That caveat is that the regional ‗hegemon‘ is not truly hegemonic; indeed it is 
better to call these states regional great powers. The difference is elementary, a regional 
great power might be able to dominate the region and act hegemonically to create and 
maintain regional institutions, but only as long as the global hegemon does not interfere. 
Moreover, as Mearsheimer notes, the global hegemon will usually interfere to the degree 
required to prevent the rise of a peer competitor. This interference by the global hegemon 
means that achieving ‗regional hegemony‘ is difficult, as an aspirant regional great power 
will likely face derailing attempts by the global hegemon. 
 
The  importance  of  global  hegemonic  intervention  in  regional  stability  is  underlined  by 
Lemke  who  notes  that,  ―when  great  powers  do  not  interfere,  [power]  parity  and 
dissatisfaction with the local status quo are expected to increase the probability of war 
within  local  [regional]  hierarchies.‖
93  Realism  therefore  leads  to  a  catch-22  for  the 
development  of  regional  institutions.  If  the  global  hegemon  is  absent  then  the  likely 
resultant  regional  instability  will  complicate  efforts  at  regional  institution  building.  As 
Pederson explains, ―in regions where institutionalization has failed or stagnated, a [global] 
hegemon  has  normally  been  lacking.‖
94 However,  if  the  hegemon  is  present  then  any 
regional great power‘s effort to build up institutions will likely be derailed by the hegemon in 
an effort to head off future peer competition. 
 
From the realist view, the most likely way that regional institutions could come into being is 
where a regional great power (without world hegemonic ambitions) constructs institutions 
which also support the global order of the hegemon, and thus win the hegemon‘s support. 
These are not ‗pure‘ regional institutions as the world hegemon continues to play a big, 
even leading role, in the institutions; examples might be North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
in Europe and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in Asia. This view does not 
however explain regional institutions such as the ARF or the ASEAN Plus Three, where 
regional powers have come together to manage common security or economic interests 
either without US membership or with the US playing a formally secondary role to the 
regional states.  
 
The implication of the realist theory is that institutions are generally formed by a global 
hegemon-regional great power alliance (such as US-Japan) acting together to create and 
enforce rules. The rise and possible replacement of the previous great power by another 
regional great power, probably at odds with alliance institutions, does not bode well for 
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these  institutions although it does  not follow that  they  will  necessarily perish, or perish 
immediately. Even as the regional balance shifts against its ally, to the extent that the global 
hegemon commits to that alliance, the institutions should continue to function. If the global 
hegemon exits the region, or swaps partner to the rising regional great power (or in the 
extreme case is itself replaced by the rising power), then we would expect to see major 
changes in the these institutions.  
 
From  a  power  theory  perspective  then,  a  power  transition  must  render  inoperable  the 
former regional hegemon‘s institutional arrangements.  
 
2.3  The Relevance of Liberalism 
  
Others  however  question  this  direct  link  between  power  distribution  and  institutional 
functioning.
95 Liberal thinkers paint a more hopeful picture. Liberalism has, in this regard, 
played the role of checking the excesses of realism. The fundamental difference between 
the two paradigms  lies in the problem they wish to solve: for realists, the aim was to 




The liberal theory of international relations can trace its roots back to John Locke during the 
Enlightenment; but its stock has fluctuated over time. In the 20
th century, liberalism has 
tended to experience strong support after war. In the inter-war period (1919-1939) liberal 
theory gained strength. However, the idealism of the times did not manifest itself in the 
desired  ‗world  government‘.  Instead,  liberalism  was  dealt  a  serious  blow  with  both  the 
Second World War (exactly what the League of Nations was constructed to stop) and the 
subsequent Cold War. At the end of the Cold War, liberalism underwent something of a 
renaissance. Throughout the 1990s, as the world geared up to enjoy the ‗peace-dividend‘, 
and as the UN gained legitimacy and European Union formed, liberalism again became 
increasing persuasive. Not insignificant was the phenomenon of seeing the most powerful 
country in the world, America, couching its foreign policy goals in liberal terms; although the 
Bush administration‘s promotion of democracy by force of arms has again weakened the 
appeal of the liberal viewpoint. 
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While originally premised on the assumption that humans would naturally cooperate when it 
is rational, liberalism has undergone many transformations. Current liberal (or so-called 
neo-liberal) thinking has accepted many of the assumptions of neo-realism. Neo-liberalism 
accepts the proposition that the world is anarchical, but does not accept that ipso facto 
zero-sum, competitive policies are the most rational means to achieve state interests.
97 
Liberals are willing to factor in to their analysis of state behaviour other variables such as 
regime type (republican liberals), interdependence (commercial liberals),  and (importantly 
for this thesis) participation in international institutions (liberal-institutionalism).
98  
 
2.3.1  …to the China-Japan Relationship: Regime Type and Interdependence 
Where  realism  identifies  power  as  the  key  to  understanding  state  behaviour,  liberalism 
examines  differences  in  domestic  regime  type  and  the  extent  of  interdependence.  
Liberalism  is  generally  more  optimistic  than  realism  about  the  prospects  of  a  peaceful 
power transition with minimal negative effects on regional institutions, but even here the 
message is mixed. 
 
Regime Type 
In the liberal tradition, the democratic peace thesis is the most succinct explanation of how 
regime type affects international relations. Miller has convincingly demonstrated that liberal 
compatibility of regimes is an intervening variable for peace.
99 However, China has a non-
liberal non-democratic political regime. Whatever might be said about its economic regime, 
this thesis is limited to observing that the China -Japan dyad is lacking a political factor 
which might otherwise ameliorate tensions in the relationship. Unfortunately, this does not 
tell us anything about the direction or limits on the relationship other than that.  
 
A  better  explanation  of  how  the  differing  regimes  types  in  Japan  and  China  might 
complicate bilateral relations is to be found in Mark Haas‘s model of the mechanisms by 
which  ideological  differences,  in  particular  those  surrounding  the  political  regime,  affect 
perceptions of threat and consequently impact on the ability to cooperate.
100 Indeed, the 
gap in ideology between China and Japan will make it harder for Japanese leaders to 
understand  China‘s  internal  and  external  policies  and  to  explain  those  policies  to  the 
Japanese people. Moreover, the authoritarian nature of Chinese politics makes the ‗us-
them‘ divide starker, and facilitates painting the Chinese as an ‗out-group‘ in Japan. This 
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can complicate Japan‘s regional efforts, especially where ‗values‘ (c.f. China) is made a 
condition of membership. This will be discussed further as a part of social constructivism 
later, as the line blurs from regime type into national identity. 
 
Interdependence 
Liberal  theory  also  identifies  the  extent  of  interdependence,  especially  commercial 
interdependence, as a factor in positive state relations.
101 According to Staley, free trade 
and commerce (by making territory non-contiguous with economic opportunity) reduces the 
pressure to go to war. For this reason, interdependence is seen as facilitating cooperative 
bilateral  relations.
102 However,  ever  since  England  and  Germany,  despite  the  heav ily 
liberalized trade between them, bled each other white in  World War I, the significance of 
interdependence has been questioned.  Indeed, one recent statistical analysis has shown 
that dyadic trade interdependence is an insignificant variable in predicting a war.
103  
 
Interdependence  theory  identifies  the  growing  c ost  of  defaulting  to  autarky  from  an 
international trade regime, locking states into a complex interdependence which limits their 
ability  to  pursue  selfish  interests.    However,  Keohane  notes  that  this  complex 
interdependence  need  not  be  symmetrical  or  nece ssarily  have  positive  outcomes.
104  
Growing dependence in both China and Japan for imported energy and mineral resources 
underlines the relevance of this point; their growing external dependence could push them 
either together or apart. 
 
Indeed,  asymmetries  of interdependence  are  used  for political  advantage  and  are  in 
Keohane‘s view the foundations of state power. Also from the trade perspective, quality of 
trade is important. Growing relative volume of trade and growing trade in strategic assets 
(e.g. weapons systems) is regarded as leading to greater interdependence effects on the 
relationship  than  increasing  absolute  volumes  of  trade  in  non-strategic  goods  or 
components and which involve little or no technological transfer.
105  
 
Another causal logic that lib eral independence theory identifies is the formation of a 
commercial middle-class opposed to nationalist, aggressive policy by the elites. And while 
commerce has been positively linked to the development of an increasingly liberal middle 
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class, even in the case of China
106, the link between middle class values and foreign policy 




Thus,  while  Liberalism  identifies  some  features  which  might  facilitate  Japan-China 
cooperation, the story is mixed at best. 
 
2.3.2  …to regional institutions: liberal-institutionalism 
 Liberalism, with its roots in idealism and legalism, has focused on international institutions. 
While previous manifestations of liberal thought had suggested that institutions can also 
shape state calculation of interest, the current model (so-called neo-liberal institutionalism) 
does not dwell on these questions. Whereas realism views the formation and effectiveness 
of international institutions as a function of the balance of power, liberalists view institutional 
formation and change as a reflection of the convergence (or otherwise) of state interests - 
in other words, the pursuit not of power per se, but of efficiency; and of absolute rather than 
relative gains. 
 
One  of  the  earlier  theories  designed  to  explain  how  states  can  move  toward  closer 
cooperation through interdependence is Ernst Haas‘s neo-functionalism, and its concept of 
spill-over.
108 For  Haas,  solving  the  larger  coordination  problems  could  happen  as  a 
consequence of smaller ones being solved  – i.e. that once mechanisms were in place to 
coordinate trade, it would only be a matter of time before other areas, including national 
security would be drawn into interdependent cooperation.
109 But this has not occurred in 
Asia, and regionalism has remained ‗stunted‘ in institutional terms.
110   
 
Institutionalism‘s difference from realism is due in part to the different foci of each theory, 
with realism biased towards bilateralism and liberalism towards multilateralism. Indeed, to 
engage in multilateral (institutional) diplomacy (as compared to bilateralism) is prima facie 
an  unusual  stratagem  for  a  realist.  Bringing  in  additional  players  (the  heart  of 
multilateralism) always carries the risk of being ‗ganged up upon‘ as it lessens each states‘ 
power, included the instigator of the multilateral framework.
111 Whereas the realist view has 
identified hegemony, i.e. intense power concentration, as the  sine qua non of institutional 
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formation, liberal theory does not accept this claim.
112  
 
Many  international  relations  scholars  have  noted  that  hegemony  is  a  relatively  rare 
commodity whilst international institutions are comparatively easy to come by. Keohane 
explains this institutional ‗commonness‘ with reference to micro-economics, suggesting that 
political market failure to provide such international public goods as security is the chief 
cause of institutions.
113 More deeply, this is an argument which draws from game theory, 
specifically the ‗Stag Hunt‘ game.
114    
 
Of course liberal thinkers do not simply discount the role of power in the development of 
institutions. Oran Young identifies two different types of institutions; those formed by/for the 
hegemon and those which are arrived at by negotiation amongst more or less formally 
equal powers.
115 The ability  of institutions  to survive  or be formed  ‗after  hegemony‘  is 
therefore  considered  more  likely  in  the  case  of  the  ‗cooperative‘  rather  than  ‗dictated‘ 
institutions. 
 
Indeed, the realist view  of regional institutions  has been explicitly challenged  by liberal 
theorists.  As  Pedersen  notes,  ―to  think  of  regional  institutions  as  spear  headed  by  a 
hegemonic  power  begs  the  question,  why  hegemons  should  need  such  institutions?‖  
Pedersen develops this thinking into the cooperative hegemony concept, which suggests 
that regional institutionalization can come around even in instances where there is no clear-
cut hegemon providing the major regional powers can cooperate.
116  
 
In the case of two (or more) large regional powers, what is needed for ‗cooperative‘ regional 
institution building is political leadership. Young identifies the need for leadership across 
three areas; material, entrepreneurial and intellectual.
117 Although Young does not believe 
that the material leadership (power) element needs to be controlled by only one actor, it is 
clear that changes in the material capabilities of the players will necessitate some change 
                                                   
112 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). 
113 Ibid. 
114 A Stag Hunt game is one in which the players both b enefit more from cooperation than if  either party defaults. In 
other words, it is in the players interest both to cooperate, and to ensure that the other player also cooperates. It is 
called a Stag Hunt because only when both hunters in the game cooperate can they catch a Stag (worth 4 points), and if 
either defaults then they can catch only one rabbit (1 point) each, (total 2 points). It is therefore clearly in their interests 
to cooperate, and merely adequate communication should allow this. 
115 Oran Young, "Review: International Regimes: Towards a New Theory of Institutions," World Politics 39, no. 1 (1986). 
116 Thomas Pedersen, "Cooperative Hegemony: Power, Ideas and Institution in Regional Integration,"  Review  of 
International Studies 28(2002). 
117 Oran Young, "Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International 
Society," in International Institutions: An International Organisation Reader, ed. Lisa Martin (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 
2001). 34 
 
in the institution if the leadership deficit is not filled in other ways. For East Asia, this view is 
supported  by  Yoshimatsu,  who  has  noted  that  great  power  politics  has  not  impeded 




The problem with cooperative hegemony is that it implies unproblematically that the actors 
are sharing the same expectation of the institutions to be formed cooperatively. This is not 
necessarily the case. Pedersen discusses two different types of cooperative hegemony; 
offensive and defensive. The offensive type, which ―comparatively weak revisionist states 
will tend to opt for‖ is geared toward power aggregation to resist external threats and/or 
shore  up  internal  markets.  Whereas  the  defensive  type,  which  would  ―appeal  to 
consolidating or retrenching superpowers [such as Japan]‖, is geared towards providing 
stability.
119 Indeed, Pedersen notes that ―regional institutionalization is seen as typically the 
product of a grand strategy pursed by comparatively weak or declining big powers.‖
120 The 
basic rationale for this can be found in March and Olsen‘s discussion of institutions as 
‗frozen  decisions‘  or  ‗history  encoded  into  rules.‘
121 From  their  perspective,  institutions 
support the status quo. And Japan, which is interesting in defending the status quo, is thus 
likely to become increasingly interested in institutions.  
 
In conclusion, from the liberal perceptive, while the distribution of material power is a key 
factor  in  the  creation  and  maintenance  of  institutions,  the  distribution  need  not  be 
hegemonic  (i.e.  clustered  in  one  power)  provided  that  the  institution-making  actor  has 
sufficient  entrepreneurial  and  intellectual  leadership.  From  a  liberal  view  then,  regional 
institutions ought to be able to develop in spite of the lack of hegemony due to the logic of 
interdependence.  
 
2.4  The Relevance of Social Constructivism 
 
The last theory to be discussed is social constructivism. Social constructivism is the most 
recent  theory  to  gain  admission  into  the  club  of  dominant  paradigms  in  international 
relations,  gaining  prominence  only  in  the  1990s.The  chief  proponent  of  social 
constructivism is Alexander Wendt. The theory‘s central claim is that what shapes actor 
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decisions is the subjective meaning applied to the objective world rather than the objective 
world directly.
122 Sorensen notes that this socialization (perhaps through institutions which 
help states to achieve their interests cooperatively) breaks the automatic  link between 
anarchy  and  self -help  argumentsin  rationalist  theory.
123  Thus  the  structure  of  the 
international system may be anarchy, but that anarchy alone does not explain why states 
behave in a self-help fash ion.   
 
The international structure is therefore not regarded as ‗causative‘ by Wendt, rather, social 
practices explain why states act in a self-help manner.  There is no a priori reason why 
states could not act in a cooperative fashion due to implications attributed (meaning given) 
to anarchy.  As Wendt puts it, ―anarchy is what states make of it‖ - thus competitive state 
behaviour  is  not  an  unchangeable  fact.
  124 As  Katzenstein  explains  ―rationalist  theory 
factors out of its analysis the actor identities that are often consequential for the definition of 
actor interests.‖
125 The implication of this is that state level politics are to be regarded as a 




2.4.1  …to China-Japan relations: Nationalism and National identity 
For social constructivists, the chief determinant of national behaviour is national identity. 
‗National identity‘ theory states that nations conceive of their interests on the basis of their 
interactions over time with the outside world, and thus interests and behaviour patterns are 
formed within the context of a relationship.
127 States behave in a given way depending on 
what  they  believe  their  role  in  the  international  community  is,  i.e.  the  rationale  of 
appropriateness.  Social  constructivists   would  identify  compatible  and   symmetrical 
identities as essential for harmonious relationships. In the context of Asia, Kang points out 
that  hierarchical  identities  and  the  greater  acceptance  of  authority  explains  the  lack  of 
balancing towards China, with the notable exception of Japan.
128  These relational identities 
are nessessary in attempting to understand the Sino-Japanese relationship.
 129  
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There is a also link here between the liberal theory (regime type) and constructivism. But 
where  liberalism  limits  itself  to  shared  political  values  (ideally  liberal  democracy), 
constructivism focused on shared ideas of ‗self‘ and ‗other‘ in society. State‘s interests are 
determined by these ideas (sometimes called constitutive norms), especially in the high 
politics of national security.
130 Indeed, Henry Nau has demonstrated that threat perception 
is a function of identity.  This is because, "state identities determine whether countries see 
each  other  as  friends  or  foes  and  thus   whether  relative  power  differences  between 
countries are threatening or not."
131 Attempts to make constructivism more concrete have 
resulted in mathematic modelling such as in Rosenau‘s threatening identities.
132 Simpler 
models and demonstrations of how identity affects policy can be found in Legro; although 
both  Legro  and  Rosenau  draw  their  raw  data  from  public  perception  polling  or 
‗kremlinological‘ speech analysis of politicians‘ public addresses.
 133  
 
Also significant for constructivists is the level of nationalism in a society. Nationalism is 
seen as anathema to the kind of collective identity building that constructivists identify as 
promoting of peaceful, cooperative international relations.
134 However, what is significant in 
each is the extent of the ‗we-feeling‘ or in-group identification, usually inferred from a belief 
in a shared destiny and high levels of inter-societal trust.  In the case of China and Japan, it 
is clear that this we-feeling is severely truncated, and presents both the greatest obstacle to 
regionalism and most powerful argument for a regional reconciliation. 
 
2.4.2  ...to regional institutions: regionalism and regional identity 
Social constructivism is also important as it underscores the emergence of regionalism, and 
is  thus  closely  associated  with  the  development  of  regional  institutions.  Some  would 
describe this as an institution of regional multilateralism, i.e. expectations of how regional 
multilateralism  should  operate.
135 From  this  view,  regional  institutions  are  a  material 
manifestation of the underlying regional ideational structure of what it means to be East 
Asian, i.e. of the regional identity.
136  
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‗Regional identity‘, like national identity, is about the ‗we-feeling‘- but at a regional level. In 
the European experience, it is argued that the shared ‗deep institutions‘ like Roman law are 
the  foundations  of  regionalism.
137  However,  there  is  no  consensus  over  what  deep 
institutions Asian countries might share. Some suggest a common experience of being 
colonized, however as Frost points out this experience of being carved up has done more 
to un-wind regional identities than to foster them.
138 Others point to shared ‗Asian values‘ 
as a deep institution that might hold the region together. However, there is no consensus 
about what these values might entail, as the region is split between the religious traditions 
of Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, Confucianism and (to an extent) ancestor worship. Nor is it 
clear how these might contribute to Asia‘s regional community building or its institutions.
139  
 
Of course the lack of some internal uniting feature might not be a problem if the contrast to 
an out-group is sufficient. Here the new move s in Asian regionalism might be examined 
from a constructivist view as a response to globalization and the encroachment of the West 
into the region‘s cultural space – in particular the American form of political and economic 
liberalism. Additionally, there is more than a little doubt about the membership of East Asia. 
- not merely the status of Taiwan but the role of Japan itself. Indeed, China‘s ambivalence 
towards Japan as a member of Asia has a long history.
140 
  
Constructivism sees institutions  as also helping to establish collective identities but does 
not shed light on why certain institutions arise and other do not, nor t he stability of said 
institutions.
141 The results of Kydd‘s model suggest that a hegemon must be trustworthy in 
order  to  promote  cooperation.  An  untrustworthy  hegemon  not  only  fails  to  promote 
cooperation but can prevent it from occurring between otherwise trustworthy states. Thus it 
is more than mere power underwriting institutions, rather it is the expectation that the power 
to make these institution work will delivered reliably.
142 Kydd‘s model closely fits to work by 
Mattli, which identified a trusted, undisputed regional leader as preconditions for integration 
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– as well as the role of a crisis to trigger regional identity formation.
143 From a constructivist 
view then, regionalism and regional institutional development is caused by the nature and 
vigour of a common regional identity. 
 
2.5  The Argument from Eclecticism 
 
Having  identified  the  factors  which  the  various  international  relations  theories  assign 
significance  to  when  seeking  to  explain  bilateral  relations  and  its  effect  on  regional 
institutional development the task of building up an analytical toolkit is complete. As a result, 
what  has  become  clear  is  that  the  expectations  of  the  various  international  relations 
theories are inconsistent. The factors identified as significant by realists would suggest a 
worsening bilateral relationship, even as liberals would be more hopeful. At the same time, 
Liberalism  and  constructivism  would  allow  that  regional  organizations  could  remain 
functioning  (possessing  a  dynamic  all  their  own)  even  as  Sino-Japanese  relations  are 
transformed, the realist position being the outlier. See table,   
 
Table 1 Expectations of the International Relations theories 
Theory  Factor  Area  Expectation 
Realism  Power transition  Bilateral relations  Worsen 
Regional hegemony  Regional Institution  Weaken 
Liberalism  Inter-dependence  Bilateral relations  Improve 
Institutionalism  Regional Institution  Progress 
Constructivism  Nationalism  Bilateral relations  Uncertain 
Regionalism  Regional Institution  Uncertain 
 
To wit, the first hypothesis (realism - power theory), would predict that if there is power 
transition then the relationship will worsen, and as there is no clear regional hegemon, then 
regional institutions will suffer. The second hypothesis (liberalism - efficiency), would predict 
that if there is interdependence then the political relationship will improve, and regional 
institutions  will  be  developed  and  strengthened  to  support  and  manage  the 
interdependence.  The  third  hypothesis  (constructivism  –  identity)  suggests  that  if  the 
national identities compete then the relationship will suffer but that while competing national 
identities would hinder regionalism, regionalism could also help manage and ameliorate the 
bilateral competition.  
 
This theoretical toolkit also helps to generate hypotheses about the kind of regionalism 
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which might be on display in East Asia today. Realists, who identify power as the key 
variable, would tend dismiss the possibility of regionalism in the case of a power transition 
and no clear single regional leader. For these analysts, any regionalism which occurred 
would be of a bilaterally-networked variety, with Japan and China competing to be the hub. 
In the context of the thesis question, if Japan chooses not to cooperate with China due to 
fear  of  its  growing  power,  then  networked  regionalism  would  be  the  outcome.  Liberal 
thinkers on the other hand would be more positive, suggesting that true regionalism is both 
possible  and,  given  time  and  practice  at  cooperation,  likely.  But  even  liberalism 
acknowledges that international cooperation does not suddenly occur, and that a period of 
bilaterally-networked regionalism is likely. From a liberal perspective, bilaterally-networked 
regionalism is still a form of regional cooperation and thus not reflective of competition per 
se but rather the functional needs of the region at that time. The difference between these 
two camps of thought lies, ironically, in the meaning they apply to such limited cooperation. 
To a social constructivist, bilaterally-networked regionalism – even when focused on Japan 
and China – does not necessary imply a competition for regional hegemony or the current 
functional solution to regional problem but rather is a manifestation of where the us/them 
identity  dichotomy  is  drawn.  The  inability  of  Japanese  and  Chinese  to  see  themselves 
bound  together  in  a  shared  regional  future,  for  whatever  reasons  (political,  economic, 
cultural), would be considered the case for a bilaterally-networked regionalism to emerge. 
Thus while realists would expect such weak regionalist structures to be blown away by the 
first crisis and liberals would expect bilaterally-networked regionalism to coalesce into a 
uniform  regional  code,  social  constructivists  would  look  to  how  regional  identities  are 
formed to gauge the likely trajectory and success of a regionalist project. 
 
With the theoretical toolkit in place, this dissertation will examine the impact on regional 
institutions of the Sino-Japanese relationship. Each institution, and each site of change 
within each institution, will be examined along lines identified above. In each case study, an 
argument  will  be  developed  as  to  whether  the  institution,  or  institutional  element,  is 
weakening or progressing and why. It may be due to a regional hegemony, or lack thereof, 
or an endogenous function of the institution itself, or due, in some part, to an emerging 
regional identity.  The dissertation now turns to the Sino-Japanese relationship itself, to 
examine how the relationship has changed, and what that may mean for the development 
of regional institutions.   40 
 
3  The Rise of China 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
In this chapter I will discuss the background to the problem, which is in essence the Sino-
Japanese relationship. Much has been written on this relationship, but the focus here is on 
reaching an understanding of how the rise of China has impacted on Japan and how that in 
turn has coloured Japan‘s policy towards East Asian regionalism. The chapter will examine 
three key areas. The first is an overview of China‘s rise in absolute terms, i.e. looking at 
how China has changed. The second is a comparison with Japan‘s stagnancy in order to 
demonstrate the speed and extent of China‘s rise relative to Japan. The third area is an 
examination of how Japanese foreign policy making process itself has changed over time.  
 
This chapter develops an argument that China‘s rise has impacted on Japan in a way that 
reduces  Japan‘s  interest  in  cooperation  with  China  on  regionalism  and  regional 
institutionalization. From each of the theoretical perspectives developed in the previous 
chapter, it seems likely that Japan and China would be rivals to some extent rather than 
strategic partners, regardless of how they try to portray themselves in public. Moreover, 
even  an  examination  of  how  Japan‘s  policy  making  process  has  changed  over  time 
suggests that Japan has less room to cooperate with China, notwithstanding the potentially 
huge benefits such cooperation might have for Japan and for the region. 
 
3.2  The Rise of China 
 
The rise of China is a term used to describe the rapidly increasing role of China in world 
affairs  since  the  end  of  the  Cold  War.  This  section  will  briefly  examine  the  growth  of 
Chinese national power in both military and economic terms, as well as discuss the rising 
expectations within China for a role commensurate with its power.   
 
3.2.1  Chinese military power 
While  attempts  have  been  made  to  convert  military  power  into  comprehensible  units, 
comparing  military  power  is  more  an  art  than  a  science.  Firstly,  even  in  an  age  of 
unprecedented  military  transparency,  the  true  power  of  military  hardware  is  hard  to 
measure and only rarely made available for external scrutiny. And, in the case of China, the 
military is not transparent, and often not even an attempt is made by China to explain its 
defence and weapon- acquisitions decisions. This discussion on Chinese military power will 
focus  on  the  military  spending  and  to  a  lesser  extent  on  some  of  the  key  weapons 
acquisitions. This section will briefly recount the rapid rate of growth of Chinese spending 41 
 
since 1990, and as well as the beginning of a Chinese blue water navy, to show the rise of 
China in military power terms.  
 
Estimating  the  Chinese  military  budget  has  been  one  of  the  great  problems  for  China 
watchers.  There  is  comparatively  little  information  provided  by  the  Chinese  authorities 
about their defence apparatus and goals, indeed China has only recently started publishing 
a Defence White Paper. Previously, China had made clear that it did not think it could make 
any strategic gains by being more transparent. Without a doubt China was weak militarily in 
the 1990s, but China did not wish to help people understand just how weak.
144  Moreover, 
in the minds of the old guard of the People‘s Liberation Army (PLA), there was an outright 
disbelief that transparency was a legitimate approach to security.
145 China published its first 
Defence White Paper in 1995, which dealt more with its expectations from the disarmament 
processes and less about China‘s own military modernization. In the earlier period, the 
chief  conduit  for  information  about  defence  spending  had  come  from  internal  sources. 
Recently however, information is beginning to be available through official Defence White 
Papers and budget information. And yet, as David Shambaugh notes, not even the PLA 
itself  is  aware  of  total  military  spending.
146 Certainly, many believe that not even the 
Chinese government knows for sure the actual amounts, because: 
…budgeted  functions  are  hidden  under  construction,  administrative  expenses  and 
under  state  organizations  such  as  the  Commission  On  Science  Technology  and 
Industry  for  National  Defence  (COSTIND)…further  sources  of  income  outside  the 
national defence budget include official local and regional government expenses for 
local  army  contributions,  pensions,  militia  upkeep  and  off-budget  income  from  PLA 
commercial enterprises and defence industries, as well as income from international 
arms  sales…[and]  Analysis  is  complicated  by  purchasing  power  parity 
disparities…between  cost  in  China  and  the  cost  of  an  equivalent  item  in  other 
countries.
147 
The  accuracy  of  China‘s  defence  budget  reports,  however,  is  increasing  all  the  time. 
Although whether this is due to a true commitment to transparency, or whether it is simply a 
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function of the PLA‘s declining role Chinese political life and its concomitant decline as an 
economic force, is debatable.
148 However, these White Papers are not clear where the 
budget goes, noting only that personnel, operations and equipment each take roughly a 
third of the total – leaving third parties in the dark as to what China is doing behind the 
screen. Moreover, China claims that the budget is accurate, which is patently untrue (as 
their  internal  sources  admit).
149 The real figures are probably nearly double  that of  the 
official figures.
150 And if Purchasing Power Parity is factored in then the ‗real‘ spending 
might be doubled up again, although this figure would probably not help to understand 
China‘s true ability to project military force.
151 
 
Regardless of whether one uses th e official data or expert opinion, it is apparent that 
Chinese military spending is increasing rapidly. Part of the reason for this rapid growth may 
not be strategic opportunism on behalf of China but rather a reflection depressed spending 
until 1990.
152 However, this kind of explanation is not likely to satisfy regional states who 
wonder why China is expanding so rapidly its capabilities when there are no pressing 
threats. Certainly the role of Taiwan as a factor pushing Chinese military modern ization 
cannot be ignored. 
 
China is also acquiring sophisticated weapons systems. Specifically, China is looking to 
acquire a blue water navy and increasing its strategic missile forces, both with Taiwan in 
mind.
153 Sovremenny-class guided missile destroyers with Sunburn sea-skimming anti-ship 
missiles are specifically built to neutralise Aegis-class destroyers and aircraft carrier battle 
groups. China acquired two such destroyers in 2000, and has since received delivery two 
more with options to purchase still more. Moreover, China continues to build up its strategic 
missiles, and in the mid-nineties conducted nuclear weapons tests in Xinjiang. Apart from 
its nuclear capability, China is deploying more short-range ballistic missiles and medium-
range ballistic missiles which can threaten ships at ranges of more than 1,000km.
154 Both 
                                                   
148 ———, "China's Military Modernization: Making Steady and Surprising Progress," in Strategic Asia 2005-6: Military 
Modernisation in an Uncertain Era, ed. Ashely Tellis and Michael Wills (Washington: National Bureau of Asian Research, 
2005). p. 79 
149 Ibid. pp. 79-80 
150 Michael Heazle, "Sino-Japan Relations and Japan's Emerging Foreign Policy Crisis," (Brisbane: Griffith Asia Institute, 
2005). p. 20 
151 Dwight Perkins, "China's Economic Growth: Implications for the Defense Budget," in Strategic Asia, ed. Ashely Tellis 
(Washington: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005). p. 382 
152 David Shambaugh, "China's Military Modernization: Making Steady and Surprising Progress," in Strategic Asia 2005-
6: Military Modernisation in an Uncertain Era, ed. Ashely Tellis and Michael Wills (Washington: National Bureau of Asian 
Research, 2005). p. 80 
153 Modelski and Thompson in ‗Sea power‘ argue that a blue water navy is the telling mark of hegemon. 
154 David Shambaugh, "China's Military Modernization: Making Steady and Surprising Progress," in Strategic Asia 2005-
6: Military Modernisation in an Uncertain Era, ed. Ashely Tellis and Michael Wills (Washington: National Bureau of Asian 43 
 
of these capabilities increase China‘s ability to project force into Taiwan, but also beyond 
that to Japan.
155 China‘s also shocked the world in 2007 by demonstrating the ability to 
‗knock-out‘ satellites, bringing China into the era of Space warfare. More recently, China‘s 
effort to acquire an aircraft carrier is being cited as a signpost of the rise of a maritime great 
power.
156 China expects to acquire its first air-craft carrier by 2012.
157All these acquisitions 
show that China‘s force projection capabilities are growing rapidly. 
 
3.2.2  Chinese economic power 
Economic power is in many ways easier to measure than military power. The data available 
to a researcher though governments and international organizations like the IMF is more 
reliable and plentiful. However, there are questions around which data set gives the best 
indication  of  economic  power.  One  key  dispute,  of  particular  significance  to  China,  is 
between Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as measured in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 
terms or Exchange Rate terms. In 2009, the Chinese economy was valued at nearly US$5 
trillion in exchange rate terms, whereas in Purchasing Power Parity terms it was worth the 
equivalent of $8.7 trillion according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  Because 
Purchasing Power Parity is a measure which factors in the cost of living, China appears 
much wealthier in PPP terms. The ‗low value‘ of the Renminbi means that measures in 
exchange rate terms tend to exaggerate poverty. For measuring national power however, 
exchange  rate  terms  provide  a  better  measure.    This  is  because  the  exchange  rate 
captures the relative purchasing power of the nation in the world, not the domestic absolute 
wealth enjoyed by its citizens.  
 
Another area of debate is around the reliability of China‘s official economic statistics.
158 
Some  have  argued  that  China‘s  economic  reporting,  through  the  National  Bureau  of 
Statistics, is in the words of Holz ‗Fast, Clear and Accurate.‘
159 However this view is the 
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minority among economists, who have become more sceptical of China‘s reporting since 
the Asian Financial Crisis. However, Holz acknowledges China recent economic reports are 
both ‗more and less reliable than  most think.‘ Arguing that it is unlikely that there is a 
systemic campaign to politically pressure  on  the National  Bureau of  Statistics to report 
favourably, Holz places faith in the institutions to report factually, arguing that the Bureau ―is 
unlikely to be purposefully falsifying data… [as] the evidence on falsification of economic 
growth  data  is invalid,  or  at  least  highly  problematic…  [rather]  the  NBS  appears  to  be 
making sincere efforts to prevent data falsification.‖
160  
 
Others hold a more jaded position. Rawski for instance points out that many economists, 
Chinese and American, are sceptical of much of data produced by China. Focusing on the 
Asian Financial Crisis period, Rawski suggests that official data was exaggerated by a 
factor of four based on his analysis of correlates with economic growth.
161 He is also more 
sympathetic to a political explanation, such as local authorities becoming ―obsessed with … 
GDP growth rates [as] the leading criteria for evaluating cadre performance,‖ and therefore 
falsifying figures and interfering in the reporting process.
162  
 
Regardless of whether the official statistics are incorrect because of technical difficulties or 
the political climate in China, and whether they over- or under-report Chinese growth, it is 
apparent that China‘s economy has undergone drastic change since the Deng reforms in 
1979. The growth figures, despite their problems, are indicative – with double digit growth 
nearly every year for two decades.  During the early 1990s, the Chinese economy was 
growing at 14%, and even during the Crisis years of 1997-8 still maintained high growth. In 
2008 China‘s economy was still growing at roughly 10%, well ahead of Western developed 
nations  and  Japan.
163 Indeed, there is talk of China over taking the US as the largest 
economy in the world by 2040.
164 It is these figures and perceptions that characterise the 
so-called rise of China.  
 
The economic development of China has also had significant effects on Chinese society. As 
James McGregor puts it in One Billion Customers, "China is <simultaneously> undergoing 
the raw capitalism of the Robber Baron era of the late 1800s; the speculative financial 
mania of the 1920s; the rural-to-urban migration of the 1930s; the emergence of the first-
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car,  first-home,  first-fashionable  clothes,  first-college  education,  first-family  vacation, 
middle-class consumer of the 1950s, and even aspects of social upheaval similar to the 
1960s."
165 Chinese society is therefore suffering a kind of nation -wide social dislocation. 
Unemployment (and underemployment) is rife, and inequality is growing out of  control 
challenging the basic tenets of the communist system. Indeed, this has led some to note 
that  the  bottleneck  (environmental,  unemployment  and  inequity  issues)  in  Chinese 
development is coming in the year 2015, roughly as China overtakes Japan
166 - a situation 
that realists would identify as dangerous to the bilateral relationship.  
 
3.2.3  China’s ‘new’ great-power identity 
It is increasingly apparent that China is now pursuing a great power role in world affairs. In 
some ways this is nothing new, as China has been interested in playing such a role since 
thw inception of the People‘s Republic in 1949. Indeed, ever since Sun Yat-sen, Chinese 
leaders have all believed that China belongs in the ‗great power club‘ by virtue of its size, 
population  and  civilization.
167 And  while  China  was  a  considered  ‗big‘  military  power, 
politically it was hamstrung by being economically backward and inward looking. Moreover, 
the very sovereignty of China was contested (by the recognition by Western states of the 
Republic of China on Taiwan) until the 1970s. All these circumstances are now changed, 
and China feels the century of humiliation is over and is craving a new identity with itself at 
the centre of Asia. 
 
However,  there  remains  a  question  about  how  much  of  these  shockwaves  are  due  to 
China‘s sheer size as it rises, and how much is due to it wilfully causing a ruckua. In other 
words, now that China is able to change the system, at least at the regional level, just how 
interested is it in doing so? How dissatisfied is China with the US-led world order it finds 
itself waking up to in the late 20
th and early 21
st century? According to Alastair Iain Johnston, 
China is not dissatisfied at this stage. Indeed, he describes China as a status-quo power 
based on its participation and good faith in international institutions.
168 However, he also 
highlights the real possibility for China to become more dissatisfied and attempt to rip up 
the rulebook. Even Johnston, who is generally sympathetic towards China in his work, 
admits that there is some evidence that China is interested i n a little revisionism, and is 
keen to resume the mantle of a great power.
 169  
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Why is China interested in Great power-ism? One of the key drivers of Chinese popular 
nationalism is the Chinese Communist Party itself. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
and increasing domestic criticism of Mao Zedong thought, the ideological underpinning of 
loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the masses was critically weakened. The 
popular fears and anger about the direction the CCP was taking the country came to a 
head in Tiananmen Square in 1989. The protesters were challenging the legitimacy of, and 
questioning the loyalty of the people to the People‘s party.
170  In the aftermath of these 
events,  the  CCP  rediscovered  the  value  of  nationalism  and  commenced  a  large-scale 
nationalist propaganda campaign, aimed particularly at the young.
171 The campaign hoped 
to foster a ‗defensive‘ nationalism, of loyalty to the CCP and China; however, the campaign 
contained not merely celebration of the achievements of the Chinese people, but a most 
definite criticism of the Western Powers (and especially Japan) as the hostile ‗other.‘
172 This 
led to the appearance of the more virulent form of Chinese popular nationalism in 1990s.  
The source of Chinese nationalism at the popular level is due to economic growth and 
government propaganda.  Takahara Akio has shown the link between China‘s nationalism 
and rapid economic growth, and demonstrated that public opinion has emerged as a factor 
in China‘s foreign policy decision making.
173 
 
This in turn has given rise to the idea that China is aiming to open a new ‗pole‘ to counter 
the  US-led  world  order.  China  uses  the  rhetoric  of  multi-polarity  and  emphasises 
multilateralism in its rhetoric to contrast itself with the US as the uni-polar power and US 
preference for unilateralism. However, Thomas Christensen has noted that multi-polarity is 
actually a euphemism for rising Chinese power, and does not extend to legitimize Indian 
nuclear ambitions, let alone Japan‘s efforts to become a ‗normal‘ country.
174 This multi-
polarity then is a part of China‘s dissatisfaction with the world order, and an attempt to open 
a Sinic pole (or Sinic Zone). However, either this dissatisfaction is not yet strong enough to 
warrant strong rebuke of the Western world order or China is simply not strong enough to 
do so – and probably both.  
 
The most important of China‘s interests in re-shaping the world revolve around the ‗lost 
territories‘, especially Taiwan. Chinese military posturing over the Straits in the mid-1990s, 
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and Naval posturing earlier in the South China Sea, demonstrated forcefully to the world 
these tensions. With regards to Taiwan the threat of the use of force to ‗resolve‘ the issue 
has not been taken off the table. This is due to popular ethnic nationalism which makes 
state concession impossible even if it were desired by the CCP.
175  Indeed, in 2005 China 
passed the anti-secession law which made war ‗automatic‘ in the event that Taiwan makes 
its de facto independence de jure. In the South China Sea, disputes over Mischief Island 
and  the like have been handled more cautiously. This is because China regards these 
territorial disputes as international, rather than domestic (like Taiwan).
176 However, while 
China has officially taken the use of force off the table in resolving the territorial problems in 
the South China Sea by signing the ASEAN-Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (effectively 
shelved the issue), China has not dropped its claim.  
 
What China learnt from its neighbour‘s expressions of dissatisfaction was that China did not 
have the power to change the regional system, even if it could challenge it somewhat. In 
the case of the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1995-6, what China saw was a ‗hardening‘ of the 
US-led order in response.
177 Apart from the immediate dispatch of two US aircraft carriers, 
America  moved  to  both  sell  more  sophisticated  weapons  to  the  Taiwanese  and  to 
strengthen the US-Japan alliance. While China should have been able to see that its 
provocative manoeuvres could trigger a security dilemma, it was not  adequately sensitive 
about the likely response to its actions by the other parties. More shocking to China was 
the response of South East Asia to its maritime posture on the South China Sea. With 
Vietnam in the lead, the ASEAN powers acted to balance against China‘s power.
 178  China 
has learnt that it is still not strong enough to attract bandwagoners in all but the weakest of 
regional states, such as Burma. Rather strong positions by China have been  balanced 
against thus far.  
 
This triggered China‘s policy of reassurance and the so-called ‗peaceful rise‘ thesis. China 
has  been  sensitive  since  Deng‘s  tour  of  Southeast  Asia  to  the  potential  of  a  security 
dilemma centred on its military modernization.
179 To combat this, China has launched its 
co-called ‗charm offensive‘ aimed squarely at reassuring its neighbours of its benign intent 
in late 1990s. Central to this was China‘s accession to the ASEAN-Treaty of Amity and 
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Cooperation  in  2003,  which  obliges  China  not  to  use  force  to  resolve  international 
disputes.
180 China very much likes to see, and portray, itself as both important and a 
positive force in the region. For example, during the Sumatran Tsunami disaster in 2004, 
China played a small (but appreciated) role in disaster relief. While both the financial and 
material support was almost embarrassingly small compared with the US, Japan ese and 
Taiwanese contributions, the Chinese media exaggerated the effect and appreciation and 
made sure that at least the message was not lost on its own citizens.
181 According to one 
poll in 2007, the Chinese rated themselves as quite a lot more important to both world 
affairs and regional affairs than Japan, although this view was not reciprocated by  other 
Asian countries
182 - suggesting a perception gap between China and other Asian nations. 
 
China increasingly strives to present itself as a force for regional stability. At the 2004 Bo‘ao 
forum, Hu Jintao stated ―the very purpose of China‘s foreign policy is to maintain world 
peace,‖ implying a strong status-quo tendency. Wen Jiabao has declared China will never 
be  a  hegemon,  even  after  it  is  a  world  power.
183 Thus, at the16
th  Communist  Party 
Congress the official doctrine was to take advantage of the positive environment of ―a 20 
year period of strategic opportunities‖ to focus on domestic priorities.
184 The ‗peaceful rise‘ 
thesis, as it is known, is central in the formulation of this policy of reassurance.
185  
 
As China emerges more clearly as a great power in the light of the  World Financial Crisis, 
some within China (while emphasising the US relationship under what is being termed the 
G2) have begun to look at Japan as a possible partner. For example, Li Changchun, a 
standing committee member of the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, has 
repeatedly made the offer of a ‗Japan-Chinese partnership‘ to further the region; identifying 
what he believes are ‗basic differences‘ between the West (the US and Europe) on the one 
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hand and China and  Japan  on the other.
186 Of course, the Japanese are continuing to 
doubt Chinese intentions in such a proposal.
187 
 
3.3  The Rise of China: Impacts on Japan 
 
It  is  apparent  then  that  China  has  increased  its  absolute  power  in  both  military  and 
economic terms, and that it is seeking a greater role commensurate with its power. This has 
led some to believe that China is a revisionist power seeking to deliberately restructure the 
world, or at least region, in its favour. Francis Fukuyama, writing in the Wall Street Journal, 
declared that ―the Chinese know what they are doing…they want to organise East Asia in a 
way puts them in the centre.‖
188 Such views tend to paint China‘s rise as a negative force, 
but what are the impacts of China‘s rising power on Japan?  
 
This  next  section  looks  at  the  effect  of  rising  Chinese  power  on  Japan.  It  is  therefore 
relational, and examines China role in limiting or stimulating Japanese foreign policy from 
the perspectives of power transition, interdependence and identity theory. In particular, it 
will demonstrate how China and Japan have recently entered the zone of power parity. 
Further, it will demonstrate that the growing interdependence between the two tells a mixed 
story at best about the there future propects for cooperation. Lastly, it will show that the 
Japanese government and people are increasingly coming to view China as a threat. This 
outlook  is  not  positive  for  their  bilateral  relationship,  and  the  implications  for  regional 
institutions are generally poor.    
 
3.3.1  The rise of China versus Japan: evidence of power transition? 
For Power Transition theory to be relevant there would need to be a closing of the power 
gap  between  Japan  and  China  defined  in  both  traditional  military  terms  and  industrial 
prowess. To investigate whether and how a power transition is in effect, I will examine the 
Chinese military spending and China‘s economic growth compared to that of Japan. 
 
Economic power transition 
In  the  mid-nineties,  China  turned  the  corner  and  entered  into  the  phase  of  transitional 
growth in national power. In economic terms, this has been reflected in double digit growth 
and the consequent exponential growth rate. At roughly the same time, Japan too turned a 
corner, but rather than leading to rapid and continued growth under the Japan miracle, it led 
to an economic dead-end. Japan‘s economic growth has all but flat-lined, and what growth 
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there is to be found is usually attributed to China‘s power house economy. 
 
Indeed, in 1994, China overtook Japan in terms of size of economy as calculated by the 
Purchasing Power Parity method. This method, which corrects for the domestic cost of 
living,  is  useful  for  establishing  the  strength  of  the  domestic  economy,  however  it  is 
problematic to use the method to make national comparisons; China is not a major Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) and Official Development Assistance (ODA) power like Japan even 
though their economies may have been similar in Purchasing Power Parity terms. A more 
appropriate means for comparing international economic strength is in exchange rate terms, 
although this too carries its own share of problems. Not least among these problems is that 
the Chinese currency is effectively pegged to the US dollar, whereas the yen has been 
rather more volatile. Notwithstanding the current spike brought on by the Global Fiancial 
Crisis, the the Japanese yen has been generally depreciating since the mid-1990s. These 
effects both distort and under-emphasize Japanese growth over this time. In exchange rate 
terms, Japan is still the number two ranked economy in the world. However, it may only be 
a matter of time before China catches up in exchange rate terms as well. Some earlier 
projections suggest 2012 as the cross-over point, but the effects of World Financial Crisis in 
2008-9 might well make this year (2010) the year China surpasses Japan in these terms. 
See Figure 3 overleaf, 
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Figure 3 China and Japan’s GDP in Exchange Rate Terms 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database 
 
Further evidence for a Power Transition in the economic field can be found in the changing 
make-up  of  the  two  economies.  Power  Transition  theory  in  fact  expressly  focused  on 
industrialization.  China‘s development  of  an industrial  and manufacturing  base  dynamic 
enough to leapfrog up the value added chain, even as Japan de-industrialises (amid much 
complaining about hollowing-out) should ring alarm bells for a Power Transition theorist.
189 
Indeed, as Michael Green suggests, ―Japan in spite of – indeed because of – its economic 
travails is set to become a larger actor in international affairs.‖
190 
 
From a zero-sum perspective, the industrial weight of the region seems to be moving to 
China from Japan.  There are signs that the so-called vertically integrated model, in which 
Japanese companies operating in China source hi-tech parts and components from Japan, 
is being replaced with a more ‗horizontal‘ pattern. In this new and emerging pattern of trade, 
Japanese  companies  in  China  locally  source  parts  and  components  from  companies 
operating in China. In 1995 Japanese multinationals in China sourced only 29.1% of their 
parts and components from local companies, by 2001 this had increased to over 50%, 
including  in  hi-tech  areas  such  as  precision  instruments,  and  remains  at  roughly  50% 
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since.
191 While some these locally sourced parts and components come from Japanese 
affiliates
192, it is clear that a new triangular trade pattern has replaced the Japan-led ‗flying 
geese‘ model. 
 
Military power transition 
We have already seen that China‘s defence spending is rising rapidly in absolute terms. In 
order to maintain the current balance of power Japan would either have to spend more, 
and/or increase the ‗value‘ of its alliance portfolio. Yet Japan has failed to balance internally 
against China by increasing its own defence expenditure. Japanese defence spending has 
instead remained stable in both absolute amounts and relative to GDP due to the above 
mentioned economic slump. This has effectively allowed China to very rapidly expand its 
military power relative to Japan. Indeed, according to the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute China‘s military spending officially overtook Japan in 2007.
193 However, 
as mentioned previously, due to vagaries in the Chinese reporting, it is unsure quite when 
the ‗cross-over‘ occurred and how far ahead China is at the present, see Figure 4 overleaf.    
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Figure 4 China vs. Japan Military Spending 
 
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Military Expenditure Database), 
and the US Department of Defence.  
 
Even  though  China  has  overtaken  Japan  in  military  spending,  at  the  present  Japan  is 
probably still ahead in terms of actual military power. While military spending is usually a 
good indicator of military prowess, in the case of China it is important to factor in that the 
PLA budget was systematically not prioritised during the previous two decades.
 194 This 
means that even after the budget official overtakes Japan, one might expect that it would 
take another couple of decades before China‘s military hardware catches up with that of the 
Japanese armed forces.  
 
While China‘s rise in effect poses a challenge to the US-led security order in East Asia, 
which Japan through the US-alliance is an integral part of, it is still hard to imagine a 
Chinese led security order for a variety of reasons. China has not yet demonstrated much 
interest in being the primary security provider for Asia. China is in fact a beneficiary of the 
US-led order in Asia and China benefits from the US Navy securing the Sea Lanes of 
Communication  to  the  Persian  Gulf  for  its  oil  and  to  Southeast  Asia  for  trade.  As 
Shambaugh notes, ―a close reading of Chinese military doctrinal manuals gives little, if any, 
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evidence that power projection beyond China‘s immediate periphery is a priority…more to 
the  point,  there  is  no  evidence  of  assertive  PLA  attempts  to  develop  force  multiplier 
capacities.‖
195 Chinese military presence in the Asia region, while growing, is still smaller in 
scale than that of Japan.
196 
 
Notwithstanding  China‘s  rising  defence  spending  vis-à-vis  Japan,  Colonel  Gui  Xinning, 
research fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies in China‘s National Defence University 
believes  that  ―China  is  the  weaker  side…  when  compared  to  the  Japanese  military… 
nowadays the strongest military power – in terms of conventional weapons – is Japan.‖
197 
This view is supported by Japan‘s professional armed services. In private Japanese military 
officers  concede  that  the  opaqueness  of  the  Chinese  military  probably  reflects  basic 
weakness rather than strength, and Japan should remain calm and avoid causing anxiety in 
China by rapidly building up Japanese military strength; a view completely at odds with 
Japanese political rhetoric.
198  Clearly, Chinese leaders are paying close attention to the 
balance of power, but close attention to power is not the mark of a revisionist country rather 
it is the neglect of power realities which is more dangerous.
199 
 
A power transition is occurring and China has entered the cross-over zone, even if there is 
some uncertainty about whether China has yet surpassed  Japan. Indeed, the absence of 
clarity about who is dominant militarily and economically, ironically,  is clear evidence that 
the players are in the transition zone of maximum instability. 
 
3.3.2  The rise of China and Japan: evidence of interdependence? 
Interdependence is identified by Wan as an intervening variable that helps to explain the 
limits on Japan‘s foreign policy responses to China.
200 Insofar as this is the case, it is also 
clear that interdependence is in itself  insufficient force to push Japan and China closer 
politically but still suggests that they are more likely to cooperate in regional institutions.
201 
Unlike power transition, as an  ‗efficiency seeking‘ logic interdependence is not limited to 
only two players. Thus, this next section will discuss interdependence in the Sino-Japanese 
relationship with reference to trade and investment patterns between each other and in 
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third markets, especially in the region.  
 
Bilateral trade interdependence 
The economic relationship between China and Japan is very dynamic. In terms of volumes 
of trade, Japan‘s exports to China have growth rapidly from US$6 billion in 1990 to over 
US$124 billion in 2008, a roughly twenty-fold increase in almost as many years. At the 
same time Japan‘s imports have increased from US$12 billion to more than US143 billion 
over  the  same  timeframe.  The  percentage  of  Japan‘s  total  trade  with  China  (its  trade 
dependence on China) has also risen from less than 5% in 1990 to over 15% in 2008. 
China‘s trade dependence on Japan over this time has however been falling, indeed China 
is now less trade dependent on Japan than vice versa (see Figure 5). While in absolute 
terms the trade interdependence between China and Japan has gone up since 1990, the 
relative balance of dependence is moving against Japan.  
 
Figure 5 Sino-Japan Trade Relations 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics 
 
Japan‘s  dependence  on  China  also  extends  to  its  food  supply.  China  has  for  the  last 
several years ranked as Japan‘s second largest source of food imports, behind only the US 
and providing nearly twice as much as the number three ranked, Australia.  In 2006, China 
was responsible for 17% of Japan‘s food imports, up from previous years.
202 Again, the 
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inverse is not true as China is still self-sufficient in food production. And although that might 
change in the future, Japan is hardly able to become a major supplier of food for China.  
This is not to say that the Chinese food market is unimportant for Japan. Indeed, mainland 
China has consistently rated as in the top three (number three in 2004-6) of Japan‘s food 
export destinations. In 2007, 15.8% of Japan‘s food exports worth some US$400m went to 
China.  Moreover,  Hong  Kong  has  also  rated  in  the  top  three  (number  two  in  2004-6) 
claiming in 2007 another 17.9%, or US$467 million, of Japan‘s food exports. Taken together, 
Japanese food exporters are very dependent on China market.
203 
 
Regional patterns of trade: Flying Geese to triangular pattern 
Arguably the most important change in the structure of the East Asian economy since the 
Cold War has been the rise of China and the stagnation of Japan. The effect of this change 
has  been  to  undermine  the  prior  economic  order which  was  characterised  by  a  strong 
Japan driving the region‘s economic development, the so-called Flying Geese Model.  The 
Flying Geese Model was premised on Japan as the head goose, leading in technology and 
manufactures and transferring redundant industries ‗down‘ to the next developing economy.  
However, the rise of industrial China has led to the so-called triangular trade pattern in East 
Asia, and the collapse at least in part of the prior pattern.
204 China, as a latecomer, ought to 
have been a low-tier goose, yet its staggering economic growth is pushing it towards pol e 
position as it overtakes other developing economies in Asia - even increasingly vying with 
Japan for dominance in regional economies, see  Figure 6 and Figure 7 overleaf. If trends 
continue, then this triangular pattern may lead to a new order of a ‗Greater China-centred 
production network‘ – rather than one centred on Japan.   
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As can be seen in the graphs above, China is increasingly dominating intra-regional trade. 
Not only does China now import more from regional states than Japan, its export profile is 
also larger than Japan‘s to these states – especially if Hong Kong is included.
205 Indeed, 
according to surveys conducted by the Japan External Trade Organization, Japanese 
multinationals  active  in  Southeast  Asia  were  sourcing  raw  materials  and  Parts  and 
Components from China more often that Japan.
206 Moreover, as China‘s trade profile is 
shifting  towards  increasingly  complex  goods  such  as  cars  and  consumer  electronics, 
Southeast  Asian  countries  are  coming  under  pressure.  Chinese  trade  increasingly 
competes for a greater share in third markets, such as in office machinery - an area where 
ASEAN  traditionally  has  been  competitive.
207 And even Japan is beginning to lose its 
competitive advantage in machinery and transport equipment to China.
208 While China is 
not yet in a position to challenge the supremacy of  Japan in these sectors, the economic 
landscape is changing in China‘s favour.  
 
Another significant impact of the rise of China on the regional economic order has been in 
FDI. Southeast Asian economies were ‗feeling the squeeze‘ as China took not only a larger 
share of the labour-intensive industries, but also, they believed, an increasing share of 
Japanese FDI.
209 Indeed, Japanese investment to Southeast Asia fell off steeply in the 
early 2000s while China continued to attract FDI, see Figure 8. Although, Japanese FDI to 
Southeast Asia has since returned Eichengreen suggests that this too is a function of the 
growth of China as an export destination.
210  
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Figure 8 Japanese FDI to China and ASEAN5 
 
Source: Prepared by Japan External Trade Organization from Ministry of Finance Balance 
of Payments Statistics and Bank of Japan foreign exchange rates. Accessed: April 2010 
 
John Ravenhill supports Eichengreen‘s argument that despite the appearance of China‘s 
rise  somehow  ‗stealing‘ FDI  earmarked for  Southeast  Asia and  despite Southeast  Asia 
losing some market share in the third counties, China has a net positive influence on these 
countries by increasing inter-regional intra-industry trade.
 211 This adds up to a region which 
is increasingly reliant on China as the driver of growth and development, and subsequently 
less  reliant  on  ‗traditional‘  markets  in  Japan  and  the  US.  In  the  face  of  increased 
competition from China, Japanese firms in Southeast Asia have moved to producing more 
complex, high tech items – abandoning certain lines of production to China.
212 
 
Increasingly, Japan‘s imports of final goods are coming from China, which accounts for 
nearly a third of Japan‘s total global imports. This has happened mainly at the expense of 
Southeast Asia, which lost much of its market share. At the same time Japan has become 
increasingly  dependent  on  China  for  supply  of  capital  goods,  including  important  basic 
technologies necessary for business growth such as telecommunications equipment and 
computers.
213  As Gaudier argues, ―The changes that have taken place in Japan's trade 
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pattern  as  a  result  of  China's  emergence  can  be  viewed  as  a  switch  from  bilateral  to 
triangular trade. Japan's trade which used to be dominated by the exports of final goods to 
North America and Europe has been driven by exports of Parts and Components and semi-
finished goods to China where they are processed and assembled and then re-exported to 
Western markets  and  also  to  Japan.‖
214 The  effect of  this  triangular  trade  pattern  is  to 
increase Japanese dependence on China.  
 
3.3.3  The rise of China to Japan: evidence of contested national identity? 
China‘s rising great power identity also impacts on Japan. One of the weaknesses with the 
realist theory is that is does not specify the direction of balancing. Thus China‘s rise could, 
in theory, encourage Japan to balance against US hegemony. Yet this balancing is not 
occurring. The most important reason why is the way national identity is constructed by 
each side of the China-Japan bilateral relationship.  From a constructivist perspective, the 
basic  problem  is  naturally  one  of  identity;  Japan  and  China  have  mutually  constructed 
images of the other as a ‗threat‘ to one extent or another and self-images as the ‗first in 
Asia‘ - a position that objectively only one can hold. Moreover, contested history has given 
rise to a victim identity on both sides, making civil patriotism appear more dangerously 
nationalist  to  the  other.  Benjamin  Self  calls  this  ―duelling  nationalism  and  national 
identity‖
215 ,  a  situation  of  contested  identity  which  makes  further  instability  in  the 
relationship more likely.   
 
Underlying this situation of duelling nationalism is the issue of history. Japanese society as 
a  whole  has  not  been  very  concerned  or  knowledgeable  about  their  war  history.  Even 
worse,  this  lack  of  understanding  is  even  more  marked  in  the  youth  of  Japan.    As 
Tamamoto  notes,  ―people  were  victims  of  a  war  abstractly  conceived…this  ahistorical 
imagination [has]…left little room for recalling Japanese aggression.‖
216 While Zhou Enlai 
was willing to grant that the Japanese people were also the victims of Japan militarism, an 
acknowledgement  of  Japan‘s  role  as  aggressor  was/is  a  necessary  component  for 
reconciliation. Not that there have not been attempts to resolve the history issue before, but 
these have run into trouble. Koizumi had proposed a shared textbook in 2001, although it 
was not until 2006 that the idea was taken up by the Foreign Ministers (Asō Tarō and Li 
Zhaoxing).
217 In  2010,  the  finding  joint  textbook  was  finally  launched  but  even  then 
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interpretations of key events remain different and different versions will be provided to each 
country.
218   
 
China acts (up) 
The  view  that  Japan  is not  yet  ‗suitable‘  to  act  as  an  equal  internationally,  or  within a 
Chinese-led conception of the region, is based in part on the popular nationalism fostered 
by  the  CCP  since  1989. While  the  CCP  is  playing  with  fire  by  allowing  the  nationalist 
sentiment to grow, the CCP is aware of this as China‘s leadership remembers that 1935 
protest against Japan turned on China‘s government. The CCP has several times banned 
large  protests  (such  as  in  2005  in  Tiananmen  Square)  to  prevent  a  possible  such  re-
occurrence - it is likely however that the horse has already bolted.
219 As Zhao notes, ―while 
nationalism may be used by the regime to replace the discredited communist ideology as a 
new  base  of  legitimacy…  It  was  clear  that  rising  nationalism  in  1995-1997  ran  into  a 
criticism  of  Chinese foreign  policy,  especially  the  seemingly  too  soft  stance  toward  the 
United  States  and  Japan.‖
220 The  military,  the  bastion  of  the  Chinese  nationalism,  is 
probably the most thus affected. As Shambaugh notes ―the anti-Japanese sentiment one 
encounters  among  the  PLA  at  all  levels  is  palpable.  Distrust  of  Japan  runs  deep, 
transcends generations, and is virulent among the generation of PLA officers in their forties 
and fifties [who are the decision makers].‖
221  
 
The  politics  of  taking  a  pro-Japanese  line  in  China  is  hardly  new;  CCP  Party  General 
Secretary Hu Yaobang lost his job in the 1980s in part because of excessive friendship with 
Japan.
222 Moreover, a series of intellectuals (such as Ma Licheng) and pop figures (Zhao 
Wei, Jiang Wen) have been ‗named and shamed‘, in some cases threatened with death for 
seeming  to  take  a  pro-Japan  line.
223  Although  China  officially  denies  fostering  anti -
Japanese nationalism for political gain, and insists history is a real issue being taken up in 
the interests of justice alone
224, this view is unlikely to wash  with the Japanese.
225 This 
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perception gap represents a weakness in the Sino-Japanese relationship, limiting China‘s 
freedom of action in its approach to Japan with potentially quite negative results.
226 Some 
China-watchers note  that, not withstanding  that  Hu  and  Wen preferred  a  soft line on 
Japan,
227  they  are  restricted  especially  on  the  Yasukuni  and  historical  points,  by  a 
nationalist sentiment which could turn against the CCP.
228 
 
Japan reacts  
This has created what Wan Ming called a re-enforcing pattern, whereby nationalist/anti-
Japanese acts by Chinese causes a backlash in Japan.
229 This dynamic was played out 
during the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, as nationalist groups in China and Japan were 
engaged in a re-enforcing spiral of mutually aggravation by entering the disputed territory of 
the Senkaku islands (Diaoyutai in Chinese).
230 
 
Chinese anti-Japanese nationalism has affected the Japanese popular sentiment directly. 
The abuse that Chinese nationals heaped on the Japanese soccer team in the 2004 Asia 
Cup,  and  the  subsequent  rioting  and  violence,  resulted  in  major  deterioration  of  the 
Japanese  public  sentiment  towards  China,  see  Figure  9.
231 Shortly after Chinese fans 
booed the Japanese national anthem, a poll was conducted by  the Asahi Shimbum which 
revealed a significantly worsened impression of China.
232 The large-scale protest which 
broke out in Shanghai in 2005, ostensibly over a newly approved history textbook  which it 
was claimed whitewashed Japan‘s wartime atrocities in China, represented a watershed of 
negativity  in  the  Sino-Japanese  relationship.  The  extent  of  the  anti-Japanese  feelings 
displayed, blurring some legitimate feelings of injustice with a large dose of irrational hatred, 
made  many  Japanese  begin  to  consider  whether  China  could  ever  be  considered  a 
friend.
233 Indeed, 2005 represents the lowest score of feelings of trust towards the Chinese 
in Japan according to the poll. Of course some, such as Gavan McCormack, doubt that this 
nationalism  will  play  a  significant   role  in  Japanese  foreign  policy  making  despite  its 
prevalence and volume.
234  
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Figure 9 Popular Opinion Poll: Japanese Public Trust towards China 
 
Source: Author‘s Translation of Cabinet Office, Public Opinion Polling.  
 
The 2005 protests challenged Japan‘s aspirations of leadership. Tkacik notes that ―A desire 
to demonstrate to Asia that China, not Japan, is the dominant regional power was the 
animate  force  behind  the  government-organised  anti-Japanese  riots  and  boycotts  of 
Japanese goods in the spring of 2005.‖
235 These thoughts and feelings were displayed 
most clearly in the infamous ‗small Japan‘ (小日本) placards. As Lam Peng Er has observed, 
one of the triggers of the 2005 anti-Japanese protest was Japan‘s bid for a United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) permanent seat, at a popular level many Chinese do not believe 
Japan has the moral authority to take this position until the history issue is resolved.
236 The 
protests certainly scuttled Japan‘s dream of increased influence.
237  
 
What is particularly disconcerting for the Japanese is the apparent role the CCP played in 
allowing  these  protests  to  go  ahead;  presumably  aware  of  the  potential  effect  on  the 
bilateral relationship, but nevertheless also willing to take this risk in order to complicate 
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Japan‘s bid for a seat at the Security Council.
238 Japan increasingly sees itself as unable to 
change the international system. Judged from their Whitepapers, Yamakage argues that 
Japan focuses on reacting to great power relations, in particular China, rather than trying to 
shape them.
239   
 
In conclusion, an identity dilemma exists between China and Japan. The perception gap 
between how Japan views itself in relation to China and how China sees view itself in 
relation  to  Japan  has  widened.    Some  therefore  see  Japan‘s  attempt  to  move  from 
bilateralism and a pursuit of a unique identity, to a pursuit of an Asian identity linked to a 
multilateral diplomacy as it is challenged by China‘s rise.
240  
 
3.4  Japan’s Foreign Policy Making in Transformation 
 
Japanese foreign policy making has undergone a transformation since the end of the Cold 
War. Many writers have attempted to characterise this transformation. Japan has become 
more assertive in world politics, as its bid for the UNSC demonstrates. While Japan was 
considered a ‗reactive state‘ during the Cold War, it was also considered by many to be 
highly  pragmatic  –  notwithstanding  misgivings  by  the  US  administration  about  Japan‘s 
apparent  disinterest  in  providing  for  its  own  national  security.
241 Increasingly Japanese 
foreign  relations  are  acquiring  a  moralistic  or  ‗emotional‘  edge,  such  as  towards  North 
Korea.  This change appears to be due largely to the ‗generational change‘ going on in 
Japan, as the old political leaders and people with memories of the war disappear and a 
new, younger and more self-confident generation pick up their voting slip and take up posts 
in the Diet and the Ministries. It is these Japanese who, unlike their peers, believe that 
Japan  can,  indeed,  should,  be  active  in  the  creation  of  the  world,  rather  than  merely 
reactive – a belief that Japan, again, has something worthwhile to offer the world. 
 
However,  it  is  not  merely  the  society  that  has  changed;  the  institutions  which  are 
responsible for making foreign policy formulation have themselves evolved, leading to an 
increasing ‗democratization‘ of foreign policy making. This ‗democratization‘ is due to three 
inter-related phenomena.  The first is the rise of the Prime Minister and Cabinet as a source 
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of foreign policy making.
242 The second is the rise of foreign policy as a ‗vote-getting‘ issue, 
and Diet members responding to growing popular interest in Japanese foreign relations.
243 
The third is the concomitant fall in the influence of the ministries over foreign policy making, 
with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) becoming more involved in implementing policy 
than creating it.
244 While the MOFA was criticised for kowtowing to China, no doubt some 
will miss the stability and long-term planning these insulated policy elites brought.  
 
These societal and institutional changes are particularly significant for the Sino -Japanese 
relationship. Prior to the end of the Cold War there was a consensus in the MOFA and 
society at large that China had to be accommodated in certain regards so as to bring it into 
the Western camp. This mode of thinking  was carried over into the post-Cold War period. 
MOFA continued this policy under the rubric of ‗engagement‘, hoping to socialise China into 
the liberal world order. China however has not yet signed onto the ‗liberal‘ package, unlike 
its ‗other‘ Taiwan. The PRC also continues to make Japan‘s history problematic, unlike 
Taiwan. This posturing by the Chinese over history, even as ‗Japan-sponsored‘ growth has 
allowed China‘s trade to grow rapidly and living standards soar, seems ungrateful to many 
Japanese.
245 But while the MOFA urged patience, the growing social antipathy towards 
mainland China and the Chinese has enabled the right wing to  gain greater control of the 
China relationship – as evinced by the popularity of Koizumi standing up to the Chinese by 
visiting  the  Yasukuni  shrine.  The  changing  balance  of  power  within  the  foreign  policy 
making  organs  of  Japan,  while  perhaps  expressing  certain  legitimate  concerns  of  the 
Japanese  people  that  had  previously  been  hidden,  do  not  bode  well for  a  cooperative 
relationship.  
 
3.4.1  …at the Head of State level: generation shift, instability and popularism 
Thus far the Prime Ministers of Japan have been men usually aged in their sixties. With the 
passing of the sixtieth anniversary of the end of war in 2005, a new post-war generation 
came  to  the  prime  ministership.  Abe  Shinzo‘s  Prime  Ministership  (2006-7)  marked  this 
transition. Abe, born in 1954, was not merely the youngest PM in Japan‘s post-war history 
but also the first to born after the War. The Japan that Abe grew up in was a country 
enjoying high growth and high hopes for the future. In the shadow of the Cold War, Japan 
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was an easier place to understand and its role in international affairs not contested greatly. 
Even  Abe‘s  predecessor,  Koizumi  Junichirō  (born  1942)  was  only  three  when  the  war 
ended and thus was not shaped by the War.  
 
This stands in stark contrast with the politicians of 1960s and 1970s who did much of the 
work to normalise relations with the mainland. Prime Ministers like Tanaka Kakuei whose 
personal experiences during the war as a Sergeant in the Kwantung Army in mainland 
China made him unusually sensitive to the hurt Japan had inflicted on its neighbour and 
desirous to make amends.
246 Indeed, China‘s leaders were delighted when Tanaka became 
Prime Minister in 1972. He had signalled his intentions to China as Minister for International 
Trade and Industry (MITI) Minster when he established the China Division and stated his 
intent to allow the Export-Import Bank of Japan to commence loans to China.
247 Together 
with his Foreign Minister, Ohira Masayoshi, Tanaka rammed through the normal ization of 
relations with China  (1972), against protests from pro -Taiwan Diet-men.
248 Even  after 
Tanaka left in 1974 under a cloud of corruption, his influence was still felt in the ruling 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and subsequent many Prime Ministers were drawn from his 
faction. Tanaka‘s influence pushed the LDP politicians towards a pro-China line.  Important 
among these were Fukuda Takeo, who signed the China-Japan friendship agreement in 
1978 and Ohira Masayoshi who cleared the way to provide ‗yen loans‘ to China.
249 But by 
the  1990s,  Tanaka‘s  influence  was  waning  and  a  new  political  logic  was  rising  in  the 
younger LDP politicians. 
 
The early nineties thus marked a period of transition, and indeed confusion, in Japan‘s 
China policy. In the first instance, the continuous one-party rule by the LDP, which had 
provided  stability  if  not  ingenuity,  to  the  China  relationship  was  broken  by  a  period  of 
coalition government from 1993. Later, the Japan Socialist Party‘s PM Murayama Tomiichi 
personally apologized to China for Japan‘s war of aggression, and pushed for the Diet to 
approve  a  bill  that  effect.
250 But  the  bill floundered,  and  a  right  wing backlash from 
nationalists in the Diet made clear to the world that Japan had not reached cons ensus on 
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Prime Minister, Hashimoto Ryūtarō (1996-8) truly had one foot on each side of the divide in 
the debate over Japan‘s China policy. Unlike Tanaka, he did not experience the war as a 
soldier in China, but unlike Koizumi/Abe he did remember the war as a child. Hashimoto 
was a member of the Tanaka faction, which despite the passing of Tanaka himself, still was 
considered pro-China. However, Hashimoto‘s electoral power base included the Izokukai, 
the  War  Bereaved  Association  which  was  nationalistic  and  less  sensitive  to  China‘s 
concerns  about  history.  While  the  precedent  had  been  set  by  Nakasone  in  1985, 
Hashimoto  also  visited  the  Yasukuni  shrine  in  his  official  capacity  as  PM,  marking  the 
second official visit by a PM of Japan. However, he avoided the symbolic dates in August, 
and moreover stopped visiting in his PM capacity after the Chinese protested furiously.
252  
 
Koizumi Junichirō (2001-6) did not however share this view. Indeed, his prime ministership 
marks the declared end of the ‗emotional‘ or personnel China-guilt sentiment in the Prime 
Minister.  Koizumi‘s refusal to acknowledge China‘s legitimacy, either moral or legal, in 
objecting to his visits to the Yasukuni Shrine are well known, and underpin Koizumi‘s basic 
belief that the relationship with China should not be considered ‗special‘ due to the wartime 
history.
253 Moreover, Koizumi reduced the influence of the ‗traditionally‘ pro-China Tanaka 
faction within the LDP.   
 
Much  has  been  made  of  Koizumi‘s  pledge  to  destroy  the  LDP  if  it  stopped  his  reform 
agenda. Koizumi‘s first scuffle with the bad-old style politics was with Nonaka Hiromu, a 
powerful faction leader.
254 Nonaka Hiromu headed the Obuchi faction ( heiseiken), which 
was  the  former  Tanaka faction,  and  thus considered  pro-China.
255 In fact, Nonaka was 
personally very sympathetic to China having experienced the war first hand, and made no 
bones about his differences with Koizumi over the history question.
256 However, Koizumi 
was able to ‗steal‘ the LDP leadership in 2001, and in the process weakened the heiseiken 
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Koizumi‘s second victory over the pro-China Diet-men was centred on the figure of Tanaka 
Makiko, Tanaka Kakuei‘s daughter and Koizumi‘s Foreign Minister until 2002. Due to her 
father‘s influence, she was also considered a member of the pro-China group.  Tanaka 
Makiko was in fact quite active publicly about her disapproval of Koizumi‘s visits to the 
Yasukuni shrine, as ―lacking sensitivity.‖
258 For her forthrightness, Tanaka was dismissed 
from her post, ostensibly for incompetence. By the time he left office in 2006, Koizumi had 
―deposed the old guard, coincidentally including most of the party's doves on China.‖
259 
  
Koizumi‘s  hardline  position  ironically  gave  his  successor,  Abe  Shinzō  (2006-7),  greater 
latitude in his dealings with China. Abe adopted a softer line, and avoided the Yasukuni 
Shrine. However, like Koizumi, Abe did not see the China relationship as ‗special.‘ Apart 
from  the  occasional  gaffe,  such as  over  the ‗comfort  women‘  issue in early  2007, Abe 
adopted a pragmatic approach to China. Indeed, Abe‘s lifeline was his management of the 
China relationship as an area where he could distinguish himself from the larger than life 
Koizumi. Abe‘s meeting with Wen in April of 2007 was considered a success by all, and 
lifted Abe‘s flagging approval ratings.
260 However, Abe was also far from dewy eyed about 
the Chinese. Together with his Foreign Minister Asō Tarō, Abe proposed a new pillar of 
Japanese foreign policy – the so-called values diplomacy (kachi gaikō). This, together with 
the  auxiliary  concept  of  ‗the  arc  of  freedom  and  propensity‘  aimed  to  link  the  great 
democracies of the Asia. Conveniently, the ‗arc of freedom and prosperity‘ which links these 
states together casts a wide net around notably ‗un-democratic‘ China, (see Figure 10), 
signalling Japan‘s basic distrust of China‘s military build-up and scepticism of the so-called 
‗peaceful rise.‘  
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Figure 10 Graphic of the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity 
 
Source: Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs homepage. 
 
The anti-Chinese focus of the arc concept was most clearly seen in the values-diplomacy 
parliamentary league of LDP Diet members formed in May 2007. Chairman, Furuya Keiyu, 
noted, ―We cannot dispel doubts about China‘s act of hegemony, including its huge military 
spending. So China does not share the same common values with Japan.‖ Another high 
ranking  member,  Nakagawa  Shōichi  (now  deceased),  stating  simply  ―We  must  prevent 
Japan from becoming one of China‘s provinces.‖
261 However, Japan‘s MOFA has taken 
care to note that values diplomacy does not ‗push a particular ideology or support regime 
change‘ out of concern of upsetting China. 
262 Indeed, Tanaka Akihiko notes that the weak 
point in Abe foreign policy from the first was the ‗disconnect‘ between his conservative-




In July 2007, Abe‘s LDP lost to the DPJ in House of Councillors elections. This gave rise to 
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the much disparaged nejire kokkai (twisted parliament) and frustrated much of the LDP‘s 
agenda. Dispite initial resisting,  Abe‘s suddenly stood  down in September of 2007 and 
made way for Fukuda Yasuo‘s to rise to the post of Prime Minister (2007-8). Fukuda (born 
1936) was old enough to remember the War – thus is a member of the previous ‗transition‘ 
generation like Hashimoto. Moreover, it was Fukuda Yasuo‘s father, Fukuda Takeo, who 
signed  the  China-Japan  friendship  agreement  in  1978.  Yet  despite  these  credentials, 
Fukuda was, in the tradition of his faction, defence minded and watched China‘s moves in 
Southeast  Asia  with  particular  interest.
264 He took  a firm line against China over the 
Senkaku  islands,  and  had  gone  on  record  during  his  days  as  cabinet  secretary  under 
Koizumi  of  supporting  a  nuclear  weapon  for  Japan.
265  But  Fukuda  also  retired  the 
nationalistic Asō, who he perceived an impediment to the China relationship, and made 
Kōmura Masahiko the Foreign Minister instead. Komura was the head of the Japan-China 
Friendship  Parliamentarians'  Union  and  its  vice  president  was  Fukuda‘s  Chief  Cabinet 
Secretary (faction head) Machimura Nobutaka. 
 
Fukuda however also retired suddenly, clearing the way for Asō Tarō to become Prime 
Minister. At this stage, Japanese politics at the top was too unstable for Asō to manage 
strategically  any  of  Japan‘s  foreign  relations,  let  alone  construct  a  consensus  for  the 
management  of  China.  Instead  the  bureaucracy  mostly  ran  the  relationship,  in  part 
explaining its formulaic smoothness (against concerns that Asō‘s famous slip of the tongue 
might turn nationalistic).  Only piecemeal policy occurred at this time, such as responding to 
China‘s decision to send to Somalia anti-piracy escort vessels by trying to push through a 
similar  law  in  Japan  –  but  even  this  was  paralysed  by  his  administration‘s  political 
weakness (despite inheriting a supermajority).
266 
 
In September 2009, Hatoyama‘s Democratic Party of Japan (DJP) defeated the LDP in a 
landslide election – falling just short of taking an absolute majority and forming single party 
rule. The coalition includes the Social Democratic Party of Japan, heirs to the Socialist 
Party of Japan and which is considered pro-China. Hatoyama‘s DPJ fought the election on 
a  manifesto  which  contained  placing  greater  emphasis  on  the  relationship  with  China. 
Moreover, symbolic acts such as the mass visit to China by Diet members in early 2010 
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suggest that a pro-China swing is underway.   
 
While it is uncertain what will happen under the current administration in Japan. It is clear 
that a domestic transition has taken place, not just politically but also generationally. The 
loss of the old China hands who had acted as pipelines to Beijing has meant that the 
Japanese elite to now feel that they are powerless to influence Beijing‘s decisions, they feel 
locked  out.
267 Politically, the implications of this  transition  are still uncertain, and the 
recently elected DJP could yet swing either way on the question of how to manage China.   
 
3.4.2  …at the Executive level: greater powers and fewer opponents 
As  the  nature  of  the  Japanese  body  politic  at  both  elite  and  societal  level  is  being 
transformed,  the  relationship  between  the  two  is  shifting.  Japanese  politics  has  been 
undergoing a transformation since the 1990s, as the emergence of ‗normal‘ politics takes 
over from the previous ‗special‘ arrangements.
268 The decline of bureaucratic influence and 
the increased power of the executive is one of the most important changes to the way in 
which Japanese foreign policy is now being made, especially in the case of China policy. 
 
The power shift away from the MOFA accelerated with the end of the Cold War, and in 
particular the foreign policy train-wreck that was the Gulf War. The Gulf War brought home 
to Japan the basic fact that the alliance, and Japan foreign policy as a whole, was no 
longer able to be managed by bureaucrats. This was because in order to enable Japan to 
take  part  in  Peace  Keeping  Operations  (PKO),  a  political  solution  was  needed.  The 
enactment of the PKO bill marked a beginning of the cabinet taking an active role  and 
interest in foreign policy.  The cabinet has therefore sought to empower itself more in the 
field of foreign policy making with various cabinet bills.
269 
 
These administrative reforms continued under Hashimoto, who was frustrated by the stove-
piping of vital intelligence by the ministries. Both the Hanshin earthquake and the terrorist 
attacks of the Aum Shinrikyō in 1995 demonstrated that the Prime Minister‘s Office was not 
adequately prepared to take control in the event of a national crisis – an artefact of post-
war uncertainty about the possible abuse of emergency powers. By the end of the century 
Japan had centralised in the executive emergency response powers to make policy. 
 
The review of cabinet law clarified the authority of the Prime Minister and Cabinet Secretary 
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to initiate policy.
270 This top-down style of policy formulation was a break with the previous 
bottom-up approach, whereby cabinet dealt with policy that top bureaucrats had discussed 
and pre-approved. This reform has allowed Prime Minister Koizumi to react to crises faster 
than his predecessors.  It was under precisely these reforms that Koizumi was able to set 
up the liaison office at the Situation Centre of Cabinet, forty -five minutes after the attacks 
on September 11, 2001; and in the press briefing afterwards, the Koizumi a dministration 
already  had  a  policy  to  deliver  to  the  people.
271 This  trend  away  from  bureaucratic 
dependence continues into the current Hatoyama administration.
272 
 
Regime change: the end of socialist opposition and the rise of the DPJ 
The political landscape of the Japan has also changed since in the introduction of electoral 
reforms  in  the  mid-1990s.    The  previous  multi-seat  system  had  tended  to  promote 
politicians  who  served  small  interest  groups.  However,  national  issues  such  as  foreign 
policy can be sources of political capital for young aspiring politicians.
273  There is a feeling 
among Diet members that the populace is becoming more interested in, and aware of, 
foreign policy issues, and that there are votes to be gained on these issues.
274 
 
Unfortunately,  grassroots  nationalistic  organizations  are  further  clouding  the  historical 
memory of Japan and impacting on Japan‘s policy outputs.  Such groups as the historical-
revisionist Nippon Kaigi, which in 1999 had as many as 200 Diet-men in its ranks, and the 
mighty  Izokukai  which  had  at  its  peak  8  million  registered  voters  as  members,  are 
particularly active.
275 As Shibuichi notes, ―In the mid-1990‘s a new mass constituency for 
nationalist  causes  opened  up  among  teachers,  [university]  students  and  middle  class 
professionals…[such as] the ‗liberal view of history study group‘ and the ‗society for the 
making a new school textbooks in history‘.‖
276 These groups were involved in the so-called 
‗bloodless revolution‘ of 1999, in which the national symbols of the Flag and Anthem (both 
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The  early  nineties  also  saw  the  traditional  bastion  of  one  country  pacifism,  the  Japan 
Socialist Party ending its ideological opposition to the Japan Self Defence Force (JSDF) in 
order to strike-up a marriage of convenience and seize political power with the LDP. By this 
act the Socialist Party (which was the strongest opposition party in the Diet at one stage 
holding  136  seats  of  480  in  1990)  effectively  committed  political  suicide.  It  was 
subsequently reduced to just 14 seats by 1998, effectively taking with them the ‗alternative 
voice‘ in Japanese politics.
278 An essential part of the Japan Socialist Party‘s ‗alternative 
voice‘  was  its  advocacy  of  a  closer  relationship  with  China.
279 Indeed, since the split 
between the CCP and the Japan Communist Party in 1966, the Socialist Party had been 
the custodian of the China relationship. The Socialist Party had even made managing the 
China relationship a core element in their challenge to the dominant LDP – as the primus 
inter pares of the opposition parties, the Socialists nearly succeeded in displacing the LDP 
in the mid-seventies (a factor contributing to the shift towards China during this period). The 
demise of the Socialist Party of Japan has removed from the political field a pro-China 
opposition party which might check the excesses of the LDP or other more nationalistic 
groups in the Diet.  
 
3.4.3  …at the Bureaucratic level: Decline of the MOFA and the China school 
At the macro-level, the ministries, including the MOFA have become less relevant to the 
formulation  of  policy  as  the  executive  gains  greater  control.  And  even  as  the  MOFA 
declines in relevance, internally MOFA has become less interested in appeasing China. 
This is due to the decline of the influence of the China School within the MOFA. All this had 
led to a new foreign policy making environment which more accurately reflects Japan‘s 
concerns about China and a Japan more willing and able to take a hardline again China 
when its interests are threatened.  
 
Weakening of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
The Cabinet, as the executive, has the prerogative to be sole makers of Japan‘s foreign 
policy as empowered under Constitution Art 73(ii). Despite this formal power, it has been a 
much  remarked  feature  of  Japan  politics,  especially  during  the  Cold  War,  that  the 
bureaucracies  were  actually  responsible  for  Japan‘s  policy  making,  including  foreign 
policy.
280 The basic reason for this was clearly not the lack  of power, but rather the belief 
that foreign policy did not get votes. Indeed, it was often argued that t he insularity from 
public opinion allowed the MOFA to construct policy with a long -term vision.
281 Beginning 
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with Nakasone‘s decentralization policies of the 1980s, the role of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs  as  a  foreign  policy  maker  has  since  suffered  a  series  of  blows  and  it  is  now 
incapable of acting as decisively as it did in the past.
282 
 
The MOFA had a series of turf wars with other bureaucracies which have chipped away at 
the ministry‘s scope and competence. Importantly, management of  the  US-alliance  was 
shifted  from  the  MOFA  to  the  Japan  Defence  Agency,  which  became  the  Ministry  of 
Defence (MOD). At the same time, control of the ODA budget (a central element of the 
MOFA‘s  foreign  policy  making  apparatus)  was  shifted  in  parts  to  both  the  Ministry  of 
Finance (MOF) and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), renamed the 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) in 2001.
283 With the advent of coalition 
politics, the bureaucracy also became increasingly politicized. In the early 1990s, c ertain 
senior officials at the Ministries were forced to resign due to political purges, reducing the 
ability of key top level bureaucrats to negotiate with Diet members of behalf of their 
ministry.
284 The MOFA has also been rocked by a series of financial a nd ethical scandals 
which further eroded its political influence.
285  
 
End of the China school 
Even  as  the  bureaucracy  lost  influence in foreign  policy  making,  the balance  of  power 
within the MOFA has changed. The MOFA has itself shifted to the right, and the so-called 
China  School  which  favours  appeasement  strategies  losing  influence  to  a  younger 
generation of MOFA officials with a background in America. Indeed, the ‗young turks‘ in the 
North American Bureau, together with their counterparts in the newly minted Ministry of 
Defence are ideologically closer to the US and its position on China.
286 The decline of the 
China School
287 can be linked to the more assertive position taken by the executive 
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towards China and the politicization of bureaucracy.
288 
 
The  first  major  breaking  of  the  China  School  happened  under  Prime  Minister  Mori 
Yoshirō(2000-1); specifically, his decision in 2001 to issue a visa to former president of 
Taiwan Lee Teng-hui. China had strongly warned Japan not to grant Lee a visa, and the 
China  School  in  the  MOFA  took  the  threat  seriously;  initially  a  decision  was  made  by 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Kōno Yōhei not to issue a visa. Mori overrode the decision of the 
MOFA and the China School, to grant Lee a visa, ostensibly for humanitarian grounds to 
access a certain medical treatment in hospital.
289 Mori‘s decision was popular. Even the 
liberal,  left  of  centre  Asahi  Shimbun  supported  the  stance  taken  by  the  GOJ,  which 
appealed to both humanitarian and democratic solidarity for the Left and the rising ‗saying 
no‘ nationalism of the Right. Criticism began to mount over the MOFA, and in particular the 
China School‘s mishandling of the situation. Indeed, Murata Ryohei, a (very) high up official 
in the MOFA, came out and directly criticised the China School for their approach.
290 Within 
the Ministry itself, it was realized that the current stock of China managers was perhaps too 
close to China emotionally.  
 
The China School was again snubbed by the Koizumi administration. The loss of Tanaka 
Makiko as an advocate for a pro-China policy of course greatly reduced the China School‘s 
influence at the highest levels of foreign policy making. But aside from that, its reputation 
was further damaged by a series of crises, such as the 2002 Shenyang incident (in which 
Chinese police entered a Japanese consulate to seize North Korean refugees).
291 After its 
offices were raided by Chinese police, the MOFA was restrained in criticising what was, by 
any interpretation, a grave breach of diplomatic protocol and national sovereignty.  This 
concession by the MOFA to China did not go over well in Tokyo‘s Nagatachō – with Koizumi 
stepping in to heighten the disciplinary actions against the officials involved. 
 
The loosening of the China School‘s grip on foreign policy making can also be seen in the 
appointment of Akiba Takeo as the director of MOFA‘s China/Mongolia Division.
292 Akiba 
was not a member of the China School, but one of the young turks, a fluent speaker of 
English and on the fast track to the coveted position of vice-minister of foreign affairs. 
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Akiba‘s appointment represented a further reduction in the China School‘s influence, and 
the rise of the ‗realist‘ officials who take a harder line on China.
293 Akiba‘s replacement by 
Tarumi Hideo in 2008 did little to change this fact, as both men believe that a firm line must 
to taken on crucial matters now before China‘s power grows to the point where Japan‘s 
voice will not be heard.
294 In fact the climate within the ministry is now such that while the 
China School has assets it could bring to J apan‘s  China  policy  formulation  (such  as 
language, contacts and cultural knowledge), these assets cannot be accessed.
295 Indeed, 
since 2001 a program has put in place to train China experts within the MOFA rather than 
to accept from outside those already with the skills . This is in order to prevent private 
feelings interfering in policy asse ssments.
296 This shift towards  managers  developed  in 
house suggests that that the China School has faded from relevance.   
 
What we see then in Japan‘s China policy making is the falling away of the elements which 
would oppose a containment strategy. While some have called this the fragmentation of 
Japan‘s policy-making towards China, fragmentation is only half the story.
297 At the level of 
the  executive,  generation  change  has  removed  those  who  recall  Japan‘s  historical 
aggression towards the Chinese. The new Japanese leadership is more interested in the 
future than in the past. While Abe‘s prime ministership may have marked the height of 
momentum for ‗normalization‘ of Japan, it is clear that at the popular level the norm of anti-
militarism  is  dying  as  Japan  moves  towards  constitution  reform  and  the  increased 
importance of Japan‘s national defence. In the bureaucracies too, those who would oppose 
a harder line strategy are finding their voice reduced. With the death of these voices, Japan 
will be more willing to try to check Chinese influence where Japanese national interest 
clashes with it. 
 
Other Ministries involved in foreign policy 
Lastly, the various bureaucracies within Japan have differing and competing views about 
the rise of China. There is no executive foreign policy oversight in the MOFA to control the 
various policy initiatives of the METI, the MOF or the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishery  (MAFF)  in  the  international  arena,  leading  to  potential  fragmentation  of  policy 
towards China.
298  Even the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare can become involved in 
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foreign  policy  making,  such  as  over  the  issue  of  food  security  in  China  caused  by 
contaminated Gyōza. In particular, the Ministry of Finance (MOF)‘s basic standpoint on the 
rise of China is that the phenomena while significant is over-emphasized, MOF officials 
apparently still citing Paul Krugman‘s ―What happened to Asia?” (1998) or Gerald Segal‘s 
―Does China Matter?” (1999).
299 The MOF does not greatly trust Chinese statistics and is 
suspicious  about  whether  China  will  actually  deliver  on  international  legal  promises. 
Moreover  the  MOF  is  the  champion  for  globalising  Japan‘s  financial  market,  and  view 
China as a potential future threat there.  
 
The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry is diametrically opposed to the MOF view, 
regarding China‘s rise as a reality of profound significance. METI officials believe that for 
Japan to recover it must compete with China, although they emphasise the complementary 
nature  of  the  two  economies.  For  this  reason,  the  METI  has  championed  Free  Trade 
Agreements (FTA) across Asia, but there are still concerns that the Japan-China link is not 
concluded.
300  Lastly, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) is highly sceptical of China and its so-
called peaceful  rise. Kliman  note s  that,  ―a  majority  of  uniformed  and  civilian  leaders 




3.5  Conclusion 
 
This section has examined the rise of China. It has noted that even as China‘s national 
power as measured in both military and economic terms has increased rapidly, Japan has 
been stagnant in absolute terms. The result of these trends, from a power theoretical point 
of view, is that Japan and China have entered the zone of power transition. At the same 
time,  from  a  liberal  perspective,  it  is  clear  that  interdependence  is  growing  –  but 
asymmetrically.  The  Japanese  economy  is  becoming  more  dependent  on  China,  while 
China‘s dependence on Japan is falling as it emerges as the workshop of  the world (a 
function previously of industrial Japan). This shift suggests that Japan ought to become 
more interested in having good political relations with China. However, Japan had not made 
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significant overtures under the LDP, even if the potential to do so has now increased under 
the DPJ. This seems to be due to the emergence of a dangerous tension between the 
national identities of the two countries. Due to a series of events in which the ‗ugly face‘ of 
China was revealed, Japanese officials have all but stopped trusting the People‘s Republic 
of China – and, at the popular level perhaps ‗Chinese‘ more widely defined.  
 
Moreover  even  as  a  power  transition  unfolds  at  the  national  level,  Japan  has  been 
changing  internally.  Generational  shift  at  the  level  of  the  political  executive,  and  the 
evolution in their powers, suggest that Japan will be more likely to take a harder line stance 
towards China in the international arena. At the same time as the influence of the more 
cautious voices on China declined, the previous ‗brakes‘ on hawkish policy in the opposition 
political parties and the corridors of the MOFA became less interested in taking a pro-China 
line. All this suggests that Japan is now less likely to be patient with China, and more willing 
to flex its diplomatic muscles.  
 
Viewed  from  the  three  theoretical  perspectives  discussed  in  this  chapter  and  from  the 
domestic political situation, the outlook for Sino-Japanese relationship is less than glowing. 
It will take a Herculean effort (on both sides) to undo the damage of years of suspicion, 
indeed it may require a fundamental change in the nature of either or both of the two 
countries - hopefully peaceably achieved. The point is that, despite the promise of major 
mutual gains, Sino-Japanese cooperation has powerful constraints on it. This political fact 
will help us to explain in later chapters the limited nature of Sino-Japanese cooperation in 
regional institutions. 
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4  East Asian Free Trade Area 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
Within the auspices of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) grouping, the most important agenda 
item is that of a Free Trade Area (FTA). Such an FTA would be a symbol of an East Asian 
community in a similar way that the European Common Market is for Europe; a community 
predicated on a certain level of trust and reflective of warm strategic relations. However, 
such an FTA has proved elusive for Asia thus far.  
 
One of the key reasons for this inability to conclude this crucial regional pact lies in the 
Sino-Japanese  relationship.  Specifically,  Japan‘s  response  to  China‘s  rising  regional 
economic significance has been to attempt to lock-in its pre-existing advantages. Thus, 
Japan has not sought cooperative regional leadership with China in the field of trade. This 
unwillingness to cooperate with China has meant that the common regional institutions for 
trade have not merely failed to develop; they have developed in ways which complicate any 
future  institutionalization.  The  inability  to  form  a  Japan-China  FTA  has  precluded  the 
formation of hub which might pull in other East Asian economies into a single harmonized 
regime and instead has created a bilaterally-networked form of trade regionalism. Until now, 
this link between Sino-Japanese relations and the troubles facing the region‘s so-called 
‗noodle bowl‘ network of trade agreements has not been explored empirically. Exploring this 
link forms this chapter‘s contribution to academic understanding. 
 
This chapter argues that realist theories are half right regarding the East Asian Free Trade 
Area (EAFTA) project. Hegemonic stability is indeed a crucial factor in the creation of a new 
regional trade  institution. However, Japanese regional trade  policy is more than  merely 
economic  power  balancing.
302 In  order  to  understand  some  of  the  specifics  of  Japan‘s 
policy  towards  an  EAFTA  it  is  necessary  to  examine  variables  that  liberals  and 
constructivists identify as significant. Liberal-institutionalism does a good job of explaining 
how Japan went about concluding its various bilateral, and ultimately sub-regional, FTAs or 
- as Japan prefers to call them - Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA). In addition to 
Japanese domestic political variables, these agreements have acquired a life of their own 
in the international arena and path dependency effects are in play with each FTA affecting 
the  outcome  of  others  still  under  negotiation  or  not  yet  even  conceived.
303  Lastly, 
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constructivist variables must also be considered, at a minimum as a supplement to realism 
in  order  to  understand  the  direction  and  degree  of  balancing,  and  in  order  to  ground 
ourselves in Japan‘s political realities and appreciate how limited Japan‘s policy responses 
actually are - as opposed to the freedoms that realism would posit.  
 
4.1.1  EAFTA as a regional institution. 
Bilateral FTAs as a means for furthering free trade and increasing global welfare are hotly 
contested  within  the  economic  academic  community.  A  debate  even  surrounds  the 
nomenclature  itself.  Many  economists  insist  that  FTAs  be  called  Preferential  Trade 
Agreements  (PTAs)  to  better  describe  their  effects.
304  While  bilateral  FTAs  do  ‗free 
(liberalize) trade‘ between two countries, the effect is to deflect, (or perhaps deliberately, to 
direct), trade from the lowest cost producer under the global system to the lowest cost 
producer with the FTA ‗alliance.‘  
 
Why a country would choose to direct/deflect trade to its FTA partners, while puzzling to an 
economist, is in political/strategic terms understandable.
305 Economically, it is well known 
that most ―PTAs [FTAs] rarely make much of a difference to aggregate national welfare.‖
306 
This has certainly been the case for many of Japan‘s FTA/EPAs with ASEAN (which may 
well imply such political factors). Apart from the domestic politics, FTA signing ceremonies 
are a chance for politicians hoping to look competent economically and to get on TV.
307 
However, it is also possible that states would choose to formalize their trade relationships in 
an FTA for strategic reasons, such as the protection of domestic industries in the face 
‗external‘ competition, securing access to resources or protecting strategic technology. If 
FTAs  are  signed  for  these  strategic  reasons  and  especially  if  they  grant  significant 
preferential advantages, the effects can be more than merely trade distorting but can raise 
or exacerbate political tensions between the FTA in-group and those excluded.
308 
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On the other hand, some (mostly liberal thinkers) have argued that FTAs in fact increase 
the prospects for peaceful relationships between  the dyad. While possible, it seems to 
depend  greatly  on  the  sort  of  FTA  envisaged.  While  these  studies  show  a  correlation 
between  FTA  and  peaceful  dyadic  relations,  it  is  uncertain  the  extent  and  direction  of 
causality.
309  It may be, in fact likely it is, that FTAs are signed between parties which do not 
expect to fight each other and so are happy to preference each other. 
 
Part of the reason as to why different studies have drawn different conclusions about the 
link between peace and an FTA is due to confusion between a Free Trade Area and a Free 
Trade Agreement; i.e. whether the agreement is bilateral or multilateral. For most this 
distinction matters little, as both types of FTAs aim to liberalize trade among a group of 
countries.  However,  there  are  important  differences  in  the  political  implications  of 
membership.  Put  crudely,  bilateral  FTAs  contain  a  very  real  possibility  of  worsening 
relations within the region, whereas area-wide FTAs (such as those found in Europe and 
the Americas) are more likely to boost regional security, albeit with a potential cost to those 
outside of the region.  The reason for this  ‗peace effect‘ is that a regional level FTA (or 
Customs Union in Europe‘s case) creates an institution in which rules are shared, including 
the attendant norms about conflict resolution.  
 
On the other hand, bilateral FTAs will tend to create competing ‗hubs‘ around the largest 
economies. In the case that these large economies share an FTA and the rules of the FTA 
are common to their FTAs with the smaller economies, and those rules (e.g. culmination) 
are common also to the FTAs among the smaller economies, then little is lost in the de 
facto  trade  area.
310   Indeed,  the  justification  for  East  Asia‘s  bilateral  FTAs  was  as  a 
‗stepping  stone‘  towards  a  regional  FTA,  building  up  from  de  facto  and  informal 
arrangements towards the creation of a full-fledged trade institution called the EAFTA.
311  
 
4.2  The EAFTA Agenda Emerges  
  
The formation of a Free Trade Area in East Asia was not initially a mandated APT task. 
Notwithstanding previous proposals for a preferential trade body, such as Dr. Mahathir‘s 
infamous and ill-fortuned East Asia Economic Group, the very structure of the first several 
APT summits militated against the realization of an EAFTA. Indeed, the first meeting held in 
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Kuala  Lumpur  1997  produced  separate  Joint  Statements  for  Japan  and  China  -  an 
indication of how far from cooperative the two giants were. Moreover, the ASEAN-China 
joint statement made no real mention of economic matters (save APEC) in spite of the 
ongoing  financial  crisis,  staying  almost  entirely  with  politico-security  matters.  The  joint 
statement  of  ASEAN-Japan  also  made  no  mention  of  a  free  trade  agenda  within  the 
auspices of the APT; in fact both ASEAN and Japan confirmed the centrality of the WTO 
and  APEC  in  any  further  liberalization.  The  1999  Joint  Declaration  on  East  Asia 
Cooperation, (the Manila Declaration) also avoided formal suggestion of a Free Trade Area, 




The first formal inclusion of the words Free Trade Agreement in the press releases after the 
APT came at the fifth summit in 2001, Brunei. A report by the ASEAN -China expert group 
was  considered,  and  ASEAN  endorsed  the  proposal  for  a  Framework  on  Economic 
Cooperation, and importantly the establishment within ten years of an ASEAN-China Free 
Trade Agreement. Significantly, this was not a plan to move ahead with an East Asian Free 
Trade Area designed to include all 13 members of the APT. After having successfully 
concluded difficult negotiations with the US about accession to the WTO, China‘s Premier 
Zhu Rongji was poised to seize the initiative at the regional level too.
313  In fact perversely, 




Although Zhu Rongji had signposted his intentions a year prior at the 2000 APT summit, the 
Chinese proposal caught Japan unawares. In Japan, the MOFA had viewed the proposal 
as unrealistic lip service and paid it little attention.
315 Both the Japanese and international 
media started to ask how it was that China, a developing country could offer an FTA before 
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Japan.
316 According to some in the METI, Japan had discussed with ASEAN members 
whether ASEAN would take up China‘s offer after 2000 but were told by ASEAN officials 




What shocked Japan the most about China‘s proposed FTA with the ASEAN was not the 
suddenness, nor the economic content, but the implications of the act itself. The proposal 
seemed to be a strategic play in the East Asian power game, aimed at replacing Japan as 
the head of Asia‘s economic order. Of course this view is denied by China. Zhang Yunling, 
one of the leading figures in the China-ASEAN FTA has said, ―I participated in initiation the 
China-ASEAN  FTA,  [there  was]  no[t]  any  political  consideration  to  isolate  Japan,  just 
improving  relations  with  ASEAN.‖
318 But  as  Sheng  Lijun  notes,  the  ASEAN-China  FTA 
feasibility study was set up in 2000 after Zhu had announced it at the APT – revealing the 
political nature of the decision. In fact Sheng has discovered that the focus of the FTA study 
in Beijing (the study by Zhang) was on the geo-political implications of the proposal rather 
than, as one might expect, the economics.
319 And as others have noted, a China–ASEAN 
FTA will also provide China (and ASEAN) with a stronger bargaining position for negotiating 
an  EAFTA  with  Japan  and  South  Korea.
320 Underlying the ASEAN-China FTA proposal 
therefore,  was  ―China‘s  strong  belief  that  Beijing  should  assume  a  leading  role  in  the 
process of East Asian integration.‖
321 Japanese politicians and bureaucrats also tended to 
perceive Chinese intentions in this manner.
322 
 
One of the unintended side-effects of China‘s FTA proposal was to prime ASEAN for an 
agreement with Japan. For Southeast Asian countries, China‘s comparative advantage in 
the field of low skilled labour was a challenge. There were already fears that FDI would be 
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redirected from ASEAN to China, the remedy for which could be found in an agreement 
with Japan.
323 Politically too, the ASEAN-Chinese FTA had the potential to undermine the 
ASEAN Free  Trade  Aread (AFTA)  –  as  the bilaterally  negotiated  early  harvest  clauses 
could potentially ‗distract‘ a core group from pursuing intra-ASEAN integration. China also 
benefited in its quest to be recognized as a market economy in the WTO, a victory in 
ASEAN  preparing  the  way  for  recognition  by  Japan  and  other  major  economies.
324 It 
became clear to Japan that some form of counter-offer to ASEAN had to be made.
325    
  
4.2.1  Japan’s Initial response: Singapore 
In the 2001 APT Press statement, Japan‘s PM Koizumi Junichirō revealed his intent to 
make a counter-offer to ASEAN.
326 The first response was a knee -jerk ODA offer, Japan 
pledging further economic assistance for Southeast Asia, focused on technology and the IT 
sector.
327 Koizumi  also  established  FTA/EPA  Affairs  Departments  in  both  MOFA  and 
METI.
328 Japan and ASEAN also agreed to  deepen  their relationship at the APT   by 
declaring 2003 as their year of  exchange. But perhaps the greatest diplomatic coup for 
Japan came at the end of 2003, the privilege of hosting the first ASEAN summit held 
outside Southeast Asia.  Japan also proposed an EPA to ASEAN just one day after the 
China-ASEAN FTA framework agreement was announced in November 2002.
329 
 
Yet it was clear that to bring the ASEAN-Japan relationship on par with China, more formal 
FTAs were needed. In Singapore in January 2002 Koizumi offered a vision of an East Asian 
community ―that acts together and advances together‖, and proposed a Japan-Singapore 
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FTA. Singapore was the logical first choice for Japan because it had no agricultural sector. 
It  was  therefore  believed  that  an  agreement  could  be  reached  quickly,  effectively 
responding to China and triggering a round of negotiations with ASEAN as a whole.
330  
 
China moves again 
The 2003 APT summit in Bali looked to be a repeat of the previous year‘s pattern, with 
China leading and Japan following. China‘s decision to accede to the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation  (TAC)  early  that  year  earned  China  warm  praise  in  the  Chairman‘s  press 
statement, which ―welcomed…[China‘s accession to the TAC] as testimony to our deeper 
political trust.‖ The same document ―encouraged Japan to consider its accession to the 
TAC.‖
331 Moreover, China‘s Premier Wen Jiabao pressed ahead with the EAFTA project by 
signing the Protocol to Amend the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation, thereby bringing forward the previously agreed deadline of the China-ASEAN 
FTA to 2010. Premier Wen also proposed a feasibility study be undertaken about the future 
establishment of a free trade area in East Asia (as defined as the APT membership).
332 
 
Wen also pursued the possibility of an FTA within Northea st Asia, i.e. with Japan. In fact, 
the Premier of the PRC, Zhu Rongji had proposed an FTA among the Plus Three countries 
(China, Japan and South Korea)  at the previous APT in November 2002 . Koizumi had 
responded to this offer coolly, noting ―it should be considered.‖
333 Wen continued on this 
proposal by suggesting instead a bilateral China-Japan FTA at the ASEAN Summit in Bali, 
but again Koizumi was evasive and called for further study.
334 Further study was merely 
another way of politely saying  ‗no‘  to  China  -  a  fact  made  clear  by  the  agreement  to 
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4.2.2  The Japan-ASEAN FTA (AJCEP) 
Perceiving the prospect for regional leadership with ASEAN at the December 2003 Japan-
ASEAN  summit  in  Tokyo,  Koizumi  proposed  a  Japan-ASEAN  FTA.  However,  the  2003 
summit  did  not  reveal  any  concrete  details  about  the  trade  pact.  Instead,  Koizumi 
sweepingly proposed that Japan and ASEAN become the central axis of the East Asia 
grouping - JASEAN axis to which others could be invited. Hoping to sweeten the deal, 
Koizumi pledged a further US$3 billion in aid to Southeast Asia and promised to maintain 
security  ties,  further  liberalise  trade  and  deliver  on  the  ―economic  partnership.‖
336 
Intriguingly, despite the origins of this historical summit in Koizumi‘s response to ASEAN 
after  China‘s  FTA  pitch,  Japan  took  care  to  present  the  Japan-ASEAN  summit  as 
something occurring completely independent of China. One official pointedly remarking that 
the Japan-ASEAN summit ―is about Japan and ASEAN, and I do not expect questions 
about China to be raised.‖
337 This summit led to Japan acceding to the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation  (in  July  2004),  Japan  again  seeming  to  be  playing  catch-up  with  China. 
Moreover, China furthered its lead signing an agreement for trade in goods as the first 
ASEAN Plus One FTA in November of that year.  
 
In January of 2005, Japan and ASEAN entered negotiations on an EPA/FTA, the ASEAN 
Japan  Comprehensive  Economic  Partnership  (AJCEP).  However,  Japan‘s  progress  in 
Southeast  Asia  was  not  mirrored  by  developments  in  Northeast  Asia  with  Koizumi‘s 
continued visits to the Yasukuni shrine ending the possibility for any progress with China 
and Korea. As anti-Japanese riots broke out in cities across China, Wen Jiabao and Hu 
Jintao called off meetings bilaterally with Koizumi at the APT Summit in Kuala Lumpur in 
December.  With tensions mounting between China and Japan, Koizumi sought to increase 
Japan‘s presence in ASEAN, pledging a further US$70 million in aid.
338 More importantly, 
Koizumi also signed the first of the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnerships 
with Malaysia.
339 Japan also successful pressed (over Chinese objections) for the inclusion 
of Australia, New Zealand and India in the newly established East Asian Summit . The first 
meeting of which was held in December 2005.
340 
                                                   
336 Vincent Wang, "The Logic of China-Asean Free Trade Agreement: Economic Statecraft Of "Peaceful Rise"," in China 
in the World, the World in China (University of Malaya: Institute of China Studies, 2007).   p. 25, ASEAN was hoping to 
cut some profits out of the great power game, and would never side clearly with Japan – certainly not for 3bil in aid 
337 Anthony Rowley, "Koizumi to Convince Asean on Integration.," Business Times Singapore, 1 December 2003. 
338 Natsumi Mizumoto, "Koizumi Raps China, Pledges Aid in Talks with Asean," Kyodo news, 13 December 2005., even 
the handshake between Wen and Koizumi was re-interpreted by the Chinese official as given as a formality only. 
339 Ibid., even the handshake between Wen and Koizumi was re -interpreted by the Chinese official as given as a 
formality only. 
340 China objects to the phrase ―the creation of an East Asian Community‖ be included in the 14 December, 2005 Kuala 
Lumpur East Asian Summit, stating that that phrase be used only in the APT declaration. A compromise solution calling 
for ―community building in this region‖ is finally agreed to. Tomotaka Shōji, "Pursuing a Multi-Dimensional Relationship: 87 
 
4.2.3  Japan leads with CEPEA 
The  year  2006  marked  an  evolution  in  Japan‘s  FTA  strategy.  In  April,  Nikai  Toshiyuki, 
Japan‘s METI minister suggested an FTA among the EAS members. Then in August, Nikai 
launched the Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA) initiative (for a 
‗full‘  EAFTA  with  the  sixteen  members  of  the  EAS)  at  the  ASEAN  Economic  Ministers 
meeting. The CEPEA idea proposed by Nikai, and approved by Koizumi‘s Economic and 
Fiscal Committee, focussed more on non-tariff concerns – chief among them the relaxation 
of Japan‘s standards for foreign workers.
341  
 
However, the true extent of strategic thinking behind the CEPEA proposal is questionable. 
Firstly, it is apparent that the proposal was decision made on the fly, with little research or 
preparation before the proposal.
342 Secondly, the CEPEA apparently was designed to fit a 
gap in the ‗Asia‘ section in METI‘s 2006 Economic Strategy Whitepaper. Moreover, it was 
not an idea which came from Koizumi, except indirectly via the creation of the EAS.
343 In 
fact, the CEPEA is best understood as a piece of ‗on the fly‘ diplomacy. Not only did the 
METI minister reverse the PM‘s opposition to engaging in an FTA with China, but he did so 
in  way  which  suited  both  his personal  opinions
344 and the bureaucratic interests of the 
METI. It suddeness provoked a backlash from the Mini stry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheies (MAFF) and its then minister Nakagawa Shōichi.  
 
Furthermore,  as  CEPEA  entered  a  research  phase,  Japan  continued  to  build  onto  its 
ASEAN-Japan  Comprehensive  Economic  Partnership  (AJCEP)  framework,  reaching 
agreements with the Philippines in September and Indonesia (in principle) in November. 
The CEPEA received minimal reaction from ASEAN, in part because the December 2006 
APT Summit in the Philippines had to be rescheduled to early 2007 due to a Typhoon.
345 
 
The year 2007 was also very politically active, not least because the APT summit would be 
held twice.  The 10
th APT Summit was held in January in the Philippines. The extent of the 
competition between China and Japan was evident in the Chairman‘s Statement in which 
the two rivals each offered a series of inducements in what appeared to be bidding war.
 346 
                                                                                                                                                     
Rising China and Japan's Southesast Asia Policy," in The Rise of China: Responses from Southeast Asia and Japan ed. 
Jun Tsunekawa (Tokyo: National Institute for Defence Studies, 2009). p. 174 
341 "Panel Pushes 16-Nation FTA in Asia, Mulls Boosting Foreign Workers," Kyodo News, 4/7 2006. 
342 Author's Interview with Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry Official Sekizawa Yoichi (FTA/Epa Analyst), 17 
November 2009. Tokyo. 
343 Ibid.. 
344 Ibid. 
345 The Philippines domestic political situation did not help either, quite unstable and with  rumours of a terrorist plot to 
attack the APT gathering.  
346 Offers of inducements from China and Japan ran, literally, alternately throughout the document, and included a series 88 
 
However, the most significant event for the development of an EAFTA was the signing by 
China and ASEAN of a new agreement for trade in services. The ASEAN-China Agreement 
on the trade in services represented a further challenge to Japan in the field of regional 
economic  leadership.  This  agreement  would  later  be  combined  with  the  China-ASEAN 




Return to Japan-ASEAN 
While the beginning of the year saw Japan and Thailand signed their bilateral EPA (April 
2007), the significance of such bilaterals were already beginning to decline in the face of 
the imminent Japan-ASEAN pact and other region-wide projects. In fact, the key outcomes 
of the APT Summit (November 2007) were the Second Joint Statement on East Asian 
Cooperation and the more concrete APT Cooperation Work Plan (2007-2017), discussed 
later. Another opportunity for advancing a Sino-Japanese trade agreement was missed at 
the APT. Although the leaders of Japan and China met for two hours on the sidelines, the 
discussions were by necessity focused on the Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands dispute which 
was threatening to boil over.  Lastly, Japan and ASEAN also reached final agreement on 
the Japan-ASEAN EPA Framework agreement.
348  
 
Due to domestic political unrest (which  was manifested in a blocking off of the Bangkok 
airport), the November 2008 APT Summit was cancelled, returning the focus to the bilateral 
arena. In December, Japan concluded negotiations with Vietnam on a bilateral EPA/FTA. 
The negotiations themselves only began in January of 2007, making the J apan-Vietnam 
EPA one of the quickest – indeed Japan has quickened the pace of negotiations over time, 
sacrificing inclusiveness in order to get a quicker result.
349 This was due largely to trying to 
                                                                                                                                                     
of training seminars (Japan/China), support for disaster reduction (Japan), regional monitoring on infectious diseases 
(China), US$67 million for Avian Flu (Japan), establish an Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA, 
Japan (see APT resources)) and, an Expert Group on EAFTA Report (China, the Report was headed by Zhang Yunling, 
recommended that an EAFTA be agreed to sooner rather than later, to those ends be negotiated as a single undertaking, 
but these recommendations were not accepted by either ASEAN or Japan. One doubts if China actually wanted to move 
this quickly too.) And, for good measure, Korea got in on the inducement-fest offering an APT Center for the Gifted in 
Science. 
347 Carsten Fink, "East Asian Preferential Trade Agreements in Services: Liberalization Content and WTO Rules," World 
Trade Review 7, no. 4 (2008). p. 647, Japan‘s commitments to ASEAN under their EPA for liberalization of investment 
are usually substantive – going further that those requirements found in the GATS. The Chinese commitments in the 
China-ASEAN investment agreement are however almost entirely show – not going further than General Agreement on 
Trade in Services.  
348 Although it took some five years more than China to conclude , and thus interpreted as a  signal of Japan‘s basic 
disinterest in Southeast Asia by ASEAN. 
349 Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, The Political Economy of Regionalism in East Asia (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008). p. 
154, 89 
 
fit Vietnam into the AJCEP, which also went into effect in December of 2008.
350 But on the 
issue of trade regionalism, slotting Vietnam into the AJCEP also put Japan on a more equal 
footing with China in ASEAN. In order to strike a better balance still, Japan also created a 




The result of these moves by Japan and China are graphically represented in Figure 11, 
which shows all FTAs proposed, under negotiation or concluded by Japan or China in East 
Asia.  
 

















Source:  Asian  Development  Bank,  Asian  Regional  Integration  Centre,  FTA  Database. 
Accessed: April 2010 
   
                                                   
350  The JACEP went into force for five of the eleven members (Japan, Vietnam, Laos, Malaysia and Brunei. "Asean-
Japanese FTA to Take Effect Dec. 1," Japan Times, 22 October 2008. 
351 China appointed Xue Hanqin as ambassador at large for ASEAN in December 30 2008, GOJ appointed a Southeast 
Asian specialist, Katori Yoshinori to the post of ambassador in October 17 2008. Japan announced its intent to post an 
ambassador at the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference in July 23 2008, earlier than China who responded in Beijing 
one day later.  
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   This figure is included on page 89 of the print copy of  
     the thesis held in the University of Adelaide Library.90 
 
4.2.4  The China factor in Japan’s EAFTA policy.  
While it is clear that Japan has championed a rival vision of the EAFTA project to that of 
China,  it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  the China  is  the  cause.  Japan‘s  rival  EAFTA 
project may have resulted from other external factors or internal interests. However, this 
section argues that is the China factor that matters most. This will be demonstrated by 
examining  the  timing  of  Japan‘s  proposals,  the  partners  Japan  chose  and  Japan‘s 
negotiating strategy. 
 
Even  before  the  emergence  of  China  on  the  FTA  scene  Japan  had  faced  economic 
pressure  to  form  bilateral  trade  agreements.  The  most  important  of  these  was  the 
emergence of trade blocs in Europe and North America, which had led some scholars to 
interpret Japan‘s EAFTA movements as a defensive response to economic regionalism in 
the Americas and Europe rather than a coping strategy for China.
352  Japan was aware of 
the detrimental effect of tariff liberalising trade agreements which excluded Japan. In fact, 
even before China proposed its FTA to ASEAN, Japan and Korea begun to study a possible 
bilateral FTA as early as 1998. To explain its changing position on FTAs, Japan adopted in 
1999 a new ―White Paper on Trade.‖
353 This document discussed broadening Japanese 
trade strategy to include both multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations and marked a 
break with Japan‘s previous policy WTO-centred non-discriminatory trade negotiations. It 
did not mention China, but rather the emergence of outside trade blocs, as the cause of a 
shift in Japan‘s trade policy.  
 
However, while the negative effects of these trade blocs were becoming harder to dismiss, 
many within Japan continued to discount their import.
354 This perception  of the utility of 
FTAs rested on the growing feeling that although Japan‘s trade was not being hurt directly, 
Japan was suffering indirectly by not being a part of the rapid expansion of trade within 
these  Free  Trade  Areas.  But  as  the  extent  of  damage  was  hidden  and  might  only  be 
gauged indirectly, it was difficult to mobilize political support for a strategic reassessment.  
 
Yet  Japan  was  lagging  behind  in  terms  of  such  agreements.  A  survey  by  the  World 
Customs Organizations found that in 2008 only 3.1% of Japan‘s trade was with FTA or 
Customs Union partners (China scored lower,1.6%) as compared to nearly a third (30%) 
percent  for  the  US,  and  two-thirds  or  above  for  EU  member  countries  (66-75%,  inc. 
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Germany  and  France).
355  Moreover,  compared  with  countries  within  these  regional 
arrangements,  Japanese  traders  faced  on  average  higher  tariff  rates.  Japan‘s  trade  is 
increasingly  concentrated  in  East  Asia,  where  the  average  higher  tariff  rates  of  these 
countries pose an addition burden for Japan‘s exporters; this is particularly true in key 
markets such as Indonesia and sectors like automobiles.
356 Indeed, correlations between 
the economies of the APT and US/EU are declini ng, while at the same time the APT 
economies  have  increasingly  moved  together  against  ‗external‘  economies.
357  These 
phenomena, regardless of their causes
358, implied that the region was ‗naturally‘ ready for 
an FTA proposal.  
 
The last of these external arguments suggested that the stalled Cancun WTO negotiations 
have also given a general impetus to defect to bilateral and regional FTAs; even though 
these alternative modes come at a cost to real progress on trade liberalization.
359 Indeed, 
Japan‘s Working Group on Economic Partnership Agreements in the Council on Economic 
and  Fiscal    Policy  pointed  out  that  bilateral  EPAs  not  only  allow  for  close  economic 
cooperation in investment and transport, but may in fact achieve a better result for Japan 
than would be possible under the WTO process.
360 
 
Yet these pressures alone or in combination do not predict when or with whom Japan would 
attempt to conclude bilateral FTAs. If these extra -regional pressures were sufficient, one 
would expect Japan to approach China and Korea  first in the process of building up a 
regional trade bloc.
361 The reason why Japan preferred to launch an FTA with ASEAN and 
not China reflected political realities. Moreover, the timing of Japan‘s FTA proposal, even if 
not  solely  determined  by  China‘s  ASEAN  FTA  bid,  was  certainly  triggered  by  it.  The 
                                                   
355  See  Annex  II  of  "Survey  on  Free  Trade  Agreements  (September  2008),"  
http://www.wcoomd.org/files/1.%20Public%20files/PDFandDocuments/Harmonized%20System/SurveyFTA20080915.pd
f.2008, December 
356 Lydia Yu-Jose, "Phillipines-Japan Economic Partnership: Where Is the Philippines in Japan's Plan," in  Discussion 
paper series (Manila: the Philipine Insitute for Development Studies, 2004). p. 15. She notes that,“As is apparent from 
the simple average figures for tariff rates (the U.S, 3.6%; the E.U., 4.1%; China, 10%; Malaysia, 14.5%; the Republic of 
Korea, 16.1%; the Philippines, 25.6%; and Indonesia, 37.5%), East Asia, the region where Japanese products account 
for the highest percentage in trade, has the highest tariffs.‖ 
357 Indeed intra-regional trade in East Asia is higher than that of NAFTA,   Masahiro Kawai, "Evolving Economic 
Architecture in East Asia," (Tokyo: ADB Institute Discussion Paper No. 84, 2007).  pp.  7-8 
358 Various interpretations, East Asia is now subject to common supply shocks  (Oil, US market movements etc), other 
interpretations emphasize China‘s role in production. 
359 Peter Drysdale, "Regional Cooperation in East Asia and FTA Strategies ," in  Pacific  Economic  Papers  No.344 
(Canberra: Australian National University, 2005). p. 13 
360 Especially for car exporters, this view supported by Tanaka Hitoshi (Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs until 2005). See, 
Aurelia George Mulgan, "Japan's FTA Politics and the Problem of Agricultural Trade Liberalisation" (paper presented at 
the Symposium on Australia and Free Trade Agreements, Australian National University, 1-2 November 2007). 
361 Indeed, this is precisely what officials in the METI have been advocating.  92 
 
Chinese proposal was a foreign policy crisis of sorts which allowed for a reconfiguration of 
strategy.
362 The political rationale for Japan‘s FTA policy is  openly explained in  Japan‘s 
2004 Diplomatic Blue Book itself.
363 
 
Apart from the direct pressure explanation for Japan‘s switch to an FTA-led regional trade 
policy,  the  rise  of  China  has  also  indirectly  contributed  to  Japan‘s  push  for  FTAs  with 
ASEAN. Indeed, Singapore‘s Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong‘s initial offer of an FTA to 
Japan‘s PM Obuchi in 2000 was seen as an attempt to balance China‘s rising presence in 
Singapore (and ASEAN).
364  Whilst on the Japan side, Yatsu Yoshirō the second chairman 
of the LDP‘s select commission on FTAs said in interview in November 2004, ―if Japan lags 
behind China in the EPA formation, we will suffer serious economic damage. I would like to 
work positively in an EPA with ASEAN.‖ At least in the minds of Japanese decision makers 




Moreover, the manner in which Japan approached FTA negotiations suggested  that the 
China factor was important. The counter case is put forward by Katada, who argues that, ―if 
Japan‘s trade initiatives were aimed primordially to counteract China‘ leadership bid, then it 
would have responded in kind to the surprise announcement of China‘s FTA with ASEAN by 
quickly negotiating a sub-regional trade agreement focussed mostly of tariff elimination. 
Instead,  because  of  the  demands  of  the  Japanese  business  community,  the  Japanese 
government opted for a more protracted route unlikely to reap swift leadership gains.‖
366 
However,  this  confuses  intention  and  output.  As  demonstrated  previously,  Japan  was 
hoping for swiftly realized FTAs (hence the bilateral approach) which would create such 
leadership gains. Japan‘s interest only appeared to be primarily commercial once domestic-
side political actors (like MAFF) became involved and negotiations got bogged down.  
Why  the  political  ends  of  Japan‘s  strategy  were  confused  once  the  bureaucracy  got 
involved is explained by liberal-institutionalism. This confusion arose because for a long 
                                                   
362 Shiraishi  Takeshi  has  suggested  that  Japan  had  been  thinking  aloud  about  a  Japan-ASEAN  FTA,  see  Takashi 
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time MOFA and METI had built up capacities (and standard operation procedures) in trade 
negotiation with an exclusive focus on non-preferential trade at the WTO.
 367 These biases 
in  the  negotiation  teams  towards  what  Araki  calls  ‗aggressive  legalism‘,  were  always 
unlikely to win political points with Japan‘s negotiating partners in Asia. From 2000 to 2004, 
the number of personnel involved in FTA negotiations across the departments increased 




From this perspective, it is indeed possible to see h ow domestic actors can affect the 
output of policy. In setting Japan‘s FTA policy, the MOFA, METI and the MAFF operated 
separately and equally (see Appendix 3). Neither was able to veto the other and establish 
executive control. Each Ministry maintained its own task force for dealing with FTAs, and 
each ministry sent a (usually senior) bureaucrat to manage FTA negotiations.
369  Moreover, 
METI must co-opt ‗agriculture‘ Diet men on FTA matters or potentially face opposition on 
internal  industrial  policy  via  issue-linkage.
370 As a result,  international trade negotiators 
have noted that dealing with ‗Japan‘ is actually dealing with multiple and divided policy 
makers (i.e. Japan is not a unitary actor). This problem has led Mulgan to conclude that, 
―Japan does not have one FTA strategy or policy; it has several. There is no single body 
producing trade policy for Japan. Nor is there an independent body capable of coordinating 
and unifying conflicting domestic interests on trade issues.‖
371 These negotiators already 
have assumptions built up from their WTO experiences, preferring that each agreement be 
legally tight regardless of potential political fall-out.
372 
 
From a realist perspective we should have expected that Japan would seek to realize a 
sub-regional trade agreement aimed at swift leadership gains,
373 but this did not occur. 
Instead, while Japan is responding to international factors that realism highlights, the 
contents  of  the  r esponse  are  being  colo ured  by  Japan‘s  unique  domestic  political 
landscape. By incorporating this perspective into explaining Japanese policy it is easy to 
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see how a large structural phenomenon such as the rise of China might produce a policy 
neither principally focussed on managing China nor adequate to the task.  
 
4.3  Membership: Excluding China? 
 
Despite all the activities and agreements which describe the development of the EAFTA, an 
FTA between Japan and China has not been realized. Indeed, a China-Japan FTA is not 
even close to realization, with no formal movement as of April 2010. Further, this is true not 
merely for a bilateral arrangement but even for a trilateral pact with Korea or a plurilateral 
pact with ASEAN.
374 The greatest chance for China-Japan FTA is the CEPEA, but here 
China‘s position is negative raising doubts of its actual chances of realization. 
 
4.3.1  Bilateral: The political impossibility of China 
Despite  repeated  requests  from  the  Chinese  side,  Japan  has  been  quite  opposed  to 
proceeding with a bilateral FTA with China. The underlying reason for this is that China is 
likely to benefit significantly more if an agreement is concluded. Some have suggested that 
China could expect to increase its GDP growth by as much as a whole extra percentage 
point.
  375 In  contrast,  even  in  the  best  case  scenario,  Japan‘s  GDP  growth  might  be 
increased a mere 0.07%, according to one study.
376  
 
Yet this disparity does not imply that Japan ought to be uninterested. Quite the contrary, 
from an economic perceptive, the absolute gains for Japan from an FTA with China should 
still be very large. Japan has FTAs with much smaller countries like the Philippines (gains 
so small as to be immeasurable); so, turning away China because it is not an economically 
worthwhile  partner  is  a n  argument  that  few  would  accept.  Indeed,  most  agree  that 
economically China is Japan‘s logical FTA partner. According to modelling by Cheong, ―an 
East Asian FTA [with ASEAN included] will bring more economic benefits… compared to a 
CJK FTA, but the difference would not be great.‖
 377 In other words economically Japan 
should order its preferences for China first, then ASEAN. It is puzzling then that Japan 
would reverse that order. Cheong continues, ―According to the estimation, China is found to 
be a more suitable FTA partner to both Japan and Korea. In other words, both Japan and 
Korea  will  gain  more  benefits  by  forming  an  FTA  with  China  rather  than  concluding  a 
                                                   
374 After the trilateral in October 2009, Hatoyama proposed study of a trilateral FTA between China, Japan and Korea 
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bilateral FTA with each other.‖
378 Likewise, Japan ought to give preference to China ahead 
of  Korea,  but  here  too  the  order  is  reversed.  Indeed,  compared  to  other  developing 
countries the economic structure of Japan and China are extraordinarily complementary, 
especially in the services sector.
379 Considering the costs of conducting negotiations across 
a large number bilateral deals, a single undertaking as offered by China would show quick 
and significant results for Japan‘s economic growth.  
 
But despite these strong rationales, Japan has been unwilling to proceed with an FTA with 
China. One potential area of concern for Japan is the further hollowing out of its industrial 
base, especially in rural areas. Igawa Kazuhiro, the head of the Kobe Research Institute of 
Economics and Business, politely rephrased this classic fear of being swamped by cheap 
Chinese manufactures, noting that Japan is not able to be a market for China‘s goods and 
so an FTA should be avoided.
 380  
 
In particular the powerful agricultural lobby is strongly opposed, fearing a wipe-out of family 
farms. Subsequent to the first formal announcement at the ATP on an EAFTA with Japan 
and China (late 2003), the MAFF entered into the EPA/FTA fray issuing the ‗Green Asia 
EPA‘ report in November (2004). Couched in terms of food security, the report called for 
agricultural imports to be stable, diversified and safe (anzen anshin).
381 It clearly, though 
not explicitly, targeted China - Japan‘s second largest supplier of food. China‘s growing 
market  share  in  Japan  has  triggered  calls  for  diversification;  a  goal  which  would  be 
unattainable were Japan to conclude a China-FTA.
382 According to modelling by Urata, an 
FTA which included agriculture with China (and Korea) would drastically reduce Japan‘s 
grain production.
383 This implies that Japan would stand to ‗lose‘ US$1.3 billion annually in 
national welfare, losses focused on rural areas with traditionally strong LDP links and which 
remain  political  relevant  (although  less  so)  even  under  the  current  DPJ  regime.
384 
Intriguingly, these concerns have not prevented Japan from pursuing FTAs with Thailand 
and Australia, also major suppliers of Japan‘s food imports. 
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Moreover,  even  for  non-LDP  politicians,  there  are  few  obvious  benefits  and  potentially 
major political costs in being associated with a Japan-China FTA. Japan has been rocked 
by a series of food-scares which have originated from China and which have resulted in a 
widespread fear of Chinese imported food among the Japanese public.
385 Whether it be 
frozen gyōza, imitation eel, or contaminated dairy products, the resultant popular outrage 
makes  it  unlikely  that  Japan  would  be  able  to  conclude  a  deal  with  China.
386 Tellingly, 
Japan‘s politically powerful business lobby, the Keidanren, has not issued a single policy 
recommendation paper for a JCFTA, although it has pressed hard for bilateral FTAs with 
other East Asian countries.
387 This is in spite of the fact that most companies expect the 
highest return from an FTA with China.
388 In fact,  in  a 2006 Keidanren position paper 
entitled ―Requests of the business circles for expanding commercial and economic relations 
between Japan and China” the first four items listed were; early conclusion of an Japan-
China-Korea  investment  pact,  transparency  of  laws  and  regulations,  protection  of  the 




China is aware that there  is  no desire within Japan for an FTA with it. One important 
Chinese scholar noted that, ―China proposed to start negotiation (on FTA), but no response 
from Japan [yet]. Japan is only interested to negotiate an investment treaty for Japanese 
companies. China will face big pressure if it starts those negotiations, but China is willing to 
do so. There is no political foundation in current Japanese leaders to accept a China-Japan 
FTA yet.‖
390 Not that this has stopped China testing the waters. In October 2004, Watanabe 
Osamu Chairman of JETRO proposed to Zhang Yunling to organise a study on China-
Japan  FTA,  aimed  at  framework  for  formal  negotiation.
391 In February 2005, Chinese 
Ambassador to Japan,  Wang Yi proposed that   Japan and China launch negotiations 
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387 Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, "Japan's Keidanren and Free Trade Agreements; Societal Interests and Trade Policy,"  Asian 
Survey 45, no. 2 (2005). 
388 In a questionnaire survey presented to Keidanren members China got the highest marks as a desirable FTA partner 
(62), with ASEAN second (54) and India (39).  Also  43.8% of companies  responded favourably, of companies with 
overseas operations bases 68% were in China, see, Akira Kajita, "The Influence on Japanese Companies by East Asian 
Ftas, and an Overview of East Asian Countries' Tariff Rates," (Tokyo: JETRO, 2004). 
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390 Author's Communication With Yunling Zhang, personal correspondence, 25 September 2008. 
391 Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, The Political Economy of Regionalism in East Asia (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008). p. 
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bilaterally on a free trade agreement (without attempting to include Korea). Wang noted 
pointedly that ‗China has taken a positive attitude on an FTA with Japan and China wants to 
see a positive response from Japan.‘
392  
 
China‘s moves can be interpreted as an attempt to demonstrate China‘s willingness to 
move forward with East Asian regionalism compared with Japan. Indeed, one economist 
has  noted  that  for  China,  ―It  is  good  to  get  political  credit  for  proposing  a  free  trade 
agreement with Japan and South Korea but not really having to do it.‖
393 It is perhaps no 
surprise then that officials within Japan‘s METI have noted that the China-Japan FTA rivalry 
is very political.
394 A belief publicly held by some major figures such as Asō Tarō.
395 
 
Japan‘s disinterest in an FTA was also visible when Fukuda and Wen met at the first high 
level  economic  dialogue  meeting  in  Beijing  (November  2007),  free  trade  arrangements 
were  discussed  but  again  nothing  was  decided.  Instead,  the  focus  was  on  non-FTA 
economic cooperation on issues like climate change, energy, currency forgery and RMB 
appreciation.
396 This approach of resorting to non-FTA trade agreements was continued at 
the May 2008, Summit of Japan and China at which agreement  was reached on business 
environment concerns. This agreement (the action agenda) was finalised in December of 
that year (together with a similar document for Korea). However, the action agenda in fact 
represented  Japan‘s  unwillingness  to  progress  to  an  FTA  in  prefer  for  less  ‗political‘ 
economic cooperation.  
 
4.3.2  Trilateral: The impossibility of China revisited 
Even  with  the  addition  of  Korea  in  the  trilateral  process,  Japan‘s  opposition  to  China 
continues to prevent reaching an agreement. In 2002 a report entitled Economic effects of 
a possible Free Trade Area among China, Japan and South Korea emphasised ―the urgent 
need to establish a trilateral FTA‖; a call repeated one year in a follow-up report.
397 But 
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despite these calls, at the fifth Trilateral Summit (Bali, 2003) on the sidelines of the APT 
saw the Plus Three FTA be quietly dropped due to Japanese objections.
398  
 
In 2004, based on a study by think -tanks  within the Plus Three c ountries which had 
reported  ―substantial  macroeconomic  effects  favourable  to  the  three  countries,‖  to  the 
Trilateral Summit meeting (November 27), Premier Wen proposed to his two neighbours in 
Northeast Asia that trilateral negotiations be started. But two days later at the Trilateral 
meeting  of  the  leaders  of  Japan,  PRC  and  ROK,  Koizumi  gave  his  answer  –  further 
research at the academic level.
399 China‘s impatience with Japan began to show, Premier 
Wen publicly replying to Koizumi that, ―the need for a trilateral FTA had been pointed out in 
the Joint Study Group Report, and thus work must be accelerated to realize a trilateral 
FTA.‖
400 The subsequent two years saw no progress on the FTA front, with China calling off 
meetings with Koizumi at subsequent trilateral summits. 
 
At the December 2008 meeting of the Plus Three countries in Fukuoka City, expectations in 
Northeast Asia were high that progress might be made on an FTA. Premier Wen Jiabao 
again  proposed  that  negotiations  on  a  Japan-China  bilateral  free  trade  agreement  be 
started as soon,
 401 but Japan‘s Asō Tarō restated Japan‘s desire for the resumption of the 
stalled  bilateral  FTA  talks  with  Korea  instead.
402 With Japan still unable to reach an 
agreement, the chances for a Plus Three FTA agreement remained dim. Unsurprisingly, the 
responses of business leaders and governmental officials in the ‗state of the region‘ report 
by the PECC and ADB-OREI (2008) reveals that Northeast Asians rated the chances of a 
EAFTA  as  much  less  likely  than  their  Southeast  Asian  neighbours.
403 Lastly, the joint 
research projects which were begun in 2003 presented recommendations, and another 
                                                                                                                                                     
Japan," in Asia's New Institutional Architecture, ed. Vinod Aggarwal and Min Gyo Koo (Springer: Leipzig, 2008). pp. 104-
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round of study was proposed for 2009.
404 
 
More  recently,  Japan  under  the  D PJ  has  made  moves  toward  a  trilateral  FTA.  PM 
Hatoyama Yukio proposed on October 10  at the trilateral summit in (Beijing) that such an 
FTA be accelerated, at the same time raising the option of signing an investment pact as 
well.
405 Just over two weeks later in Hua Hin (Thailand), Hatoyama  advanced the China-
Japan-Korea trilateral FTA idea with the announcement of working groups to do joint 
research. While this is the third time research has been commissioned, it is the first time  
government departments are involved. This change in policy, however, has come from the 
top, as METI had not been asked to provide any sort of policy brief as to the implications of 
a trilateral FTA to Hatoyama (or his Office) prior to his announcements at either of the 
above forums.
406 Quite whether this is represents a major change in policy is too early to 
know. 
 
4.3.3  Plurilateral: wider not deeper (CEPEA)  
With Japan opposed to a 13 party FTA, the only grouping in which Japan is willing to 
accept China‘s participation is the Japan proposed sixteen-party FTA - the CEPEA.
407 But 
while it is true the CEPEA proposal includes China, there are at least two possible 
interpretations of its meaning. The first is simply that Japan wishes that China be involved; 
certainly the METI minister at the time Nikai Toshihiro was considered pro -China by his 
ministerial officials.
408 The second is that Japan‘s proposal was aimed at scuttling China‘s 
preferred ‗narrow‘ EAFTA among the APT members.  
 
Of course, as Japanese scholars argue, the decision to expand membership of an EAFTA 
to the democracies of Australia, New Zealand and India would imply greater gains than 
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from a narrower 13 party EAFTA.
 409 This technical truism could be extended to justify the 
inclusion  of  the  US,  Canada,  Cuba  and  the  whole  the  WTO  –  it  is  thus  a  useless 
explanation.  An  expansion  of  institutional  membership  is  in  itself  likely  to  reduce  the 
chances  of  establishment,  but  expanding  the  membership  to  these  three  particular 
countries is singularly damaging to the chances of CEPEA‘s realization. To wit, it is unlikely 
that the other major regional power, China would allow Japan to stack the FTA with its 
political allies.  
 
And  indeed,  China‘s  response  suggests  that  Japan‘s  decision  was  political.  Almost 
immediately, the Chinese Vice-Minister of Commerce came out and strongly opposed the 
proposal. On the other hand, ASEAN supported the CEPEA proposal (and Australia, New 
Zealand and India of course supported CEPEA). For METI, this protest by the Chinese side, 
taken together with previous Chinese efforts to cement the 13 party FTA (such as the 2004 
‗10+3 FTA research project‘, and monies from China to the ASEAN secretariat), suggested 
a bid by China to take over leadership in regional trade from Japan; only adding more 
urgency to CEPEA.
410 As one senior METI official said , ―China will take the lead in +3 
negotiations. We should promote +6 negotiations ahead of the curve.‖
411  
 
Japan‘s advocacy of the CEPEA therefore is due to a sort of realist type of thinking focused 
on balancing against China. Indeed, realism captures the gist of Japan‘s policy toward 
regional membership in an FTA. The inclusion of Australia and India is explicable in terms 
of traditional external balancing (alliance building). However, realist analysis fails to explain 
why Australia and India were selected rather than for example Canada and/or Russia. Here 
constructivist variables are important in determining which external powers to balance with, 
and shared values and institutions proving to be just as important as, if not more important, 
than naked power alone. Additionally, constructivism also explains better than simple zero-
sum thinking why it is that Japan is unable to cooperate with China. Low levels of popular 
trust towards China are certainly important, but so too is the fact that (after a series of food 
scares emanating from China), any Japanese politician advocating an FTA will be fighting 
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4.3.4  Resources: Japan, ERIA and CEPEA leadership 
Japan has also attempted to bolster its leadership through the creation and sponsoring of 
research into economic integration. At the East Asian Vision Group, proposed by South 
Korea‘s president Kim Dae Jung in December 1998 at the APT, Japan pushed forward 
many of its research institutes.  
 
The APT process has officially recognised a number of research institutions as ‗leaders‘ in 
various fields of economic integration. Japan, which has both the funding and competence 
to undertake such studies, has done  well here. The Institute for International Monetary 
Affairs and Daiwa Institute dominating APT Research Group studies (See Appendix 4).  
 
Perhaps  seeking  to  mitigate  Japan‘s  apparent  lead  in  terms  of  officially  recognised 
‗intellectual  leadership‘  at  the  Track  II  level,  China  offered  to  implement  one  of  the 
recommendation of the East Asia Vision Group report, the setting up of the ‗Network of 
East  Asian  Think  tanks‘ (NEAT)  in November  2002.    This  triggered  further  research in 
Japan  into  the  East  Asian  community  concept,  and  greater  activism  by  the  Japanese-
sponsored Council on East Asia Community.
413  In 2005, duelling summitry by think-tanks 
broke out in the lead up to the East Asia Summit. In August Japan hosted the 3rd NEAT 
meeting entitled ―Towards an East Asia Community‖ in Tokyo, and in October China hosted 
the 3rd East Asian Forum in Beijing, both of which reported finding back to the APT.
414  
 
At the 2007 APT meeting in the Philippines, Japan again attempted to be the regional ideas 
leader with the proposal by PM Abe of a Track II research group for the East Asian Summit 
and ASEAN Plus Three Economic leaders, the so -called Economic Research Institute for 
ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA).
415 The ERIA was established in Jakarta, Indonesia on June 
3, 2008.
416 
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It is clear however that ERIA is Japan‘s creature, designed at least in part to further Japan‘s 
interests in the CEPEA.
417 Japan initially committed 10 billion yen over ten years to the 
institute. Later, all three of the non-core regional members in a future FTA, India, Australia 
and New Zealand would each contribute symbolic sums of roughly USD one million  to 
ERIA.
418 The research being conducted at ERIA is also influenced by its institutional link to 
the prominent Japanese research body, the Institute of Developing Economies at the Japan 
External  Trade  Organization,  and  has  therefore  picked  up  Japan‘s  preference  for  the 
CEPEA. 
 
4.4  Authority: A JASEAN Mothership? 
 
Japan‘s exclusion of China in the FTAs has gone hand in hand with a strategy of trying to 
build a Japan-ASEAN hub. Japan is not been able to do so, but was in theory the most 
likely site for a trade hub at the time when these FTAs negotiations begun (see Appendix 5). 
Indeed, if Japan were to conclude an FTA with China it would have significant negative 
impacts on the economies of ASEAN.
419 The ASEAN manufacturing sector does not enjoy 
relative competitive advantage versus China, and ASEAN economies have already seen 
Japanese  investment  gravitate  North.  ASEAN‘s  position  in  the  Japanese  production 
network would be fatally undermined if China was given preferential treatment.
420  
 
The idea of locking ASEAN into the Japanese production network was also reflected in the 
‗JASEAN‘ axis that Koizumi proposed, Japan and ASEAN being the core of East Asian 
integration with China and others being invited in.
421 For Japan, these FTAs are seen as 
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the  building  blocs  of  a  Japan-led  regional  trade  network.  As  Kimura  notes,  ―FTA‘s  are 
expected  to  contribute  to  the  development  of  international  networks  of  production  and 
distribution with Japanese firms as their core.‖
422 As if to highlight this the first FTA Japan 
signed, with Singapore, was developed to be model for future bilateral FTAs with ASEAN - 
and to pressure ASEAN countries to enter into FTA talks with Japan.
423 Indeed, Singapore‘s 
interest in the Japan-Singapore EPA was to avoid becoming a ‗spoke‘
424, by sublimating 
itself into (what it perceived as) the Japan-centred hub in East Asia.
425 Maki notes that 
Konno Hidehiro, Director of the Trade Policy Bureau at Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry regarded  the ROK-FTA first priority, then ASEAN and  finally Singapore. This is 
because Singapore would never be valuable as a part of hub building strategy.
426  
 
Indeed, the FTA with Singapore did not provide a sufficient hub -ness ‗bang‘ because of a 
lack of tariff liberalization on Japan‘s side. Japan‘s imports from Singapore under zero-tariff 
entry  increased  to  93.8%  from  84.2%  but  that  increase  reflected  only  liberalization  in 
industrial goods. The share of agricultural produce imported at the zero tariff rate rose from 
6.6% to 6.9%, a marginal increase from a low base (agriculture represented less than 5% 
of  Singapore  exports  to  Japan).  For  other  Southeast  countries,  for  whom  agriculture‘s 
share of exports to Japan was more significant (e.g. Malaysia 13%), this result promised 
little. In practice the effects of the Japan-Singapore FTA on the economies of Japan and 
Singapore were so small as to be negligible.
427 
 
4.4.1  Hubs, spokes and building blocks 
Unsurprisingly,  other  ASEAN  members  did  not  clamour  to  join  the  Japan-FTA  hub.
428 
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Nogami Yoshiji, the then Vice Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, put paid to this by 
saying, ―an [FTA] agreement with Singapore alone would not carry  enough weight. We 
need something that will give us a bigger bang.‖
429 Within Japan, the idea for a JASEAN 
hub progressed, now focusing on a Japan-ASEAN FTA rather than bilaterals. In 2003 the 
ASEAN–Japan Research Institute Meeting called for a Japan–ASEAN FTA to be a building 
block for broader East Asian Free Trade arrangements, the effect of which would be the 
standardization of trade rules, with potential benefits to Japan of between one and two 
trillion yen.
430 Interestingly, the same ambition was held by so me in China. The former 
Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Long Yongtu believed 
that China could play a leadership role with the China–ASEAN FTA by creating ―very useful 
stepping stones to an eventual East Asian economic integration.‖
431  
 
However, as highlighted earlier, Japan had not considered joining an FTA with China. By 
avoiding an agreement (although an offer was on the table as early as 2001) Japan has 
been forced to try and build a hub centred on its own economy. The result of this however 
has been to creation of bilaterally-networked trade regionalism (also also called the East 
Asian noodle bowl) with China and Japan as the competing hubs, see  Figure 12 overleaf.  
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 Figure 12 East Asian Noodle Bowl: View from Japan/China 
 
 
Source: Generated by Author 
Note: Dotted line means under negotiation, Full line means FTA concluded. 106 
 
This section argues that the interaction of domestic and international factors has meant that 
this JASEAN hub  has created a  bilaterally-networked trade  structure rather than  single 
uniform trade area. In order to demonstrate how Japan‘s unwillingness to cooperate with 
China and its consequent efforts to build an FTA centred on its own economy have resulted 
in hub-and-spoke, bilaterally-networked trade regionalism it is necessary to examine each 
of these agreements in turn. 
 
4.4.2  Malaysia 
Unfortunately for Japan, the next FTA after Singapore signed also failed to net any regional 
leadership on trade matters. While Prime Minister Badawi of Malaysia was pleased with 
being able to take credit for the 2005 signing of the Japan-Malaysia EPA as a ‗diplomatic 
coup‘ at the APT summit; speaking as ASEAN chair, he voiced concerns that "this [bilateral] 
approach  by  Japan  may  give  rise  to  two  classes  of  ASEAN  members,  those  with  full 
bilateral EPAs with Japan, and those without.‖ Moreover, he noted that, in reference to 
Japan‘s  bargaining  position,  "the  negotiations  are  not  progressing  satisfactorily  [for 
ASEAN].‖
432 In Baldwin-ian terms, he was telling Japan that ASEAN wanted to be in the 
hub, not just one of the spokes.  
 
While Japan was of course keen to spin the agreement as  a ―new era for the Japan-
Malaysia strategic partnership,‖
433 the agreement was not viewed favourably in Malaysia.
434 
Indeed,  there  were  concerns  within  Malaysia  that  the  Japanese  had  gained  more 
concessions from Malaysia than  vice  versa.  In  fact,  Japan  gained  an  additional  32% 
reduction in zero-tariff entry over previous rates while Malaysia gained 8%.
435 This was 
because Malaysia chose to prioritize technical assistance in the car market over market 
liberalization in Japan. This defection by Malaysia and Japan from deeper liberalization (a 
benefit that all of ASEAN might expect to share in their future negotiations with Japan) 
towards assistance (only of use to Malaysia) weakened of the appeal of Japan as an 
EAFTA hub for others in ASEAN.  However, the provisions still ratcheted up pressure on the 
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member nations of ASEAN, and made exclusion from the Japan hub more costly.
436 
 
4.4.3  Philippines 
Likewise, the negotiations with the Philippines, and the subsequent Japan-Philippines EPA, 
did  not  further  Japan‘s  objective  of  building  a  JASEAN  hub.  However,  even  the  small 
economy of the Philippines was viewed as a part of a larger project, with Asō Tarō stating in 
a Diet Foreign Affairs Hearing, ―by signing an FTA with Japan, the Philippines (which is a 
little slow economically in ASEAN) can improve its economy and I expect political relations 
with Japan and in this way the East Asia community can be formed.‖
437 For its part, the 
Philippines  government  proposed  its  EPA  be  modelled  after  the  Japan-Singapore 
agreement,  hoping  to  attract  FDI  to  leverage  economic  development  and  poverty 
reduction.
438 Yet the Philippines was forced to sideline its important developmental interests 
to make way for Japan‘s WTO-plus agenda. Japanese delegates ―repeating that an EPA 
should  not  be  focussed  too  narrowly  on  tariff  reductions.‖
439 An  agreement  was  only 
reached when the Philippines conceded to delay negotiations on the elimination of tariffs on 
sugar for four years in order to satisfy Japan‘s demands.
440  
 
After  the  agreements  with  Malaysia  and  Singapore,  Japan‘s  bilateral  approach  in 
concluding FTAs had created ‗spokes‘ – and the trade diversion effects meant that for the 
Philippines remaining outside of an FTA with Japan had become too costly. It was after all 
the Philippine side which approached Japan in May 2002 – not the other way around. One 
of these spoke effects was the re-ordering of the Philippines‘ priorities; forcing the Filipino 
negotiation team to accept a less beneficial agreement than if they had negotiated as part 
of an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) bloc.
441 As one Philippine officer involved noted, ―the 
costs of non-participation… [means] that the Philippines would lose around 0.04% of GDP 
if we do not forge an FTA with Japan while Thailand does…. hence, forging a bilateral 
agreement with Japan at this time is a very strategic move.‖
442 In other words, just to hold 
onto their position in the regional economy required signing up, even if the Philippines 
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would not actually gain anything new. In contrast, failure or success meant little to the 




One component of the EPA whi ch might have won praise was the liberal ization  of the 
movement of natural persons, particularly visas for Philippine nurses and other medical 
staff to work in Japan. However, Japan continued to insist on a high degree of competence 
in both Japanese language and specialist skills, while at the same time failing to clarify 
those standards despite requests from the Philippine side to do so.
444 Moreover, like 
technical assistance, concessions in this area could not be rolled over into other FTAs 
under negotiation, and for these reasons the Japan -Philippines EPA did not act as a 
stepping stone towards a larger regional trade arrangement. Indeed, from the perspective 
of the Philippines, the EPA delivered much less than expected.
445 Moreover, the JPEPA‘s 
legitimacy  was  further  damaged  once  it  had  been  rail-roaded  through  the  Philippine‘s 
parliament over serious constitutional concerns.
446 As a result, Japan failed to gain any 
political credit from the EPA. 
  
4.4.4  Indonesia 
In  August  2007,  Japan  also  finally  signed  an  FTA  agreement  with  Indonesia,  having 
declared  the  agreement  concluded  nearly  a  year  earlier.  This  delay  was  due  to  the 
Indonesian side attempting to re-negotiate parts of the deal which they realized only after 
concluding  negotiations  would  carry  too  many  costs.
447 As with previous negotiations, 
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446 Moreover, after disputes about processing industrial waste and foreign ownership  the agreement had to be rushed 
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Castro, "Landmark Japan-Philippines Trade Deal: A Recap," Business World, January 8 2009. Protests and the general 
perception that the JPEPA was lopsided to favour Japan given creed by the right accorded Japanese not to transfer 
technology to the Philippines and the right not to hire any local Philippine staff.  
447 Satō Yuri, "Indonesia," in FTA No Seiji Keizai Gaku, ed. Higashi Shigeki (Chiba: IDE-JETRO, 2007). pp. 173-4, Japan 109 
 
Japan believed that its other FTAs/EPAs had put pressure on Indonesia to join its hub.
448 
From Japan‘s point of view the special feature of the Indonesian FTA was that energy was 
included.  Japan  had  initially  proposed  pre-negotiated  contracts  for  Indonesian  energy 
resources, although this component fell through.
449 Energy had featured in other FTAs as 
well, although rarely as prominently.
450 Instead, the EPA signed contained capacity building 
to help (make cheaper) Indonesian energy extraction and processing for export, although 
Japan was not able to lock itself in as the preferred client.
451  
 
4.4.5  Thailand 
In November 2007, the Japan-Thai EPA went into effect, having been signed earlier in April 
of that year.  It was clear that Thailand would be a net winner from any EPA/FTA agreed 
with Japan. One simulation conducted by Japanese researchers revealed that real GDP in 
Thailand  would  increase  by  a  staggering  20.09%,  this  would  represent  an  increase  in 
national  welfare  of  US$23  billion  in  Thailand,  compared  to  Japan‘s  projected  US$13 
billion.
452 Although the early decision (discussed later) to exclude rice from the negotiations 
no doubt caused upset some in Thailand, by and large the EPA was basically well received 
in Thailand.
453 This is despite the  fact that decision to ratify the EPA with Japan was not 
made by a democratically elected parliament but by the military, which had taken control in 
another of Thailand‘s too often coup-d‘états. In terms of increasing Japan‘s hub-ness, the 
                                                                                                                                                     
was playing hard ball, proposing to negotiate the EPA as a single undertaking which would allow to use its depth of 
competence to take advantage of yet unlearned Indonesians, the Indonesia team believed at this time that they would 
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JTEPA would be significant as the Thai machinery sector was highly competitive.
454   
 
4.4.6  ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP) 
These bilateral trade agreements were creating a hub-and-spoke trade network centred on 
Japan. However, at the same time, another hub was being developed in the China-ASEAN 
agreement.  Japan‘s  preference  for  bilateralism  in  FTA  negotiation  stood  in  contrast  to 
China‘s decision to deal with ASEAN as a group. China‘s decision to negotiate with ASEAN 
as a group did much to allay fears and won China important political points with ASEAN as 
a  whole.
455 Japan,  on  the  othe r  hand,  at  first  seemed  unaware   or  apathetic  about 
undermining ASEAN‘s precious unity.   
 
In  an  attempt  to  facilitate  trade  between  Japan‘s  ASEAN  ‗spokes‘  and  reinforce  the 
JASEAN hub, Japan developed its region wide FTA proposal. In November of 2007, this 
ASEAN-Japan EPA agreement  was concluded. The  AJCEP‘s  rationale  had  been made 
clear in a 2003 Joint Study Report, citing ASEAN‘s desire to increase its competitiveness, 
and Japan‘s interest in protecting and developing its manufacturing network in ASEAN, 
under pressure from the rise of Chinese industrial power.
456  
 
But underlying this change in approach lay political considerations towards ASEAN. As one 
JETRO official noted, even though signing an AJCEP (including with the CLM countries) 
was considered a waste of Japanese time and manpower, the AJCEP went ahead because 
of pressure put on the Japanese government by ASEAN countries concerned about their 
unity.
457  Not  surprising,  the  AJCEP  would  offer  little  new,  one  Vietnamese  official 
commented that Japan‘s FTA proposal seemed to be a hastily-put-together affair that was 
‗all show‘ and ‗little substance‘ and that its main purpose, not stated, was to counter the FTA 
proposal floated by China to ASEAN.‖
458 
 
Economic modelling suggested that the gains of the AJCEP would be limited for Japan. 
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With the bilateral FTAs already covering the major economies, adding in the smaller CLMV 
countries only made sense from a political perspective. The modelling suggested that by 
2020, the GDP of ASEAN members countries would increase by an average of nearly 2%, 
while Japan‘s GDP would edge forward by 0.07%. In absolute number terms however the 
parties  would  be  more  closely  balanced.  The  national  welfare  of  Japan  expected  to 
increase by US$4.59 billion to ASEAN‘s US$5.59 billion from the base year of 1997.
459 
However, this modelling did not take into account the existence of the alternative bilateral 
FTA structure and that much of these economic benefits were thus already in the pipeline; 
in other words the limited marginal utility of AJCEP for Japan. Indeed, economically it made 
little sense for the major ASEAN powers either, except as a symbol of their unity.  
 
From the point of view of building up a regional hub, Japan and ASEAN concluded a less 
than  meaningful  trade  pact  as  a  result  of  the  basic  lack  of  interest  on  both  sides.  Yet 
regional integration was the stated goal, with the AJCEP aiming to allow intra-regional trade 
not merely between Japan and its partner but amongst its partners as well (See Appendix 
6).  However,  an examination of  the  actual  structure  of  concessions  reveals  that  this is 
rhetoric.  
 
First, ASEAN partners of Japan are more likely to use their individual bilateral FTAs than 
the AJCEP for exporting to Japan. The tariff rates in ASEAN members‘ individual bilateral 
agreements are simply more generous than the subregional pact (See Table 2 overleaf). 
Indeed, Malaysia has not a single item which attracts a more favourable tariff rate under the 
AJCEP than with the bilateral.   
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Table 2 Tariff preferences comparison between AJCEP and Japan’s bilateral 
Agreements 
Source: Japan External Trade Organization 
 
Secondly, ASEAN members of the AJCEP are more likely to use their AFTA preferences to 
trade amongst each other rather using AJCEP. Firstly, the AFTA provides better tariff rates 
with 69% of all tariff lines zeroed compared to 48% under the AJCEP. Additionally, it seems 
the deciding factor in usage is Rules of Origin and the AFTA‘s established history. The AFTA 
has simpler rules for establishing regional content, and the AFTA has been in existence 
since 1992 thus local companies are more familiar with it.
460  
 
Additionally, the AJCEP was noticeably silent about other assistance, such as liberalization 
of the movement of natural persons.
461 The effect of this silence is to create two classes 
within  Japan‘s  FTAs,  the  developed  ASEAN  countries  which  concluded  a  bilateral 
agreement  receiving  preferential  treatment  for  labour  mobility  compared  to  their  poorer 
cousins.  In  addition,  the  developed  ASEAN  countries  received  access  to  technical 
assistance to their individual economies, a facility which will not be available to the smaller 
countries in the AJCEP.  
 
4.4.7  Utilization Rates 
Evidence of the weakness of Japan as trade hub can be found in the low utilization rates of 
these FTAs. The data - the number of trading companies actually using the preferences, is 
still incomplete and derived mostly from company surveys. In general though, utilization 
rates  below  50%  are  considered  low  by  European  and  American  standards.
462 All  of 
Japan‘s bilateral FTAs/EPAs have utilization rates lower than 50%, according to one survey 
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the usage rate for Japan-Singapore FTA was just 3.6% and the Japan-Malaysia FTA just 
5.5% in 2007. Another survey put the figure at 12.5% on average, but even this larger 
number is viewed as depressingly small.
463 Another survey which asked companies about 
the importance they placed on various FTAs saw the AJCEP placed third after AFTA, and 
the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA).
464   
 
Taken together, Japan‘s rejection of China and selection of ASEAN as starting point for a 
trade area has meant that trade regionalism in East Asia still lacks a crucial hub.  A Japan-
ASEAN hub, were it to share a common schedule of significant tariff reductions, might be 
able to function as an East Asian trade hub and form the institutional basis into which China 
and  Korea  might  later  be  integrated.  Instead,  Japan‘s  bilaterally-networked  approach, 
which  has  allowed  it  to  differentiate  between  its  trade  partners,  has  meant  that  tariff 
concessions  in  one  negotiation  do  not  spill  over  in  following  negotiations,  creating  a 
situation in which significant tariff cuts are not realized and no common regional schedule is 
created. 
 
4.5  Scope: Excluding Agriculture, Including Assistance: Domestic and 
International Factors 
 
Another  feature  of  Japan‘s  FTA  network  is  the  exclusion  of  agricultural  goods.  While 
Japan‘s decision to exclude agricultural products is made for domestic political reasons,
465 
Japan‘s determination to nevertheless press ahead with FTA negotiations is revealing.
466 
Indeed, in order to close the FTA deal Japan has been willing to provide assistance into to 
‗cover  the  gap‘  which  emerged  due  to  Japan‘s  inability  open  its  agricultural  sector.
467 I 
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suggest here that competition with China has been an important factor in shifting the scope 
of Japan‘s EPAs to included economic assistance at a cost to trade regionalism.  
Indeed, Japan has insisting on excluding trade in the one sector were ASEAN countries are 
generally more competitive - even taking pains to exclude the one or two specific produce 
lines which its partner would be most interested in: Goldfish and Tulips in the case of 
Singapore (Singapore only competitive agricultural exports), Pineapples, Plywood and Milk 
in  the  case  of  Malaysia,  Sugar  in  the  case  of  Philippines,  and  Rice  in  the  case  of 
Thailand.
468 The effect of this re luctance by Japan has been to require  it to grant more 
assistance if Japan was to successfully close the deal.  In fact, the Indonesians deliberately 
targeted the farm sector as a negotiation strategy, pressing for liberalization on areas 
Indonesia itself was unsure of in order to elicit the maximum economic concessions from 
Japan in other areas.
469  
 
Why is Japan s o keen to conclude an FTA with small economies of marginal value, 
especially when Japan must offer costly additional assistance in order to close the deal? 
The inclusion of assistance to Malaysia‘s domestic car manufacturers comes at an obvious 
cost  to  Japan‘s  competitiveness  in  the  Malay  domestic  car  market.  If  protecting  its 
agricultural sector was Japan‘s only goal, then simply avoiding FTAs with ASEAN would 
have been quite sufficient. Since these FTAs do not promise major economic returns, and 
some  (like  the  Philippine  EPA)  are  even  considered  as  a  form  of  ‗poverty  reduction‘ 
assistance by another name
470, it is puzzling that Japan chooses to sign on at all - unless 
the wider political factors, especially the China factor, are considered. 
 
It appears that China‘s move to form an FTA with ASEAN pressured Japan to respond in 
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kind. For political reasons, Japan was unable to simply walk away from negotiations. The 
China-ASEAN FTA therefore seems to have acted as a juggernaut
471, forcing other players 
such as Japan to become involved despite their limited economic interests. In other words, 
if China had not moved first, Japan would not have faced much pressure to sign FTAs with 
ASEAN.  Japan  would  not  have   then  been  required  to  provide  as  much  economic 
assistance in place of tariff reductions. 
  
While realism predicts that Japan would respond to the rise of China, the nature of that 
response is not described. A realist might argue that as a matter of national security it is 
only to be expected that Japan would protect its farming sector (in order to raise its already 
low self-sufficiency ratio). However, Japan‘s rational pursuit of its interests might just as 
easily take the opposite track, sacrificing the agricultural sector (a mere one percent of 
GDP) in order to realize much bigger gains in those sectors it is internationally competitive. 
Indeed, if FTAs are considered as an economic alliance, then concluding an FTA with the 
US and Australia which included secure supply of food would also be a possible response. 
In  Japan‘s  case,  intervening  variables  on  the  domestic  side  have  coloured  its  policy 
response and been responsible for a weaker form of trade regionalism.  
 
4.6  Rules: Rules of Origin 
 
From the outset the EAFTA project was aimed at creating a regional economic community. 
However, in order to become such a community, it is necessary that trade rules be common 
to all members. Japan‘s decision not to form an FTA with China first to which others might 
be invited has had the effect of preventing the formation of common rules.
472 
 
In the context of FTAs, the most important common rules are the Rules of Origin, or ROOs. 
The strictness of the ROOs determines how ‗regional‘ a free trade area is.
473 Without a 
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definition of what constitutes a regional product, all external countries would simply direct 
their trade via one of the FTA members in order to achieve tariff-free entry.
474 With tighter 
ROOs in place, however, the FTA can be used to direct trade towards intra -FTA industrial 
linkages in preference to potentially cheaper world  prices (or perhaps, the ‗China price‘). 
This means that an FTA with tight ROOs can be used to indirectly protect industries within 
the FTA from their rivals.
475 Unsurprisingly, whichever state(s) maintains the regional FTA 
and thus determines its ROOs is usually the central economic power of its region, such as 
France and Germany for PANEURO and the US for the NAFTA ROOs systems.
476 
 
However, unlike in the Euro-zone or NAFTA, Japan has not championed a single set of 
ROOs. This means that the ROOs of each of Jap an‘s FTA is, to one extent or another, 
unique. For example, both the Japan-Indonesia and Japan-Malaysia agreements require a 
higher percentage of regional Value Added (50%, rather than the base of 40%) for Export 
Sake or Mirin (clearly goods in competition with Japanese domestic producers) than other 
(non-producing)  ASEAN  countries.  Malaysia  is  also  held  to  a  higher  standard  for 
automobiles (50%, and 60% for certain large, diesel motor vehicles).  The Japan-Singapore 
agreement  demands  60%  regional  content,  except  sparkling  beverages  (40%),  before 
goods  are  considered  regional  and  therefore  tariff  exempt.  Even  under  the  Umbrella 
Agreement, Japanese domestic politics interfered in creating a uniform system; agricultural 
products  such  as  Coca  beans  also  face  differentiated  ROOs  for  the  Philippines  and 
Thailand (50%).  
 
Japan‘s FTAs also uses a complex mix of various metrics to determine regional content.
477 
This complexity stands in marked contrast to the AFTA and the ACFTA, which both use a 
simple, flat 40% regional Value Added criterion  for tariff-exempt status (see Appendix 7). 
Importantly, these ROOs apply across all goods within the ACFTA, meaning that the ROOs 
                                                                                                                                                     
Shenzhen, 2006). 
474 In this way, a Japan-Thailand FTA might see Thailand simply re -exporting Chinese manufactures to Japan rather 
than the FTA  facilitating the growth of Thai industries. While from Thailand ‘s point of view the re-exporting Chinese 
manufactures  under  a JTEPA  would  be  economically  beneficial, from  Japan‘s  point  of  view  it  would  unacceptable. 
Economically, the reason is elementary – Thailand could re-export more third country goods to Japan (larger market) 
than Japan could to Thailand (smaller market) under a situation of no ROO in their FTA. Indeed, Auto-bike kits imported 
from China, assembled in Thailand and exported (attempted) to Japan under JTEPA ran into exactly this problem. 
475 Kala Krishna, "Understanding Rules of Origin," NBER Working Paper Series 11149(2005). p. 4 
476 PANEURO runs from the EU, EFTA states, Central and East European States and Mediterrrean states with whic h 
there are separate agreements. Common ROOs function as a hegemonic marker of sorts, like a common currency etc. 
477 In addition to the default value-added method, Japan uses were appropriate change in tariff headings on an either or 
basis. This is because ―because the VA is preferred for some goods and CTC preferred for others, the construction of 
the ROO within an FTA affects the outcome, in terms of frequency used (usage rate) and the balance of trade between 
the two. Both sides will want the ROOs which favour their products entering the others markets.‖ Author's Interview with 
Kiep Official Han Sung Kim, 3 June 2009. Tokyo. 117 
 
are not functioning as non-tariff barriers to trade.
478 China has been more upfront about 
sensitive sectors and opted to use the AFTA negative list approach, a political decision 
which  typically  smoothes  negotiations  and  (in  this  case )  acts  as  an  obvious 
acknowledgement of ASEAN‘s role as a hub for economic integration in East Asia.
479 Japan 
instead has tried to impose its own sets of rules, however inconsistently.  
 
Another negative effect of Japan‘s decision to engage in a series of FTAs with inconsistent 
ROOs is that both Korea, and more recently, even China, have begun to follow Japan‘s 
lead.  Indeed,  some  suggest  that  China‘s  initial  agreement  to  40%  Value  Added  in  the 
ACFTA  was  due  to  the  Chinese  not  understanding  the  importance  of  ROOs,  the 
significance of which was only made clear with comparison to Japan‘s ASEAN FTAs.
480 
China‘s subsequent adjustment to the ROOs in its FTA with ASEAN can therefore be traced 
back to the Japanese precedent. After Japan, Korea too has signed an FTA with ASEAN. 
But this FTA contains even more irregular ROOs than that of Japan‘s, with many drawing 
the obvious conclusion that Korea learnt from Japan.
481 Adding evidence to this view that 
Japan is leading a default away from consisten t ROOs is Korea‘s recent consideration of 
starting bilateral FTA negotiations on top of the ASEAN-Korea FTA to in order to copy 
Japan‘s success in opening ASEAN, or at least the individual members thereof.
482 
 
In conclusion, the effect of Japan‘s policy to avoid negotiating an FTA with China and rather 
to negotiate a series of bilateral FTAs with ASEAN and the umbrella AJCEP agreement has 
significantly weakened the EAFTA institutionalization process. It has created a situation in 
which the bilateral hub-and-spokes network centred on Japan may well hamper, rather than 
help, future efforts for deeper integration. This result is because by not signing a ‗mother-
ship‘ FTA with China which might both serve as a model and trigger for other FTAs in Asia, 
differences in the various bilateral FTAs with ASEAN, and between the AJCEP and the 
bilaterals, have made the creation of common Rules Of Origin all but impossible.
483 This 
outcome can be explained from a realist perspective as a deficit of regional hegemony, the 
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outcome of which is a half-way institutionalization of trade rules throughout the region.  
 
4.7  Conclusion: Power, Identity and Domestic Politics in East Asian 
Trade Regionalism.  
 
Japan‘s response to the rise of China has had major implications for the development of 
East  Asian  trade  regionalism,  and  the  institutions  that  would  underpin  it.  Specifically, 
Japan‘s decision not to cooperate with China has prevented the formation of a hub FTA 
whose rules might function as a template for wider regional cooperation.  Instead, Japan 
has selected ASEAN in place of China as a site to build up a trade hub. Negotiating with 
ASEAN  would  mean  that  more  of  the  rules  that  Japan  is  interested  in  might  be 
institutionalized  before  eventually  trying  to  incorporate  China.  However,  rather  than 
negotiating with China to build up a common set of rules throughout all FTAs with ASEAN, 
Japan pursued a strategy which has resulted in a bilaterally-networked type of regionalism 
rather than a single and uniform undertaking.  
 
Realism therefore gets it half right when describing the Sino-Japanese relationship and its 
impact on East Asian trade regionalism. The power transition in their bilateral relationship 
has  encouraged  competition,  and  prevented  a  cooperative  form  of  regional  hegemony 
crucial to the formation of uniform regional trade institutions. Japan is not interested in 
letting China accrue regional prestige for joint leadership of an East Asian trade regime, 
even though China offers the largest potential gains as FTA partner. Realism therefore 
predicts the triumph of concerns about relative gains in Japanese policy toward the EAFTA 
due to China‘s rise, and its corrosive effects on regional institution building. 
 
On the other hand, mere economic power balancing alone does not sufficiently describe 
the details of Japan regionalist trade policy, only its direction.
484 In order to understand 
some of  the  specifics  of  Japan‘s  policy  towards  an  EAFTA  it  is  necessary  to  examine 
variables that liberals and constructivists argue are significant.  
 
Firstly, as institutionalism suggests, these trade agreements have acquired a life of their 
own. Each agreement affects the outcome of others still under negotiation or not yet even 
conceived.
485  Japan  had  become  locked  into  bilateralism  after  the  2002  Singapore 
agreement, even as it was increasingly apparent that this would be inadequate from a 
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political perspective. The nature of these negotiations and the training of the Japanese 
negotiators also meant that Japan tended to view each agreement in isolation, without a 
view to its impact on future agreements and wider political significance. Yet liberalism fails 
to  explain  quite  why  Japan  should  take  a  bilateralist  position,  when  the  growing 
interdependence of the region as a whole surely called for a region-wide arrangement. This 
was  hardly  a  problem  of  inadequate  communication,  but  a  deliberate  policy  choice  by 
Japan taken due to the rise of China.  
  
From  a  constructivist  view-point,  it  is  important  to  understand  how  Japan  views  itself 
relative to China to understand why an FTA is impossible despite compelling economic 
reasons. It is also important to note that the shared ‗democratic‘ identity of Japan, India, 
Australia  and  New  Zealand  in  forming  the  sixteen-party  FTA  counter-offer  by  Japan. 
Including these additional democratic powers makes it easier for Japan to ‗sell‘ the idea of 
an FTA both domestically.  
 
In conclusion, the realists are half-right. Japan is trying to balance China in its EAFTA 
strategy, but realist analysis mistakenly assumes a direct line of causality from external 
stimulus to policy response. However, in the case of Japan, the internal political landscape 
surrounding  both  trade  and  China  has  intervened  to  create  an  EAFTA  strategy  which 
addresses the rise of China only indirectly. Additionally, the bilaterally-networked outcome 
in Japan‘s foreign trade policy might have been predicted by Hegemonic Stability theory, 
but when actually examining the causes of this decision it is clear that domestic political 
factors were telling.    
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5  Chiang Mai Initiative 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses Japan‘s policy towards the development of regional institutions for 
monetary and financial cooperation in light of the rise of China. There are three main sites 
at which such institutionalization is progressing; Chiang-Mai Initiatives (exchange rate), the 
Asian Bond Market Initiative (finance), and the Asian Currency Unit (common currency). 
This chapter focuses on the development of the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), and to a lesser 
extent on the Asian Currency Unit (ACU) debate. The reason for focussing on the CMI is 
that it is the most institutionalized of the three sites outlined as well as having the most 
developed, if still incomplete, academic literature. Additionally, the CMI is shaping up to be 
a significant institution in its own right.    
 
This  chapter  argues  that  the  rise  of  China  has  triggered  Japan  to  (belatedly)  try  to 
‗institutionalize‘ its role as regional leader through the provision of international public goods, 
in this case financial stability. However, Japan‘s slipping material advantages have made 
such institution building almost impossible without Chinese participation. The outcome of 
institutional development is therefore significantly influenced by power variables. However, 
while  realist  analysis  identifies  the  major  problem  of  insufficient  hegemony  within  the 
institution, it will be shown that realist understandings alone do not sufficiently explain the 
institutional outcomes.  
 
This chapter will show that Japan has been able to offset its relative loss of material power 
with  intellectual  and  entrepreneurial  leadership.  This  has  permitted  the  CMI  to 
institutionalize  to  an  extent  that  realists  would  not  have  predicted  and  which  permits a 
functional, if limited, cooperation between China and Japan on behalf of East Asia. Social 
constructivist favoured variables, such as the symbolic value of such cooperation and ideas 
about Japan‘s role in the East Asian economy, are also shown to be factors which have 
pushed forward the institutionalization of the CMI while giving rise to some unusual (from a 
realist  perspective)  effects  such  as  debates  on  a  common  currency.  This  chapter‘s 
contribution to the literature is to demonstrate that, at least within the CMI, power variables 
are not the sole determinants of institutional development, and that even in the midst of 
regional power transition institutions can be formed. 
 
Of course, extra-regional factors cannot be ignored either and are also addressed. Indeed, 
one important factor is the World Financial Crisis (2008-9). This factor is so important to the 
development  of  the  CMI  that  unlike  previous  chapters  a  post-script  is  added  for  the 121 
 
changes that have occurred during the crisis, and what it can tell us about Sino-Japanese 
cooperation and rivalry. I suggest that as of the time of writing the multilateralization of the 
CMI is still incomplete, remaining stove-piped and thus limited. 
  
Financial cooperation and international relations theory 
Opening a book on international financial cooperation in East Asia at random will often 
reveal carefully put together charts and tables about such economic esoterics as capital 
requirements, currency weighting and co-variance in exchange rate profiles. Intriguing as 
these  topics  may  be  to  a  pure  economist,  the  literature  on  the  politics  behind  this 
cooperation is not as developed. In the United States, both Jennifer Amyx and William 
Grimes provide the best examples of what hybrid work does exist. In Japan, Ito Takatoshi, 
Kawai Masahiro, and Sakakibara Eisaku among others have arguably provided the most 
insight into the politics of regional financial cooperation.
486  
 
As this mix of economists and political scientists shows, international financial cooperation 
is an issue of international political economy. While international relations theory was 
developed first and foremost to discuss and analyse national security, it is also applicable 
to government level international financial cooperation. Indeed, Grimes takes a traditional 
realist framework into his analysis of currency politics, and Kawai Masahiro also discusses 
political hegemony in his analysis of the success and failure of regionalism.
487  This nexus 
between international political factors and economic factors indicates that the eclectic 
analytical  approach  is  applicable,  and  potentially  more  so  than  a  purely   political  or 
economic based approach.  
 
5.2  The Asian Financial Crisis and the AMF Proposal 
 
In  the  field  of  monetary  and  financial  integration,  Japan‘s  first  major  attempt  to 
institutionalise its regional leadership came during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-8. The 
Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) was to be Japan‘s flagship initiative, by using Japan‘s vast 
foreign exchange reserves to fend off currency speculation, Japan hoped to provide greater 
currency stability and avoid an outright financial crisis in East Asia. The AMF concept, while 
                                                   
486 See, for example, Jennifer Amyx, "Regional Financial Cooperation in East Asia since the Asian Financial Crisis," in 
Crisis as Catalyst; Asia's Dynamic Political Economy, ed. Andrew MacIntyre, T J Pempel, and John Ravenhill (Ithaca: 
Cornell  University Press,  2008)., William  Grimes,  Currency  and Contest  in East  Asia:  The  Great  Power  Politics  of 
Financial Regionalism (New York: Cornell University Press, 2009)., Takatoshi Ito and Yung Chul Park, "Promoting Asian 
Basket Currency Bonds," in Developing Asian Bond Markets (Canberra: Australian National University, 2004); Masahiro 
Kawai and Haruhiko Kuroda, "Strengthening Regional Financial Cooperation in East Asia," Pacific Economic Papers, no. 
332 (2002). 
487 Masahiro Kawai, "Evolving Economic Architecture in East Asia," (Tokyo: ADB I nstitute Discussion Paper No. 84, 
2007). 122 
 
still inchoate, promised to be a regional reserve bank, in the sense that regional members 
could borrow its funds to bolster their individual currency interventions or to solve short-
term balance of payments problems. However, the AMF concept clearly held open the door 
for greater Japanese influence in the region. If the AMF were ever to come into existence, it 
would no doubt weaken the influence of the US and the IMF. Moreover, some saw the 
beginning of an ‗Asian EU‘ - with the AMF in its role as a ‗regional reserve bank‘ evolving in 
an Asian Central Bank. Such grandiose dreams were not realized. Japan, rather than being 
hailed as regional leader, was by the time the crisis ended instead derided as the source of 
regional problems.
488 Japan could only watch in envy as China‘s stock in the eyes of East 
Asia continued to rise.  
 
The usual story of the Asian Financial Crisis starts with the Thai Baht. In July of 1997, the 
Baht, which was pegged to the US dollar, came under speculative attack by international 
hedge funds. The Thai government failed to fend off the attack and was forced to devalue 
its currency against the US dollar. This move proved to be contagious and the weakened 
Baht  triggered  a  crisis  in  confidence  in  the  Asian  markets  and  led  to  a  weakening  of 
currencies in the region. Suddenly, the currency crisis became a financial one as short-term 
loans were called in. As regional currencies were already weak, many borrowers had to 
default. When the IMF stepped in, it was accused of both doing too little and being too late, 
as well as failing to take into account the region‘s preferences. With the US assuming a 
lower profile than had been expected, there was a palpable leadership vacuum.
489 In this 
context, Japan realized that the Asian Financial Crisis was a good opportunity to further its 
independent leadership credentials in the region. 
 
The key site at which Japan‘s response to the crisis was decided was inside the MOF. 
Indeed,  the AMF  idea  was  really  a  brainchild  of the  MOF,  particularly  the  International 
Finance Bureau (now the International Bureau) of the MOF, which set up a group to study 
the plan. As this policy was discussed at the highest levels, and was worked on by the 
highest tier of public servant in the MOF, Director-General Haruhiko Kuroda (later vice-
minister, and later still president of the ADB, see Chapter Seven) and the Vice-minister for 
International Affairs, the ‗dynamic‘ Sakakibara Eisaku.
490 The proposal they came up with 
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was for a new organization, which would provide immediate emergency liquidity relief to 
crisis-struck regional countries. Initially, the MOF suggested that this Asian Monetary Fund 
would hold US$100 billion, of which Japan was to provide half.
491 Its members were to be 
initially drawn from the ‗Friends of Thailand‘, a group which did not include the US.  
 
In fact, Sakakibara badly managed the diplomacy of creating a new institution when he 
opened  ‗secret  negotiations‘  (i.e.  without  informing  the  US).  There  is  little  doubt  that 
Sakakibara pushed the AMF platform hard, earning the support of the crisis-struck Asian 
countries. But the proposal ran into difficulties with the US as Sakakibara had given the 
impression to Lawrence Summers (then US Deputy Secretary of the Treasury) that the 
AMF was to be a subset of the IMF, i.e. would not be decoupled from IMF conditionality. 
However, after consultations with its East Asian partners, Japan concluded that the crisis 
was one of liquidity, and that draconian conditions would prolong and intensify the pain. 
Japan was also hoping that its non-interventionalist approach might pay political dividends, 
such  as  in  the  APEC  where  Early  Voluntary  Sectional  Liberalization  was  under 
discussion.
492 When it became apparent that Japan wanted the AMF to act independent of 
the IMF, America moved quickly and decisively to block its formation  - Larry Summers 
arguing to Sakakibara that   if  decoupled from IMF conditionality ,  the AMF would only 
increase the ‗moral hazard‘ which the US regarded as the root cause of the crisis.
 493 It 
looked to the US like the AMF idea that Japan was championing was a callow attempt to 
gain  influence  in  the  region  at  a  cost  to  the  US,  the  regional  economies  and  the 
international financial system as a whole.
494  
 
But the US was not the only great power agains t the AMF  proposal. Much to Japan‘s 
surprise, China also opposed it, stating that it wanted no part in the development of a 
regional foreign exchange policy which included the RMB.
495 With China against the AMF 
proposal, it became politically, as well as eco nomically, impossible to proceed. Japan, or 
rather the MOF, was from the outset prepared to go ahead with the AMF provided China 
was supportive - even if the US objected. In other words, China (not the US) held the veto.  
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In the opinion of some in the MOF China‘s objection was not an in principle objection but 
came from a lack of understanding about how the AMF might work in practice. Hu Angang, 
a politically influential scholar at the Chinese Academy of Science, stated at the ‗the future 
of Asia‘ conference in June 2000 that support for the AMF was growing in China.
496  The 
then premier Zhu Rongji also said that he supported an ‗East Asian monetary fund‘ during a 
meeting with Mahathir in November 1999.
497 But without sufficient consultation, China was 
not willing to commit to the plan. This was because the PRC was both less willing to risk its 
currency reserves on  behalf  of Southeast Asia with out  the authority of the IMF, and 
concerned that the AMF would institutionalize a Japanese regional hegemony.
498  
 
While the AMF plan remained technically on the books until the November APEC (1997) , 
Japan turned to a bilateral approach to attempt to rebuild its presence in the region. The 
so-called New Miyazawa Initiative (named after Miyazawa Kiichi, the Finance Minister) was 
unveiled at the 2
nd APT in October 1998, aiming to form a sort of hub-and-spokes series of 
bilateral economic ties centred on Japan.
499 The NMI pledged US$30 billion in assistance 
for crisis-struck East Asian countries, of which half would be short-term lending for currency 
reserve needs. The remaining were medium to long term loans at near markets rates in the 
form of structural adjustment program loans to the financial sector provided via the Japan 
Export-Import Bank (co-financed by the ADB and the  World Bank).
 500 Additional pledges 




These elements of the Initiative contained little by the way of condition ality (certainly 
compared to the IMF‘s program) and provided, both directly and through the special facility 
at the ADB, a total of nearly US$21 billion.
502 At the May 15-6 APEC meeting, Miyazawa 
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pledged to provide another two trillion yen (equivalent to US$16 billion) in guarantees for 
long term bonds issued by East Asian governments. Another notable feature of the NMI 
was the extension of one-way currency swaps with Malaysia and Korea, features which 
would return in the CMI. As one official in the Japanese Ministry of Finance explained, ―the 
USA,  Japan  and  China  are  seeking  influence  over  the  region  [East  Asia]  …The  New 




5.2.1  View from the Sino-Japanese relationship  
With the failure of the AMF, Japan‘s hopes for regional leadership had been dashed. Japan 
also realized that its importance to the region had declined relative to China, both politically 
and  economically.  Politically,  Japan  came  out  of  the  crisis  looking  weak,  while  China 
emerged looking like a leader. The transfer of the mantle of leadership between China and 
Japan revolved around questions of who was to blame for the crisis.  
 
Many pointed the finger at Japan. In Southeast Asia, Japan‘s most ardent pupil, Malaysia‘s 
Mahathir, put the case succinctly saying that Japan had ‗lost the will to be head goose.‘
504 
The failure of Japan‘s leaders to effect reform, particularly of the ailing banking sector, had 
caused Japan to remain in a recession which in turn weakened the regional economy.
505 
This meant that Japan was unable to provide its traditional role as an engine of growth by 
injecting investment. Worse still, it looked to Southeast Asia as if Japan was not interested 
in playing this role if it ris ked its own recovery. Japan was unwilling or unable to be a 
regional ‗consumer of last resort‘, as efforts to lift demand in Japan failed to bear fruit. 
Moreover, Japan continued to block further trade liberalization efforts in the APEC, meaning 
that there was less opportunity for ASEAN to trade its way out of the crisis.  Perhaps most 
damning  of  all  was  the  perception  that  Japan  had  deliberately  allowed  its  currency  to 
depreciate  against  the  dollar  during  the  Crisis  without  a  thought  for  the  negative 
implications for its erstwhile partners in East Asia.
506  
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This all compared unfavourably to the role played by China during the Crisis. Although 
China had devalued its currency in 1994 (by 30%), during the crisis China announced that 
the value of the RMB would remain pegged to the dollar, and not be devalued any further. 
This meant that, during to the crisis, China was not adding any additional pressure to the 
ASEAN  states  export-led  development  strategy  –  although  China  did  not  contribute 
significantly  to  any  actual  bail  out.
507 This decision by China earned it high praise in 
ASEAN.
508 And the Chinese were not averse to publically naming Japan the culprit – Jiang 
Zemin  and  President  Clinton  denounced  the  deficient  management  of  the  yen  in  the 
bilateral US-China summit in June 1998. Rather than Japan, it was China which became 
viewed as the engine of growth which pulled the region out of the crisis. By the 2001 APT 
summit, a regional consensus had been reached; and at the ASEAN-China summit the 
Chairman stated that ASEAN was ―deeply grateful for China‘s support in efforts to recover 
from the recent economic crisis‖, but noted somewhat formally in the ASEAN-Japan summit 
that ―Japan…was at the forefront of international efforts to help Southeast Asia adjust to the 
financial shocks of 1997.‖
509 This challenged a view in Japan that even though the AMF 




Japan‘s conception of itself as a regional leader had been dealt a major blow. This, despite 
the fact Japan had pledged nearly US$80 billion to the Crisis recovery effort (far more than 
China) was particularly keenly felt in Japan‘s policy circles but to little avail. Worse, the AMF 
proposal which Japan believed stood the best chance of helping Asia had been blocked by 
China.  China  was  being  praised  for  not  doing  something  (currency  devaluation)  while 
Japan  was  criticised  for  something  over  which  it  had  no  control  (yen  exchange  rate). 
                                                   
507 However, despite Chinese inferences to the contrary, the decision not to devalue the RMB is not evidence of greater 
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But the real meaning of the failure of the AMF idea was that Japan was unable to go it 
alone. It needed either the US or China in order to lead by a cooperative hegemony. With 
Japan‘s regional leadership under question, and unable to cooperate with China in the 
building up appropriate institutions, it is no surprise that Japan tried to go it alone under the 
Miyazawa initiatives. But to succeed, in other words to get to the CMI, Japan would need 
China. 
 
5.3  Formation: Chiang-Mai Initiatives 
 
The Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) was announced in May 2000 at the ASEAN Plus Three 
Finance Ministers Meeting. Taking its name from the Thai city in which it was proposed, the 
CMI is essentially the successor to the failed AMF. Indeed, Kuroda has since argued that 
the  AMF  could  be most swiftly  realized  by  the  expansion  of  swap agreements  and  an 
effective surveillance mechanism – i.e. the CMI.
512 However, to avoid upsetting the US, the 
Japanese Ministry of Finance took great pains to conceptually ‗de-link‘ the two.
513 The CMI 
saddles the gap between the AMF and New Miyazawa Initiatives, being somewhat less 
than a ‗fully‘ institutionalised financial body and yet more than merely an ad hoc bilateral 
currency swap. Nevertheless, the CMI is trending towards greater and greater levels of 
institutionalization.  The  logical  end  point,  or  one  of  the  logical  end  points,  of  this 
institutionalization is the de facto, if somewhat delayed, realization of the AMF concept.  
 
5.3.1  What is the CMI? 
The essence of the CMI is a series of Bilateral Swaps Agreements (BSAs) between Japan, 
China, Korea and the ASEAN 5 economies (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand).  Swaps  allow  member  countries  struck  by  a  currency  crisis  to  borrow  a  set 
amount of their counterpart‘s foreign exchange reserves for ninety days (renewable for up 
to  2  years).  In  exchange,  the  crisis  affected  country  would  transfer  to  the  lender  an 
                                                   
511 Of course, Japan was felt to be partially responsible as major Japanese companies were shifting to China from 
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equivalent amount of its local currency. At the end of the swap period borrowings would be 
returned plus interest (at the IMF drawing rate). The effect (in theory) of such mechanisms 
is to allow a country to pay off its short-term dollar-denominated debts without undermining 
the strength of its local currency (with effects on inflation and interest). In other words, to 
solve the problem faced during the Asian Financial Crisis. 
 
The CMI was initially established with contributions totalling the equivalent of US$40 billion 
(approx.).  This was doubled to US$80billion (approx.) at the Hyderabad Meeting of 2005, 
and, as of 2008, was slated to be extended to nearly US$120billion.
514 However, calculating 
the total of the CMI is academic; no country can in fact draw the total.
515  
 
In light of their collective experiences in the mid nineties, many in East Asia became aware 
that providing liquidity in a financial crisis, while ostensibly an economic function, is  in fact 
inherently political.  Bailing out an economy in crisis in not free, and whoever accepts this 
burden  can  claim  not  just  a  ‗leadership  role‘  but  may  also  link  their  assistance  to 
concessions in other areas. Precisely due to these fears of political interference in their 
domestic economics, the CMI was premised on the prevention of a future crisis. Somewhat 
like the ARF (discussed later), the success of the CMI is ‗proved‘ by the absence of crises. 
 
5.3.2  Japan’s interests 
The CMI should not be understood as merely a technical solution, there is more than mere 
functionalism at play. Indeed, Japan is quite able to fend off currency speculation in a crisis 
on its own. Rather, Japan‘s interests in the CMI lie in gaining the acceptance of ASEAN 
states  for  Japanese  regional  leadership.  In  part  this  is  a  hedge  against  unwanted  US 
influence by the Japanese, but regional actors also emphasize Japan‘s concerns about the 
rise of China and the inevitable lose of influence that this entails.
516 
 
Specifically, Japan is hoping to gain acceptance of a Japanese role in protecting the 
financial  stability  of  Asian  states.  Firstly,  an  acknowledgement  of  Japan‘s  continuing 
important  role,  indeed  vital  role,  in  the  economic  order  of  East  Asia.  Secondly,  Japan 
expects some additional political leverage, in particular during a crisis, for its views and 
policy  preferences.  Lastly,  there  are  some  economic  advantages  stemming  from  an 
increased covariance in yen and regional countries‘ currencies and, of course, from the 
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possibility of averting a crisis.
517  
 
Japan‘s interest in regional leadership rose after the Asian Financial Crisis. It is no accident 
therefore that some of the elements of the New Miyazawa Initiative grew out of the AMF 
concept, and can now be found within the CMI. As such, Japan can claim its role as the 
intellectual leader of the CMI even if its material leadership had slipped.
518  
 
5.3.3  The China factor in Japan’s approach to the CMI. 
There is precious little information available in the public arena about the events which led 
up the CMI‘s announcement in 2000, participants in those negotiations staying silent thus 
far.
519 China‘s earlier opposition to the AMF had softened significantly by the time of the first 
1999 ASEAN Plus Three Finance Minister‘s Meeting (APT-FMM). The APT itself having 
only  been  established  1997  was  initially  preoccupied  with  crisis  and  keen  for  further 
coordination in the financial arena. In this context it was decided to make regular a meeting 
of the region‘s financial ministers. Since the finance ministers were already scheduled to 
meet at the ADB‘s Annual General Meeting, it was decided to regularize the APT-FMM 
meeting  there.  In  only  its  second  meeting,  China  reversed  its  position  and  agreed  to 
support the creation of an institution for East Asian financial cooperation at the APT-FMM. 
 
China‘s reasons for reversing its position of regional financial cooperation are not directly 
relevant, save what it can tell us Japan‘s ability to persuade and lead. China‘s cooperation 
appears to be premised more on political concerns about its image in the region than strict 
economic utility. ASEAN had been very interested in the AMF facility and was disappointed 
when it fell though. While most fingered United States‘ opposition as to blame, China‘s role 
in downing the AMF was not forgotten in Japan. In 1999, as ASEAN decided to extend the 
ASA to its five small members (more a symbol of unity than an effective measure) and 
increase  the  size  of  the  agreement  to  US$1  billion,  Japan  proposed  that  it,  together 
perhaps with other Northeast Asian countries, might link into the ASA. With Japan (and 
possibly Korea) in agreement with ASEAN, China was left with no option but to join what 
would become the CMI.
520 In other words, Chinese participation based on perceptions of 
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the political cost of exclusion rather than an actual interest in providing leadership. 
 
5.4  Membership 
 
The membership of the CMI is instructive as to the effects of the Japan-China bilateral 
relationship  on  regional  institution  building.  Within  the  CMI,  this  has  created  two 
overlapping groups centred on China and Japan. Japan and China, as the bankrollers of 
the  CMI,  have  acted  as  hubs  for  the  various  BSAs.  The  CMI  as  a  regional  institution 
composed of Bilateral Swap Agreements is clearly a form of bilateral networked regionalism, 
see Figure 13 overleaf. Its network structure is evidence that neither Japan nor China is 
interested in giving up the freedom to choose their partners and their level of commitment. 
 
While the CMI process itself is based on the ASEAN Plus Three Finance Minister‘s Meeting, 
the membership of the two groups is not the same. In fact, of the ten ASEAN nations only 
five are CMI members. Those excluded in the initial phase were Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, 
Myanmar  and  Vietnam,  aka  the  CLMV  counties  plus  Brunei.  Moreover,  Singapore  has 
concluded a BSA only with Japan and not with China or Korea.  
 
The exclusion of the CLMV countries (and Brunei) from the CMI is due mostly to their small 
economies. Japan was unwilling to extend currency protection to these smaller ASEAN 
powers – it just was not worth it economically. In fact, Japan‘s FTAs and BSAs share a 
similar membership; with the exception of Brunei, which concluded a bilateral FTA for the 
export of energy resources, these countries were not signatories to a bilateral FTA with 
Japan.
521 Moreover, individual members had differing levels of access to funds; to wit, there 
are different ‗levels‘ of membership. Of course, in the IMF too, there are different levels of 
access to funding, but this is predicated on different levels of commitment (measured in 
SDRs). However, in the CMI, any given country‘s access to the total is dependent on how 
important  the  Big  Three  (Japan,  China  and  Korea  –  but  in  particular  Japan)  feel  that 
country is. As there is no objective measure as to how this is derived, strategic as well as 
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521 Interestingly, China is more involved in the CLVM countries. Most intriguingly is the decision to allow  RMB usage in 
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Access: April 2010 
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Access can also differ in terms of scale, symmetry, denomination and  conditionality. In 
terms of scale, Korea could call in equivalent of US$23.5 billion (or roughly 25% of the total 
CMI), while Malaysia could call in a total of US$4 billion (4.4%), half that of the Philippines 
at US$10 (11%). Why the Philippines should require more than Malaysia when their trade 
volumes  differ  greatly,  and  why  Korea  can  make  do  with  twice  that  allotted  to  the 
Philippines, is not readily explicable in economic terms.
522 
 
In terms of symmetry, some of the bilateral swaps were one -way only, i.e. there was no 
obligation for the recipient to provide its foreign reserves in the event that the lender suffers 
a currency crisis, for example the Japan -Malaysia BSA. Other BSAs were two ways, but 
the commitments are asymmetrical, such as the BSA between Japan and the Philippines in 
which Japan committed $6 billion, while the Philippines committed a symbolic $0.5 billion in 
return). While at least one other BSA oscillated between symmetrical and asymmetrical 
depending upon domestic political circu mstance, such as Japan -Thailand.
523 In general 
however, most BSAs in the CMI were two -way and symmetrical, such as Korea-Malaysia 
($1.5 billion each way). Additionally, the CMI also included in its ‗total‘ the ASEAN Swap 
Agreement (ASA) of perhaps US$2 billion which is only accessible ASEAN members. Thus 
the total is not ‗pooled‘ but rather is kept stove-piped – with no one member actually able to 
access  the  whole  pool.  Moreover,  there  are  some  questions  about  how  the  total  is 
calculated. One researcher noted that if you factor out the ‗double-counting‘ in some of the 
agreements and the symbolic pledges by developing countries to either China or Japan, 
then the total amount is perhaps a quarter less than commonly reported.
524  Of this total, 




5.4.1  Diffusion in membership 
Lastly,  even  as  the  CMI‘s  institutionalization  progressed,  both  Japan  and  China  began 
defaulting from the arrangement to provide BSAs to key powers in the region. Korea in 
particular has been a beneficiary of competition to provide financial stability between Japan 
and China. On 12 December 2008, the Plus Three countries met trilaterally for first time in 
Fukuoka. 
526 At this meeting, the Japanese central bank announced an increase in the size 
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lessens the discrepancy. China BSA with Malaysia expired in 2005, and therefore perhaps ought not to be counted. 
523 William Grimes, Currency and Contest in East Asia: The Great Power Politics of Financial Regionalism (New York: 
Cornell University Press, 2009). pp. 82-4 
524 C Randall Henning, "The Future of the Chiang Mai Initiative: An Asian Monetary Fund?,"  Peterson  Institute  for 
International Economics, Policy Brief PB09-5(2009). p. 2, It will be a cold day in hell when the Philippine pledge of 
US$500 million is called on by Japan to rescue its currency. Thus, in 2005 the CMI of 80b should be regarded as 50-60b. 
525 April 2009 numbers, there were some minor fluctuations over time but Japan was always the biggest bankroller. 
526 The historic summit was brought on by the sub-prime crisis, and interestingly featured a call for ADB capital injection 133 
 
of the Japan-Korea BSA, taking it from US$3b to US$20b denominated in local currency. At 
the same time, Korea and China signed a BSA valued at US$28b (also in local currency), 
earning China a formal thank-you at the next APT.
527 Both of these new BSAs to Korea 
came on top of prior agreements and both fall outside the conditions (such as the IMF link) 
of the CMI.
528 Likewise, on May 3  2009 on the sidelines of the Bali APT meeting, Japan 
pledged a further US$60 billion  to ASEAN outside of the CMI facility, and additionally 
offered to insure US$5 billion worth of yen denominated sovereign bonds.
529  
 
Outside of the CMI and ASEAN, Japan has also courted India, albeit only half -heartedly. 
Initial interest and basic agreement was reached in the middle of 2007; they at last settled 
on an amount over a year later (January 2008), US$6b (3b each way). However, it was not 
until June of 2008 that Japan reached a final agreement with the Indian authorities, and 
even then Japan insisted on keeping a 20% link to the IMF as per the CMI specifications.
530  
In fact, Japan cloned the conditionality of the CMI for India‘s BSA.
531 Officials in the Bank of 
Japan  suggest  that  this  may  be  part  of  a  move  to  shift  the  CMI  from  an  APT-linked 
institution  to  one  under  the  umbrella  of  the  EAS.
532 Given the long lead time into this 
agreement with India, there is some suggestion that the news that China had also extended 
a non-CMI linked BSA to Malaysia worth 13.5b (local currency) in January 2009 triggered 
Japan final agreement.
533 This indicates Japan somewhat limited trust towards India, but 
also Japan‘s interest in bringing India (and perhaps Australia and New Zealand under the 
rubric of EAS) into the CMI framework.
534 Thus, outside of the network of BSAs within the 
CMI framework, Japan has been willing to build up its own separate bilateral network. 
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prompting China and Japan to act must not be discounted.  
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Peterson Institute for International Economics, Policy Brief PB09-5(2009). p. 2 
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Japan and China‘s interest in protecting each other‘s financial stability is moot. These two 
powers hold the bulk of the world‘s foreign exchange reserves, and thus are capable of 
managing  their  currencies  independently.  Interestingly,  the  two  sides  reached  an 
agreement between their central banks (which step-sides the IMF link in CMI) in 2002. 
However despite the growth of the CMI since, this agreement has (unusually, and perhaps 
uniquely, of BSAs within the CMI membership) not be not been extended, increased or 
modified in any way since activation, reflecting its symbolic rather than functional purposes.  
 
This outcome of bilateral networks for financial cooperation both within and outside of a 
common framework can be explained with reference to realism. Both Japan and China 
have jealously protected their freedoms in choosing whom to protect and the extent of that 
protection.  Japan  and  China  have  not  reached  some  objectively  assessable  criteria  in 
choosing their partners, but rather maximized their discretion. Indeed, Japan and China 
have failed to coordinate with each other and have been willing to undercut the CMI by 
offering increasingly generous terms to key partners like Korea, suggesting a competition 
for influence has broken out.   
 
5.5  Scope: Common Currency Redux 
 
The CMI is not chartered at this stage, so discussion about the scope of this institution is 
premature. What can be noted is that while the CMI is expected to play just one role, i.e. 
the provision of liquidity in a time of crisis, there is some hope that once established it will 
develop  further.  In  particular,  Kawai  Masahiro  has  noted  that  the  CMI,  once  fully 
institutionalised,  can  be  the  basis  for  other  financial  and  monetary  cooperation  such 
regional bond market development and a regional currency.
535 Thus far however, this idea 
for a common currency has remained a plan and is far away from becoming reality. 
Nevertheless, the Asian Currency Unit (ACU) concept is relevant to understanding Japan‘s 
response to the rise of China and its possible future trajectory.  
 
Japan’ Interests in the ACU 
Within  Japan,  the  ACU  has  attracted  several  high  profile  supporters.  Not  merely 
academically-minded ex-bureaucrats such as Sakakibara Eisaku, but also former Prime 
Ministers such Nakasone Yasuhiro.
536 More recently, the current PM Hatoyama Yukio has 
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supported the ACU idea.
537 Both Nakasone (as head of Council on East Asia Community) 
and Hatoyama support the ACU  not out of a j udgement of its economic utility but  as a 
symbol  of  the  indivisibility  of  Asia.  Indeed,  as Mundell  notes  the  common  European 
currency is predicated more on feelings of ‗never again‘ than any economic analysis.
538 
 
From a Japanese perspective, apart from demonstrating unequivocally Japan‘s ‗one-ness‘ 
with Asia, a common currency for Asia would of necessity entail a greater role for the yen in 
the region. Indeed, Japan‘s interest in furthering the use of its currency in the region is 
hardly recent. Ignoring unfavourable historical parallels, Japanese academics begun calling 
for a new role for the yen since the early nineties.
539 These proposals, for what became 
known as the ‗yen bloc‘, were based on the belief that Japan‘s informal trade network in 
East and Southeast Asia ought to be ‗formalised‘ by the adoption of the yen as regional 
currency for settling trade and other accounts.
540 Due to East Asia‘s (including Japan and 
her companies
541) reliance on the dollar
542, the idea of providing a sort of financial regional 
leadership in the ‗yen bloc‘ was never adopted as government policy.
543  
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After the Asian Financial Crisis, the yen bloc concept was again advanced under title of 
‗internationalization of the yen.‘ Major domestic reforms of Japan‘s financial sector were 
pushed through aimed at making Tokyo a world-class financial capital
544 after the collapse 
in the early 1990s.
545 Internationalization of the yen, as an official Japanese policy objective, 
was emphasised by the statements  of the Minister of Finance at the Vancouver APEC in 
1998, and subsequently by Prime Minister Obuchi himself in January of 1999.
546 As a policy 
however, internationalization of the yen has clearly failed (see Appendix 8) 
 
Japan and China compete in the ACU idea 
In 2002, at the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in July, Finance Minister Shiokawa Masajūrō, 
citing the experience of Europe, called for a single Asian currency – an idea linked to yen 
internationalization.
547 Contrary to the policy advice of the IMF, Japan began to champion 
an intermediate currency regime called the ‗G3 Currency Basket for Asian economies‘. This 
basket was to be artificially constructed of US dollars, Japanese yen and the euro, but the 
weight of each component was not formally discussed.
 548 Japan also aggressively pursued 
the idea in international organizations, such as the ADB.
549 Indeed, the ACU has been seen 
by many as an attempt to ensure a privileged place for the yen in a region where the RMB 
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is increasingly likely to be the currency of choice.
550 The perception within Japan is that the 
ACU is also due to fear of Chinese influence, and not (as some in the US regard it) an 
attempt to improve relations with China.
551 
 
In fact, Japanese officials took up the currency basket idea directly with Chinese monetary 
authorities in late 2004 or early 2005. Their aim   was to persuade Chinese monetary 
authorities to move away from the straight dollar peg towards a baske t containing yen.
552 
As Vatikiotis notes, "Japan is in a hurry to cement its role as a pivot of these financial 
mechanisms  before  China  becomes  too  dominant —and  perhaps  before  the  yen  is 
overshadowed by the RMB."
553 This fear of being consumed by China, including financially, 
is clearly growing at a popular level.
554 Although many in the MOF do not feel such anxiety, 




In February of 2006, ADB‘s President Kuroda announced that the ACU would be unveiled 
at the upcoming Finance Minister‘s meeting in April.
 556 The data for the ACU would go up 
on the ADB website, including details about its current strength and the relative weights of 
the  currencies  which  composed  it.
557 However, the ACU data did not get posted as 
announced, nor has it been posted since. The reason was to do with relative weights of the 
currencies, in particular the weights of the yen and RMB.  
 
Deciding the relative weights of the currencies in the ACU was always going to be politically 
difficult.
558 The proposal which the Asian Development Bank‘s Office for Regional Economic 
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Integration put forward focussed on three economic elements, size of economy defined by 
GDP  (at  market  exchange  rate),  plus  intra-regional  trade,  plus  capital  control  variable 
(international  debt  security  by  residence  of  transactions)  simply  averaged,  to  arrive  at 
technical weights for the currencies. Using this method, the exact weights arrived at was 
yen at 36.9% and RMB at 19.51%. However, these technical weights were seen by China 
as unacceptable. The RMB was weighted too low in their estimation. What China sought 
was ―politically agreed averages‖ as in the case of Europe, which would imply a rebalance 
in  favour  of  the  RMB.
559 As  Giovanni  Capannelli,  an  involved  participant  and  senior 
economist at ADB-OREI notes, "It seems like there are many more sensitivities than we 
thought with regard to the definition of weights."
560 
 
China‘s objection at the ADB research level carried over to that year‘s formal meeting of the 
APT-FMM,  at  which  the  Chinese  insisted  that  the  resolution  read  ―potential  utilities  of 
regional currency baskets‖, rather than a stronger call for the need for the ACU. Some 
involved believed that this reflected a desire to rein in the ADB‘s efforts rather than moving 
ahead with monetary cooperation.
561 Another reason for this objection was the lack of effort 
by Japan to involve China in the APT based ACU research the previous year  – no doubt 
stirring  up  suspicions.
562 Only  after  the  ACU  proposal  was  reduced  to  an  index  for 




At the same time, the ACU idea was proving divisive among other ADB board members. 
President Kuroda‘s promotion of it was viewed darkly by the United States. Not only did it 
smack of a Japanese scheme to ease out the dollar in the region, but as far as the US was 
(and still is) concerned, the ADB, as regional development bank, should not be engaged in 
these kinds of monetary matters.
564 In addition, India also opposed on the basis that an 
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Asian Currency Unit should include India, rather than be an exclusively East Asian affair.
 565 
In the face of such difficulties at the ADB, the ACU project was transferred to the APT for 
further study but the ACU remains on the ADB‘s agenda. In May, 2009 General Manager 
Rajet Nag said,  ―one of our long-standing issues on the table is establishing an Asian 
Currency Unit.‖
566   
 
Japan has continued using its position at the ADB to push the ACU idea despite opposition 
from both the US and China.
567 However, while China‘s rise no doubt is a factor in pushing 
Japan to consider institutionalizing the yen in a regional currency, other factors are also 
important.  First  of  all,  one  must  consider  that  the  Japanese  MOF  is  itself  no  longer 
interested in the ACU. After 2002-3, interest and discussion within the MOF has apparently 
shifted away from ACU.
568 Research into the ACU is therefore funded by and pursued  by 
non-governmental agents, whether backed by the ADB, the MOF linked Research Institute 
of Economy, Trade and Industry or private academics. Even Sakakibara Eisaku, who ought 
to be  committed to  the successful realization of a common currency, suggests that  the 
project will take many decades.
569 In 2010, with Japan‘s official interest at quite low levels, 
it appears as if the ACU – while coloured by realist factors – is mostly a socially constructed 
phenomenon.
570 The common currency goal is predicated not so muc h on balancing 
against China, or even on growing levels of interdependence between Japan and East Asia 
(as exchange rate volatility demonstrates), but on a regionalist dream of integration, peace 
and prosperity. Those arguing that Japan should champion a common Asian currency bring 
in issues of peace, stability (and even war memory and guilt) in addition to stressing the 
economic factors they see as important.
571   
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5.6  Authority  
 
Sino-Japan political relations have also affected the authority of the CMI itself. Both Japan 
and China would like the ability to veto the activation of the BSAs but neither is willing to 
pay the political cost of doing so alone. The solution thus far has been to import authority 
from the IMF by conditioning activation of the CMI on an IMF stand-by agreement. However, 
a  fraction  of  the  CMI  can  be  tapped  without  an  IMF  agreement,  and  here  institutional 
authority again comes into play between Japan and China to compel them to loan into a 
crisis.  
 
How the CMI non-linked portion would work in practice remains unclear. Funds under the 
CMI are controlled by a so-called ‗two key‘ system. This system means that in order for the 
CMI to be activated, a crisis-struck country must make a request and the second parties 
must grant the request. This system does not compel the creditors to provide funds at all, 
and in effect allows the creditors to opt-out of any rescue. Thus, while swap lines must be 
activated simultaneously and proportionally (i.e. the borrower could not preference certain 
lenders) by choosing not to sign a BSA with a country (or by opting out, or not renewing) 
this could in practice be defeated.
572  
 
Compared to the European Monetary System, this lack of authority to compel creditors to 
make loans in a crisis is particularly noticeable.
573 In addition to the incorrect assumption 
that the unlinked portion of the BSA would be automatically approved, there is also a belief 
that these funds would be made available without any additional conditions. Yet there is no 
guarantee of this. Indeed, many of the BSAs already contain some performance criteria as 
conditions for disbursement. Handing over money without conditions is a fool‘s game and 
all of the Northeast Asian countries (the real money behind the CMI) are rightly concerned 
about moral hazard, i.e. the risk of becoming a long term charity for smaller Asian countries. 
For this reason the BSAs are charged at or above market rates of interest; this functions as 
a  built  in  disincentive  to  use  the  CMI  for  anything  other  than  short  term  currency 
intervention.
574 
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5.6.1  Conditionality 
In the case of Japan, initially the conditionality was simply a requirement for the recipient 
country to maintain a certain, fixed amount of foreign exchange reserves. However, Japan 
has since (during the 2005-7 re-negotiations of all the BSAs) sought to convert this fixed 
sum into a variable sum of three to four months‘ worth of imports. This conditionality might 
present difficulties if Japan attempts to multi-lateralize the CMI in the future, and may have 
to be abandoned unless others adopt the same rule.
575  
 
China too has imposed some additional conditionally onto its BSAs. While it is generally 
known that the amounts disbursed under th e BSAs are charged interest at market rates, 
what this means varies from agreement to agreement. In principle the premiums are kept 
secret to avoid stigmatising individual economies,  but it is now known that China charges 
the highest rates for access to its reserves committed under the CMI. Consequently, certain 
Southeast Asian governments (Malaysia and Thailand) have allowed their BSAs with China 
to ‗lapse‘ in 2005. This demonstrates Japan‘s greater willingness and capability to commit 
the resources to lead in Asia in this field. However, despite China‘s quiet but effective move 
to reduce its exposure in the CMI economically, China has been publicly positive about the 
process out of fear of losing political leadership.
576 Ideally, both Japan and China should 
have a common policy on access conditionality and ought not to be gaming each other for 
a free ride in a realist fashion. 
 
5.6.2  Surveillance Mechanism 
Another area of contention has been over plans for the CMI to acquire a role in regional 
economic surveillance.
577 On the sidelines of the ADB AGM  in May 2001 (Honolulu), the 
APT-FMM agreed to study a policy dialogue/review mechanism. It was no coincidence that 
Japan was to co-chair this study group (with Malaysia). When the report from the study 
group was returned in November (2001), it became clear that the Japanese Ministry of 
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Finance  (which  had  prepared  the  report)  was  unwilling  to  accept  a  monitoring  and 
surveillance mechanism outside of their control. Japan‘s demand for de facto control was 
not acceptable to China, and the result was an agreement to limit policy review to the 
deputy minister level.
578 However, such an informal process would not be able to provide 
the level and quality of surveillance that Japan desired. In fact, Japan has conditioned 
softening the CMI‘s link to the IMF on an improved surveillance policy and the increased 
(presumably  Japanese)  institutional  capacity  to  control  CMI  activities.
579    Yet  China 
remained adamantly opposed to any independent regional surveillance capacity.
580 
 
The outcome of Japanese demands for greater surveillance was the creation of the 
Economic Review and Policy Dialogue (ERPD) at the APT Deputy Finance Ministers 
Meeting in April of 2002 (Yangon). The ERPD meets twice a year; once in April at the APT-
FMM (Deputy Minister level), and once in November in a closed session hosted by a 
Northeast Asian country. Reviews at the Deputy level are more technical and include the 
region‘s central bankers plus other experts as needed. Ministerial level meetings are closed 
to all but the ministers themselves, plus the ASEAN Secretary General and (interestingly) 
the President of the ADB.
581 A side effect of the deepening of regional surveillance at the 
APT-FMM has been to edge out US influence in regional financial matters by causing the 
dissolution of the Manila Framework.
 582  
 
The role of the ERPD as a regional surveillance mechanism was reinforced at the Istanbul 
meeting  of  the  APT-FMM  in  May  2005.  It  was  agreed  that  in  order  to  strengthen 
cooperation, it was necessary to integrate the ERPD into the CMI. Following the decision to 
double the amount available under the CMI, all swap agreements were revised to include a 
requirement linking their activation to the ERPD. The Hyderabad meeting of 2006 saw the 
formal agreement that the ERPD, rather than individual states, would judge the worthiness 
of an applicant to the CMI (although the opt-out option remained in place). However, if the 
ERPD was actually used to in this manner to judge, approve, provide policy adjustment 
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recommendations or conditions, and to provide due diligence (review of policy response) 
for  the  provision  of  liquidity  in  crisis  instead  of  the  IMF,  it  will  become  very  political 
indeed.
583 As of 2008, the ERPD in fact set no rules as to the disclosure requirements, 
allowing each state a wide band of discretion in order to avoid conflict. But u nfortunately, 
the upshot of this lack of standard ization  is that comparison of national conditions has 
become impossible.
584   
 
The cause of this lack of standardization is likely the unwillingness of China to open its 
books to external scrutiny (an unwillin gness which allows other nations off the hook as 
well).
585 Part of this is due to the fact that China is unwilling to submit to any type of 
stringent surveillance, such as the IMF Article IV consultations, presumably for fear of being 
criticised over its currency policy.
586 Japan and China too have previously had disputes 
over the RMB exchange rate and exchange rate cooperation. Most notably, the high level 
strategic bilateral economic talks in 2007 were dealt a serious blow when China unilaterally 
edited its version of the formally agreed statement to remove references about the future 
convertibility of the RMB.
587  
 
Indeed, one of Japan‘s interests in strengthening the ERPD is surely to gain a better picture 
of  what  is  happening  in  China‘s  economy.  Some  suggest  that  the  real  value  of  the 
surveillance to its members is this function - an opportunity to discuss developments within 
China.
588 But without China‘s cooperation, Japan has struggled to build the ERPD as an 
independent surveillance mechanism within the CMI - an important step in de-linking the 
CMI from the IMF.  
 
China‘s decision to prioritize its flexibility over the regional (and indeed global) public good 
that submitting to surveillance  would entail is predictable by realism. So too is Japan‘s 
inability  to  compel  China  to  accept  surveillance  due  to  the  shifting  balance  of  power. 
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However, discounting all good from the process is to miss something important. That China 
is unwilling to cooperate on surveillance is a communication of sorts about the risks inside 
the Chinese economy and its banking system in particular. Thus, China‘s decision not to 
participate is in this case at least not chiefly aimed at preventing Japanese leadership, but 
a reflection of its domestic economic circumstances. Moreover, like in the CBMs process 
discussed later, China‘s disclosure is improving (although  not yet at level of actionable 
information), and the ERPD is still clearly valued by its participants. While the outcome, the 
lack of institutionalization, is due to a lack of cooperation between China and Japan, it is 
not at all apparent that this is due to a realist competition but rather the current, if now 
negotiated, limits of China‘s economic institutions. 
 
5.6.3  Rules: IMF Linkage 
One of the more significant rules of the CMI process is the limitation of access to funds 
without the IMF being involved. Initially, only up to 10% of the total amount available would 
be released without a standby agreement from the IMF to the country involved. This limit 
was raised to 20% in 2005. This link to the IMF is in fact a peculiar feature to the CMI, 
neither its parallels in the Americas or Europe contain such a rule.
589 This linkage rule is a 
thus a  shared interest of  both China and Japan, but for different reasons. Recalling the 
lessons learnt by the Japanese MOF during the crisis, one would not expect the Japanese 
side to be interested in such a link. However, after the failed the AMF proposal, any move 
towards an IMF independent monetary institution in Asia is likely to be viewed by the US as 
a threat. For the Chinese, the linkage limits Japan‘s leadership ability (if the US does not 
lead, then it will be likely be Japan). The real advantage for both China and Japan in linking 
the CMI disbursement to the IMF is that it frees them from the responsibility of having to 




Other events seem to bear out this analysis. There is some indication that China pressed 
for a full 100 percent linkage to the IMF for the CMI in the initial phase, despite the fact that 
                                                   
589 Those  parallels  being  NAFA  and  EMS  see,  C  Randall  Henning,  East  Asian  Financial  Co-Operation,  vol.  68 
(Washington: Peterson Inititute for International Economics, 2002). p. 62 
590 In fact, these unlinked loans to prop up a currency might be exactly the signal to currency markets to sell  triggering 
another destabilising round of capital flight. See, Jennifer Amyx, "Regional Financial Cooperation in East Asia since the 
Asian Financial Crisis," in Crisis as Catalyst; Asia's Dynamic Political Economy, ed. Andrew MacIntyre, T J Pempel, and 
John Ravenhill (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008); William Grimes, Currency and Contest in East Asia: The Great 
Power Politics of Financial Regionalism (New York: Cornell University Press, 2009). p. 85, and Jennifer Amyx, "Regional 
Financial Cooperation in East Asia since the Asian Financial Crisis," in  Crisis as Catalyst; Asia's Dynamic Political 
Economy, ed. Andrew MacIntyre, T J Pempel, and John Ravenhill (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008)., p. 124. This 
does not include 2.5b free of such IMF link pledge to the Philippines by Japan under the NMI, or the tiny amounts 
available to it under the ASEAN Swap Agreement. 145 
 
Chinese officials remained critical of IMF. When the 2005 APT FMM in Istanbul agreed to 
increase the unlinked proportion of the CMI to 20%, the ASEAN members (and Korea) 
preferred to completely abolish the link, or, if that were impossible, for the limit to be raised 
to 50%.
591 China did not take a formal position in these negotiations and it fell to Japan to 
take the unpopular position to support linkage.
592 
 
As  one  researcher  points  out,  ―The  largest  potential  lenders,  Japan  and  China, 
understandably wanted some assurance that their funds would not be used in the futile 
defence  of failed  economic  policy  [when  they  insisted  on  the  IMF  conditionality  for  the 
CMI].‖
593 The May 2001 Guidelines announced a review by finance ministers every three 
years, but at  the  2004 review (an explicit opportunity to revisit  the AMF idea) the joint 
statement merely affirmed, ―agreement to undertake further review‖ rather than pledge to 
remove the peg.
594   
 
Japanese  and Chinese  insistence on an IMF -link  is  reflective  of a  level  of  cooperation 
between  Japan  and  China.  But  this  is  limited  to  cooperation  on  rules  to  prevent 
membership  from  accessing  the  CMI  to  prop-up  politically  popular  but  failed  economic 
policy, hardly the kind of leadership necessary to build a regional alternative to the US-led 
IMF financial system. To an extent this demonstrates that rivalry in other spheres of the 
CMI do not prevent cooperation on shared interests as per liberal institutional prescriptions, 
but only in so far as neither cede pride of place regionally to its rival as per the realist logic.   
 
5.7  Resources 
 
The capacity of the CMI to successfully meet the challenge of a(nother) regional financial 
crisis has, at least on paper, grown substantially since inception. However, this growth of 
the CMI is a reflection of the leadership struggle between Japan and China, rather a sign of 
a growing commitment to solve regional problems in a co-ordinated manner. Coordination 
would lessen the need for larger sums to be committed to the CMI. The CMI began in 2000 
with  a  total  of  US$40b  (or  equivalent).  By  2009  it  had  trebled  to  US$120  billion 
approximately. It is generally considered that US$120 billion is necessary to actually avert a 
crisis; the IMF agreements during the Asian Financial crisis ran from between US$20-60 
                                                   
591 Author's Interview with Yung Chul Park, 1 June 2009. Seoul. 
592 Jennifer Amyx, "A Regional Bond Market for East Asia? The Evolving Poli tical Dynamics of Regional Financial 
Cooperation," in Pacific Economic Papers No. 342 (Canberra: Australia-Japan Research Centre, 2004). p. 91 
593 Stephen Grenville, "Australia, East Asia and the Current Financial Crisis," in Analysis (Sydney: Lowy Institute, 2008). 
594 Jennifer Amyx, "A Regional Bond Market for East Asia? The Evolving Political Dynamics of Regional Financial 





The ability of the CMI to deliver additional foreign exchange reserves in an immediate and 
effective manner is further complicated by the use of local currency (yen or RMB rather 
than USD) in some of the agreements  involving either Japan or China; the Japan -China 
BSA is all in local currency. In addition, growing as it did out of the New Miyazawa Initiative; 
a portion (6 of the US$21 billion equivalent) in the Japan-Korea BSA is local currency.
596 
China‘s insistence on using local currency in several of its BSAs is interesting. If China 
were to attempt to deliver on its $1billion pledge to the Philippines, the RMB provided under 
the CMI would need to be immediately converted into dollars by the People‘s Bank of China 
itself as the currency in non-convertible in international markets. It seems therefore the 
Chinese  commitment  in  local  currency  is  more  political  posturing  than  any  attempt  to 
increase the effectiveness of the CMI.
597   
 
5.7.1  Resources: USD, Yen or RMB? 
Indeed, without a regional currency to back it up, the CMI must use one or a number of 
other currencies. But how is the balance between these currencies, particularly the USD, 
yen and RMB, to be struck? While it may be economically rational to set the proportions of 
the various currencies in the CMI to their actual usage rates in the region‘s trade  and 
finance (which would see the USD dominate), it is clear that the agreement is to be based 
principally  on  political  concerns.
  598   This  is  because  every  player  has  an  interest  in 
maximising  the  role  of  their  currency  in  the  CMI.
599 Certainly  for  Japan,  which  initially 
proposed  that  the  yen  count  for  half  of  the  AMF,  anything  less  was  going  to  look  like 
backing down. However, if Japan were to contribute half, this would mean that China‘s 
RMB would be in second place – and China demanded at least equality with Japan as a 
                                                   
595 Asami Tadahiro, "Chiang Mai Intitiative as the Foundation of Financial Stability in East Asia," (Tokyo: IIMA, 2005). p. 
12 
596 BOJ is contracting party for the NEA BSAs in Yen, while the MOF is the contracting party for SEA BSAs in dollars. 
597 In fact, there is an in principle commitment to shift the BSAs to entirely local currencies in the future , which carries 
Japanese fingerprints. For China, one minor advantage of issuing in local currency for China is that damage from a 
mismatch is limited if they are forced to devalue their currency. 
598 China uses the term, ―politically agreed averages‖ as per the Euro. See, Masahiro Kawai, "An Asian Currency Unit for 
Regional Exchange Rate Policy Coordination," unpublished, for Eichengreen chapter (2008). 
599 See Point B in  Eric Girardin, "Regional Monetary Units for East Asia; Lessons from Europe," in  ADBI Disscussion 
papers 116 (Tokyo, 2008). While this has yet to confirmed as a reason to my satisfaction, when country A provides 
country B with a BSA denominated in local currencies, country A assumes country B‘s exchange rate risk. Moreover, as 
country B is now holding country A‘s currency, it is easier for country B to resolve its debts to country A (whenever in 
trade or finance). In fact, country B now has an incentive to depend on country A in trade and finance because of this. 
Swapping currency causes integration, the weaker partner B integrating into the larger partner A by using A‘s currency. 
Especially for the RMB, which is inconvertible, the smaller economy (Korea say) is virtually forced to use the RMB to 
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matter  of  national  pride.  Conversely,  Japan  was  hoping  to  lock-in  its  leadership  in  the 
provision of regional public goods:
600 (also a matter of pride) by having its currency hold the 
largest share in the CMI precisely due to concerns about China‘s rise.
601  
 
Of course, some doubt that Japan will be able to actually provide yen to its CMI partners in 
event  of  a  crisis.  One  Singaporean  official  noted  that,  as  Japan  had  not  yet  put  any 
mechanism in place, Japan might be forced to buy yen on the open market with its USD 
reserves, defeating the purpose of using local currency.
602 On the flip side, Korea‘s interest 
in a yen deal is marginal; Korea is likely use the yen to buy USD in any case. It does not 
matter to Korea if the resources are received in yen or in dollars. Rather, the benefit is 
Japan‘s  -  both  symbolically  and  in  terms  of  monetary  influence.  For  the  same  reason, 
China‘s BSA with Korea is also denominated in RMB.
 603 This interest of both Japan and 
China  in  the  symbolic  value  of  pledging  local  currency,  despite  its  limitations  and 
complications, suggests that they are indeed competing for pride of place in the CMI. 
 
5.7.2  Institutional Capacity: Secretariat?  
If the CMI is to function as intended then it will need to acquire a secretariat to control and 
manage  loans  rather  than  a  network  of  BSAs.  This  need  had  been  informally 
acknowledged by the APT minister themselves prior to the May 2007 APT FMM in Kyoto at 
which  a  formal  call  was  made  for  the  so-called  Chiang  Mai  Initiative  Multilateralization 
(CMIM). However, the agreement which resulted was not for multilateralization in the sense 
of  institution  building,  but  rather  an  agreement  (in  principle)  to  create  ―a  self-managed 
reserve pooling arrangement governed by a single contractual agreement.‖
604 The purpose 
of this ‗single agreement‘ is to actually avoid the need for an institutionalised secretariat to 
manage the funds. Instead, this agreement aimed to clarify circumstances in which CMI 
funds would be released even while maintaining the status quo of creditors managing their 
portion of the CMI within their own national foreign exchanges reserves (no paid-in portion 
but rather a promissory note).   
                                                   
600 Japan (and China) only has access to $1 for every $2 it puts in, it is clearly  therefore the ―providers‖, all other 
members ration is 1 or above and are thus recipients, see Appendix 9. 
601 Saori  Katada  and  Mireya  Solis,  "Under  Pressure:  Japan‘s  Institutional  Response  to  Regional  Uncertainty,"  in 
Northeast Asia: Ripe for Integration, ed. Ramgopal Agarwala (Berlin: Springer, 2009). p. 140 
602 The official addressing MOF Yosano begun by saying ―are you sure you have thought about this?‖, see Yasuhiko Ota, 
"Genei No Ajia Tsūka Kōbō," Nihon Keizai Shimbun, May 10th 2009. 
603  A Korean intervention with yen can hardly be blamed on Japan after all. For China, since the RMB can not be turned 
into USD on the open market, Korea is forced to trust and depend on the Chinese central bank. The other option is to 
use those RMB to purchase Chinese goods and services and take some pressure indirec tly off the Won, but hardly 
flexible. Interview with negotiator of the CMIM, Author's Interview with Yoon Deok Rong, at Kiep 3th June 2009. Seoul. 
604 Masahiro Kawai, "Evolving Economic Architecture in East Asia," (Tokyo: ADB Institute Discussion Paper No. 8 4, 
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In reality the options for the creation of a secretariat are limited. The default option is for the 
ASEAN  Secretariat  to  handle  the  CMI.  This  option,  while  neatly  side-stepping  Sino-
Japanese tensions is unlikely for two reasons; firstly, the money is coming from Northeast 
Asian countries, and secondly, the costs for ASEAN of running the CMI secretariat are high 
enough  to  cause  political  tensions  (as  not  all  of  ASEAN  are  members  of  the  CMI).
605 
Another option is for the ADB to become the home for the future secretariat. Wh ile this 
seems less likely, as the US and other Western powers would object (on the grounds that a 
development bank should not play host to a mini -IMF, and especially should not be using 
ADB money to do so). Additionally, China continues to be sceptical ab out the neutrality of 
the ADB, suspecting it of a pro-Japan bias (see Chapter Seven). Yet another option is for 
the CMI to form  de novo its secretariat, however this ‗solution‘ would run into the usual 
problems of where to house it. The logical place to establish the secretariat might be Japan, 
after all the idea was Japanese and Japan is footing at least half of the bill but Chinese 
opposition prevents this.
 606 In fact, a decision on where to place the CMI secretariat was 
due  in December 2008, but no conclusion was reached at that time.
607 A solution only 
reached in April 2010, with the decision to house the secretariat in Singapore  – a site that 
avoids both China and Japan.
608  
 
In institutionalising the role of their respective currencies and in reaching a decision on 
where to place the secretariat, China and Japan have been unable to cooperate with  each 
other  neither  willing  to  cede  pride  of   place.  In  both  instances,  Japan‘s  reasons  for 
attempting to institutionalise Japanese influence in the CMI were due to its fears about the 
implications  of  the  rise  of  China.  Unsurprisingly,  China  is  unwilling  to  see  Japanese 
influence  become  locked-in  for  precisely  this  reason  of  mutual  distrust.  Thus,  both  the 
reason for Japan‘s actions in seeking to institutionalize its influence and the inability of 
Japan  to  achieve  this  goal,  are  in  conformity  with  the  realist  prescriptions  of  Power 
Transition and Hegemonic Stability theory.     
                                                   
605 In fact, multilateralization might well weaken the rationale for ASEAN countries who viewed the CMI as a borrowing 
facility with no up-front costs. If multilateralised, these ASEAN might actually be required to help each other in crisis, 
rather than get handouts from the NEA countries see Jennifer Amyx, "Regional Financial Cooperation in East Asia since 
the Asian Financial Crisis," in Crisis as Catalyst; Asia's Dynamic Political Economy, ed. Andrew MacIntyre, T J Pempel, 
and John Ravenhill (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008). pp. 126-7 
606 The link between institutionalization and Sino-Japanese relations is clear in the mind of one member of the Tariff and 
Exchange Rate consulting group, stating that  ―we will need a secretariat if surveillance is to go ahead, but with China 
and Japan in opposition it is impossible to agree where to put it.‖ Author's Interview with Etsuko Katsu, 18th Janurary 
2010. Tokyo. 
607 Author's Interview with Jayant Menon, 4th December 2008. Tokyo. 
608 Also side-steping Thailand which had been tipped for the secretariat but whose domestic political instability called 
into question its ability to successfully host it. Indeed, Thailand nearly did not sign the CMIM document. 149 
 
 
5.8  Conclusion: Power, Efficiency and Identity in East Asia’s Financial 
Regionalism. 
 
Japan‘s  response  to  the  rise  of  China  in  the  arena  of  financial  regionalism  is  hard  to 
capture using any one international relations theory. While the need to go ahead with the 
provision  of  international  public  goods  such  as  financial  stability  must  necessarily  be 
explained  with  reference  to  interdependence,  in  tracing  actual  institutional  outcomes, 
realism‘s relevance cannot be discounted. 
 
China‘s initial veto of the AMF rendered Japan‘s preferred means for its financial leadership 
impossible. China‘s continued insistence on formal equality with Japan (on pain of spoiling 
further institutionalization) has made it impossible for Japan to lock-in its influence. Instead, 
Japan  launched  a  series  of  bilateral  swaps  with  regional  member  countries,  and 
coordinated to one extent or another with China on scale and conditionality through the 
CMI. Both China and Japan have also begun to offer a number of BSAs outside of the CMI 
process in an attempt to more directly purchase influence in the region, clearly with one eye 
on each other. The outcome of this rivalry is predictable and its deleterious effects are 
visible in the membership, authority and resources of the CMI. In particular, the bilaterally-
networked  structure  of  the  CMI  stovepipes  members‘  access  to  funds,  and  has  even 
introduced the possibility that the institution will fail to deliver in the face of a crisis .Realist 
conceptions such as power transition and hegemonic stability are therefore fundamental to 
understanding how the rivalry of Japan and China has impacted on the development of the 
CMI. But while realism describes the problems of the institution adequately, realists would 
not likely have predicted that this institution would even have come into being.  
 
Liberalism on the other hand is able to explain why the rivalry between Japan and China 
has  not  been  fatal  to  regional  financial  cooperation.  While  Japan  has  been  unable  to 
hegemonically  establish  its  preferred  institution  (the  AMF)  due  to  its  lack  of  a  material 
power  edge,  its  entrepreneurial  and  intellectual  leadership  have  prevailed.  Specifically, 
Japan  responded  to  a  perceived  demand  for  a  regional  public  good  (financial  stability) 
chiefly by ASEAN and Korea by offering a solution acceptable to both the demanders and 
suppliers (including China and the US, via the IMF). Starting modestly, the CMI has slowly 
expanded in size and prestige - even if access remains stove-piped in a network of BSAs. 
Similarly, the CMI process has also had spill-over type effects on the ERPD surveillance 
mechanism.  
 
Yet both realist and liberal thinkers would also be puzzled by Japan‘s apparent interest in a 150 
 
common regional currency. This is because the idea of a common regional currency is 
more important to the region‘s identity politics than either its actual chances of realization or 
its probable limited economic utility would suggest. Indeed, the Chiang Mai Initiatives serve 
as more of a symbolic reference of how far Asia has come together, despite the fact it has 
never been activated. The CMI is in part a response to the West (‗the other‘ in Asia‘s still 
nascent but growing regional identity formation) for the perceived wrongs committed during 
the Asian Financial crisis. For Japan too, the CMI is evidence of its continued relevance to 
Asia, both as a leader and as a part of the ‗solution‘. Recalling the damage to Japan‘s 
national self-confidence in the aftermath of the crisis, especially in light of China‘s growing 
presence  and  prestige,  the  CMI  was  important  to  Japan  for  reasons  more  to  do  with 
restoring national identity than actual economic benefits or hard-nosed calculus of national 
interest.  
 
In conclusion, the realists are half-right. Japan is trying to balance China in its approach 
towards the CMI and regional financial cooperation. Certainly the laboured first years of the 
CMI‘s existence until 2008 or early 2009, being built up as an ad hoc bilateral network with 
dubious actual utility, can be explained with realism. Thus the realist hypothesis about the 
link between  a lack of a regional hegemon and  the inability of regionalism to progress 
beyond the bilaterally-networked stage seems to capture the initial phase most accurately. 
But realist analysis over-emphasizes the role of zero sum material power considerations as 
a motivating force for state action in the financial arena. Blocking China was not the critical 
interest  in  Japan‘s  initial  offer  of  the  AMF,  rather  Japan‘s  interests  lay  with  preserving 
Japan‘s influence in the face of unwanted US interference. Scope therefore always existed 
for  China  and  Japan  to  cooperate,  and  although  Japan  is  still  unable  to  accept  China 
officially participating as co-equal ‗number one‘, Japan has been willing to see China in a 
position of influence within the institution.  
 
5.9  Postscript: the World Financial Crisis and CMI Multilateralization. 
 
Of course, regional institutional development hardly occurs in a vacuum and is a moving 
target.
609 The outbreak of the World Financial Crisis in 2009 has done more to accelerate 
the CMIM process than the improving Sino -Japanese political relationship over the same 
period. While an agreement had been reached in May 4 of 2008 that 80% of the total CMI 
would come from China, Japan and Kore a – negotiation among these three were dead-
locked for reasons outlined above.
610  
                                                   
609 Multilateralization  is  scheduled  for  24  March  2010,  and  this  thesis  ought  to  submitted  some  weeks  later.  The 
arguments made here may well be dealt a lethal blow. 
610 Put simply, China wanted to be equal to Japan, while Korea wanted to be equal to China.  Author's Interview with 151 
 
 
However, in wake of the World Financial Crisis, Korea finally accepted a quota of 16% of 
the total, or 24b, at the Pattaya conference in April 2009.
611 Even still, Japan and China 
were unable to resolve their differences at that time and could not agree how to split the 
remaining 64%.
612 The cause of the disagreement is China‘s insistence that the remaining 
be split equally, refusing to accept a lower weight than that of Japan.
613 A month later a 
compromise was worked out whereby Japan and China contribute 38.4b each (32%). 
However China‘s share included 4.2b from Hong Kong (3.5%), which was specially (and 
suddenly) added to membership of the CMI. This allowed China to claim co-equality with 
Japan and Japan to claim the largest individual contribution (with varying understandings 
about whether Hong Kong is China for the purposes of the CMI or ought to be treated 
separately).
614   This is the first time that China has been accorded an equal weight to 
Japan in an international body.
615 
 
That multilateralization has gone ahead at all is a reflection of the common perceived need 
for a regional facility in the face of the World Financial Crisis. However, if these proportions 
get rolled over in voting weight (even allowing for a portion to be equally distributed as is 
the regional norm) then it is less likely that the CMI will be able to be activated.  Assuming 
that the ASEAN vote to give  themselves access to the fund (a safe bet based on their 
interests and behaviour thus far), then the support  of either Japan or China in addition to 
that of Korea is necessary to have a majority. In fact, under the voting system in place at 
the CMIM, neither China nor Japan can block CMIM‘s activation.
616 
 
The way this negotiation process was set up tended to encourage competition between 
Japan  and  China.  Since  the  CMIM‘s  total  contribution  is  limited,  in  fact  limited  to  the 
Northeast Asian three, the contributions game started to look zero-sum; any increase in 
contribution from say, the Japanese side must be linked to a corresponding decrease in 
China or Korea. Secondly, the CMI is in fact about regional leadership. This means that 
                                                                                                                                                     
Former MOF Official, November 2008. Tokyo. 
611 Author's Interview with Yoon Deok Rong, at Kiep 3th June 2009. Seoul.  ‗Korea learnt that Japan and China are 
competing (at APTFMM) and Korea in the middle. To resolve the problems between the big two players we [Korea] 
argued for more bureaucratic process, lower level meetings and technical to build consensus and personal relationships 
as well. By agreeing to 16% Korea was also able to take itself out from between the middle of China and Japan, and let 
them work it out themselves‘ 
612 D Arul Rajoo, "Asean Summit Likely in Third Week of June," Bernama, 27 April 2009. 
613 Interview with former MOF official, and corroboration in Wichit Chaitrong, "Japan and China Vie to Be Top Contributor 
to Regional Fund," the Nation, April 10 2009. In fact the ASEAN countries resolved their individual contributions fairly 
early on, the delay in announcement due probably due to not wanting to ―shame‖ NEA countries?  
614 "Asean, China, Japan, Skorea Finalise Crisis Pact," AFP, 3 May 2009.  
615 China has half of Japan‘s voting power in the IMF (3% c.f. 6% approx) and the ADB (6% c.f. 12% approx.). 
616 Author's Confidential Interview with Bank of Japan Officials, 16 March 2010. Tokyo. 152 
 
China has every incentive not to allow Japan to cement its position as leader even as 
Japan attempts to position itself as such, a conflict not merely of national interests but also 
of status perceptions. Thirdly, there are clearly doubts in the minds of the Chinese that 
Japan would use the institution in a purely apolitical, functional manner. Money speaks, and 
by maintaining co-equal share with Japan, China can ensure than its voice will be equally 
loud.  In  fact,  given  that  there  is  already  a  basic  consensus  that  the  CMI  should  be 
institutionalised on the principle of weighted voting, i.e. wielding votes equal to contribution, 
in  is  only  natural  that  China  and  Japan  would  compete.
617 Lastly, the political decision 
about how much weight to attribute to each of the currencies can be used, and is likely to 
be used, in any future financial cooperation in the East Asia  – i.e. winning this game is 
crucial to winning future games.  
 
Moreover, even this new multilateralized framework is still stove-piped, as no one country is 
able to access the entire amount (see Appendix 9). Indeed, the total amounts accessible 
remain insufficient for individual countries to fend of financial crises without also going to 
the IMF, even assuming that the IMF condition is abolished in time. The CMIM is thus still a 
supplement to the IMF rather than an independent facility; this seems to be the preferred 
outcome for Japan. 
 
   
                                                   
617 C  Randall  Henning,  "The  Future  of the  Chiang  Mai Initiative:  An  Asian  Monetary  Fund?,"  Peterson  Institute  for 
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6  ASEAN Regional Forum 
 
6.1  Introduction 
 
The ASEAN Regional  Forum  (ARF)  is  the  only  multilateral  setting  in  which  Japan  and 
China can discuss regional security issues.
618 It is no accident that China and Japan have 
both chosen to join the ARF; the organization was formed by ASEAN precisely to engage 
these giants. Japan too was interested in the ARF to help manage its strategic options in 
the face of a rising China. This chapter argues that the rise of China has been a key factor 
in Japan‘s policy and activities in the ARF. The rise of China not only initially pushed Japan 
into multilateral institution building as a part of its national strategy, but is now responsible 
for Japan‘s virtual abandonment of the ARF and pursuit of other bilateral and mini-lateral 
security networks.  
 
This chapter also argues that realism is half right, predicting the outcome reasonably well. 
China‘s  rise  has  destabilized  the  ARF  and  caused  Japan  to  reappraise  its  institutional 
strategy towards China. But such an argument simplifies how this process has occurred, in 
other  words  the  link  between  the  bilateral  and  the  multilateral.  It  is  here  that  social 
constructivist  understandings  are  most  useful.  China‘s  rising  national  power,  and 
consequent  influence  in  the  ARF,  need  not  provoke  any  policy  response  from  Japan 
depending on how it is used and how Japan perceives it (i.e. the meaning attributed to 
power). From Japan‘s point of view, China‘s rise in power has not, however, been matched 
by a rising commitment to either a Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) regime or even a 
general commitment to allowing and equipping the ARF to discuss CBMs. Socialization is 
therefore at work, but it is the socialization of Japan into a realist-type regional order under 
China. It is no surprise then that Japan has started to defect from the ARF. This is not 
simply  due  to  a  reversing  power  balance  (which  as  in  previous  chapters  led  to  an 
institutionalization strategy) but also  because of an increasing distrust of China‘s future 
power. Tracing the link between the effects of the Sino-Japanese bilateral relationship and 
the institutional outcome is this chapter‘s contribution to the literature. 
 
6.1.1  The ARF as an institution in the IR literature 
The ASEAN Regional Forum has attracted a fair amount of academic interest. Whether or 
not ASEAN is an important grouping has been written about exhaustively, and the lines 
                                                   
618 One other setting would of course be the UN Security Council, but Japan-China bilateral disputes are unlikely to be 
raised in such a high-profile setting, it is made even more unlikely by China‘s status as a veto-holding permanent 
member of the UNSC. We will not discuss the UNSC as it is a global organization, not regional, and thus moves to 
different dynamics. 154 
 
drawn between the realists and the constructivists remain.
619 This is due in part to its status 
as an indigenous response to the region‘s security challenges, and the complete lack of 
other multilateral security institutions. And yet for all this interest, there has remained a 
question of just how significant the ARF is an institution – will it evaporate in the heat of a 
serious bilateral dispute between the major powers? Richard Stubbs and Sarah Eaton pose 
the question in terms of power, asking simply, ―is ASEAN powerful?‖
620 Unfortunately their 
conclusion, that it depends on how you define power, only raises more questions than it 
answers.  
 
Neo-realist  and  realist  thinkers  have  tended  to  discount  the  ARF  as  force  in  the 
international relations of the region. This is due in part to a belief that the only ‗real‘ actors 
on the international stage are states. Thus there is a disinclination to see the effects of 
institutions/norms on shaping state interest.
621 Also important is the central role that ASEAN 
plays within the ARF. Many realists see ASEAN as a coll ection of weak states, and thus 
incapable of building regional order. Realists thus describe the ‗ASEAN way‘ as a phantom 
that  does  not  assist  with  foreign  policy  coordination.
622 Ralf Emmers argues that the 
balance of power in Asia goes much further in explaining state behaviour than fuzzy ideas 
of norms. He suggests that ARF was formed principally to balance against rising Chinese 
power, a common interest of ASEAN, not to mention Japan and the US.
623  
 
However, Emmers notes that, rather than aiming to strike  the military balance, as is the 
traditional realist understanding of the purpose of security multilateralism (c.f. North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization), it was hoped that ARF  could achieve a  political balance. Foreign 
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policy  makers  in  the  region  also  seem  to  support  Emmers  view,  Former  Thai  Foreign 
Minister Surin Pitsuwan, (ASEAN's secretary- general) characterized the association in a 
recent interview as "a fulcrum of power plays in the region."
624 Another scholar, Yuen Foong 
Khong, has described the ARF as a ―mechanism for defusing the conflictual by-products of 
power  balancing  practices‖  in  Asia.
625 Thus  the  ARF  was  premised  on  that  belief  that 
―hegemonic  disposition  can  be  restrained  through  political  and  institutional  means  and 
without the use of war.‖
626 Indeed, He Kai has even coined the term institutional balancing 
to describe this strategy, which sits in between realist and liberal understandings.
627  
 
Constructivists, on the other hand, are most willing to entertain the prospect that a political 
solution can be found to Asia‘s security problems. The constructivists would point out that 
the ARF is not trying to be a Western-style collective security institution. Specifically, the 
constructivists, noting that ‗anarchy is what states make of it‘, suggest that the ARF is self-
consciously  trying  to  change  the  assumptions  underpinning  the  region‘s  international 
relations; its goal is ‗community-building‘, aiming towards security with, rather than against, 
others member states.  
 
The goals of ARF, according to First Statement of the Chairman includes ―to work towards 
the strengthening and enhancement of political and security cooperation within the region, 
as  a  means  of  ensuring  lasting  peace,  stability  and  prosperity  for  the  region  and  its 
peoples.‖
628 These goals are, even to pro-ASEAN scholars like Amitav Acharya, ―vague‖
629 
and difficult to concretely operationalize - certainly when compared to the Helsinki Final Act 
of  the  Conference  on  Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe  (CSCE).
630 In spite of its 
problems, constructivists still believe in the worth of the ARF as an institution capable of 
boosting  the  region‘s  security  though  its  informal  approach.  For  example,  Caballero-
Anthony notes that the networks developed at the ARF create, ―social capital, a stock of 
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trust,  familiarity,  ease  and  comfort,  which  could  become  crucial  assets  at  critical 
moments.‖
631 Dosch also sees such personal relationships among elites in the region as a 
factor in stabilizing Southeast Asia.
632 Whether or not this ‗social capital‘ is viable means of 
achieving security is contested, realists would tend to regard these beliefs as naïve at best, 
and dangerously idealistic at worst.
 633 
 
Related to Dosch‘s view is Kawasaki‘s analysis, which suggests that the ARF solves a 
particular problem in the region, an ‗assurance game‘. The assumptions underpinning the 
assurance game are fundamentally different from the hard zero-sum analysis of the realist 
school.  Rather  than  the  high  stakes  ‗prisoners‘  dilemma‘  game,  the  best  result  in  an 
assurance  game  can  only  be  achieved  by  mutual  cooperation.
634 As  Kawasaki notes, 
―Japan…  took…[a]  leading  role  in  erecting  the  ARF  in  hopes  of  inducing…[mutual 
cooperation aimed at] sustaining the status quo among the major powers.‖
635  The objective 
of  the  assurance  game  is  thus  fundamentally  conservative,  to  protect  the  status  quo. 
ASEAN states aim to maintain this balance by reassuring each other of their benign intent 
with  symbolic  displays  and  informational  exchange.  The  ARF  internationalizes  this 
assurance game by inviting others, especially key powers such as China, to lower their 
weapons  and  reduce  defence  spending  and  opacity  in  the  interests  of preserving  their 
prosperity and economic development. 
 
As Xu notes, the reason this approach can work is because of the low goal set, the ARF 
aims for a stable order (or not-war), ―because Asia‘s main concern was with economic 
development and not security‖ as had been the case in European.
636 The biggest ‗security‘ 
threat ASEAN states face is a withdrawal of the US presence in Asia, which may destabilize 
the system. As Leifer notes, ―For ASEAN, a constructive regional order would ideally be 
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based on the balancing military engagement of the United States. This would allow Japan 
to continue its limited security policy which in turn would be critical in encouraging China to 
conduct  its  regional  relations  according  to  those  norms  that  had  served  the  general 
interests of the ASEAN states so well.‖
637  
 
From a realist perspective, however, this conception of the ARF‘s goals implies that the 
relevance  of  the  ARF  to  Japan  was  in  question  even  from  the  outset.  The  ARF,  as  a 
conservative  grouping,  was  not  interested  in  seeing  a  new  leader  and  regional  order 
emerge. Indeed, it can be argued that it was actively out to prevent such an occurrence in 
the form of China‘s hegemonic potential.  Nor was ASEAN much interested in seeing Japan 
take on a ‗new‘ leadership role in the area of security, except as a means of balancing out 
Chinese influence. Thus, the ARF was hardly going to act as a force multiplier for Japan‘s 
foreign policy preferences towards China, a fact Japan would only wake up to after the ARF 
was well and truly established and China had taken its place at the table. 
 
6.2  The Formation of ARF: the China Factor and Japan’s Interests 
 
This section provides a brief history of the formation of the ARF. In particular, it will discuss 
Japan‘s interests in a regional multilateral security institution at the end of the Cold War and 
the role that Japan played in the formation of the ARF. It will argue that the rise of China 
was central in Japan‘s decision to promote multilateral security institutions. 
 
6.2.1  The Nakayama Proposal: the role of Japan in forming the ARF  
During a Diet address on January 25 1991, Minister of Foreign Affairs Nakayama Tarō, after 
giving the usual platitudes about the inappropriateness of modelling East Asian security 
cooperation on the CSCE, advocated ―strengthen[ing] dialogue and cooperative relations 
on a sub-regional basis‖ and noted ASEAN would be the most logical place to situate such 
an organ.
638 Indeed, the need for such an organization had also been realized by ASEAN. 
The  ASEAN  Institute  of  Strategic  and  International  Studies  (ASEAN -ISIS),  in  1990 
considered whether or not to broaden the scope of the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference 
(ASEAN-PMC) to include a security role. Japan played a role in these discussions at the 
ASEAN-ISIS, with Satō Yukio from the Foreign Ministry‘s Information and Analysis Division 
attending as a guest speaker and observer.
639 Sato stated at this meeting that Japan was 
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interested in playing a larger and more active role in Asia-Pacific security and politics, and 
that this required a multilateral security framework to reassure Japan‘s neighbours of its 
benign intentions.  
 
However, Satō‘s ideas for an ARF did not mesh with those of ASEAN. As opposed to 
ASEAN, Japan was open to APEC as a site for security cooperation and wished to limit the 
membership  to  ASEAN-PMC  members  (i.e.  to  exclude  the  socialist  countries,  such  as 
China).
640 Sato, who was intimately involved in the process, suggests that ―the [Nakayama] 
proposal reflected Tokyo‘s intention that Japan and ASEAN together form the core coalition 
for regional consensus building on security multilateralism. The combined diplomatic weight 
of ASEAN and Japan could largely ensure the realization of any forum they crafted.‖
641   
 
The results of this Track II meeting was then handed up to the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 
in  1991  in  Kuala  Lumpur;  however  there  was  no  consensus  and  the  idea  was  not 
developed  further.
642  In  the  PMC  that  followed,  Japan‘s  Foreign  Minister  Nakayama 
officially proposed, in what was to become known as the Nakayama proposal, that the PMC 
be  formally  mandated  to  address  regional  security  issues.  Nakayama  argued  that 
formalizing the PMC meetings would institute a "process of political discussions designed 
to  improve  the  sense  of  security  among  [Asian  countries].‖
643 Although  his  proposal 
received only a lukewarm response, the 1992 PMC meeting in Manila included political and 
security issues for the first time. Building on this momentum, in a January 1993 speech in 
Bangkok, Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi called upon the region to "develop a long-term 
vision regarding the future order of peace and security For this, various ideas should be 
thrashed out through political and security dialogue... Japan will actively take part in such 
discussions." Indeed, Japanese political interest in regional multilateralism was high, with 
support for such a mechanism appearing in the Prime Minister‘s advisory groups, in reports 
from Bōei Mondai Kondankai.
644 
 
The Nakayama proposal opposed including either the Soviets or China in a future grouping. 
Nakayama wanted to restrict the dialogue to ―the friendly countries…us.‖
645 China was a 
low priority. While some MOFA officials have suggested that the China Desk wanted to 
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include China, Chinese membership was seen as inseparable from Russia and the Soviet 
Desk (Sorenka) was against including Russia. It appears that the reason for the sudden 
appearance of the Nakayama proposal was to pre-empt others, including ASEAN,
646 and to 
head  off  the  chances  of  China  and  the  Soviets  getting  membership  in  any  security 
organization to be formed.
647 Thus Japan‘s China policy was subordinated to its Russia 
policy, which in turn depended on US strategy.
648 Japan lost an early opportunity to engage 
China in the emerging security grouping. For China, which participated as an observer in 
the PMC for the fir st time in 1991, and thus saw firsthand Nakayama propose a future 
group which might exclude it, the incentive to become included (via ASEAN support) only 
increased. 
 
In the end, the Nakayama proposal fell far short of being the instrument by which a regional 
security group would be formed. Nevertheless, ASEAN states were quietly pleased with 
Nakayama‘s speech as it had ―broken the ice‖ on the subject.
649 There are several reasons 
for this failure. Nakayama‘s lack of prior consultation before submitting the proposal was 
clearly very significant.
650 Secondly, some also suggest that the Nakayama proposal came 
as suddenly as it did because Japan saw a chance to prove that  it was still diplomatically 
dynamic after the 1991 Gulf War fiasco.
651 Of course, Japan‘s reputational problem related 




The emergence of China as factor motivating Japanese security multilateralism 
Yet in 1992, just one year after the Nakayama proposal, the situation changed radically. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and the subsequent concern in both 
Japan and ASEAN that the US might withdraw from Asia pushed the issue of a security 
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dialogue to the foreground.
653 At the 4
th ASEAN Heads of Government meeting in 1992 in 
Singapore it was decided that, ―ASEAN should intensify its external dialogues in political 
and security matters by using the ASEAN PMC‖ - a significant change from the previous 
year, and essentially embracing Japan‘s position. For ASEAN, successfully engaging China 
had become their chief security concern; especially in light of worsening territorial disputes 
with China in the South China Sea.  
 
For  Japan,  the  falling  away  of  the  Soviet  threat  and  the  possibility  of  an  American 
retrenchment  meant  that,  like  ASEAN,  Japan  needed  a  way  to  engage  with  China. 
Whereas before Japan had tried to exclude China from regional security institutions, now it 
became imperative to have China involved.  Japan came to support the ASEAN position for 
the  inclusion  of  China  in  a  regional  security  institution  for  much  the  same  reasons  as 
ASEAN itself.
654 In August 1994, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asia's first institu tion 
created solely to address security concerns, held its inaugural meeting.
655 Although Japan 
was certainly not the sole force behind the ARF's creation, Tokyo's support for ARF had 
been critical, and behind Japan‘s interests lay concerns with China‘s rise.
656 
 
6.3  The ARF: Japan’s Expectations 
 
This  section  will  examine  the  expectation  of  Japan  first  going  into  the  ARF.  We  have 
already established that Japan‘s interests lay with enhancing its role in the region and 
managing China. But did Japan truly expect to achieve this? Certainly during the 1990s 
there was some domestic division in Japan on regional security multilateralism. Idealists 
believed  that  the  ARF  might  form  a  security  community,  although  they  contested  over 
whether an open model or more conservative ‗Asians only‘ grouping was best.
657 Realists 
viewed the ARF as simply one more tool to use in playing the balance of power game with 
China, although they worried more about the role of the US.
658 In the middle, the MOFA 
merely  hoped  for  the  fostering  of  trust   and  communication  through  institutionalized 
transparency, a sort of limited community for information sharing.
659  
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6.3.1  A site for Japanese security leadership? 
What the ARF represented for Japan was an opportunity to shake off some of the negative 
war  time legacy  and  re-engage  with  its  neighbours  on matters  of  security.  Japan  was, 
however, aware that in order to achieve security leadership it would need to reassure its 
neighbours. As Yuzawa notes; 
The idea of promoting multilateral security dialogue attracted MOFA officials, as it was 
expected that multilateral dialogue would function as a means to reassure other Asian 
countries by not only allowing  them to express concerns about Japan‘s security policy 
and intentions more openly than in bilateral dialogues in which most Asian neighbours 
would be hesitant to air such concerns because of their dependence on Japan‘s ODA, 
but also providing Japan with an opportunity to respond to their concerns.
660 
 
MOFA was aware that unilateral moves by Japan to expand its military powers would be 
viewed  with  suspicion  in  ASEAN  and  might  trigger  a  security  dilemma  with  China.
661 
Moreover,  externally  granted  legitimacy  would  help  Japan  to  reform  those  domestic 
institutions  which  had  militated  against  Japan  acquiring  a  larger  role  in  th e  region‘s 
strategic affairs. Thus the ARF looked like the first real opportunity for Japan to re-join Asia 
as defined geographically rather than ideologically. 
 
Yet realists in Japan believed this so-called ‗self-targeting strategy‘ of the MOFA would be 
self-defeating. To their mind, using the ARF to explain the alliance and ‗reassure‘ was not 
only irrelevant, but potentially dangerous.
662 For them, the purpose of the ARF should be 
more properly confined to traditional security cooperation, such as promoting transparency 
measures. The difference was in discretion. The realists suggested that non-discriminatory 
application  of  principles  reached  would  undermine  Japan‘s  interests.  In  particular, 
practicing  diffuse  reciprocity  with  China  was  seen  as  dangerously  unwise,  and  instead 
Japan should argue for conditional reciprocation.
663 These realists, mostly in the Japan‘s 
then Defence Agency argued that Japan‘s involvement in the ARF process could weaken 
the value of the US alliance.
664 Of course, the ARF as a security community was from the 
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6.3.2  Japan’s view on involving China 
Nishihara,  a  leading  realist  thinker  in  Japan,  noted  that  ―Japan  could  use  the  ARF  to 
‗discourage through regular contacts, a potential adversary [i.e. China] from becoming an 
actual  adversary  (kenzaiteki  tekisei  koku)  and  show  the  benefits  of  being  a  potential 
adversary or becoming a friendly state.‘‖
666 The rightwing Japan Strategy Research Centre 
(Nihon Senryaku Kenkyū Senta) directly points out that Japan‘s goal in the ARF is ―to check 
the excessive influence of China‖ in traditional balance of power thinking. For Japanese 
realists, the ARF is only viable as long as China is a potential adversary only – and not an 
actual one; although where the line is drawn is a subject of debate. 
 
For Japan the logical target of the ARF was China. One Japanese MOFA Official noted that, 
―keeping  China  in  any  regional  multilateral  forums,  such  as  APEC  or  the  ARF,  is  the 
common interests of all Asia Pacific countries, including Japan.‖
667 Another official, Kōno 
Masaharu, noted later that ―by using the ARF as a venue within which to criticize certain 
policies of certain countries, Japan can exercise wider options.‖
668 Indeed, the ARF did 
allow Japan more opportunities for dialogue with China, such as via the Foreign Ministers 
informal breakfasts.
669Japan therefore was hoping that the ARF would provi de additional 
pressure on China to provide greater military transparency and to reduce the likelihood of 
Chinese military build up. For China‘s interests in joining the ARF see Appendix 10. 
 
6.4  Membership 
 
Membership is a defining feature of a regional institution as who is in and who is out is a 
politically  charged  question.  More  than  this,  the  membership  of  regional  institutions 
becomes a benchmark for who is in ‗the region‘, and who is beyond it. However, in this 
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regard the ARF Regional Forum is a little unusual, containing some 27 countries drawn 
from every continent save Africa and Antarctica. Membership of the ARF consists of the ten 
sub-regional  ASEAN  states  (Brunei,  Cambodia,  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Singapore,  the 
Philippines, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam) plus Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, the 
People's Republic of China, the European Union, India, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, 
Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Russia, Timor-Leste, United States 
and Sri Lanka. This broad membership is due to ASEAN‘s acknowledgement that certain 
non-East  Asian  powers  are  crucial  for  regional  security  and  stability.  Membership  is 
therefore  not  determined  principally  by  geographic  scope  but  rather  politics,  more 




This section will address issues of membership in the ARF between China and Japan. It will 
argue that China‘s rising power has pushed Japan to take a particular (expansive) line on 
membership issues.  
 
6.4.1  Taiwanese (lack of) Membership 
Taiwanese  membership  in  any  international  institution  faces  obvious  complications. 
Recalling that the loss of Taiwanese sovereignty was responsible for the unravelling of 
Asia‘s first regional attempt at security cooperation, the Asian and Pacific Council, one 
might expect that questions over how, if at all, Taiwan should participate in the ARF might 
be the best yardstick for determining ARF‘s relevance to regional security. Indeed, Taiwan‘s 
lack of membership is prima facie at odds with the ARF‘s mission of encouraging dialogue 
over  the  region‘s  security  concerns.  Moreover,  because  Taiwan  is  a  claimant  in  the 
territorial disputes over the Spratly Islands, resolution of other security issues depends in 
part on Taiwan‘s participation in the solution, undermining China‘s efforts at reassurance.
671  
 
Given Japan‘s deep trade links to Taiwan and previous support for Taiwanese involvement 
in regional security organization, Japan was interested in having Taiwan participate.
672 But 
ASEAN was not explicit about whether only sovereign countries could be members (an 
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inter-national institution) or whether it was a dialogue process more akin to APEC, which 
had successfully included Taiwan as a member (even if awkwardly labelled). As noted in 
the Guidelines for Participation, ASEAN states were willing to include those ‗which directly 
affect the peace and security of the region‘, thus Taiwan was a potential member.  
 
The decision on Taiwan might have gone either way. However, in July 1996, the ASEAN 
Regional Forum agreed to restrict membership to sovereign states (i.e. not Taiwan), with 
officials further noting that future membership would be decided by consensus - effectively 
preventing future Taiwanese participation.
673 This was due to China making clear that its 
membership  was  dependent  on  Taiwan‘s  exclusion.  Since  the  purpose  of  the  ARF  for 
ASEAN was as a vehicle to engage China, Japan was forced to cut Taiwan loose. 
 
6.4.2  Indian Membership (1996) 
Many in Japan believe that India, a vibrant democracy of over one billion and a growing 
economic and military power, may assist Japan in balancing against China.
674 But India 
was  not  a  member  of  the  ARF  from  the  beginning.  As  Ganganath  Jha  notes,  India‘s 
omission at the outset of the enterprise is especially strange when one considers who was 
in fact included.
675 No doubt, India‘s initial exclusion was based on both international and 
Indian domestic factors. In 1994, India still not fully persuaded of the merits of security 
multilateralism based in large part on the continuing dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir.
676 
Therefore, India did not pursue membership in the ARF with particular vigour. At the same 
time, others were unsure of the merits of bringing India in. 
 
Initially, Japan and China agreed that India  ought not to be included. Japan was even 
willing to side with China in arguing against Indian participation in the ARF, over the wishes 
of ASEAN.
677 More than Japan‘s limited interest in India generally, the reasons for Japan‘s 
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rejection of Indian membership were due to a fear that the institutional focus would drift 
away from East Asia to South Asia. As Japan‘s real security interests were in East Asia, 
and specifically in engaging China, Indian participation was perceived as detrimental to 
Japan. China‘s opposition on the other hand was based on a belief that Indian participation 
in the ARF would dilute Chinese influence in ASEAN. 
678 Thus, Japan and China agreed 
that India ought not to be included initially, but for different reasons. 
 
However, after the establishment of the ARF, Japan‘s priorities started to change. The 1995 
Mischief Reef incident (more later) demonstrated that China was willing to undermine the 
ARF, and Japan came to support ASEAN‘s position in favour of India, for the same balance 
of power-type considerations as ASEAN.
679 
 
6.4.3  North Korean Membership (2000) 
North Korea became a member of the ARF in 2000, despite vigorous Japanese objection. 
Japan objections were due to a perception that North Korean membership would be a boon 
for Chinese influence in the ARF. In fact, China‘s representative was the first to speak out in 
favour of North Korea being admitted at the 2000 ARF-SOM in Thailand 18 May.
680 But by 
including the North Korean regime, and by implication the issue of nuclear proliferation on 
the Korean peninsula, the ARF risked not only failure, but progress on other issues. As 
China was ambivalent about the ARF‘s CBM agenda this mattered little to China, (in fact 
having North Korea take a hard line would, perversely, help China play the role of good 
regional citizen).
681 It was precisely these concerns which Japan singled out in May 2000 ; 
Kono Yohei noting that Japan would not support North Korean inclusion unless its fears 
about weakening institutional consensus were addressed.
682  
 
In  understanding  Japan‘s  position  towards  membership  in  the  ARF  it  is  important 
toappreciate  both  realist  and  social  constructivist  factors.  While  realists  would  have 
accurately predicted the outcome, that Japan would favour the inclusion the like-minded, 
democratic powers of Taiwan and India and be opposed to the inclusion of North Korea for 
the  same  reasons,  the  actually  timing  and  rationale  of  this  position  is  due  more  to 
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constructivist  factors.  Put  simply,  Japan  has  become  socialized  to  realism  by  China‘s 
obstructive attitude. At the outset, if North Korea had shown interest in joining the ARF, it is 
unlikely Japan would have opposed vehemently, if at all. Likewise, initially Japan favoured 
engagement with China even if that meant excluding natural balancers like Taiwan and 
India. 
 
6.5  Scope 
 
Scope refers to what the institution is ‗authorized‘ to discuss, and can be defined in various 
ways. In the case of the ARF, its scope is defined both geographically and thematically. 
According  to  the  first  chairman‘s  statement,  ARF‘s  scope  involves  ―the  comprehensive 
concept of security, including its economic and social aspects, as it pertains to the Asia-
Pacific.‖
683 The scope  of the ARF  has been, since its inception, one  of the more hotly 
debated elements of the institution. Japan has sought to use the ARF to examine/test the 
nature  of  Chinese  rising  power  to  determine  its  potential  future  aggressiveness,  but 
increasingly it has been China which steers the organization‘s agenda. Consequently, the 
ARF has focused on issues of less pressing concern for Japan. Indeed, the ARF‘s broadly 
defined scope means that some ‗hard‘ issues are avoided. The scope shift in the ARF can 
also be seen in the number of meeting that the ARF sponsors. As Acharya notes, the Track 
I component alone has grown from one meeting in 1994, to nine in 1998, to fourteen in 
2000, to nineteen in 2007.
684 However, more meetings do not  necessarily equal greater 
productivity.  
 
6.5.1  South China Sea 
One area in which Japan has attempted to have the ARF involved is in the resolution of the 
South China Sea territorial dispute. For Japan, examining how China acts in the South 
China Sea is an important litmus test both for how China will use its strength in the future 
and whether Japanese security activism will be positively viewed by regional peers.
685 
 
Prior to the establishment of the ARF it had been impossible for ASEAN countries to resist 
encroachment by China into the disputed region. Beijing had simply not felt constrained by 
the individual ASEAN countries and was able to use unilateral measures to further its 
claims; a precedent that worried Japan. Both ASEAN and Tokyo were  disturbed when in 
February 1992 Beijing passed its ‗Law of the People‘s Republic of China on the Territorial 
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Waters and continuous Area‘, signalling China‘s willingness to use force in resolving its 
maritime territorial disputes. Indeed, at the first ARF meeting, China‘s Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Qian noted, ―China does not…have a single soldier stationed on foreign soil, nor 
does it have a military base abroad‖ had the paradoxical effect of reaffirming China‘s hard-




Japan is a natural player in the South China Sea dispute, as the area is important to Japan 
both economically and strategically. This fact was highlighted during the War years when 
Japan first occupied (1918), then annexed (1939) the Spratly islands, before finally being 
forced to surrender all rights to islands under the San Francisco Treaty (1951).
687 Moreover, 
the  South  China  Sea  issue  has  the  potential  to  complicate  Sino -Japanese  relations. 
Chinese possession of the South China Sea would be a minus for Japan‘s energy security, 
potentially allowing China to (in the future) interdict oil coming from the Persian Gulf. In 
addition, in the mind of the Japanese the South China Sea and Sprately Island dispute 
became linked to the Senkaku dispute. This is due in no small part to China, as the 1992 
Territorial Waters law linked the Spratlys, Senkaku/Diaoyutai, and other disputed islands in 
a single Chinese claim.
688  
 
By 1995 however Japan had begun to realize that a more active policy was necessary. 
Triggered in part by China‘s recent nuclear test, Japan used the Second ARF to push the 
South China Sea issue and apply political pressure to China.
689  Foreign Minister Kōno 
reiterated at the beginning of this meeting Tokyo‘s desire for safety of navigation and a 
peaceful solution to the Spratlys dispute. And to indicate Japan‘s growing interest in the 
area Kono, as co-chair of the ISG on CBMs also took the opportunity to propose Tokyo as a 




China did not respond favourably to these signs of growing Japanese interest, attempting 
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to freeze Japan out of the decision making process. One way China sought to do this was 
through blocking Japan‘s membership in the groupings which discussed the South China 
Sea, however informally. For example, in 1995 Japan, with the assent of ASEAN, joined the 
annual  Indonesian–initiated  Workshops  on  the  South  China  Sea  Conflict.
691 However, 
China deliberately absented itself and denounced participation of non-claimant states like 




Despite the fact that the Workshop was nearly cancelled for lack of financial support, China 
has remained staunchly against it receiving funding from both outside of the region or from 
Japan. Indeed, China refuses to discuss this issue with Japan in any setting as it rejects 
absolutely the interests of non-claimant countries.
693  
 
Japan sometimes had reason to believe that the ARF would help to bring China around to 
its  way  of  seeing  things.  In  1997  at  the  informal  meeting  of  the  ‗Plus  three‘  heads  of 
government, Japan, China and Korea were able to agree to a review of territorial issues 
and even drafted an agreement to refrain from provocative acts and to construct to those 
ends guidelines of behaviour. Despite this, an agreement could not be reached due chiefly 
to the opposition of China to the establishment of a formal device on acceptable behaviour 
in the disputed region.
694   
 
China‘s resistance to any expansion of the ARF‘s authority in the South China Sea has 
been  systematic.  Indeed,  The  Code  of  Conduct  in  the  South  China  Sea,  which  was 
prepared by both China and ASEAN at the 1999 Senior Officials Meeting (Manila), is not an 
ARF document per se. Moreover, the Chinese and ASEAN versions differ; ASEAN‘s version 
of the Code emphasizes the suspension of further occupation of islets, a point that Beijing‘s 
version lacks. Moreover, Beijing interprets the Code as limited to the islands in dispute, 
rather than the South China Sea as a whole.
695 Thus the final document is weakened both 
in its geographic scope and in its commitments to not erect new  structures.
696 China‘s 
rejection of the initiative led one media commentator to declare, ―China has taken control of 
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the agenda and other delegates, including…Japan, were forced to go along with Beijing.‖
697  
 
To summarize, discussion on the South China Sea has moved slowly; the chief reason for 
which is China‘s reticence to discuss ‗solutions‘ rather than the problem. Japan has been 
bundled along with this. Japan has been unable to gain access to the various working 
groups  which  discuss  this  issue  due  to  Chinese  opposition.  It  is  also  watching  China 
increase its presence in the disputed area even as ASEAN states become less and less 
capable of resisting incursion. As Lam Peng Er noted, ―the Spratlys dispute serves as a test 
of whether or not Japan‘s recent emphasis on multilateral forums to promote stability is 
viable.‖
698 Since Japan has been unable to increase its influence in Southeast Asia via the 
ARF  and  has  been  limited  by  China  to  giving  only  declaratory  support  for  a  peaceful 
resolution, it is unsurprising that Japan would become more pessimistic of the ARF.
699 
 
6.5.2  East China Sea 
Even  if  one  accepts  the  argument  that  the  ARF  had  been  a  catalyst  for  the  Code  of 
Conduct in the South China Sea, the ARF has not looked to the related dispute in the East 
China Sea. It is here were China and Japan both vie for possession of a group of islands, 
called in Japanese Senkaku and Diaoyutai in Chinese. These islands, which lie about 200 
nautical  miles  West  of  Naha,  Okinawa,  are  a  chain  of  eight  islands  which  Japan  has 
claimed since 1895 after they were charted and it was established (to Japan‘s satisfaction) 
they were not Chinese. They were generally thought of as ‗insignificant‘ until 1969 when UN 
geologists reported that oil and natural gas reserves might be found around them.
700 In 
1970 China formally announced its claim, arguing that the islands were first charted by 
Chinese vessels in 1534. These strong differences of opinion of ownership prompted Deng 
Xiaoping to announce in 1978 that the issue ought to be shelved and the is sue went quiet 
until the mid-1990s. 
 
The first sign that the issue might be re -opened was China‘s adoption in 1992 of the so-
called Law on Territorial Waters, which not only laid claim to the ―Nansha‖ (the South China 
Sea) but in the same breath also claimed the Senkaku islands. This sparked criticism from 
Japan at the highest levels, with the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister both protesting.
701 
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The situation only worsened during the nineties. In 1995, (the same year that China pushed 
into the Philippines and claimed Mischief Reef), Chinese vessels were spotted exploring for 
oil around the Senkaku islands. China worsened the situation by claiming its activities were 
legal as the area was ‗Chinese territory‘, at least as understood by China‘s interpretation of 
its own law. Furthermore, Chinese officials noted that China‘s military could be used to 
protect China‘s claim to Senkaku, sparking fears of an armed standoff.
702  
 
This is exactly the sort of problem in which the ARF might prove its worth as a regional 
security institution, yet the ARF has not volunteered itself. This is due, at least in part, to its 
narrowly defined interests in Southeast Asian security and a disinterest in spreading itself 
too thinly in the region. Moreover, there is a real possibility that ASEAN would then have to 
make the politically painful decision to support one party‘s claim over another‘s, a situation 
ASEAN powers would like to avoid – such a decision might split ASEAN. The most effective, 
cost free way the ARF might contribute to this dispute would be to set up an Eminent 
Persons group to discuss the issue in a neutral setting, yet even this has not occurred.
703 
Indeed, Japan has not even attempted to raise the issue at the ARF, nor, as far as is known, 
has Japan raised this prospect with either ASEAN or the US.
704 While Chinese reticence 
would  be  understandable,  Japan  has  perhaps  squandered  an  opportunity  to  lead  in 
regional security by putting this issue on the table at the ARF, even if it  is  eventually 
resolved either bilaterally or at the global level.  
 
6.5.3  US-Japan Alliance 
As Friedman notes, Tokyo‘s chief disappointment in the ARF is that China keeps talking 
about the US-alliance as part of the security ‗problem.‘
705 Japan‘s earlier liberal strategy of 
‗self-targeting‘,  aiming  to  reassure  the  region  of  the  utility  of  the  US-Japan  alliance  by 
talking through any uncertain issues, has perhaps invited this. But unfortunately for Japan, 
China is taking advantage of this openness to further its claims of regional leadership vis-à-
vis the US-Japan led regional order.  
 
Of course, China‘s expression of its concerns is not merely grandstanding. China‘s positive 
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assessment of the US-Japan alliance has been consistently weakening.
706 Ironically, China 
had been one of the greatest supporters of th e US-Japan alliance during the C old War 
(especially through the 1970s), when China believed that a resurgent Japan might upset 
the status-quo.
707 However, China has seen how the alliance has been used to accelerate, 
rather than arrest, Japan remilitarization. The ARF has provided China with the ideal site to 
air such concerns, as China believes that it can criticize the US-alliance under the rubric of 
seeking reassurance without cost. One such example is at the eighth ARF meeting in 2001 
at which Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan praised the ARF as ―the most important 
venue  in  the  Asia  pacific  region  for  the  discussion  of  regional  security  issues‖  before 
proceeding to his attack against the US-Japan alliance.
708 This comes at cost to the ARF. 
Yuzawa recounts  an  exchange at the ARF in which disagreement of the wording of 
Chairman‘s statement regarding the role of the alliance delayed a meeting several hours.
709 
 
Of particular concern to China is the movement toward Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) that 
Japan is undertaking in conjunction with the United States.
710 China is particularly sensitive 
because its comparatively small stock of strategic weapons could be knocked out by such a 
system if it ever went online, rendering its nuclear capacity obsolete. Director-general of the 
Arms Control and Disarmament Department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry Sha Zukang 
stated in 2001 that, ―we [China] just hope that the existing mutual deterrence…can be 
preserved.‖
711 China only has a limited stock of nuclear weapons capable of threatening US 
assets  in  the  Asian  region  (chiefly  in  Japan),  the  largest  of  which  is  the  roughly  20 
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Dongfeng-5 Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) which were first built in the 1960s. 
Christensen notes that TMD has an ‗offensive‘ character in China‘s eyes due to the Taiwan 
factor.
712 Ambassador Sha has gone on record saying that TMD would weaken regional 
security, not strengthen it, and likened it to ―drinking poison to quench thirst.‖ Taiwan and 
TMD are clearly linked in China‘s eyes, Sha protesting in the 1999 ARF that TMD might 
―give the separatist forces on the island a false sense of security, which may induce them 
into a reckless path.‖
713 
 
This link in the minds of the Chinese, not unreasonably, between the US, Japan and Taiwan 
(especially in light of the enhanced emphasis on TMD) is best seen in China’s National 
Defence in 2000 which notes; 
The United States is further strengthening its military presence and bilateral military 
alliances in the region, advocating the development of the TMD system and planning to 
deploy it in East Asia. Japan has passed a bill relating to measures in the event of a 
situation in the area [emphasis mine] surrounding Japan. All this goes against the tide 
of the times.
714 
It should be clear, by the obfuscating language alone, that the ‗event of a situation in the 
area‘ is Taiwanese de jure independence. China has many times attempted to pin down 
what  exactly  the  area  surrounding  Japan  might  be,  but  without  gaining  a  ‗satisfactory‘ 
answer.
715 This ambiguity in the Guidelines  makes a security dilemma with China more 




Indeed, a cursory examination of the US-Japan-Australia relationship with India, especially 
in light of India‘s potential access to nuclear materials from the US under the Nuclear Deal 
between  President  Bush  and  India‘s  PM  Manmohan  Singh,  gives  a  certain  amount  of 
credence  to  China‘s  concerns  about  a  US-led  ‗containment  alliance‘  built  on  strategic 
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717 Beijing‘s strong reaction against such an occurrence has meant that 
discussions about a ‗democratic quad‘ have been limited to deputy minister level on the 
sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum.
718  
 
China‘s desperation to avoid such a TMD-based coalition forming is visible its appeal to 
Russia, ignored by then Russian President Putin, to protest TMD.
719 China has even tried 
asking Japan to convince the US to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which would 
imply stopping the TMD project.
720 Indeed, Theatre Missile Defence is often picked up by 
Chinese officials as a concern at ARF meetings. Again, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang 
Jiaxuan has stated in the ARF that, "insistence on developing a missile defence program 
will upset the global strategic equilibrium, undermine regional peace and stability."
721  
 
Ironically, the fallout from the TMD project has contaminated the ARF‘s planned Confidence 
Building Measures. As Japan has defaulted from ARF to US-led TMD, China and some 
ASEAN countries have responded by limiting their military transparency, increasing levels 
of uncertainty in the region.
722 However ASEAN does not want to put itself in the middle of 
the  disagreement between China and  the  US-Japan axis. ASEAN watered down their 
statement from ―expressing concern‖ about TMD to ―expressing hope‖ that the two would 
solve it by themselves. One official added that both the US and China "will be pleased 
because ASEAN did not take sides", a sensible policy but one which reflects the basic 
inability of ASEAN, and by extension the ARF, to resolve this dispute.
723  
 
With regards to scope, Japan‘s preference to include the South China Sea issue and the 
US-Japan alliance as legitimate areas of discussion has not yielded a positive outcome. 
Not only has Japanese influence in the South China Sea been blocked by China, but the 
legitimacy of the alliance has come under question. Putting aside the issue of whether 
China‘s protests have weakened regional states acceptance of the US-Japan alliance as 
an  appropriate  or  necessary  means  of  gaining  regional  security,  it  is  apparent  that 
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discussion  and  communication  has  not  satisfied  China.  Indeed,  if  communication  has 
achieved anything it is to further convince the Japanese that they are distrusted by China.  
 
6.6  Authority: Seeking Reciprocity, Finding None.  
 
The ARF, as an offshoot of the ASEAN process, is by design devoid of institutional authority 
as it is typically understood. Rather the ARF has explicitly labelled itself as a ‗process‘ that 
is aimed at changing the ‗structure‘ in which state behaviour occurs, rather than attempting 
coercion directly. One of the ways in which it has tried to do this is through the creation of a 
Confidence Building Measures regime. In the context of the rise of China, a CBM regime is 
aimed at creating expectations of peaceful change and mutual reassurance (rather than 
mutual deterrence). Certainly Japan expected the ARF to facilitate China‘s integration into a 
CBM regime of a reasonable authority. 
  
From Japan‘s point of view, the construction of such a regime would greatly benefit Japan‘s 
security situation, and would form the necessary ground work for acceptance of China‘s 
rise. Firstly, with increased openness and transparency from China, Japan would be less 
reliant  on  the  US  alliance.  Moreover,  Japan  would  be  better  able  to  contain  calls  for 
constitutional reform and ‗normalization‘ of the military apparatus from Japan‘s right-wing – 
potentially heading off a security dilemma. In essence, a China deeply engaged in an ARF-
led CBM regime would not be seen a challenge to the status quo by Japan. Indeed, as 
Fukuda notes a CBM regime is essentially a communication about satisfaction with the 
status  quo.
724 Lastly, Japan might even benefit from  the  CBM regime in reassuring its 
neighbours and especially Southeast Asia and escape the trap of history. This section will 
examine  the effect  of  the  rise  of China  on  the  creation of  such  a  regime  and  Japan‘s 
approach to it. 
 
Confidence Building Measures: Institutional elements. 
It is necessary to discuss the definitions of Confidence Building Measures. As the term 
‗Confidence Building Measures‘ was initially coined in the West, it comes with certain Cold 
War era ‗baggage.‘ The ARF has attempted to side step any expectation or precedents 
from the Western experience by declaring the ARF a sui generis organization, meaning that 
it  is  institutionally  ‗all  of  its  own‘  and  will  define  for  itself  what  exactly  its  means  by 
‗Confidence Building Measures.‘ However, there are certain basic problems that a CBM 
regime, however it is defined, will aim to overcome whether in the East or the West.  
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Johan  Holst,  one  of  the  leading  scholars  of  CBM  theory  and  practice  has  noted  the 
universal applicability of CBMs as a tool to achieve common security, stating that: ―CBM 
constitute building blocks which could provide operation substance to the notion of common 
security.‖
725 Holst  notes  there  are  ‗two  types‘  of  CBMs;  Type  I,  designed  to  ―inhibit  the 
political exploitation of military force‖, and the more demanding Type II, designed to ―reduce 
the danger of surprise attack.‖
726 The ARF has so far focused on Type I, being chiefly 
concerned with superpower intervention in their internal affairs. The means by which CBMs 
are to do so, Holst summarizes, is by increasing the predictability of each state‘s military 
operations  and  thereby  build  a  pattern  of  ‗normal‘  military  interaction  against  which  a 
change to an aggressive posture would be more easily spotted. CBMs are seen therefore 
as a boost to mutual national surveillance of military preparations and ―serve the goal, 
therefore, of political demonstration of good will and common interest.‖
727 Moreover, since 
CBMs are a negotiated tool, usually through multilateral channels, they are less likely to 
reflect power imbalances in a bilateral relationship, meaning that large powers can assure 
their neighbours on the basis of formal equality.
728 
 
Of course, if CBMs really worked as advertised then war would be a thing of the past. Holst 
notes that CBM can actually destabilize a relationship build on deterrence, as uncertainty in 
the outcome of a war maintains a cold peace.
729 Yet this is merely a reflection of more 
fundamental problem with CBMs, namely it assumes that those states which enter a CBM 
regime have benign intent, and merely lack a  modus  vivendi.    Yet,  where  states  are 
dissatisfied, or are revisionist, they might still enter such a regime so as to appear to be 
non-threatening while building up their strength.
730 These general problems with CBMs are 
in play in the ARF, especially for those hoping to use the ARF to manage the rise of China. 
 
Most international relations scholarship characterizes the ARF as a whole in terms of a 
CBMs regime aimed mostly at China. Heller argues that the ―ARF can be seen as a litmus 
test: once a member acts aggressively the breach of the code of conduct of the ARF is a 
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clear warning signal for the remaining actors.‖
731 This idea of the ARF as trip-wire justifies 
the  view  that  China‘s  participation  in  the  ARF  is  itself  a  multilateral  CBM  act.
732 The 
question of course is whether the ‗ASEAN way‘ is just the most recent manifestation of the 
‗Spirit of Locarno‘, which brought a revisionist Germany back into the fold before it had 
accepted  and  internalized  the  legitimate  security  concerns  of  its  peers.  Does  China‘s 
preference for multilateralized security mechanisms reflect a cynical belief in their inability 
to prevent the US or Japan from furthering their interests, even at a cost to order and 
potentially the peace?  Put another way, does China want to put ASEAN at the centre of 
the institution, cynically aware that ASEAN can do no harm to its interests even if regional 
security is not advanced.
733  
 
6.6.1  Confidence Building Measures: the Concept Paper 1995  
When  Japan‘s  Nakayama  first  proposed  that  a  regional  security  institution  be  formed, 
CBMs were not explicitly mentioned. The reasons for this omission were both tactical and 
semantic. CBMs were conceived as a tool for bringing adversaries together – and Japan 
was uninterested in labelling others or being labelled an adversary. Additionally, CBMs were 
first designed to deal with the Soviet Union, which Japan wanted to exclude from the body. 
Indeed, Japan‘s concept paper at the first ARF Senior Officials Meetings (SOM) noted that 
the CBMs were forged in the paradigm of the East-West confrontation in Europe and thus 
were not applicable to modern Asia. Nakayama talked instead about Mutual Reassurance 
Dialogue (otagai ni anshinkan wo takameru koto wo mokuteki to suru seiji taiwa).
734 This 
term was used by the Japanese as an attempt to essentially repackage the substance of 
CBMs for Chinese consumption.
735  While Japan was interested in CBMs in the future, it 
settled  on  this  term  as  a  compromise  as  such  a  dialogue  woul d  not  require  ‗true‘ 
transparency measures (instead focused on declarative statements of intent).  At the same 
time Japan pushed the ARF towards agreeing on a ―process for CBMs creation‖ rather than 
immediately on their actual creation. 
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Initially  China  and  Japan  shared  a  common  position  towards  CBMs,  both  wishing  to 
proceed  cautiously,  acknowledging  that  a  sudden  movement  on  the  issue  would  be 
counterproductive  to  their  own  interests.
736 Indeed,  Japan‘s  proposals  for  modest  but 
concrete  steps  towards  a  CBM  regime  functioned  as  a  bridge  between  the  ‗Western‘ 
proposals of Australia/Canada which favoured strong, formal CBMs and ‗Eastern‘ proposals 
from some ASEAN countries and China which wanted a declarative, informal approach.
 737 
Japan‘s proposals struck a middle ground, urging publication of Defence White Papers and 
participation in the UN Register of Conventional Arms although only on a voluntarily basis. 
 
At only the second meeting (1995), the ARF agreed on a Concept Paper which had been 
prepared  by  the  ASEAN-SOM  in  1994.  The  Concept  Paper  laid-out  the  evolutionary 
approach of the ARF over three stage; 1) promotion of Confidence-Building Measures, 2) 
Development of preventive diplomacy, and 3) elaboration of approaches to conflict. This 
was welcomed by Japan as it meshed with their expectation for the organization.
738 But 
China was still hesitant about the role of the ARF. In order to overcome Chinese uncertainty, 
an Inter-Sessional Group (ISG) was established to examine CBMs  – although even here 
the Chinese were hesitant, insisting that the ISG‘s mandate be reviewed annually.
739 Thus 
assuaged, Beijing did not disrupt the consensus on the chairman‘s statement in the 1995 
ARF, which had called for states to end nuclear testing at the behest of Japan. China did 




Lastly, both within Japan and ASEAN there was support for the ARF eventually taking a 
role in conflict resolution, a task that might require the use of force. And in fact, point three 
of  the  Concept  Paper  was  initially  to  read  simply  ―conflict  resolution‖.
741 However,  the 
Chinese objected to conflict resolution being a  part of the ARF‘s mandate, even in the 
future, and the term was dropped.
742 Ironically, China‘s support for a multi-polar world order 
does not extend to allowing the ARF to become an independent ‗mini-UN‘, mainly due to 
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the Taiwan factor. A perception emerged that, ―[The Chinese] are concerned that if the ARF 
process moves to the second stage of preventive diplomacy it will open a Pandora's Box 
that could induce superpower intervention.‖
743 Of course, the US was at the top of China‘s 
mind. But Chinese objections also blocked Japanese coordination with ASEAN on security 
matters. These would be the first of many failures of the ARF to serve Japanese interests in 
building better relations with ASEAN or fostering greater trust in China.  
 
6.6.2  Preventive Diplomacy is Prevented: 1996-1999 
With stage three ―conflict resolution‖ out of the question, at least for the interim, Japan 
focused on trying to get China to embrace Preventive Diplomacy (PD) at the ARF, again 
with little success.  During the first Conference on Preventive Diplomacy (Singapore), a 
whole session was given over to the Chinese view. It is clear from the Co-chair‘s summary 
that China‘s view was at odds with most of the other conference members.
744 Japan chose 
to  wilfully  ignore  this  signal from China,  and  in  the  subsequent  ARF  SOM  in  Malaysia 
(1997) Japanese officials proposed a Working Group on PD – an offer which was flatly 
rejected by China. Instead, China went on the diplomatic offensive by proposing that China 
Chair at the next ISG-CBM in Beijing. One high ranking official at ARF noted that with this 
offer, ―China wants to control the progress in the ARF‘s Inter-Sessional Group.‖
745 Indeed, 
the 1997 ISG-CBMs was in many ways a non-event, the summary of the discussions being 
the shortest ever (in its admittedly short history). However, the 1997 ISG-CBMs in Beijing 




In fact, China‘s activism in the ISG-CBMs has been due in part to its realization that CBMs 
might be used to help China achieve its ‗offensive-type‘ security interests.
747 For instance, 
in the 1999 ISG -CBM meeting, China presented five new CBM proposals. One was a 
proposal for a CBM to cover the ‗use of force against civilian ships or fishermen‘, and was 
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clearly  aimed  at  reversing  some  recent  setbacks  China  had  suffered  over  its  maritime 
territorial claims with Japan and the Philippines.
748 The Chinese CBM proposal was just an 
attempt  to  deflect  similar  ‗strong‘  responses  in  the  future,  and  in  the  end  China 
subsequently withdrew the proposal after facing coordinated ASEAN-Japan diplomacy (a 
list of Japanese and Chinese sponsored CBMs is provided in Appendix 11). Likewise, at the 
at the Ninth ARF meeting in 2001, when Foreign Minister Kawaguchi called for other ARF 
countries to hold more talks on PD, it was China who opposed.
749 These objections from 
China came despite progress with Russia on similar types of cooperation in Central Asia.
 
750 The result of instability in the ARF was an agreement to keep discussion in the ISG-
CBMs at ―an overlapping area between the first stage of CBMs and the second stage of PD‖
 
751, instead of tackling the hard issues in PD directly. 
 
6.6.3  Rules: Voluntary Briefings and the ASO: developments since 2000 
One of the CBMs that Japan has been most eager to push in the ARF (and most eager for 
China to adopt) is the presentation of a Defence White Paper with a reasonable level of 
military transparency. It is worth noting that the Chinese had not produced a Defence White 
Paper  until  November  of  1995,  and  even  then  the  document,  although  a  step  in  right 
direction, was below average. Thus, at the 1996 Tokyo ISG-CBMs, Japan pushed for the 
creation of minimum standards of quality in Defence White Papers, however the idea was 
blocked.
752 A year later in 1997, Japan hosted a workshop on ‗transparency on armaments‘ 
to seek to expand the UN Register of Conventional Arms to include reporting on military 
holdings  and  procurement  from  domestic  sources.  At  a  subsequent  ministerial-level 
meeting, then Minister for Foreign Affairs Ikeda called for the same, but again the idea was 
not developed because of Chinese resistance.
753  
 
Where Japan has had more success with China is in the volunta ry briefings. This item on 
the agenda of the ISG-CBMs allows member countries to explain some element of their 
country‘s defence policy. This item appears to have grown out of a previous agenda item, 
the ‗exchange of view‘, and has been officially on the agenda since 2000. The voluntary 
briefing is more formal and more transparent, as the actual details of who spoke on what 
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are recorded and made available to public inquiry. Japan, which had embraced the self-
targeting strategy, has given nine voluntary briefings at the ISG, or on average one per year 
until 2009. Among the topics Japan has discussed are its 1997 Defence Guidelines, its 
Anti-terror laws, its bilateral talks with North Korea, its contribution to Operation Enduring 
Freedom in Iraq and the upgrading of the Japan Defence Agency to ministerial level in 
2007.  China  has  availed  itself  of  this  opportunity  five  times  (or  roughly  half  as  often). 
China‘s briefings include once in 2002 to discuss its new Defence White Paper, and twice 
in 2003/2004 to discuss the results of six party talks with North Korea, and twice in 2008 to 
discuss cooperation with Russia and the SCO (see Appendix 12).
754 
  
Another area of marginal success for Japan has been the formalization of t he Annual 
Security Outlook (ASO). This document, compiled by the ARF, is arguably one of the more 
significant CBMs developed thus far. The ASO  contains Defence White Papers or the ir 
equivalent from each of the ARF countries.
755 Although a voluntary mechanism, the ASO at 
least  provides  a  yardstick  by  which  to  measure  dissatisfaction.
756 Although  originally 
envisioned as a collection of Defence White Papers, one problem with the ASO is that by 
virtue of removing both an editor (the ARF Chair) and clear specifications like those Japan 
had proposed, the ASO has  not become sufficiently rigorous to be significant for regional 
security.  
 
Recently, the ASO contains less and less reporting of each  country‘s military and more 
opinion  and  assessment  about  the  regional  security  environment.  While  Japan  has 
contributed every year, China has been more ambivalent and has ‗skipped‘ a few years.
757 
Moreover,  a  comparison  of  Japan‘s  and  China‘s  submissions  to  the  ASO  gives  some 
indication  as  to  how  seriously  each  side  takes  the  process.  In  2007,  Japan  listed 
specifically how much money it would spend on anti-terrorist measures and their nature, 
discussed its Peace Building operations in Sri Lanka and how much it would spend there, 
and frankly assessed the ARF‘s progress, noting the good points and committing itself to 
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‗expected‘  improvements.  China  on  the  other  hand  studiously  avoided  discussing  its 
defence  policy  or  budget.  Indeed,  according  to  the  2007  ASO,  China  believes  that  its 
greatest contribution to regional peace is its growth rate of 10.7%: an economic answer to a 
political  question.  China‘s  contribution  is  therefore  hollow,  more  a  reading  list  of 
agreements already reached and declarations of its peacefulness than any real attempt to 
engage with its peers. 
 
Even in 2009, the ARF was still struggling to define a standardized format for the ASO. 
Although  able  to  reach  agreement  at  the  ISG  level  of  the  need  to  include  in  ASO 
submissions national defence budget information, the level of detail is not yet agreed – 
moreover even if the ASO standardization is agreed at the ISG, it still has to clear the SOM 
and, of course, ultimately the Ministers.
758 
 
6.6.4  Non-traditional security 
One of the side effects of this lack of progress in the ‗hard‘ area of CBMs is the emergence 
of non-traditional security (NTS) cooperation as an item on the ARF‘s agenda, which was 
initially formally focused on traditional military cooperation.
759 Without the NTS agenda, the 
ARF would have almost no work to do.  Some therefore describe the NTS agenda as a 
fight for the ARF‘s institutional survival.
760 In part to compensate for its negative stance on 
CBMs proper, it is China which is most in favour of having the ARF become focused on 
NTS.
761 Japanese officials on the other hand perceive the flourishing of NTS related so -
called  ‗CBMs‘  as  running  contrary  to  Japanese  interest  in  promoting  military  focused 
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recommendations of the PD study as a basis, the ARF-SOM could consider recommending to the Ministers at the 16th 
ARF that a Work Plan on Preventive  Diplomacy be developed. If the Ministers endorsed this recommendation, proper 
work could begin on a PD Work Plan.‖ 
759  "Chairman's  Statement,  the  Fifth  Meeting  of  the  Asean  Regional  Forum    Manila,  27  July  1998    ",  
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760 Author's Interview with Yuzawa Takeshi, 28 September 2009. Tokyo. Yuzawa is a researcher at the JIIA. 
761 And no accident that this shift towards NTS occurred after Beijing hosted 1997 ISG CBMs.Takeshi Yuzawa, Japan's 





Some Japanese scholars such as Morimoto Satoshi (a frequent Track II participant) have 
noted that even the NTS elements of the ARF, such as disaster relief, do in fact provide 
some military utility to Japan. Japanese self -defence forces deployed alongside  Chinese 
PLA  in  regional  disaster  relief  operations  would  still  have  an  opportunity  to  o bserve 
manoeuvres,  weapons  and  equipment.  One  such  example  is  the  ―civilian  led,  military 
supported‖  Voluntary  Demonstration  of  Response  on  disaster  relief  in  2009.    Although 
these activities are labelled a CBM by the ARF, Japan does not accept this label.
763 This is 
because the information thus gained is of an informal nature, and hardly represents a costly 
signal of Chinese trust in future regional peace. In fact, Japan is highly frustrated with 
China‘s cynical ploy to prevent the CBMs agenda gaining momentum. In fact, as of 2009, 
there are currently no talks at the ARF aimed at military transparency.
764 
 
Japan has consistently attempted to push forward the CBMs agenda at the ARF. It is no 
secret that Japan‘s target for such a CBMs regime is China, indeed Japan has singled out 
China in its ASO Security review nearly every year as being a growing power which needs 
to embrace transparency and CBMs. Japan‘s liberal strategy, premised on the indivisibility 
of security, has however failed in face of China‘s lack of reciprocity. Japan has learnt that 
China is not interested in any real military transparency boosting CBMs, and is only willing 
to accept declarative or NTS-type CBMs. While this is valuable information, it is hardly the 
position that Japanese hoped or expected that the ARF would be in after 16 years. Indeed, 
as it becomes apparent to Japan that China‘s basic position is unchanged and unlikely to 
change. Japan‘s commitment to an engagement strategy is therefore weakening and other 
strategies are becoming favoured.   
 
6.7   Resources: Institutional Weakness 
 
As noted earlier, the ARF is light on common institutional elements. Indeed, the ARF was 
founded without its own secretariat, source of funds or staffers – or phone line. Instead, 
ARF‘s resources were tied to ASEAN, which provided what facilities it deemed necessary 
for the ARF to succeed. This section will examine the moves towards providing the ARF 
with its own institutional resources. One area of particular interest has been the ARF‘s 
subcontracting of research staffers to the so-called Track II diplomacy, such as the Council 
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for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific.  
 
6.7.1  ARF reform: Chair 
The need for the ARF to become more institutionalized was noted early in the ARF‘s history. 
The Japan-sponsored Working Grouping on Preventive Diplomacy (1997) noted that the 
role of the ARF chair needed to be considered as a mechanism for preventive diplomacy, 
although various views were put forward about what the Chair‘s competences should be. 
The idea for the Chair‘s role to be enhanced was further developed at the ISG-CBMs 1999-
2000 in Singapore (Japan co-chaired). At the 2000 meeting, Japan developed concrete 
proposals for PD; the concept paper outlined seven main roles for the ARF chair.
765 
 
Japan‘s paper also contained the idea of helping to ‗support‘ the ARF chair by enabling the 
Chair to draw on all/any of the ARF member countries‘ resources, rather than being limited 
to  just  ASEAN.  Japan  perhaps hoped  that  increased  non-ASEAN  influence  would  help 
jump  start  reform  of  the  ARF  as  a  whole.
766 Of  course,  this  upset  Japan‘s  ASEAN 
neighbours,  some  countries  criticizing  Japan  for  drafting  a  paper  without  first  having 
ASEAN‘s approval.
767 But in fact, Japan‘s focus was on China. Japan made vigorous efforts 
to reassure China, with MOFA officials informally visiting Beijing to discuss the draft working 
paper in the interlude between the 1999 meeting and the 2000 meeting. Indeed, based on 
these exchanges Japan voluntarily redrafted its paper on the Enhanced Role of the Chair 
several times in Tokyo before presenting a ‗final‘ version at the eighth ARF-SOM (Hanoi 
2001).  
 
Despite Japan‘s efforts, the result was less than hoped for. Japan‘s proposal for the ARF 
Chair  to  be  able  to  call  an  emergency  meeting without  prior  notification was  thwarted. 
Instead, emergency meetings called by the Chair would have to have the ―prior consent of 
directly involved states and the consensus of all the ARF members.‖
768 Furthermore the 
Chairman‘s ability to make an addition to the Statement without consensus was removed, 
in part due to Chinese objections.
769 As a result Japan felt disappointed, and the ARF itself 
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acknowledged that the reforms had not moved the ARF forward institutionally.
770 Japan had 
hoped that closer coordination with China would help Japan to   push ASEAN towards 
opening up the ARF, but in the final analysis China was unwilling to cooperate with Japan to 
further institutionalize the Forum.  
 
6.7.2  ARF reform: ARF Secretariat functions 
Japan has also called for the creation of a permanent ARF secretariat to coordinate the 
ARF‘s activities and, in the event of an incident, to be able to call for talks. The secretariat 
debate is therefore linked closely to the discussion about the enhanced role of the Chair - 
Japan making this link formal at the 2003 Phnom Penh ministerial meeting.
771 At the 2004 
Ministerial meeting, Foreign Minister Kawaguchi again presented a position paper stating 
that the ARF should hold more substantive sessions with a stronger role for the Chair and 
Secretariat; in fact, at the precedi ng 2004 ISG-CBMs Japan presented a paper entitled 
―Reconsidering the ARF Functioning for the Coming Decade.‖
772 Towards the middle of that 
year there was a compromise solution reached; the ASEAN-SOM agreed to set up an ARF 




Japan‘s  understandable  attempts  to  increase  its  influence  via  deepening  the  ARF‘s 
institutionalization have been thwarted. No surprise then that even in 2009, there are still 
two  groups  struggling  over  the  definition  of  the  vision  statement;  Japan  in  one  group 




6.8  Diffusion: Mutual Defection 
 
China‘s  rise  in  the  ARF  has  challenged  Japan‘s  belief  that  its  security  needs  can  be 
provided through multilateral dialogue. Japan‘s objective from the first was to create an 
overlapping  system of bilateral  and multilateral  security  guarantees.  Ministry  of  Foreign 
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Affairs officials had begun with the expectation that the multilateral approach would work 
next  to  the  alliance,  and  assumed  that  both  were  necessary.
775 Yanai Shunji (director-
general  of  Foreign  Policy  Bureau  in  MOFA)  argued  in  1995  that  Japan‘s  national  and 
regional security policy was being shaped by the mutual co-existence of a bilateral and 




But as a consequence of the growing disillusionment with the ARF due to an inability to find 
modus operandi for cooperation with China, Japan has turned its attention towards building 
up bilateral and mini-lateral security networks outside of the ARF and China. This diffusion 
away from the ARF toward closed, invite-only groups is qualitatively different to the diffusion 
reciprocity  that  the  ARF  had  hoped  to  engender  in  its  members.  Rather  than  mutual 
security,  Japan‘s  closed-shop  discussion  with  Australia  and  India  (in  additional  to 
deepening alliance relations with the US) poses the risk of feeding into the Northeast Asian 
security dilemma as Japan seeks to improve its own security situation vis-à-vis China. 
 
Of course, Japan hardly led the diffusion away from the ARF, although its defection to 
minilateralism  will  no  doubt  accelerate  the  trend.  Japan‘s  defaulting  is  simply  because 
others,  but  most  importantly  China,  are  not  reciprocating  to  the  level  that  Japan  had 
expected. Moreover, China was already beginning to advocate a different security grouping 
which  might  undercut  the  ARF,  the  most  important  being  the  Shanghai  Cooperation 
Organization (SCO) which China established with Russia and Central Asian states in 2000.  
 
But even within the ARF, Beijing has sought to create sub-groups which limit or exclude 
outside players. To this end China has sponsored the creation of the ARF Security Policy 
Conference.
777 Japan and China‘s differing opinions on the future of the ARF were reflected 
as Japan and China both presented differing working papers about the future of the ARF in 
2007 at this conference.
778 
 
In comparison to China‘s subtle moves, the Japanese shift away from the ARF towards 
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bilateralism  and  minilateralism  is  more  direct.    In  March  of  2007,  Japan  and  Australia 
issued a Joint Declaration on Security – scheduled to be upgraded with a Cross Service 
Agreement in 2010. This was first time that Japan signed such an agreement with a country 
other than with the US, and represented an historic shift in Japan‘s strategic thinking. While 
then  Prime  Minister,  Abe,  attempted  to  obfuscate  the  true  intent  of  the  agreement,  it 
became  clear  that  the  unspoken  target  was  indeed  China.
779 By  linking  the  security 
declaration to fundamental human rights, Japan was deliberating excluding China from 
similar arrangements in the future.
780  
 
Likewise,  Japan‘s  security  cooperation  with  India,  which  had  begun  in  2001  with  the 
establishment of a Security Dialogue, experienced a sudden lift in intensity from 2005. 
Beginning with greater exchange of high level officials, such as Japan‘s Chief of Staff, and 
the Chiefs of the Army, Navy and Airforce visiting India in 2005-6, the negotiations for a 
deeper  security  relationship  were  begun  in  2006  by  then  Foreign  Minister  Aso.  These 
arrangements were later formalized under the ―Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation 
between Japan and India.‖ Like the agreement with Australia, this declaration began by 
noting  common  values
781,  and  promised  greater  bilateral  cooperation  in  the  region, 
including the ARF.
782 These agreements were also the basis for trilateral naval exercises 
with India and the US in April 2007, and quadrilateral exercises including Australia in 
September of the same year.  
 
At the same time, as a part of this diffusion away from the ARF, Japan is committing fewer 
diplomatic resources to the ARF. Japan‘s ARF policy is mostly under the control of the 
MOFA‘s National Security Policy Division which handles regional and multilateral security 
activities. In the early 2000s, the Division had eight staff, two of which were on ARF duty.
783 
However as of 2009, this number has been reduced to just one, while the North America 
bureau (which handles the alliance) reportedly has 15 staff.
784 It  is  clear  the  Japan‘s 
emphasis on the ARF, low to begin with, has fallen to what might be regarded as purely 
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Taken together, the emergence of India and Australia as security partners demonstrates 
that Japanese security has broadened from a simple reliance on the US and a hope that 
the ARF might deliver a ‗security with‘ CBMs based solution. By building up bilaterally a 
wider  security  network,  Japan  hopes  to  better  manage  its  strategic  environment,  in 
particular China.  
 
6.9  Conclusion: Power, Distrust and East Asia’s Nascent Security 
Regionalism. 
 
In conclusion, Japan‘s response to the rise of China has impacted on the region‘s security 
order and institutions in significant ways. It was chiefly due to concerns about China and a 
desire to engage with China that Japan first proposed that a regional security institution be 
formed. But in the face of an obstructive China, Japan‘s strategy has come unstuck. Japan 
has responded by adopting a two-pronged response; firstly, elevating the importance of 
bilateral and mini-lateral security networks with US, Australia and India, and secondly, by 
continuing to press for a CBMs regime at the ARF.   
 
Realism captures the first part of this dynamic accurately,  and is therefore mostly right 
about the corrosive effects of a weak Sino-Japanese bilateral relationship on the ARF. From 
realist theory, this is merely the natural outcome of the fact that as an institution the ARF 
suffers from the lack of a hegemonic stabiliser. At the outset, Japan considered ASEAN as 
sufficiently  competent,  and  itself  as  sufficiently  ‗weighty‘,  that  some  progress  might  be 
made in bringing China in to the ARF. However, China‘s growing power has allowed it to 
effectively seize control of the institution, and to guide it downs pathways which do not limit 
China‘s freedom of action and (therefore) do not help secure Japan‘s position in the region. 
Instead of consolidating its position, Japan has had to follow China‘s lead as the ARF‘s 
agenda  becomes  increasingly  cluttered  with  items  of  limited  interest  to  Japan.  Japan‘s 
anxiety about its future has thus prompted it to look outside of the ARF for its security, 
resulting in the decision to deepen its political, strategic and military ties to the US, Australia 
and India as a form of external balancing. 
 
Yet realism does not explain very well why Japan should, even now, continue its efforts 
within  the  ARF  to  promote  CBMs.  Japan  has  attempted  to  lead  by  example,  regularly 
producing high quality Defence White Papers for the Asian Security Outlook. Japan has 
availed itself frequently of the voluntary briefing facility at the ISG-CBMs, twice as often as 
China, (despite the fact that Japan has not even half as many serious security problems 188 
 
with its neighbours as China). Japan has allowed the pace of CBMs to be slowed down, 
even to the point of stalling and has been willing to play along with the NTS agenda, all in 
the  hope  that  the  ARF  might  one  day  ―develop  into  an  organization  that  contributes 
effectively for the security of the region.‖
785 Part of the reason for this apparent patience is 
that the ARF has become a diplomatic set-piece. Even while not functioning as initially 
intended,  the  Forum  continues  to  have  an  institutional  life  all  its  own.  Notwithstanding 
Condoleezza Rice‘s ‗boycott‘ in 2005, the ARF continues to be regarded as a useful site 
where Foreign Ministers might meet annually – even if they carefully control with whom 
they will interact. This perception is shared also by Japan, which is loath to see its single 
possibility  for a useful  regional security institution wither on the vine. Thus, institutional 
effects  such  as  sunk  cost  and  path  dependence  are  important  in  explaining  Japan‘s 
persistence with the ARF, in spite of the institutional weaknesses caused in large part by 
China‘s spoiling tactics.   
 
In harmonizing these two views about the ARF, social constructivism is needed. This is 
because the ARF is an institution designed to socialize states. In fact, Japan initially hoped 
that the ARF might socialize China into accepting some of Japan‘s security interests as its 
own, especially CBMs and military transparency. Socialization is not simply one way though. 
In  understanding  Japan‘s  shift  away  from  the  ARF  and  towards  building up  alternative 
bilateral/minilateral security networks, it is necessary to appreciate that Japan  has also 
been socialized by the ARF. Increased communication and contact with China since 1994 
has not led to greater trust and confidence – quite the opposite. This explains why Japan, 
which started out positive about the ARF, has become increasingly pessimistic about its 
utility.  What is emerging instead is a more realist orientation to security based on the 
lesson that China is playing a sort of zero-sum game in regional security. With cooperation 
with China unable to deliver, Japan has chosen to expand its security networks as a limited 
form of realist type balancing.  
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7  Asian Development Bank 
 
7.1  Introduction 
 
This  chapter  examines  Japan‘s  response  to  a  rising  China  in  the  context  of  the  Asian 
Development Bank (ADB). The ADB is an interesting case for several reasons. Firstly, in a 
region where institutionalization is still relatively weak, the ADB is by any measure densely 
institutionalised. Founded in 1966, the ADB is one of the older organizations in the region – 
and one of a handful which have survived the Cold War period.   
 
More importantly, the balance of power within the institution makes the ADB a good choice 
as a case study. This is because Japan enjoys within the ADB a lion‘s share of the formal 
voting  power.  This,  in  addition  to  other  informal  benefits,  allows  Japan  a  high  level  of 
influence over the Bank and its activities. The ADB is therefore invaluable as a site where 
Japan‘s response to China is comparatively easy to detect and measure. In addition, the 
ADB itself is relatively transparent compared to other institutions in East Asia.
786  
 
This chapter argues that the rise of China has played an impor tant role in how Japan 
defines and executes its preferences within the Bank. Specifically, Japan is attempting to 
use the ADB as vehicle to increase its presence and influence in Asia and  has become 
willing to bet the Bank‘s reputation on the success of a regionalist strategy. This chapter will 
argue that the institutional effects of this policy are corrosive. However, these effects are 
not yet a level which significantly impedes the Bank in pursuing its business, the hidden 
costs are being paid by the poorest member countries. This outcome is in line with realist 
thinking  and  the  relevance  of  material  power  to  creating  and  sustaining  international 
institutions. 
 
In characterizing the Japanese response and its institutional outcomes, this chapter will 
argue that the realists are however only half-right. Firstly, China‘s rise within the ADB has 
not in fact come as a challenge to Japan. Indeed, China‘s formal influence relative to Japan 
has actually slipped since accession. The institutional features of the Bank itself are at play 
as an intervening variable, and realism‘s posited direct link between power and institutional 
outcome  is  therefore  highly  questionable.  Indeed,  the  Bank‘s  management  of  loans  to 
China is also reflective of a negotiated outcome between China and Japan and no doubt 
played  a  role  in  depoliticizing  the  ending  of  Japan‘s  bilateral  ODA.  These  institutional 
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effects of ADB are testimony to the importance of liberal ideas.  
 
Likewise,  this  chapter  will  show  that  social  constructivists‘  arguments  about  the  causal 
nature  of  ideas  such  as  regional  identity  are  crucial  in  understanding  the  ADB‘s  push 
toward a regional development strategy. While Japan‘s support for the regionalist strategy 
can be understood as motivated by concerns about its influence in Asia due to the rise of 
China, this is to miss out the important role of ideas about power and identity. Indeed, 
Japan and China have both cooperated and competed in the formation of the regionalist 
development strategy at the ADB. Moreover, the personality of the ADB‘s President, and his 
ideas about regionalism, proves to be a surprisingly important factor.   
 
7.1.1  ADB as a regional institution 
Examining the interaction of state interests in international institutions is hardly novel. There 
is a vast literature available on the politics involved in multilateral forums, and the ADB has 
not been immune to this sort of analysis. However, the ADB has not attracted nearly as 
much  academic  scrutiny  as  that  received  by  the  World  Bank,  or  European  Bank  for 
Reconstruction and Development.
787 In solving the development problems of the region, 
the ADB uses economic assessment and estimation tools which are often assumed to be 
divorced from  the political concerns of the donors. Research on the ADB has therefore 
tended to focus on practical issues, such as how successful are its activities in promoting 
development or reducing poverty. 
 
One of reasons for the existence of a multil ateral organization like the Bank to dispense 
development loans rather than states doing so bilaterally is to produce credible signals for 
private capital markets. As Rodrik argues, this is a role only a multilateral organization can 
undertake  by  virtue  of   its  (seeming)  independence  from  state -level  political 
consideration.
788 Yet the ADB is not divorced from the interests of its donors, indeed from 
the donors‘ perspective there is little reason to give to such an organization without some 
kind of a return. For the states which are its donor members (such as Japan), the great 
appeal of the ADB is that it provides greater control than the World Bank over its loan 
activities in the region. This control reduces the credibility of its signalling role but its nature 
as a multilateral permits the ADB to present itself as mostly (if not completely) impartial. 
This apparent impartially among donor members as a collective increases the legitimacy of 
its  activities  and  allows  the  ADB  to  loan  to  countries  which  might  otherwise  refuse 
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assistance due to concerns about sovereignty (a right defended more vigorously in Asia 
than in the West). On closer examination therefore we can see that state interests play a 
major role in the Bank‘s activities and thus political analysis is appropriate. This is not 
immediately apparent however, and this fact also explains the lack of political analysis of 
the ADB. 
 
Where political analysis of the Bank has been done, it has tended to focus on the role of 
the  United  States.  This  is  not  surprising,  a  great  of  research  goes  on  in  the  US  and 
naturally enough research would be concerned with American involvement. While Japan 
has attracted less attention than the US, there is some good research done on Japan‘s role. 
Dennis Yasutomo has written the only book, albeit now dated, on the subject of Japan and 
the ADB.
789 Significant too is Wan Ming‘s study looking at Japan‘s role in the ADB, but as it 
was published before the Asian Financial Crisis it does not address the changes in both 
Japanese interests and Bank structure.
790 Wan‘s study also does not address the causes 
behind Japanese policy preference shift, but rather describes the activities of Japan in the 
Bank. Since we will examine Japan‘s response to China and implications for the Bank, why 
Japan acts and the effects of its actions on the Bank are as important as what Japan does. 
 
The effects of Japanese action on the Bank are addressed to some extent in work done on 
institutional  change  in  the  Asian  Development  Bank.  The  best  of  this  literature  on 
institutional change at the ADB, of admittedly very few works which address the issue, is 
Michael Wesley‘s book chapter.
791 However, while he admirably describes the changes that 
have  occurred  over  the  Bank‘s  history,  the  focus  is  not  on  Japan.  As  a  general  rule 
scholarship on the ADB has not addressed specific causes of institutional change. In short, 
despite the fact that Japan is generally acknowledged to be a central figure in the Bank, the 
motivations of Japan in the restructuring of the Bank and reordering of loans activities has 
not  been  comprehensively  addressed.  This  chapter  will  contribute  to  the  academic 
literature by addressing these points. 
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7.2  Formation  
 
Before  launching  into  an  investigation  of  the  changes  within  the  ADB  due  to  Japan‘s 
response to China, an introduction to the Bank itself is in order. In particular, how and why 
the ADB came to be and Japan‘s role in its inception needs to be explained. As noted 
previously, global multilateral development institutions such as the World Bank or even the 
United Nations Development Program could easily have performed the role of the ADB. In 
the early 1960s, the United States did not support the proposal for a regional multilateral 
development bank for Asia. The interest in such an institution sprung instead from regional 
players – particularly Japan. This section first examine why Japan was interested in an 
Asian  Development  Bank,  and  examine  its  activism  in  its  formation.  This  section  will 
examine how the Bank was then used to serve Japanese interests and how Japan was 
able to influence, directly and indirectly, the Bank‘s activities. It is important to understand 
both the ‗initial‘ level of Japan‘s control of the institution prior to China‘s accession and to 
appreciate the important role that the ADB has played in Japanese aid diplomacy and 
rebuilding of Japanese image in the region. 
  
7.2.1  Japan’s Interests in the ADB 
While a consensus more or less existed within Japan during the 1960s about the political 
and economic utility of an ADB, there was some uncertainty about which of these interests 
should  have  priority.
792 Politically, the ADB promised national prestige and a chance   to 
rebuild relations with Asia, particularly in Southeast Asia. This was hugely appealing to the 
GOJ, which during this time was keen to assuage the suspicions of its peers in the 
international community. The interest of prestige was championed by the MOFA, which was 
aware of the strategic dimension to aid. During the Cold War, membership in the ADB 
would allow access to development funds but entailed support for the US regional security 
role.
793 The MITI was also aware that the ADB could further  Japanese economic interests 
both directly, through procurement contracts for development,  and indirectly, through the 
trade facilitation effects of partner countries economic development. Additionally, the ADB‘s 
assistance to Southeast Asia was expected to help Japan secure access to raw materials. 
Moreover, the ADB, like bilateral ODA, would allow Japan to recycle its trade surpluses and 
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help to lower tensions with its neighbours over trade imbalances.
794 Japan, having decided 
that an ADB would be in its interests, put its diplomatic energies into the ADB‘s institution-
building, for details see Appendix 13.
795 
 
7.2.2   Japan’s advantage in the formal rules 
Japan‘s activism in the formation of the Bank provided it with an opportunity to help shape 
the rules which govern its operations. This influence is evident in the Charter establishing 
the Asian Development Bank, agreed upon in 1966. Voting weight within the ADB is derived 
in part from shares purchased (80%), while a proportion (20%) is equally divided among 
the membership. The equal distribution of 20% of the voting weight was designed to give 
the Developing Member Countries (DMCs), i.e. the borrowing countries which would not be 
able to purchase a large number of shares, a voice in the decision making of the Bank and 
increase the legitimacy of the Bank‘s activities.
796 This was an outcome which Japan had 
not favoured but which also cost little.  
 
But the real, if quiet, victory for Japan was in ensuring that 60% of stock was reserved for 
regional  members,  ostensibly  to  maintain  the  Bank‘s  so-called  ‗Asian  character.‘  This 
stipulation in effect meant that it would be easier for regional donor members to control loan 
allocation than non-regional members. Japan, being the dominant regional donor benefitted 
from the clause the most; other regional states simply could not purchase shares on par 
with Japan. While this so-called ‗Asian character‘ of the nascent ADB initially dissuaded 
America from contributing funds, the US eventually decided to match Japan as events 
heated up on the Indochina peninsula over the late 1960s and the Cold War waxed hot.
797  
 
In order to counter perceived Japanese influence, America and the other Western powers 
were keen to have the non-regional members well represented at the Board of Directors.
798 
Japan would have preferred a lower number, as it would have cemented its influence 
                                                   
794 David Arase, ed. Japan's Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and New Directions (London: Routledge,2005). p. 13 
795 With Japan buying into the scheme, more prospective shareholders were found, the Bank was finally capitalized with 
$1billion on the 22
nd August 1966 when the governments subscribing two thirds of the authorized capital ratified the 
agreement., For more details of the diplomacy behind the creation of the ADB. 
796  Article  33(1)  of  "Agreement  Establishing  the  Asian  Development  Bank,"  (1966), 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/Charter/default.asp.,  There  was  certainly   a  precedent  as  the  African 
Development Bank (established 196 4) had 50% of its voting weight distributed in this way. The greater the equal 
distribution to members, the more autonomy the DMCs would enjoy, however as Krasner has pointed out there seems 
to be an inverse correlation between autonomy and acc ess to funds. See, Stephen Krasner, "Power Structures and 
Regional Development Banks," International Organisation 35, no. 2 (1981). 
797 Ming Wan, "Japan and the Asian Development Bank," Pacific Affairs 68, no. 4 (1995). p. 2 
798 In the end 20% was agreed to, ―there was an informal bargain that the donors would accept 20% basic votes if the 
Asians agreed to a 30 percent share of the board seats for the non-regionals.‖ See, Dick Wilson, A Bank for Half the 
World (Asian Development Bank, 1987). p. 26 194 
 
relative to the other regional countries. This result increased the influence of regional DMCs, 
while giving the non-regional states good access to the board of directors and weakened 
the  Japanese  position  vis-à-vis  both  other  groups.
799 Still  this  was  not  a  particularly 
significant weakening, as Japan would enter the ADB a co -equal largest shareholder with 
the US, holding little over 20% of the total voting power.
800 Japan was therefore well 
positioned in the ADB at the outset.  
 
7.2.3  Japan’s further advantages in the informal rules 
In  order  to  make  the  nascent  Bank  more  useful  to  it,  Japan  consciously  set  about 
institutionalizing  its  influence  in  the  Bank.  Japan  was  able  to  do  so  by  securing  key 
positions in the Bank for its nationals – most notably the President. In order to maintain an 
‗Asian character‘, Japan was able to have written into the Charter that the President ought 
to be from a regional member country.
801 Moreover, as the president would likely come 
from a donor country (a quid pro quo for the monies put in), Japan‘s status as both a donor 
and regional member made it the only real choice for President.  
 
At  the  same  time,  Japan  was  able  to  institutionalize  –  or  embed  –  its  own  national 
preferences indirectly by having its nationals (usually from the Ministry of Finance) staff key 
posts within the ADB. This was achieved informally and almost by accident, as the first 
President Watanabe Takeshi appointed only those whom he personally knew. Watanabe‘s 
first appointment was Fujioka Masao to the important administrative post of Budget and 
Personnel matters.
802 Fujioka‘s ambit involved the hiring of future staff, and unsurprisingly 
therefore, of the first ten professional staff hired, half were Japanese.
803 This effectively 
established a shadow rule which remains to the present, whereby Japanese staffed certain 
key posts  –  such  as  Budget,  Personnel,  and  later,  Strategy.  While  Japan  did  not  get 
everything it wanted, by the time the ADB came into existence its vaunted Asian character 
already had a ‗Japanese‘ face.   
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7.3  Membership: Japan and the Accession of China  
 
Membership  in  the  Asian  Development  Bank  has  expanded  quite  significantly  since 
formation.  There  were  31  founding  members  in  1966,  however  by  late  2008  the  Bank 
consisted of 67 members. Not for nothing was the ADB‘s official history entitled ―A Bank for 
Half the World.‖
804 The reason for this expansion is two-fold. Firstly, the end of the Cold War 
has seen European countries joining the ADB as non-regional members as their interest in 
Asian development has grown. Secondly, regional membership is also up, driven by the 
emergence of Central Asian and Oceanic countries. This section however will focus on the 
accession of China and Japan‘s policy towards it. It will argue that realism explains Japan‘s 
interest in involving China, but that intuitionalism plays a key role in explaining Taiwan‘s 
continued participation in the ADB. 
 
7.3.1  Japanese Interests in China’s accession 
Chinese membership in the ADB was perceived as an opportunity by Japan to further its 
interests both in trade and security. Like the US, Japan was interested in splitting China 
from the Soviets, and economic development assistance appealed as a tool to achieve 
this.
805 While Japan had pursued informal bilateral diplomacy with China before the 1972 
normalization of relations, the ADB represented a formal multilateral path of engaging with 
the Chinese. Most importantly for  Japan, it would allow China to ‗practice‘ international 
conference diplomacy in a ‗safe‘ environment, and would hopefully be a pathway to further 
diplomacy in the future. 
 
For Japan, the ADB was thus seen as a tool to socialise China into the world system. 
Japan aimed to support the ‗opening‘ and reform movement and to prevent a return to 
autarky in China. The reforms in China began in 1978, and the Ohira administration put in a 
place an ODA program in 1979 to support the modernization effort in China – the yen loans 
component first paying out in 1980. Additionally, Japan hoped to shore up the Deng reforms 
through its ODA and PRC membership in the ADB.
806 However, then Prime Minister Suzuki 




Japan also expected to receive economic benefits from Chinese membership in the ADB. 
Directly, Japan could expect that China‘s development needs would be met by Japanese 
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suppliers.    Some  rather  cynically  observed  that  ―Japan  has  no  hesitation  about  letting 
China  in,  since  more  construction  capital  for  China  may  produce  more  contracts  for 
Japanese traders and industrialists.‖
808 Indirectly, Japan was expecting that the Chinese 
market  would  develop  to  be  highly  with  compatible  the  Japanese  market.  At  this  time 
Akamatsu  Kaname‘s  ‗flying  goose‘  model  held  sway  in  the  minds  of  many  Japanese. 
According to this model, China too could pull itself out of backwardness and into modernity 
as the newest ‗goose‘ in Japan‘s flock. Additionally, Japan was interested in China for coal 
and other unrefined or natural products, which a low tier goose could provide. And while 
China would require assistance (thus the ADB), in order to efficiently and stably provide 
such goods,  Japan could  expect  to  benefit  from  China‘s  economic  development.
809 For 
China‘s interests in joining the ADB see Appendix 14. 
 
7.3.2  Taiwan or China? Japanese preferences and ADB politics over membership 
However, the accession of China carried with it one significant hurdle - Taiwan. China‘s 
accession  to  multilateral  bodies  such  as  the  UN  had  in  the  past  entailed  Taiwanese 
expulsion.  But  this  time  Taiwan  refused  to  back  down.  Japan  was  torn.  Japan  had 
economic and political interests in both Taiwan and China, and was reluctant to sacrifice 
either. Moreover Taiwan flattered Japan with its positive take on Japan‘s role in the region 
and cutting Taiwan loose would have cost Japanese business interests dearly. However, if 
China did not join the ADB, Japan feared the organization might lose relevance and in the 
long term cease to exist.
810 Similarly, if Taiwan was expelled the damage to the ADB would 
be extensive. Whereas China was a new and unknown quantity, Taiwan was a founding 
member of the ADB. 
 
For reasons relating to the rules contained within the Charter, it was difficult  for China to 
press home its case about Taiwanese expulsion. According to the Charter, a member might 
be expelled only if it defaults on loan repayments. By 1971, not only was Taiwan no longer 
borrowing, it was paying its loans ahead of schedule and was held up as a model.
811 While 
China had been encouraged to join by the non -political nature of the ADB, this same 
technocratic nature meant that political demands for ‗One China‘ carried less weight in the 
organization. Moreover, the balance of power within the organization was still against China. 
The US was not going to chose to support the PRC over Taiwan, and made clear that its 
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support for the ADB (and its money) might be withdrawn if Taiwan were to be expelled. 
Likewise, demands to remove a ―successful, contributing regional member‖ in to order to 
include a poor and backward China was never going to win over the other DMCs. 
 
It was Japan which played the central role in negotiating a compromise that would allow the 
Republic of China to stay on even as the PRC joined. Through the discussions surrounding 
China accession and Taiwanese membership, Japan was able to communicate its position 
into  ADB  policy  by  the  ‗back  door‘  of  its  national  staff,  importantly  via  the  President. 
President Fujioka had previous sought the advice of Japan‘s MOFA.
812 Moreover, Fujioka 
also talked with the MOF about the Taiwan issue to gauge Tokyo‘s feelings on the plan.
813 
And it was Fujioka, together with the US and Japanese representatives, who put together 
the deal; to keep on the Republic of China but under the name ‗Taipei, China‘ and to allow 
the accession of the PRC.
814  
 
The accession of China had significant implications for the running of the Bank. In 1986, 
the Board of Governors had not agreed on how China should be represented at the Board 
of Directors, and thus the PRC initially participated as an observer only.
815 In 1987, China 
formally became the 47
th member of the ADB, and its third largest stockholder.
816 ‗Taipei, 
China‘  was able  to keep  control  of  its  stock,  despite  the  name  change,  but  became  a 
smaller stockholder with only 1.394% of the total voting power. China had joined the ADB 
and Taiwan was permitted to stay on.
817 This outcome satisfied Japan‘s interests. While 
realism explains Japan‘s interests in seeking to include China in the ADB, institutionalism 
explains how Japan was able to influence the outcome on the question of Taiwan.  
 
7.4  Scope: Regional Strategy  
 
One of the areas in which the ADB has changed most has been in terms of the type of 
activities it undertakes, i.e. its scope. One reason for this has been the changing needs of 
Asia. The ADB‘s traditional role in providing loans for large national works projects is not as 
relevant in a region with an enviably high saving rate. Instead, the ADB has moved towards 
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providing  expertise,  targeted  projects  and,  more  controversially,  regional  vision.  This 
section will focus on the last of these, regional vision. The ADB‘s growing emphasis on 
regional development through integration is an agenda with greater international political 
significance than traditional aid operations. This section will show the Japanese role in the 
expansion of ADB scope and discuss Japan‘s motivation in the leadership game with China. 
Rather than just a response to changing power realities, this section will argue that social 
constructivism  is  most  relevant  in  understanding  the  institutional  outcomes  of  Japan‘s 
response to China in the ADB.  
 
7.4.1  The Regional Cooperation and Integration strategy 
While the historical trend towards greater wealth in Asia was always going to challenge the 
ADB‘s core business and necessitate either the provision of different international goods or 
going out of business, the ADB did not necessarily have to adopt a strategy based on 
leveraging Asian regional integration for economic development.
818 In fact, the ADB‘s initial 
move away from its traditional role as the bank-roller of large national projects was towards 
poverty reduction. Mirroring moves within the World Bank, President Satō(1993-1999) in 
fact re-emphasised a close national focus, and brought the ADB to local and ‗micro‘ issues 
like village sanitation.  
 
However, the Asian Financial Crisis caused the ADB to revise its approach. Not only did the 
Crisis threaten to wipe out nearly forty years of development progress, but as the ADB 
admits internally, the ADB was also effectively sidelined from decision making. The ADB 
was unable to provide this international leadership itself, nor did it voice regional concerns 
to the IMF when the decisions were being made. As one internal report notes, ―the ADB 
was not able to utilize its special regional knowledge and regional sensitivities to help its 
member countries, and instead largely followed the lead of <the IMF>.‖
819 Japan too had 
suffered heavy criticism during the crisis, and in order to demonstrate Japan‘s continued 
relevance to the region, then Finance Minister, Miyazawa channelled short term assistance 
through the ADB.  
 
To  put  the  ADB  back  on  the  map,  President  Chino  Tadao  (1999-2004)  approved  the 
Poverty  Reduction  Strategy  and  put  in  place  a  Long-Term  Strategic  Framework.  Both 
strategies included regional cooperation as a way to leverage development, yet little was 
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specifically done to foster regionalism, rather social and environment issues continued to 
dominate.
820 The ADB also institutionally evolved by setting up within its walls the Regional 
Economic Monitoring Unit (REMU), which was mandated by a request from ASEAN leaders. 
Initially the REMU was set up to provide early warning of financial crises, and it was soon 
expanded to manage ongoing components of the New Miyazawa Initiative. However, this 
role really only saw Japan and the ADB providing a series of bilateral short-term loans and 
support to regional countries, and did not represent a truly regionalist push.  
 
Only in the term of the subsequent President of the ADB, Kuroda Haruhiko (2004-present) 
did regional cooperation assume pride of place. In fact, in his first speech, the newly 
installed President stressed the ADB‘s role in regional economic integration, saying;  
ADB must also assume an even more proactive role as catalyst, as well as coordinator, 
for regional cooperation and integration - a special and unique mission of a regional 
development bank. ADB must continue to support financial cooperation agreements in 
the region, such as the Chiang Mai Initiative and the Asian Bond Markets Initiative. In 
coming years, ADB should also work toward advancing regional economic integration 
as a Knowledge Leader.
821 
This focus on regional development as opposed to a national focus has real effects both 
institutionally  and  in  the  disbursement  of  funds.  The  regional  approach  was  further 
institutionalised  at  the  operations  level,  with  the  country  strategy  program  and  regional 
cooperation strategy programs required to mesh and the creation in 2007 of the Regional 
Cooperation and Integration (RCI) Fund. These institutional adjustments to the regional 
departments have had a major impact on the ADB at the operations level.
822 Indeed, the 




7.4.2  Office of Regional Economic Integration (OREI) 
In order to further his vision for regional development through cooperation, Kuroda worked 
towards  establishing  a  new  department  to  oversee  regional  economic  integration.  The 
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Office of Regional Economic Integration (OREI) was founded on 1 April 2005 – taking only 
a few months to come into existence, an unusually short time for organizational change. 
Kuroda also appointed fellow-national Kawai Masahiro to the Head of OREI
824, both men 
had  been active in Japan on issues of regional integration and had a good personal 
relationship.
825 OREI took over the activities of the REMU, such as continuing to support 
the ASEAN Surveillances Process. However, compared with REMU wh ich was formed at 
the request of the ASEAN Finance Ministers, in spite of its sweeping  responsibilities the 
OREI was not similarly ministerially mandated.  
 
Organizationally, the OREI is set up within the office of the President. And whereas the 
REMU had been somewhat removed from the ADB, OREI is very much at heart of the ‗new‘ 
ADB. In addition to picking up the five professional staffers of REMU, OREI has acquired a 
further dozen or so professional staff (20). However, most of these new personnel at OREI 
were not trained ‗regional‘ economists or specialists but have been transferred from other 
unrelated parts of the ADB.
826 Quite apart from causing some strained relations within the 




In  July of 2006, little more than a year after Kuroda took office, the ADB approved a 
Regional  Cooperation  and  Integration  strategy.  This  strategy  sought  to  further  Asia‘s 
economic development by building up regional cross-border infrastructure to support trade 
and investment.
828 In particular, the OREI was mandated to take ―the primary responsibility 
for  pillars  2  and  3‖  of  the  RCI  strategy,  i.e.  trade  and  investment,  and  monetary  and 
financial  cooperation  –  neither  of  which  are  traditional  development  issues.
829  More 
significantly, the ADB decided to earmark 30 percent of its loans for projects under the 
regional  cooperation  and  integration  category  in  its  ―Strategy  2020‖  Report.
830 It  was 
perhaps for this reason that the ADB was found to be ―spread too thin‖ by an independent 
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Moving the ADB away from its traditional role of a primary financier of development, a task 
which it seemed increasingly unsuited for,
832 Kuroda argued that the ADB added value by 
providing a regional vision. What this implicitly meant was supporting and building up the 
regional production network which had been centred on Japan.  Naturally, leveraging this 
production network naturally lined up with Japan‘s interests. Indeed, Kawai commented that, 
―We [Kuroda and I] …knew that Japan‘s relative importance was declining… whereas other 
countries, in particular China, were growing very fast…the only way for Japan to survive 
would be to strengthen its economy with other economies in Asia. So this RCI would also 
good opportunity for Japan.‖
833 It is important to note that the MOF did not give any order to 
Kuroda  (or  Kawai)  to  pursue  a  regional  agenda;  rather,  those  two  carried  with  them 
perceptions and beliefs which had been built up during their time at the Ministry. In fact, 
Kuroda‘s swift decision to develop a regional strategy after becoming President apparently 
was not taken in consultation with the ADB professional staff. Some of these veterans were 
unconvinced about Kuroda‘s direction.
834  
 
Japan was pleased this new direction. At the 2005 Annual Meeting of the ADB, Tanigaki 
Sadakazu, then Minister of Finance, addressed a special session of the Governors entitled 
―A road map for Asia‘s economic cooperation and integration.‖ Tanigaki outlined Japanese 
support for the new approach that Kuroda was taking and expressed his hopes that OREI 
would be further strengthened as site for economic surveillance and policy dialogue.
835  
Indeed, Japan championed the  RCI from the outset, immediately recognising the ADB‘s 
mandate to promote regional economic integration.
836  Official Japanese support for Kuroda 
and the RCI has continued. Tanigaki spent nearly a tenth of his speech at the next year‘s 
(2006) Annual Meeting praising Kuroda‘s leadership and the RCI.
837  In 2008, then Finance 
Minister Nukaga, Fukushiro also spoke about the RCI, calling for the ―ADB to continue its 
leading  role  in  regional  cooperation  and  regional  integration.‖
838 Interestingly  Nukaga 
                                                   
831 "ADB Deemed Effective but Could Do Better," November 14 2006. 
832 Even in 1996, the ADB was fast approaching irrelevance as a source of funds for development projects, see  "Help 
Yourselves: The Asian Development Bank," The Economist v339, no. n7964 (1996).  
833 Author's Interview with Kawai Masahiro, 14 November 2008. Tokyo. 
834 Author's Confidential Interview with ADB Official, November 2008. Tokyo., especially in the South Asia were it is not 
at all obvious that India, Pakistan and Bangladesh would be interested in cross border infrastructure build operations as 
‗‘they hate each other.‘ 
835 "Speech by  Sadakazu Tanigaki  -  Minister of Finance of Japan", (paper presented at the ADB Annual Meeting, 
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singled  out  the  East West  Corridor  Project,  an  ADB  project  which  skirts  around  China 
(discussed later). 
 
Intriguingly, China has also publicly supported the RCI. At the 2005 AGM, China‘s Finance 
Minister Jin Renqing spent a good paragraph defending the ADB‘s mandate in the area of 
regional cooperation, and praising regional effort in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) 
and  with  the  Central  Asian  Regional  Economic  Cooperation  (CAREC).
839 As one ADB 
official noted, China‘s support for the regional strategy comes from the belief that regional 
operations  on  its  periphery  will  benefit  China.
840 Firstly,  these  projects  benefit  China 
economically by facilitating trade between China and its neighbours. Also, because China‘s 
allotted assess to loans for purely national develop is sufficiently large, China is under less 
pressure to use regional allotments as a supplement for strictly national development.
841  
Secondly, China feels that the RCI has political benefits as well, not only putting China at 
the  centre  of  the  region‘s  economic  development  but  building  better  informal  policy 
networks  between  China  and  its  neighbours.  Ultimately  however,  it  was  Japanese 
persistence in the face of US opposition which won over the Board, with China playing a 
negligibly small role in this formal decision making.
842 
 
7.4.3  ADB’s role in Japan’s push for an Asian Currency Unit 
Japan‘s  push  towards  regionalism  in  the  ADB  has  taken  the  Bank  into  some  unusual 
territory, such as the creation of a regional currency.  In 2002, the Asian Development Bank 
Economics and Research Department (ADB-ERD) produced a working paper calling for the 
ADB to promote an ACU (Asian Currency Unit) formed along the essentially same lines as 
a paper that Kuroda and Kawai had published earlier at the MOF.
843 In 2004, Kuroda had 
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842 Author's Confidential Interview with ADB Official, November 2008. Tokyo. 
843  The paper called for the ACU to function as  a unit of account, invoicing and as reserve currency,  and to be freely 
converted into other currencies, and to be served by an Asian Reserve Bank, broadly in line with Shiokawa‘s proposal to 
ASEM. See, Ramgopal Agarwala, "Regional Cooperation in Asia: Long Term Progress, Recent Retrogression and the 
Way Forward," in Economics and Research Department Working Paper Series no. 28 (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 
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commissioned by any government (such as Japan) but came from within the ADB itself. Although it seems clear that 
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given  a  speech  to  the  ADB‘s  Board  of  Governors  about  the  merits  of  the  ACU  as  an 
academic.
844 Unsurprisingly therefore, Kuroda was quick to endorse the ACU project from 
the bully pulpit of the ADB‘s presidency, explaining how he expected the ACU would come 
into  existence.
845 After  Kuroda‘s  accession,  the  ADB  almost  immediately  commenced 
research about the utility of an ACU. Shortly thereafter, the ADB also became involved in 
the APT research group examining the same topic.    
 
In February 2006, President Kuroda announced that the ACU would be unveiled at the 
upcoming Finance Minister‘s meeting in April. Data for the ACU would go up on the ADB 
website, including details about its current strength and composition. While Kuroda had 
made clear that the ACU was to be composed of a basket of the APT currencies, the actual 
weights  had  not  yet  been  made  public.
846 In the event, the ACU was not posted as 
announced, nor has it been announced since. The reason was to do with weights of the 
currencies, in particular the weights of the yen and RMB.  
 
Deciding the relative weights of the currencies in the ACU was always going to be difficult. 
In this case the Office of Regional Economic Integration under Kawai undertook a study to 
look at the issue of the ACU. Using a technical me thod, the exact weights arrived at was 
yen at 36.9% and RMB at 19.51%.
847 However, these technical weights were seen by 
China  as  unacceptable,  as  the  RMB  was  weighted  too  low  versus  the  yen  in  their 
estimation.  As such, the research group was told by Chines e representatives not to go 
ahead and unilaterally post this ACU on the webpage. As the Senior Economist at OREI , 
Giovanni Capannelli said, "It seems like there are many more sensitivities than we thought 
with regard to the definition of weights."
848 
 
At the same time, the ACU idea was proving divisive among the ADB board members. 
President Kuroda‘s promotion of an ACU was viewed darkly by the United States. Not only 
did it smack of a Japanese scheme to ease out the dollar in the region, but as far as the US 
is concerned the ADB, as regional development bank, should not be engaged in these 
kinds of monetary matters.
849  In addition, India also opposed on the basis that an Asian 
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Currency  Unit  should  include  India,  rather  than  be  an  exclusively  East  Asian  affair.
 850 
Facing such difficulties in the ADB, the ACU project was transferred back to the APT for 
further  study.
851 However,  the  ACU  still  remains  on  the  ADB‘s  agenda.  In  May,  2009 
General Manager Rajet Nag said at the ―One of our long-standing issues on the table is 
establishing an Asian Currency Unit.‖
852 
 
There is little doubt that this move towards a regionalist agenda at the ADB is being driven 
by Japan. However, there are two reasons why this ought not to be considered a response 
to China, at least not in a realist manner. Firstly, Japan is interested in seeing its influence 
being extended via a regionalist push at the ADB, but from a zero sum perspective it is the 
US rather than China which stands to lose from this. Not surprisingly, it is the US which is 
most opposed to the RCI at the Board.
853 China and Japan have apparently worked (and 
voted) together against the US in pushing the RCI through and China too expects to benefit 
from the regional strategy.
854 Secondly, it is unclear how far Japan actually wished to ta ke 
the regional strategy, and how much due to the surprisingly determined person of President 
Kuroda.
 855 Kuroda, together with Kawai, are responsible for re-engineering the ADB along 
lines of thought developed in the Japanese Ministry of Finance after the Asian Financial 
Crisis.  Kuroda‘s  ideas,  even  if  they  correlate  closely  with  Japanese  policy-makers‘  and 
imply a concern about China‘s rise, are not GOJ policy and are devoid of the meaning of a 
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balancing strategy (or any strategy) on behalf of Japan at the  ADB. To the extent that 
Kuroda‘s personality is a factor, it is a reflection of the importance of social constructivist 
variables in international politics. 
 
7.5  Resources: Japan’s Policy Towards ADB operations in China  
 
Compared to scope, Japan and China have competed more vigorously over distribution of 
the ADB resources. In the area of ADB development loans to China from the Ordinary 
Capital Reserve (OCR), Japan has sought to bring the ADB practices in line with its own 
national objectives – a process which China has had to agree to. In the area of Technical 
Assistance (TA), Japan has attempted to do the same. However, China has found ways to 
still access TA via the RCI, and is starting to contribute resources of its own in order to 
shape ADB operations.  
 
At the same time, the continuing significance of the ADB to China‘s overall development is 
in question. ADB loans representing merely 0.15% of total fixed assets investment to the 
Chinese economy.
856 China‘s economic rise means that it is now able to finance more and 
more of its own development, and hence the ADB‘s primary tool - development loans - is 
now increasingly irrelevant to China‘s overall economic development.
857 However, this does 
not reflect any desire by China to ‗graduate‘ from the ADB‘s assistance. Quite the opposite 
in fact, China‘s access to the ADB‘s OCR loans has increased even as Japan ODA dries up, 
see Figure 14 below. Another way of interpreting this graph is that Japan has allowed this 
greater access by China to the OCR to offset its declining bilateral flows.  
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Figure 14 Comparison of Japanese ODA and ADB loans to China 
 
Source: OECD-DAC and the ADB Annual Report, various years. 
 
7.5.1  ADB OCR and Japanese ODA in China  
When China  joined  the  ADB  in  1986,  its  largest  source  of  ODA  was  Japan.  This  was 
mirrored  by  the  fact  that  Japan‘s  largest  ODA  destination  was  China.
858 Unsurprisingly, 
China‘s access to the ADB‘s OCR expanded quickly; doubling annually until 1989. The 
Tiananmen Square crisis triggered a suspension of Japanese ODA and at the same time 
steep cuts in the ADB‘s activities. At the 1990 New Delhi meeting of the ADB, both Japan 
and the US agreed to continue to block the resumption of ADB activities in China.
859 But 
Japan was interested in a swift return to normal operations, and then Finance Minister 
(later Prime Minister) Hashimoto Ryūtarō pushed for an early resumption of multilateral aid, 
especially through the ADB.
860 Japan‘s bilateral ODA to China resumed in 1992, before that 
of  the  Western  countries.  Shortly  thereafter,  the  ADB  declared  that  it  too  would 
recommence its activities. In 1992 China received nearly half a billion from the ADB‘s OCR 
coffers, and over next several years attracted one billion annually – wiping out any losses 
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due to the earlier suspension.  
 
However,  the  Tiananmen  Square  incident  had  affected  Japanese  ODA  policy.  In  1992, 
Japan produced an ODA Charter which, although it contained escape clauses, would allow 
Japan to invoke sanctions in the future under a wider range of conditions.  While at the 
ADB, Japan‘s concerns were also reflected in the Medium Term Strategic Framework of 
1994, which highlighted environmental and social loaning (committing itself to increasing 
loans to these sectors from 30% to 40%).
861 
 
While there was a high correlation between Japanese bilateral ODA and ADB activities  in 
the early period, differences grew during the nineties. In 1995, Chinese nuclear testing 
caused  another  suspension  of  Japanese  ODA,  based  on  the  provisions  of  the 
aforementioned Charter. Popular support for ODA to China started to fall, and according to 
one poll 90% of Japanese felt that suspension was either appropriate or too lenient.
862 
While in the end, only a symbolic amount of US$75m was suspended, the Lop Nor nuclear 
weapons test crisis in 1995 shocked Japan into the realization that aid diplomacy would not 
be effective.
863 This crisis, together with ongoing tension s across the Taiwan Strait, the 
South China Sea and the East China sea (disputes over the Senkaku islands would cause 
another suspension in 2000) pushed Japan to reconsi der how aid was given. Japanese 
bilateral ODA begun to shift to environmental and social sectors away from heavy industry 
linked projects like in the transport and energy sectors, as Figure 15 overleaf shows.  
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Figure 15 Japan ODA to China by Sector 
 
Source: Japan Bank for International Cooperation 
 
7.5.2  ADB’s OCR sectoral adjustments and Japanese ODA 
These moves were reflected in the ADB. But even as Japan was reconsidering how to 
manage its bilateral aid, China‘s appetite for ADB‘s development loans continued to expand. 
China‘s borrowing more than doubling from almost $600 million in 1997 to $1500 million in 
2008. In relative terms, China‘s percentage share of OCR loans has also increased; going 
from under 10% to around 25% of total OCR lending. Thus China is both receiving both 
more compared to previously and more compared to others. This would suggest that China 
had become a top priority for the ADB.  
 
The ADB OCR operations reflect these trends in Japan‘s ODA to China. In particular, ADB 
loans to the social sector rose over the 1990s and remained high into the 2000s. However, 
in 2003, ADB lending from the OCR to the social sector in China abruptly ended. This was 
due to protest from the PRC, which was unhappy with loans for poverty reduction to the 
social sector attracting the higher OCR rates (compared to the concessional rates at either 
Asian Development Fund (ADF) or other grants) – to the Chinese, that money could be 
better used elsewhere.
864 This can be seen in China‘s Country Partnership Strategy (CPS). 
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The CPS is a document in which the ADB make clear its intentions for each country, much 
as  the  Medium  Term  Strategy  does  in  general.  In  the  PRC‘s  2006-8  CPS,  ‗social 
infrastructure‘ appears as a loan receiving sector – attracting nearly 15% of the total and 
expanding to over 20% by 2008.
865 
 
The ‗social infrastructure‘ sector allays Japanese concerns that the ADB is propping up 
China‘s military modernization, and focuses on economic development in rural areas by 
covering such diverse activities as water supply, waste material treatment, rural transport 
and communication. It also suited the Japanese business community, which was feeling the 
squeeze from Chinese producers.
866 Certainly, China‘s interest continues to be in engaging 
the  ADB  to  assist  infrastructure  development,  under  whatever  category,  for  as  long  as 
possible. At the 2007 Board of Governors meeting, the Chinese Minister of Finance called 
on the ADB to retain its focus on infrastructure development, and to reduce borrowing costs 
for social sector development.
867 There have also been meetings at the highest level, with 
the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao meeting with ADB President Kuroda in January of 2007, 




What we can see therefore in the ADB‘s loans activities to China is a re-negotiation of the 
development agenda. While China under Deng had realized the necessity of addressing 
regional inequality, it only became a part of the Chinese development strategy in the ADB 
after the 11
th five year plan in 2006-2010. However, the Japanese decision to shift the 
geographical focus of their ODA towards the central provinces was not based on China‘s 
preferences but rather due to Japan‘s domestic political considerations driven by growing 
threat assessment of China‘s rise – especially in the military field.
869 Thus the ADB‘s move 
towards  focusing  on  the  Western  provinces  is  driven  by  both  China  and  Japan.  The 
introduction of the ‗social infrastructure‘ sector can be seen as the ADB‘s attempt to realize 
this common interest in the two parties. The ADB was therefore instrumental in getting the 
                                                                                                                                                     
2004). 
865 "People's Republic of China Country Strategy and Program Update 2006 -8,"  (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 
2005)., "People's Republic of China Country Strategy and Program Update 2007-8,"  (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 
2006). 
866  By 1999 China was insisting that it provide the majority (70%) of the contracts for its development, this competition 
for contracts limited further Japanese business interests in ODA. See, Stuart Harris and Greg Austin, Japan and Greater 
China: Political Economy and Military Power in the Asian Century (London: Hurst and Company, 2001). p. 159 
867 Renqing Jin, "Address by the People's Republic of China Governor of the Asian Development Bank" (paper 
presented at the Asian Development Bank Annual Meeting, Kyoto, Japan, 6-7 May 2007). 
868 "China Factsheet 2007," Asian Development Bank, http://www.adb.org/Documents/Fact_Sheets/PRC.pdf.2007, July 
869 Reinhard Drifte, "The Ending of Japan's ODA Loan Programme to China  - All's Well That Ends Well?," Asia Pacific 
Review 13, no. 1 (2006). 210 
 
two sides reach a common understanding. This institutional effect that the ADB can provide 
in this area is important for the health of the China-Japan relationship into the future.  
 
7.5.3  ADB’s OCR geographical and Japanese ODA 
The  ADB  has  couched  its  new  country  strategy  for  the  PRC  in  terms  of  the  Chinese 
government‘s 11
th five year plan and  the so-called ‗five-balances‘ development strategy 
espoused therein.
870 One of these balances that China has identified as needi ng to be 
struck is between the East coast and central provinces. China has also promoted to Japan 
(and others) the Western provinces as an area  requiring assistance.
871 Yet, according to 
one  ADB  official,  China‘s  real  preference  was  for  continued  support  for  industrial 
development in the East, and ADB had to apply pressure to influence the strategic priorities 




Japan is more than happy to see the central provinces receive a larger share of assistance, 
as China‘s East coast is threatening to hollow out Japanese manufacturing – at least in 
Japanese  popular  perception.  This  perception  has  precipitated  a  rise  in  Japanese 
dissatisfaction about its bilateral ODA to China; indeed Japan‘s committed bilateral ODA to 
China has been falling steadily since 2000. Due to concerns over the possible use of ODA 
to  subsidise  military  development,  Japan  has,  since  the  mid-nineties,  shifted  its  focus 
towards poverty reduction; the projects were aimed squarely at the same Western and 
central provinces which China now highlights as needing assistance. Reinhard Drifte points 
out that the PRC was not developed to the point where Japan could ‗graduate‘ China from 
the yen loans scheme, even under Japan‘s own definitions.
873 Thus, the decision to wind 
down the ODA to China, and to shift its focus to central provinces, was not based on ‗pure‘ 
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7.5.4  ADB loans to China and India and Japanese ODA 
While China‘s share of ADB loans appears to be increasing through to 2005, there are 
indications that the ADB is shifting its focus. Indeed, the CPS Update for the PRC (2006-8) 
is increasingly starting to resemble Japan‘s preferences in its ODA commitments. 
The  CSPU  has  programmed  total  loan  assistance  of  $4.5  billion  for  2006–2008 
(excluding subregional projects), amounting to annual average lending of about $1.5 
billion.  Of  this,  47.6%  is  for  transport  projects,  20.0%  for  agriculture  and  natural 
resource  projects,  14.8%  for  social  infrastructure  projects,  12.0%  for  energy  sector 
projects,  and  5.6%  for  multisectoral  projects.  About  85%  of  these  projects  will  be 
located in the central and Western provinces.
874 
In terms of absolute amounts this program will see China stabilize at about US$1.5 billion, 
arresting its upward movement. While this is not the same as an absolute decline (although 
that might depend on disbursements each year) as was seen in the bilateral setting growth 
in disbursements is dropping off. More interestingly perhaps, there is a movement away 
from  transport  sectors  towards  the  agriculture  sector  –  i.e.  direct  support  for 
industrialization is  being withheld,  instead  ‗other‘ concerns  are  on display  in  the ADB‘s 
lending to China. Together with the move away from the Eastern provinces towards Central 
and  West  provinces,  this  CSP  ties  in  with  the  ADB  and  GOJ‘s  decreasing  support  for 
industrial development.  
 
Of particular interest is the comparison with India, which is tipped to become the largest 
recipient of Japanese ODA. The ADB started to tip in favour of loaning to India in place of 
China in 2009, with India to overtake China as the largest recipient of OCR loans in 2009, 
see Figure 16. At the same time India is likely to have overtaken China as the largest 
recipient of ODA from Japan also in 2009, see Figure 17. Indian access to ADB loans over 
the same period (2006-8), is projected to increase according to its CPS update – ―from 
$2.25 billion in 2006 to $2.45 billion in 2007 to $2.65 billion in 2008.‖
 875 Moreover India 
does not have the same restriction on its development assistance ―…with infrastructure 
projects  (transport,  urban,  and  energy)  accounting  for  nearly  77%  of  the  3-year 
pipeline…The relative size of infrastructure (transport, urban, and energy) projects in the 
ADB‘s  assistance  program  was  increased  from  69%  of  the  2005–  2007  pipeline  as 
proposed in the 2004‖.
876  This indicates that Japan is moving to balance its interests in 
China with its wider strategic needs.
877 
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Figure 17 China and India's Access to the Ordinary Capital Reserves (OCR) 
 
Source: ADB Annual Report, various years. 
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Taken together the shift in the focus of the ADB is not described entirely by realism. As the 
ADB‘s relevance to China falls, the ADB focus on the West of  China will in fact help the 
Chinese Communist Party authorities to demonstrate that they have not forgotten their rural 
roots.  At  the  same  time,  it  ameliorates  suspicions  in  Japan  about  Japanese  aid 
inadvertently subsidizing Chinese militarization. 
 
7.6  Diffusion: the ADB Special Funds 
 
In addition to the OCR, the ADB also manages a series of special funds. The first of these, 
the  1968  Agricultural  Special  Fund,  was  a  means  to  further  Japanese  interests  and 
influence in the ADB.
878 This section will examine two special funds,  the Japan Special 
Fund (JSF) and the China Special Fund for Regional Cooperation  (CSF). The creation of 
these special funds reflects a move away from true multilateralism in the policy of both 
Japan and China towards the ADB in an attempt to purchase greater influence. Indeed, the 
ADB has stated that it is willing to draw additional resources from larger economies (this 
means China and Japan) in order to pursue its regionalist agenda.
879 This section will 
argue that the emergence of these two special funds and the ‗innovation‘
 880 of bilateral 
loaning  from  China  and  Japan  reflects  a  competition  between  Japan  and  China  for 
influence  in/through  the  ADB  which  will  be  ultimately  damaging  for  the  institution.  This 
section will also show that these bilateral loans, which might be considered the start of 
network  type  of  regionalism  within  the  development  agenda,  are  not  yet  a  level  that 
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highly criticised by western powers in the ADB, who felt that the stringent conditionality attached to accessing the AGF 
undermined its purpose. Ming Wan, "Japan and the Asian Development Bank," Pacific Affairs 68, no. 4 (1995). p. 4 
879 "Regional Cooperation and Intergration Strategy,"  (Asian Development  Bank, 2006). Article 94. ―Additional financial 
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880 The funding for regional projects is sourced not from the countries‘ national quota (or ―envelop‖ as it called), but 
rather  from  a  regional  ―allowance‖.  Indeed,  the  ADB  admits  that  these  nations  would  not  use  their  own  national 
allowance to buy in regional development goals. See, "Medium Term Strategy II (2006-8),"  (Manila: Asian Development 
Bank, 2006). Article 39 reads, ―the rationale for RCI is premised on significant externalities, benefits that transcend 
national borders. This requires innovative funding arrangement because the distribution of benefits and costs among the 
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7.6.1  The Japan Special Fund (JSF) 
Throughout the 1980s Japan was trying to increase its influence in the ADB. The most 
direct route was to push for a Special Capital Increase, which would allow Japan to break 
parity with the US (which was undergoing budget restrictions) and give Japan the formal 
leadership  it  felt  it  deserved.  Part  of  the  Japanese  argument  for  the  Special  Capital 
Increase was that Japan‘s contributions to the ADB‘s concessionary arm (the ADF) ought to 
be reflected in its voting weight – a move countered by the US.
881 While Japan and the US 
contributed  equally  to  the  OCR,  Japan‘s  contribution  to  other  elements  of  the  ADB  far 
outstripped that of the US. In 1987, Japan‘s contribution to the ADF was US$2billion while 
the US contributed nothing.  
 
The  alternate  view  by  which  influence  could  be  gained  is  through  additional  financial 
contributions to voluntary special funds. By 2007, Japan had contributed US$9.86 billion to 
the various voluntary funds (around a third of the total special funds).
882 Moreover, in any 
individual year, Japan gave more than half of the total contribution to these voluntary Funds 
(far outstripping the US).
883 Japan had also become involved in co-financing for the same 
reasons. Co-financing allows the ADB to supplement its loans with private and state finance. 
In 1999, US$3.2b of ADB loans came with a further $3b in co-financing, over half of which 




Japan  wished  to  ‗harmonise‘  its  voting  shares  by  including  these  contributions.  Japan 
started to send English-speaking ‗young turks‘ to the ADB and pushed harder for Japanese 
interests at the Board meetings.
885 The new assertiveness was based on Japan‘s growing 
economic dominance in region, which it wished to funnel into the ADB.
886 This included 
expanding their contribution to the ADB‘s concessional and grant aid through the creation 
of the Japan Special Fund for Poverty Reduction at the ADB. The time taken from proposal 
to Board authorization to first grant was less than one year.
887 China‘s access to the JSF 
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was immediate, China receiving $1.831 million in grant technical assistance in 1988. The 
amount disbursed to China nearly doubled to $3.3 million the following year, see Figure 18 
below. As a part of Japan‘s wider ODA diplomacy China‘s access to the JSF was always 
dependent on Japan. As such, China‘s access to the JSF therefore varied depending on 
Japan‘s policy at that time – rather than being a part of the ADB‘s institutional ambit. 
 
Figure 18 China's Access to the Japan Special Fund 
 
Source: Asian Development Bank Annual Report, various years. Compiled by the Author. 
 
For Japan, the JSF represented a path to regional influence. Japan was able to borrow the 
institutional legitimacy of the ADB even though under its charter Japan would have the 
authority to turn down any application to the JSF.  Japan could therefore pick and choose 
projects  outside  of  a  true  multilateral  selection  process.  In  fact,  the  ADB  became 
increasingly dependent of the JSF for funding grant projects, with almost half of grants 
approved  being  JSF  rather  than  the  generic  Technical  Assistance  Special  Fund.  The 
Technical Assistance Special Fund is the generic pool and is more truly ‗multilateral‘ as 
Japan does not have a formal veto, but its relevance is declining as the JSF is increasingly 
tapped for projects mainly in East Asia.  
 
7.6.2  The China Special Fund for Regional Cooperation 
Recently, China too has begun to contribute to the ADB, sending a powerful signal that 
China has become interested in the ADB. In 2005, it committed $30 million to the ADF - the 




















major donor countries and shape policy at levels previously barred to them.
888 In the same 
year, China also contributed US$20 million to set up its own special fund in the ADB  - the 
‗People‘s Republic of China Regional Cooperation and Poverty Reduction Fund.‘
889  At the 
same time, China has stepped up its bilateral aid program, which threatens to undermine 
the ADB (See Appendix 15). 
 
This special fund is used by China to extend its influence over the region. One project, the 
‗Capacity Building for Designing, Negotiating, and Implementing Free Trade Agreements in 
Selected Asian  Developing  Member  Countries‘,  financed  by  the  China  Special  Fund  in 
October 2006, is aimed at training officials in Southeast Asian countries in FTA negotiations. 
Conveniently  for  China,  FTA  negotiations  were  underway  between  it  and  its  Southeast 
Asian neighbours while this TA was in effect. And while training officials whilst negotiating 
with them on a bilateral basis would look sinister, China is able to add legitimacy by using 
the multilateral ADB channel.
890 
 
China has also become skilled in tap ping the RCI Fund (discussed in scope) usually in 
combination with  the China  Special Fund to direct the ADB t owards financing regional 
projects  that  benefit  China.  One  example  of  this  is  the  ―Facilitating  sustainable, 
environmental-friendly regional power trading in the GMS‖ project, co-financed by Region 
Cooperation  and  Integration  Fund  and  the  PRC  Special  Fund.  The  purpose  of  this 
cooperative US$2 million dollar project is ―developing the hydropower plants for exporting 
power to Yunan province or other potential hydropower sources for inclusion in the power 
trade.‖
891 This project clearly benefits China both politically and economically, and is a mark 




The Mekong subregion has also seen the most obvious case of Sino -Japanese rivalry in 
the ADB‘s funding for the North-South and East-West economic corridors project. Japan 
has  been  supporting  the  East-West  corridor,  a  road  which  connects  Eastern  coastal 
Vietnam  to  the  West  coast  of  Myanmar  and  is  expected  to  improve  Japanese  market 
                                                   
888 In 2008 China again contributed $35 million to the ADF.  
889 To be used initially within a four year window, for details see  "Board Paper: People‘s Republic of China Regional 
Cooperation and Poverty Reduction Fund,"  (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2005). See Article 19. 
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access  to  the  GMS.    Financing  for  the  East-West  corridor  has  come  from  Japanese 
bilateral  ODA  sources  (the  Japan  Bank  for  International  Cooperation  and  Japan 
International Cooperation Agency) together with the Japan Special Fund at the ADB. At the 
same time, China has promoted the North-South corridor, providing the funds and workers 
to  complete  a  road  from  Kunming  in  South  China  through  Thailand  and  Myanmar  to 
Singapore.
893  In addition to the considerable investment that the ADB has made to the 
various countries of the GMS sub-region in the pursuit of this project, China also  used its 
Special Fund within the ADB to guide certain sections of the larger project.
894 But despite 
the fact  that the East-West and North-South Corridor  projects literally intersected, there 
was little policy coordination between China and Japan.
895  
 
The emergence of the China Special Fund, and the A DB‘s  innovation  of  using  these 
‗multilateral appearing/bilateral provided‘ funds for regional projects is a major institutional 
change and a reflection of China‘s rise. Japan‘s response of cutting the JSF funding to 
China and limiting coordination even as Japan steps up its involvement in the GMS is 
reflective of a realist logic.
896 For the ADB as an institution, this outcome bodes poorly. By 
permitting these bilaterally funded projects to carry the ADB name, the institution risks  its 
reputation.
897 An international institution‘s raison d’être lies in promoting cooperation, and 
allowing China and Japan to go their separate ways within the institution is reflective of 
weakness.    From  a  realist  perspective  this  weakness  is  due  to  a  lack  of  a  regional 
hegemony. That said, the amounts in the JSF and its Chinese equivalent are still small 
compared to the ADB‘s overall profile. But more than simply a lack of power concentration, 
this outcome is due to the institutional history of the ADB. Ironically, it was Japan which first 
defaulted from the ADB by establishing the JSF in 1998 to boost its influence versus the US, 
a  precedent  which  subsequently  allowed  the  PRC  to  create  its  own  fund  to  boost  its 
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7.7  Rules 
 
This next section addresses changes in the ADB‘s rules. I will show that China, despite 
slipping in formal voting weight, has increased its informal influence. Japan has accepted 
this subtle, informal shift in institutional power and is not feeling threatened by China in the 
ADB, or at least not enough to act on.  
  
7.7.1  Voting Weight 
The first area to be examined is voting weight. When the ADB was founded in 1966, Japan 
held 17.12% of total voting weight, and the PRC was not represented. Japan‘s share fell to 
12.5%  after  the  PRC  joined  in  1986.  Upon  accession,  China  received  114,000  shares 
valued at US$1.3 billion and thus garnered 6.1% of the voting share, or roughly half of 
Japan‘s share. This allowed China to appoint its own director, giving it an immediate say of 
the day to day operation of the Bank. Not all were happy with this outcome and there were 
some fears that small countries would lose out on representation to China.
898  
  
Some twenty years later, in 2006, China‘s voting power had fallen to 5.4% despite its rising 
economic  power.  Inversely,  Japan,  despite  its  economic  malaise,  has  been  able  to 
marginally increase its stock share to 12.8%.
899 This has meant that despite China‘s rising 
power (especially relative to Japan) this story is played in reverse inside the ADB. China‘s 
actual voting power in the ADB had fallen 15% vis-à-vis Japan, albeit from an admittedly 
low base.
900 Nevertheless, China has retained its position as  the third largest holder of 
shares after Japan and the United States, with India coming a close fourth.
901  
 
In May 2009, there was an additional General Capital Increase to help the ADB fund its 
response to the World Financial Crisis. While it was possible that voting weight might again 
be adjusted, this has not occurred .
902 Neither China nor Japan have sought to increase 
their voting weight to formally take greater control of the Bank. This is in part because there 
are more cost effective informal means to achieve the same result. 
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Organizations of the Asia-Pacific (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,2003). p. 26 
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7.7.2  Informal Influence 
Both  Japan  and  China  have  sought  to  increase  their  influence  informally.  China,  in 
particular, has gained a greater voice in decision making by making a donation to the ADF, 
allowing it to sit in on meetings with the major donors. China‘s Establishment of a Regional 
Cooperation Special Fund (discussed in resources) has also allowed it to also shape the 
direction of the ADB, in a similar (if lesser) manner to the Japan Special Fund. 
 
China has also benefited from being moved into essentially its own department. The March 
2005  realignment  of  regional  departments  means  PRC  now  shares  71  staffers  with 
Mongolia - yet Mongolia borrows only a fraction of what China does (for example, in 2005 
Mongolia received 0.01% of total ADB loans and TA, compared to China‘s 25%). The head 
of ADB‘s Regional Office in China, Jeffery Liang, noted that China and Mongolia sharing a 




The establishment of the Beijing Regional Office has also been quite useful to China. This 
Office was established to help with the day to day administration of the ADB operations in 
China  and  facilitate  better people-to-people linkages. The Office has also allowed the 
Chinese government side (usually the Finance Ministry) to become involved  in the earlier 
‗design stage‘ of China‘s country strategy.
904 It is evident that China can, and intends to, 
use  this  office  to  gain  control  over  development  assistance  allocation  decision-making 
process within the ADB.
905  Likewise, in 2008 Japan established its own representative in 
Tokyo  to  better  coordinate  its  policy  to  the  ADB.  Japan‘s  new  regional  office  was 
established across the hall from the ADBI on the eighth floor of the Kasumigaseki building 
near the Ministry of Finance.    
 
In  addition  to  being  a  source  of  national  pride,  having  one‘s  citizens  well  placed  in 
multilateral institutions is a possible (third) source of influence, or at least prestige. This is 
generally  denied  by  the  institutions  themselves  due  to  legal  (and  largely  theoretical) 
imperatives. However, both officials working in the ADB and the academics involved with 
the Bank all believe that nationality is not somehow ‗left at the door.‘
906 One scholar who 
has examined the ADB at length has noted how Japan has gained influence though the 
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904 The ADB admin budget pays for the RO. But a portion of that is paid by PRC. Ibid. 
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shadow posting of its Ministry of Finance (MOF) officials to the Bank.
907 Considering that 
these officials know that they will return to the MOF, they are unlikely to advocate any policy 
which radically challenges dogma in their home institutions. 
 
It is also apparent that some ADB staffers continue to identify with their home nation even 
after beginning work at the ADB. One MOF official at the ADB (director) stated commented 
on this link stating, ―I did not consider the ADB appointment as any kind of great honour. I 
considered it as my fourth division director (kachō) in the International Finance Bureau‘s 
Manila branch.‖
908 According the 2007 Annual Report, Japanese nationals held 119 (14%) 
of a total of 856 professional positions, while Chinese nationals number 52 (6%).
909  
 
Data from previous years is not yet available but there are indications that the number of 
positions held by Chinese nationals is increasing. Part of this is due to the Chinese Ministry 
of Finance pushing its nationals forward.
910 Most prominent is China‘s former vice-minister 
for Finance (and former Ministry of Finance official), Jin Liqun, who was appointed to the 
position  of  Vice-President  in  2003.  However,  Japan  still  retains  key  positions  in 
management. The President continues to be a Japanese national in deference to tradition 




One former Japanese official at the ADB noted that that the Chinese are pushing for more 
‗earmarked‘  professional  posts  for  their  nationals,  and  that  sometimes  horse  trading 
Japanese over a post occurs.
912 There is some evidence too that India is becoming more 
vocal, demanding at the 2006 Board of Governors a Vice-President position, but settling for 
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a Canadian Indian (Rajat Nag) as the Managing Director. There are fears that China will 
also demand the same or similar treatment. 
 
7.7.3  The Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI) 
Another area where the Japan has sought informal influence over the agenda is in the 
establishment of the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI). Proposed by Japan in 1995, 
the ADBI was established only in 1998.
913 It is funded through the ADBI Special Fund, in 
turn a grant from the Government of Japan.
 914 Despite its source of funding, its Tokyo 
location and the current Dean‘s nationality  –  the ADBI is presented as ‗not Japanese‘. 
However, the purpose of the ADBI is clearly to boost Japan‘s leadership credentials.  
 
Japan benefits in an informal manner by drawing to Tokyo DMC officials for training and 
research seminars. Recently, the ADBI has been making efforts to attract Chinese officials. 
Apart from these networks, the ADBI‘s research platform has acted as means for Japan to 
express its policy preferences and potentially impact on policy decisions throughout the 
region.
915  One  example  of  this  influence  o n  regional  policy  is  the  Emerging  Asian 
Regionalism Report (2008) which was funded and directed by the ADBI.
916 Interestingly, 
one participate has stated that the conclusion was already decided at the initial meeting.
917 
The ADBI has reportedly picked up the research agenda of other Japanese research 




Taken together though, Japan‘s influence both formal and informal over the ADB has hardly 
been significantly eroded by China‘s rise. Indeed, the incongruous fall of China‘s formal 
control relative to Japan has put hard limits on the effectiveness of China‘s growing informal 
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influence. In fact, China is not interested in challenging Japan for leadership in the ADB. 
China‘s chief interest remains extracting resources from the Bank rather than contributing 
more in a bid to lead it. Because China both lacks the means and the intent to challenge for 
leadership, Japan has not felt any need to respond actively. Rather, China has shown itself 
willing to obey the rules of the ADB, rules which favour Japan, in order to gain the benefits 
of membership. 
 
7.8  Conclusion: Power, Institutions and Regionalism. 
 
Japan‘s response to the rise of China in the ADB has been mixed, and no one theory of 
international relations quite does justice to its complexity. The most significant development 
in recent years at the Bank has been the emergence of the RCI strategy and its associated 
emphasis on regional cooperation. For Japan, the RCI represents a means of increasing its 
presence and influence in Asia, an interest which has only grown as China‘s influence and 
aid diplomacy expands. Unsurprisingly, Japan has been anxious about coordinating with 
China  at  a  strategic  level,  even  though  both  powers  are  deeply  involved  and  vocally 
supportive of the RCI.  
 
While  realism  might  not  have  predicted  competition  over  regionalism,  it  is  correct  in 
identifying competition in the relationship between Japan and China at the ADB. Indeed, as 
Japan‘s primary interest in the PRC‘s participation was based on a realist, political calculus, 
it should be no surprise that political factors would colour its assessment of the role of 
China today. Japan‘s growing concern about Chinese national power, in particular the rapid 
pace of militarization, has driven a reassessment of Japan‘s aid diplomacy. Here, the ADB 
has served as a foil to Japan‘s ODA policy in China. As China‘s access to Japanese ODA 
declined over the late 1990s and 2000s, so ADB‘s policy towards China has also shifted. 
While  the  net  amount  has  remained  constant,  or  even  grown,  in  recent  years,  the 
geographical and sectoral distribution has changed to be in line with Japanese preferences 
(away from areas with potential military links). This political use of the ADB is even clearer 
in the Japan Special Fund, which would be switched off and on depending on Chinese 
behaviour – and which is now seemingly permanently in the off position.   
 
Likewise, the emergence of the China Special Fund, in part modelled and a response to the 
Japan Special Fund, reflects the rise of China as a challenge to Japan. Indeed, the use of 
the  China  Special  Fund  and  Japan  Special  Fund  to  funnel  Technical  Assistance  into 
regional  projects, especially in light of the lack of policy coordination between  the two, 
suggests a competition for influence in the GMS in particular. With Japan and China both 
willing to undermine the Bank‘s reputation and authority in a struggle for influence, realists 223 
 
would suggest that the institution will suffer. This outcome is very much in line with realist 
thinking  and  the  relevance  of  material  power  to  creating  and  sustaining  international 
institutions.  The  increased  use  of  bilateral  funds  to  guide  the  ADB‘s  operations  into 
countries/areas in which Japan or China has an interest also suggests that the ADB is at 
risk. While the institution is unlikely to devolve wholly into a network, some network-like 
effects are occurring. 
 
Yet  this  line  of  thinking  over-states  the  role  and  significance  of  balance  of  power  type 
factors in determining actual institutional outcomes. In examining the rules of the ADB, it is 
apparent  that  the  institutional  features  of  the  Bank  itself  are  at  play  as  an  intervening 
variable in determining institutional outcomes of the rise of China. China‘s rising power in 
the region and versus Japan was not matched by a comparable rise in formal influence at 
the ADB – China‘s voting weight even slipping slightly. Japan‘s position of privilege in the 
Bank has therefore been effectively locked-in despite rising Chinese influence within the 
region. The ADB has also functioned to depoliticize the ending of Japan‘s bilateral aid to 
China.  As  seen  in  the  resources  section,  the  ADB  was  able  to  find  a  reasonable 
compromise solution between China and Japan on the levels and sorts of access China 
might receive by emphasizing less political sensitive sectors, thus reaffirming the relevance 
and value of the ADB to both countries.  
 
While  Japan‘s  support  for  the  regionalist  strategy  can  be  understood  as  motivated  by 
concerns about its influence in Asia under threat from the rise of China, this is to miss out 
the important role that East Asia‘s nascent regional identity plays in shaping the institutional 
outcomes. While both the Japan and China Special Funds are clearly manifestations of 
national self interest, their focus on regional cooperation is hardly accidental. To wit, Sino-
Japanese competition for influence need not have taken the form of funding for regional 
cooperation but could have equally occurred on country-by-country basis.  In explaining this 
outcome it is necessary to appreciate the desire of some in Asia, but particularly in Japan, 
to be more independent of American power after the 1997 financial crisis. And indeed, the 
personality  of  the  ADB  President,  and  his  ideas  about  regionalism,  proves  to  be  a 
surprisingly important factor in explaining the move towards a regionalist strategy at the 
ADB.  The  constructivists‘  favoured  intellectual  framework  of  the  ‗us-them‘  dichotomy  is 
therefore not dividing Japan from China in the ADB so much as ‗Asia‘ from ‗the West‘.  
 
Under this constructivist ideational framework both Japan and China perceive that they 
might  displace  the  US  to  increase  their  own  influence  in  the  region.  The  most  potent 
example of this was the spectacle of China and Japan calling together for a greater role for 
the  ADB  in  the  face  of  the  Global  Financial  Crisis.  Japan  and  China  have  therefore 224 
 
cooperated with each other in promoting the ADB as a site of East Asian regionalism. 
Japan and China have vocally supported at annual meetings regionalist activities promoted 
by  the  ADB




In conclusion, despite the seemingly technocratic arena of economic development, the 
realists are half-right. Japan and China are competing for influence in  East Asia, and the 
ADB is not except as a field of play. However, it is incorrect to conclude simpl y that this 
competition has resulted in damage to the ADB as an institution. Rather, as per liberal 
understandings, the ADB has been strong enough institutionally to resolve some issues 
related to aid in the Sino-Japanese relationship. Thus, contrary to realist expectations, the 
direction of causality goes from the ADB to the bilateral relationship as well. Part of this 
might be explained as the ADB having effectively  slowed the speed of power transition 
between Japan and China in the ADB allowing greater levels of cooperation. But in fact 
there is something more fundamental at work. It is clear that there is a growing demand for 
regional common goods, and the beginnings of shared vision of the (East) Asian future. 
These ideational forces are pulling the ADB towards playing a bigger role in regionalism, 
regardless of the actual merit of such plans.  China‘s rise has not prompted Japan to defect 
from  the  institution,  and  the  bilaterally-networked  regionalism  effects  on  institutional 
development seen in previous case studies are thus not on display to the same extent in 
the ADB. In short, Japan‘s response to the rise of China in the ADB cannot be totally 
explained  by  a  form  of  realism  as  significant  cooperation  exists  parallel  to  a  level  of 
competition.   
 
   
                                                   
919 Sadakazu Tanigaki, "Address by Japan's Governor of the Asian Development Bank" (paper presented at the Asian 
Development Bank Annual Meeting, Hydrabad, India, 4-6 May 2006). Also see, Anthony Rowley, "ADB Divided over 
Future Direction," Business Times Singapore, 8 May 2006. 
920 It is perhaps no surprise that the US has voiced its concern over ‗mission creep‘ in the ADB, as an alignment of 
interests between China and Japan about a more exclusive regionalism would only undermine the US‘s influence. Rick 
Carew,  "Friction  over  Adb's  Role  ---  East Asian  Members  Use  Lender  to Foster  Financial  Integration,"  Wall Street 
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8  Conclusion 
 
This dissertation set out to establish why East Asian regional institutions proliferated even 
under the conditions of a Sino-Japanese rivalry. In particular, it examined the effects of the 
rise of China on Japan‘s regional policy and its outcomes. It adopted an eclectic approach 
to test each of the main international relations theories against the story of Sino-Japanese 
relations within the studied regional institutions of East Asia.  
 
This thesis has shown that no one international relations theory was able to satisfactorily 
capture the complexities of Japan‘s policy towards East Asian regionalism. Specifically, it 
demonstrated that no one theory could satisfactorily explain how Japan‘s response to the 
rise of China would impact on the development of East Asian regional institutions. Instead, 
this thesis confirmed the importance and utility of Analytical Eclecticism as an approach. It 
demonstrated the importance and utility of the eclectic approach by empirically examining 
the institutional changes within four case studies, and tracing the link to Japanese policy 
and the rise of China. As realism was only ever half-right in explaining actual institutional 
outcomes,  it  was  important  and  necessary  to  bring  in  variables  favoured  by  other 
international relations theories. This eclectic approach was more sensitive to the unique 
characteristics of each case and was able to explain why Japan‘s response to the rise of 
China was responsible for different institutional outcomes across the case studies.  
 
This thesis also found that across all the case studies, the weakness of the Sino-Japanese 
relationship was a crucial explanatory variable in understanding the development of East 
Asian regional institutions. Japan‘s attempts to lock-in its influence by institutionalizing rules 
that  favour  it  have  sometimes  succeeded  and  sometimes  failed  but  in  either  case  the 
motivation  was  generally  to  be  found  in  Japanese  anxieties  about  China.  While  this 
dynamic has no doubt pushed forward regional institutions, it is also responsible, at least in 
part, for a certain kind of institutionalization built up from a network of bilateral relations.  
 
The Case Studies 
 
The link between the rise of China, Japan‘s response and the emergence of a bilaterally- 
networked regionalism was first explained in Chapter Four. This thesis demonstrated that 
Japan‘s  attempts  at  leadership  in  the  field  of  trade  regionalism  were  linked  closely  to 
China‘s rise; whether directly as a response to Chinese proposals to ASEAN or indirectly 
due to a perceived need to protect the Japanese manufacturing network from becoming 
overly dependent on China. In either case, Japan‘s decisions can be seen as following a 
form of realist logic. The effects of a regional power transition explain why the institutions of 226 
 
regional  trade  have  remained  weak;  Japan  avoiding  an  FTA  with  China  and  instead 
championing the sixteen-party EAFTA. 
  
Nevertheless, factors other than those favoured by realism are necessary to explain some 
important  idiosyncrasies  of  Japan‘s  FTA  policy.  Firstly,  Japan‘s  unique  set  of  domestic 
political  conditions,  such  as  the  role  of  the  agricultural  lobby  and  big  business,  have 
impacted  on  Japan‘s  FTA  strategy  and  subsequently  on  the  wider  EAFTA  agenda. 
Moreover, this thesis has found qua liberalism that these trade agreements acquire a life of 
their  own.  This  locked-in  expectations  and  created  a  certain  level  of  path  dependency 
which limited the effects of simple power factors and explained why Japan‘s policy might 
favour the creation of a bilaterally-network trade regionalism. Secondly, while Japan may 
be more afraid of relative losses than absolute gains arising from an FTA deal with China, 
this has less to do with rising power per se than with perceptions of that power as explained 
by social constructivism. Even as China grows to become Japan‘s largest export market, 
this shift is hardly translating into a deeper shared identity. Instead, popular polling shows 
the Japanese are more negative towards China than ever, and in the context of a trade 
deal, worried about the safety of Chinese produced goods. Such a perception gap limits 
Japan‘s ability to cooperate with China in the furtherance of regional free trade, and creates 
an image (self-fulfilling) of competition between Japan and China. 
 
Chapter  Five  discussed  financial  regionalism.  Here  we  found  that  Japan‘s  attempts  at 
leadership are able to be linked to  the rise of China and  the emergence of bilaterally-
networked regionalism.  While Japan no doubt aims to increase its influence in the region 
by leading with financial cooperation, Japan did not aim at displacing China‘s still modest 
role in this arena. The outcome of negotiations with China at the Chiang Mai Initiatives is 
broadly  in  keeping  with  realist  expectations.  Yet  the  stalling  of  an  agreement  over 
contributions to CMI is reflective of the problem of a zero-sum type negotiation when the 
question of regional leadership and hierarchy remains unsettled. As predicted by realism, 
the  CMI  is  a  story  of  China  dragging  down  Japanese  efforts  to  institutionalize  Japan‘s 
position and influence in the region and the inability of these two to cooperate leading to a 
bilaterally-networked solution for regional financial cooperation. 
  
But this picture is incomplete. The fact that China and Japan were able to sit down with 
their neighbours and create even this modest network of bilateral swaps is evidence of the 
causative nature of deepening regional interdependence in a manner described by liberals. 
While this interdependence does not extend to China and Japan, as each is amply able to 
fight off a speculative attack on their respective currencies, both Japan and China share an 
interest in trying to head off such events in the future, or at least to be better positioned to 227 
 
negotiate  with  the  IMF  on  behalf  of  Asia  about  the  conditions  of  a  bail-out.  From  a 
constructivist point of view, the parallel story of internationalization of the yen, the RMB and 
a future regional common currency captures the dynamics of an emerging regional identity. 
From  both  these  perspectives,  the  CMI  should  be  explained  with  reference  to  growing 
interdependence in East Asia and the emergence of regional (rather than national) ‗us/them‘ 
dichotomy. The CMI, while limited by factors identified by realism, is in fact being driven 
more by factors identified by liberalism and social constructivism. 
 
As discussed in Chapter Six, the ASEAN Regional Forum, this thesis has established that 
Japanese efforts to create a Confidence Building Measures regime at the ARF can be 
linked to China‘s rise. Japan has repeatedly called for greater transparency from China in 
its military spending, and has proposed at the ARF a series of CBMs which aim to limit the 
freedom of China‘s military. However, Japan has been unable to progress the preventive 
diplomacy and conflict resolution agenda at the ARF over Chinese objections. At the same 
time, China has used the ARF to call into question Japan‘s role in regional security by 
criticizing the US alliance and blocking Japanese participation in sub-groups, such as those 
focussed on the South China Sea. Thus, China‘s rise in the region had allowed it to seize 
control of the institution. 
 
Yet  power  variables  alone  are  insufficient  in  explaining  Japan‘s  policy  towards  regional 
security. Japan‘s initial policy towards the ARF was best described by liberalism, with its 
emphasis on self-targeting and mutual (and assumed reciprocal) reassurance. The causes 
for this change are best explained by social constructivism with its emphasis on learning 
and identity. Specifically, this thesis has shown that Japan‘s interactions with China in the 
ARF have taught Japan that cooperation with China on regional security is not possible. 
The upshot of this disappointment has been the weakening of Japanese commitment to the 
ARF, and Japan‘s attempts to build-up new security networks (both bilaterally and mini-
laterally) to manage China. 
 
Chapter Seven examined the Asian Development Bank. Here we found that the rise of 
China  has  influenced  the  manner  in  which  Japan  uses  the  ADB,  and  that  bilaterally-
networked  regionalism  was  evident  at  the  ADB,  albeit  only  mildly.  As  per  realist 
expectations, China‘s rise has caused Japan to funnel development assistance away from 
sensitive sectors in China via its influence at the ADB and encouraged Japan to target 
other regions and sectors. Realists would also identify the emergence of the China Special 
Fund and competition in the GMS sub-region via the Regional Cooperation and Integration 
strategy as a challenge to the ADB itself.  
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However, it was also found that realism overstates the impact of a changing balance of 
power on institutional outcomes by suggesting an uninterrupted, direct line from power to 
institutional development.  China‘s rise has not led to the degeneration of the ADB itself or 
undermined  Japan‘s  influence  at  the  ADB.  This  is  because,  as  liberals  suggest,  the 
institution itself plays a role as an intervening variable.  China‘s growing influence in the 
ADB has instead been limited to the informal sphere and the PRC‘s formal voting weight 
actually  falling  relative  to  Japan.  Thus  Japan‘s  position  of  leadership  in  the  Bank  has 
effectively been locked-in, and the bilateral power transition has not been played out in the 
ADB.  
 
Additionally, explaining the emergence of the ADB‘s Regional Cooperation and Integration 
agenda requires bringing in variables that the constructivists identify as important. Since 
the Asian Financial Crisis, and now with the onset of the World Financial Crisis, Japan and 
China have sought to extend their influence in and through the ADB as a foil to US power. 
President Kuroda‘s personal experience and ideas aside, the fact that China and Japan 
lined up side by side to support a greater role  and more money for the ADB over US 
objections suggests that, in the ADB at least, the identity boundary is cutting through the 
Pacific Ocean rather than the Sea of Japan. This development has meant that as opposed 
to realist expectations to the contrary, the ADB has only increased in relevance to both 
Japan  and  China  (and  regionalism  as  a  whole)  even  as  their  bilateral  relationship  has 
suffered. 
 
Discussion of Results 
 
Throughout all the regional institutions examined, one trend has emerged. Whether in trade, 
finance,  security  or  development,  East  Asian  regionalism  is  characterized  by  ‗bilateral 
networks.‘  This  networked  outcome  is  more  flexible  than  European  or  American-type 
regionalism, allowing for any dyad to calibrate their commitments as they please without 
reference to a regional standard. It is precisely the lack of common agreed rules which 
allows, and perhaps encourages, this form of cooperation. But as long as agreement on 
common rules for East Asia remains unforthcoming, this bilaterally-networked regionalism 
will not lead into more formal and deeper cooperation.  
 
If these bilateral networks can be collapsed in a larger, harmonized regional structure (as 
appears to the case in the CMI) then the significance of this finding is that it confirms liberal 
understanding about how international institutions can be developed from the ground up 
rather than hegemonically imposed from above. If, on the other hand, the bilateral networks 
are incapable to progressing to truer multilateralism (such as in the ARF and potentially the 229 
 
EAFTA), then the realist case for power and institutional development in East Asia is made. 
What  is  clear  however  is  that  progress  from  bilaterally-networked  regionalism  to  a 
regionalism based on harmonized rules and expectations will be driven by different factors 
depending on the area of cooperation. Thus in the relatively low politics area of economic 
development, the ADB has least displayed such bilaterally-networked effects even though it 
faces the same pressures from the Sino-Japanese relationship as the other cases studied. 
In  addition  to  the  theoretical  conclusion,  this  conclusion  about  the  manner  of 
institutionalization  in  East  Asia  forms  another  contribution  to  the  international  relations 
literature. 
  
Additionally, over the course of the research some other generalizations about the nature of 
East Asian institution building were discovered. Firstly, even as Japan proposes a regional 
agenda  with  an  eye  to  China,  China  responds  with  its  own  initiatives.  This  feedback 
process ensures that Japan‘s policy is always in a state of change. One effect of this is that 
Japanese policy is more ‗rushed‘ than need be, either in the preliminary stage or during 
implementation. Japan has therefore had to revisit and revise its position several times in 
each  of  the  institutions  studied  and  has  therefore  missed  opportunities  for  further 
integration. The costs of this are not borne by Japan alone but also by the region as a 
whole.  
 
Secondly, while institution creep is hardly a phenomenon unique to Asia, the institutions 
studied do share a similar kind of creep. With China and Japan gridlocked, institutions have 
had to defend their relevance in new areas where success is more likely, even if not entirely 
consistent  with  the  institutions‘  original  official  mandate.  This  has  created  a  form  of 
institution creep which leads not towards ‗deeper‘ cooperation, as spillover-type thinking 
might  suggest,  but  towards  ‗wider‘  cooperation  and  the  creation  of  new,  symbolic 
appendages of limited use in helping to resolve the major regional problems; including the 
Sino-Japanese relationship itself. 
 
Finally, the suggestion that Japan and China‘s competition for influence in the provision of 
public goods is a net benefit for East Asia can be shown to be wrong. In the field of trade, 
East Asia has had to settle with a networked arrangement which is not only difficult to use, 
but frequently simply not worth it economically. In the field of finance, the CMI has not only 
remained unactivated as of yet, but continues to define its success by remaining inactive. 
Likewise, tensions between Japan and China over the role of the US in the ARF have only 
exacerbated the major problems already facing efforts at creating a CBMs regime there. 
While at the ADB, regionalist projects (while helpful) are not the kind of help that poorest of 
the poor need. 230 
 
 
These  above  findings  imply  some  significant  challenges  to  the  current  theoretical 
understanding about East Asian regionalism.  The first of these is the potency of the link 
between the Sino-Japan bilateral relationship and multilateral relations. Whilst many have 
observed that a weak Sino-Japanese relationship was either unhelpful or detrimental for 
the development of East Asian regional institutions in a commonsense manner, this thesis 
has empirically established the effect that the Sino-Japanese relationship has. In particular, 
Japan‘s response to a rising China was seen as a key explanatory variable in causing East 
Asian  regional  institutions  to  develop  in  a  bilaterally-networked  manner.  Thus,  this 
dissertation  has  contributed  to  the  literature  by  explaining  the  mechanisms  by  which 
bilateral relationships on the one hand effects regional institutions on the other.  
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9  Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 List of Interviews by Affiliation 
Academics 
 
Informal Discussion with Peter Drysdale, ANU 
 
November 2009. 
Interview with Etsuko Katsu, Meiji Uni 
 
18th January 2010. 
Interview with R Taggart Murphy, Tsukuba Uni  
 
1th April 2009. 
Interview with Shiraishi Takeshi. Cabinet Research Office 
 
May 20 2009. 
Interview with Terada Takashi. Waseda Uni 
 
9 March 2010. 
Interview with Urata Shujiro, Waseda Uni 
 
8th February 2010. 
Interview with Yung Chul Park, Korea University, 
 
1st June 2009 
Think-tank staffers and other researchers 
 
Interview with Kim Han Sung, Korea Institute for International 
Economic Policy 
 
3rd June 2009 
Interview  with  Yoon  Deok  Rong,  Korea  Institute  for 
International Economic Policy  
 
4th June 2009. 
Interview  with  Yuzawa  Takeshi,  Japan  Institute  for 
International Affairs  
28 September 2009. 
 
Interview  with  Sukegawa  Seiya,  Japan  External  Trade 
Organization Official 




Government of Japan, Ministry Officials (and former/affiliated) 
 
Interview with Former Ministry of Finance Official.  
 
November 2008. 
Confidential Interview with Ministry of Finance Official.   16 March 2010. 
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Interview with, Sekizawa Yōichi,  FTA/EPA Analyst at Ministry 
for Economy, Trade and Industry 
17th November 2009. 
 
Interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs Official 
 
5 February 2010. 
Confidential Interview with Bank of Japan Officials.  
 
16 March 2010. 
Asian Development Bank/ADBI 
 
Confidential Interview with ADB Official.  
 
November 2008. 




Informal Interview with an ADBI Official (2).   June 2009. 
 
Informal Interview with an ADBI Official.   November 2008. 
 
Interview  with  Giovanni  Capannelli,  Office  of  Regional 
Economic Integration 
14 September 2009. 
 
Interview  with  Jayant  Menon,  Office  of  Regional  Economic 
Integration 
4th December 2008. 
Interview  with  Jeffery  Liang,  Vice  Director  Beijing  Regional 
Office 
 
31 July 2009. 
Interview with Kawai Masahiro, Dean of the ADBI 
 
14 November 2008. 
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Appendix 3 The significance of the Japanese Agricultural lobby to FTA negotiations 
 
At the 2003 meeting of the ASEAN–Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP) 
Expert Group, which consisted of senior officials from Japan and ASEAN in charge of their 
respective economic affairs, ASEAN emphasized repeatedly the absolute necessity of the 
inclusion of agriculture in trade liberalization reached within an FTA.
921 However, going into 
the negotiations with Thailand there were storm clouds on the horizon. Thailand is a v ery 
competitive producer of rice (in fact it is the  world‘s largest exporter of rice), the most 
politicized sector of the Japanese economy. More than that, Thailand was the most vocal in 
demands for agricultural liberalization during the 2003 preparatory meeting.
922  
 
For the first time, there was potential in these dealings for Japan‘s FTA/EPA project to be 
derailed  by  failing  to  reach  an  agreement.  It  is  likely  that  Japan  would  be  unable  to 
conclude an FTA with Thailand if rice were not excluded from the talks.
923 ―Indeed, only a 
few years earlier, the JMAFF (sending a ‗kill-team‘ delegation larger than that the JMOFA 
and JMETI) scuttled the WTO talks in Cancun over agricultural matters, it did not seem 
likely that JMAFF would concede then to Thailand.
924 This play was in fact signalled by the 




   
                                                   
921  Takashi Terada, "The Making of Asia's First Bilateral FTA: Origins and Regional Implications of the Japan-Singapore 
Economic  Partnership  Agreement,"  Pacific  Economic  Papers  354(2006).  23,  citing  interview  with  METI  official, 
Singapore 25 March 2002 
922 Maki Aoki, "New Issues in Ftas," in Working Paper No. 8 (Tokyo: IDE-JETRO - APEC Study center, 2004).p. 21 
923 Takashi Terada, "The Making of Asia's First Bilateral FTA: Origins and Regional Implications of the Japan-Singapore 
Economic Partnership Agreement," Pacific Economic Papers 354(2006). p.24 
924 Lydia Yu-Jose, "Phillipines-Japan Economic Partnership: Where Is the Philippines in Japan's Plan," in  Discussion 
paper series (Manila: the Philipine Insitute for Development Studies, 2004). p.19 
925 Yōichi Sekizawa, "Japan's FTA Policy: Analysis of the Policy Process," in Tokyo University Institute of Social Science 
(Tokyo: Tokyo University, 2008). pp. 81-2 235 
 










Source: Japan External Trade Organization 
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Appendix 5 Richard Baldwin’s calculations for Hub-ness in East Asia 
Source: Personal notes of Richard Baldwin 
Note: JKCFTA is most likely to trigger the creation of a hub, it does not yet exist.  
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Source: Japan External Trade Organization 
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Appendix 7 Comparison of Rules of Origin in JACEP and CAFTA 
 
ROO  Japan-ASEAN  China-ASEAN 
CC  736  2 
CC or RVC  123   
CC+ECTC  175   
CC+ECTC or RVC  3   
CC+ECTC+RVC  41   
CC+RM  348   
CC+RM or TECH  44   
CH  121  40 
CH or RVC  3041   
CH+ECTC  32   
CH+ECTC or RVC  13   
CH+ECTC+RM  81   
CH+ECTC+RM or TECH  200   
CS  8  6 
CS or RVC  33   
RVC  220  4752 
WO  3   
TECH  0  424 
Other  2   
Total  5224  5224 
Notes: CC – Change in Chapter, CH – Change in Heading, CS - Change in Subheading, 
RVC - Regional Value Content, TECH – Technical Process, ECTC – Exception to 
CTC, WO – Wholly Owned, RM – Regional Value Content Minimum 
Source: Personal notes of Kim Han Sung, shared with Author. 
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Appendix 8 Usage of Yen and the RMB in International financial market(s) 
 




   
Currency distribution of reported foreign exchange market










































Appendix 9 Access and Contribution to the CMIM 
 Source:  Japanese  Ministry  of  Finance, 




   
  
                                               NOTE:   
      This appendix is included on page 241 of the print copy  
       of the thesis held in the University of Adelaide Library.242 
 
Appendix 10 China’s interests in the ARF 
 
China‘s decision to join the ARF reflects a fundamental change in China‘s perception of the 
region and its role in it. Indeed, as late as the early 1990s, the terms of ‗multilateralism‘ and 
‗regionalism‘ were almost unknown to China‘s international relations scholars, let alone to 
its policy makers and officials.
926 As Hempton Jones notes, China was initially fearful of 
joining the ARF for two reasons.
 927 Firstly, China believed that China would not be able to 
leverage its relative strength as easily in a multilateral setting. Certainly within the Chinese 
MOFA, there was an acknowledgement that China could potentially make itself a target, as 
Xu has discovered ―in general the [Chinese] MOFA officials observe that multilateral setting 
make China feel pressured for China is usually everyone‘s target.‖
928 And secondly, China‘s 
core, ‗internal‘ interests in Taiwan would be exposed. 
 
What  then  was  China‘s  interest  in  joining  the  ARF?  Some  have  suggested  a  realist 
motivation for relative gain, in other words that China was hoping to undermine the US hub-
and-spokes regional security structure.
929 Part of the strategy would naturally entail trying to 
loosen the ‗tight‘ alliance between the US and Japan, a concern even Japan had noted in 
the  early  days  of  the  ARF.  Indeed,  China‘s  New  Security  Concept  includes  so-called 
‗democratization‘ of international relations, and an emphasis on discarding ‗old‘ alliance 
politics. Also noted are the similarities between the NSC and the ASEAN way.
930  
 
But most see China engagement with the ARF not as an attempt to undermine the US-led 
order, but in order to avoid becoming a target for containment. In other w ords to reassure 
its neighbours, and indeed the world, that China will be a responsible power. Indeed, many 
believed that the PRC hoped to throw off the last vestiges of international isolation it had 
suffered after 1989 by joining the ARF.
931 In this view, China is playing a social constructive 
game aimed at trying to shape regional  perceptions about its nature and capabilities  – 
rather than a realist game aimed at joining with the weak powers to balance against the US 
                                                   
926 Xin  Xu,  "China  and  East  Asia:  Reshaping  Power  and  Identity  in  the  Post  Cold  War  Era"  (Phd  thesis,  Cornell 
University, 2003). p.404 
927 Justin Hempson-Jones, "The Evolution of China's Engagement with International Governmental Organisations," 
Asian Survey 45, no. 5 (2005). p. 719 
928 Xin Xu, "China and East Asia: Reshaping Power and Identity in the Post  Cold War Era" (Phd thesis, Cornell 
University, 2003). p.439 
929 Justin Hempson-Jones, "The Evolution of China's Engagement with International Governmental Organisations," 
Asian Survey 45, no. 5 (2005). p. 719 
930 Xin Xu, "China and East Asia: Reshaping Power a nd Identity in the Post Cold War Era" (Phd thesis, Cornell 
University, 2003). 
931 Dominik Heller, "The Relevance of the Asean Regional Forum (ARF) for Regional Security in the Asian Pacific," 
Contemporary South East Asia 27, no. 1 (2005). 243 
 
while bidding its time and amassing power.  The reasons are simple enough; the US is not 
perceived as a threat in the region, whereas China is. In this context power balancing 
behaviour  is  unnecessary  and  possibly  dangerous.  China  has  received  a  boost  from 
ASEAN,  which  has  traditionally  avoided  public  discussion  in  favour  of  a  behind  closed 
doors approach.
 932 From ASEAN‘s point of view, it is dangerous to talk about the ‗China 
Threat‘ because it might lead to a self-fulfilling prophesy, which suits China‘s interests well.  
 
Another factor in China‘s warming to the ARF was American attempts to turn APEC into a 
security forum. At the Osaka APEC in November 1995, US secretary of Defence Perry had 
proposed  that  APEC  be  a  site  of  security  consultation  but  China  had  opposed  due  to 
Taiwanese membership in the APEC. Thus it is likely that, as Takagi argues, ‗to pre-empt 
further development of the idea by reinforcing the effectiveness of the ARF must have been 
one  of  the  calculations  behind  China  decision  [to  be  more  positive  about  joining  the 
ARF].‖
933 In fact, upon joining China also placed at the outset fairly clear limits about what it 
was prepared to be engaged about. When China first agreed to the establishment of the 
ARF at the ASEAN FMM in 1993, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said ―it [the ARF] should 
not make  a decision nor take common action on a certain country, a certain region, a 
certain question‖, indicating that the price for China‘s participation was the avoidance of 
Taiwan issue.
934 More promising however was the potential for the ARF to resolve So uth 
China Sea dispute. On the eve of the [first] ARF, a Chinese MOFA spokesman noted that it 
was unavoidable for the Nansha/Spratly issues to be on the agenda, even though China 
still preferred a bilateral approach.
935 
 
Indeed, it seems fairly clear then tha t China did not join the ARF with the intention of 
engaging with Japan. China‘s interests lay with protecting its claim on Taiwan, managing 
relations with the US and with Southeast Asian countries. Thus there was a perception gap 
between Japan desire to engage with China, and China lack of interest in engaging with 
Japan from the outset. 
 
   
                                                   
932 Acharya in Xin Xu, "China and East Asia: Reshaping Power and Identity in the Post Cold War Era" (Phd thesis, 
Cornell University, 2003). ―Identifying a country publicly as your adversary goes against the grain of Asian Strategic 
culture.‖ p. 425 
933 Ibid. p. 442 
934 Takeshi Yuzawa, "Japan's Changing Conception of the ARF," The Pacific Review 18, no. 4 (2005). 468, of course it 
stands  to  reason  that  given  the  widened  geographical  scope  of  the  US  alliance,  Japan  would  wish  Taiwan  to  be 
discussed at the ARF. 
935 Xin Xu, "China and East Asia: Reshaping Power and Identity in the Post Cold War Era" (Phd thesis, Cornell 
University, 2003). p. 436 244 
 
Appendix 11 Japanese and Chinese sponsored CBMs at the ARF 1998-2005 
Source:  www.aseansec.org/ARF/cbmdb.pdf Accessed: April 2010 
Note: ARF discontinued reporting CBMS by sponsor in 2005, the Author has been unable 
to secure access. 
 
 
   
  
                                               NOTE:   
      This appendix is included on page 244 of the print copy  
       of the thesis held in the University of Adelaide Library.245 
 
Appendix 12 Voluntary Briefs at the CBMs-ISG 
Year  Japan  China 
2000  Unknown  Unknown 
2001  New anti-terror laws  None 
2002  Cooperation with US/UK  Defence White paper 
2003  None  Six Party Talks outcome 
2004  Non-proliferation   Six Party Talks outcome 
2005  Various, unspecified  None  
2006  11
th Tokyo Defence forum, People 
Building for Peace 
None 
2007  On  upgrading  the  Defence 
agency to the Ministry of Defence 
None 
2008  12
th  Tokyo  Defence  Forum, 
Pacific Shield 2007 
Peace Mission 2007 (SCO), China-India-
Russia Foreign Minister Summit 
2009  None   None 
Tot.  9  5 
Source: Chairman‘s statement of the ARF‘s ISG-CBMs, compiled by Author 
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Appendix 13 Japan’s diplomacy and the formation of the ADB 
 
Japan played a critical role in the formation of the ADB, without Japanese  support and 
activism it is unlikely the ADB would have ever been formed. The idea of a multilateral 
development bank was not new in Asia. Proposals had been made at various forums for an 
organization  capable  of  bridging  the  credit  worthiness  gap  in  Asia  and  facilitating  the 
development of the region. In Japan too, the idea for a development bank had been floated 
privately  by  an  economic  journalist  and  researcher  Ohashi Kaoru.  In  1962,  momentum 
started gaining in Japan as Ohashi put together a group to discuss the plan, a group which 
included  Watanabe  Takeshi  –  a  Ministry  of  Finance  (MOF)  official  who  would  become 
president of the Asian Development Bank. While American support for the plan did not 
seem  immediately  forthcoming,  the  energy  with  which  Asian  countries  (particularly  Sri 
Lanka and Thailand) embraced the plan was sufficient to put a regional development bank 
onto  the  agenda  in  the  UN  sponsored  Economic  Commission  for  Asia  and  Far  East 
(ECAFE). After passing through an expert group in August-September of 1963, the plan 
was passed up to the first full-blown Ministerial conference for Asian Economic Cooperation 
which accepted, in principle, the need for a regional development bank.
936  
 
These moves in Asia and ECAFE (the multilateral forum in which the act ion happened) 
reflected  an  understanding  in  the  region  that  development  was  reliant  on  external 
assistance. The idea of an Asian Development Bank, followed in the footsteps of such 
organizations as the African Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, 
which had been founded  later was already heading towards loaning its first $1billion.
937 
While India and Pakistan could look to  Britain (and through Britain to easy access to the 
World Bank‘s soft loans) and China might to a lesser extent look to Russia, Asia were 
seemingly without ‗natural‘ powerful friends. For the Asian country members of ECAFE, the 
proposal for ADB was appealing, as it would hopefully provide a better conduit for foreign 
aid to reach Asia. However, as eager as the Asian countries were for concessionary loans 
in the early 60s, there was no desire for having it controlled by either Japan or America. 
While  acknowledging  that  these  players  would  want  political  influence  in  exchange  for 
contributions, regional states hoped to find a middle path between these great powers.
938 At 
this stage there was no Chinese presence per se. 
 
                                                   
936 Dick Wilson, A Bank for Half the World (Asian Development Bank, 1987). p. 4 
937 Ibid. 
938 The ADB came into existence in 1966, about the same time as ASEAN was formed. The strategy of ASEAN states to 
attempt to avoid entanglement in either Japan or US, can now be seen in ASEAN ‘s approach to China too. For more 
about  the  impetus  to  regional  organization  see  Mark  Beeson,  "Asean  Plus  Three  and  the  Rise  of  Reactionary 
Regionalism," Contemporary South East Asia 25, no. 2 (2003). 247 
 
Japan in the meantime was working in the background to get the ADB formed.
939  In his 
capacity  as  an  expert,  Watanabe  advised  the  Expert  Group  on  what  elements  the 
Government of Japan (GOJ) would like to see in any ADB proposal, elements which the 
Ohashi group had already discussed in depth. But he did so as an expert and  not as a 
representative of Japan. This approach was taken as Watanabe did not want to reveal to 
the Expert Group that Japan already had ideas for an ADB as this might put offside those in 
Asia already suspicious of Tokyo‘s growing economic power. 
 
Appendix 14 Chinese interests in joining the ADB 
 
China signalled its intention to join the ADB in 1983. However it would not be until 1986 that 
it  would  take  a  place  at  the  table.  China  was  still  highly  suspicious  of  international 
organizations and anxious about preserving its sovereignty and freedom of action. Chinese 
commentators tended to view regional cooperation of any stripe, including the ADB, as part 
of ―capitalistic‖ US and Japanese strategy to dominate developing countries.
940 And yet 
China was painfully aware of how desperately it needed development assistance, and thus 
how necessary joining the international community was.  
 
From  China‘s  point  of  the  view  the  ADB  was  ‗different‘  from  other  international 
organizations.  While multilateralism was a new approach as far as China was concerned, 
ADB allowed China to accept aid that it might not of. Furthermore, the ADB‘s non-political 
nature  facilitated  China  joining,  as  it  could  practice  multilateral  diplomacy  without  the 
potential of causing  itself  catastrophic damage  in  the  international  arena. Put  simply,  if 
China was willing to join the UN Security Council, then it may as well join the ADB. There is 
also some evidence that Japan‘s strategy of socialising China into the international system 
through economic means, including Japan‘s vaulted ‗aid diplomacy‘, had worked.   
 
By 1985, after Nakasone had approved the second yen loan package, worth nearly US$2.5 
billion, and, as bilateral trade with Japan expanded rapidly to exceed US$10billion, China 
                                                   
939 Japan preferred the background for a variety of reasons, certainly among them was being continuing suspicions in 
the region about Japan based on its wartime legacy. Japan needed to work quietly but efficiently. Takeshi Watanabe was 
able  to  do  just  that,  possessing  both  MOF  and  international  experience.  When  the  expert  group  re-assembled  in 
Bangkok on 20th October 1964, Watanabe was in attendance and had gathered support back in Japan for proposals 
which might arise from the meeting. Despite attending as ‗an expert‘, with no official capacity to represent Japan, he had 
already sounded out the political leadership of Japan about an ADB developed along the lines of the Ohashi plan. In 
exchange,  Prime  Minister  Ikeda  had  told Watanabe  that  the  Government  of  Japan  would  support  any  reasonable 
proposal which came out of the Expert Group. See, Dick Wilson, A Bank for Half the World (Asian Development Bank, 
1987). p. 11 
940 See Wu Jixian in  Yong Deng, "Chinese Relations with Japan: Implications for Asia -Pacific Regionalism,"  Pacific 
Affairs 70, no. 3 (1997). p. 376 248 
 
began to see the benefits associated with multilateral economic cooperation.
941 However, 
from the outset China treated joining the ADB with a calculated lack of interest. China never 
did tip its hand about why it wished to join the ADB. Then President of ADB, Fujioka (1981-
89) commented that it was not clear even to him what China wanted from membership in 
the bank, as China had never indicted that it as interested in development loans to him.
942 
China was of course still suspicious therefore, and playing ‗hard to get‘ in the interests of 
getting a better deal, true realpolitick style. 
 
Appendix 15 Rise of China’s bilateral aid and impact on the ADB 
 
At the same time the ADB has become increasing challenged by China‘s growing bilateral 
aid activities. In this light, China‘s aid diplomacy has become more significant. Indeed, the 
mere fact that China, an ostensibly developing country, has an aid program at all has raised 
eyebrows.  Opinions  about  China‘s  aid  vary  widely,  attracting  either  criticism  or  praise 
depending on who you listen to. Most observers agree that China‘s interest in giving aid is 
political, whether in its own region or in Africa where China‘s activities have ruffled feathers 
at the G8 – fears in part arising from China‘s historical use of aid in the early cold war 
years.
943 Certainly, China is interested in using aid to generate a positive perception of itself 
in the region, as well as to win points in the diplomatic game with Taiwan. While remaining 
agnostic about what China‘s intentions may be, this section will suggest that China‘s rising 
aid profile does undermine the ADB as is perceived a threat to Japan‘s interests. 
 
Indeed, we need to understand the increased supply of aid with low or zero conditionality 
being provided by China has had real effects on the way the business of aid is being 
carried  out  in  the  region.
944 Secondly, Chinese aid is highly politically and strategically 
motivated.
945 While no aid is given entirely free of self -interest, protecting the national 
                                                   
941 Ibid. 
942 ―The president of Asian Development Bank has seen China's entry as one of the bank's major achievements in the 
last three years‖ (1986). 
943 For more on China‘s early aid diplomacy and its ―rather blatant efforts to buy political influence‖ see, Peter Poole, 
"Communist China's Aid Diplomacy," Asian Survey 6, no. 11 (1966). 
944 Even the World Bank is not immune, with  Chinese willingness to build a dam  in Laos pushing the World Bank to 
approve the project despite its concerns over its environmental impact. 
945 In Cambodia, Chinese aid has been linked to access to oil. China has helped finance a deep port in Sihanoukville 
which would allow an overland route for oil coming from the Gulf. Additionally, China has received permission to explore 
Cambodia‘s own oil reserves. Jane Perlez, "China Competes with West in Aid to Its Neighbours," The New York Times 
2006. See also, Joshua Kurlantzick, "China's Charm Offensive in Southeast Asia," Current History 105(2006). for more 
on the energy security factors driving this strategy.  
While in the Pacific islands, China has been using aid diplomacy to swing a diplomatic coup over the recognition of 
Taiwan through the oddity of cricket stadium construction, but with a short term goal only in mind undermining the utility 
of the development assistance. This short sightedness has meant instability, such as China also got a satellite tracking 249 
 
interest plays a dominant role in Chinese aid diplomacy ahead of factors like the actual 
success  of  the  development  assistance.
946 Indeed,  China  often  ties  its  development 
assistance to its own businesses, even providing the labour for many these projects.
947 
Moreover, due to this political nature it is difficult to get good and  accurate statistics on 
China‘s  aid.
948 China‘s  politically  motivated  and  non-transparent  aid  is  a  challenge  for 
Japan. These tensions emerge most clearly in Southeast Asia, as an area of strategic 
concern to both parties.  
 
One example of where this is happening is in Burma, one of the poorest countries in the 
region,  ruled  by  a  military  junta.  Both  Japanese  yen  loans  and  the  ADB  operations  in 
Burma were suspended in 1988 in the aftermath of the coup. However, China is less fussy 
about dealing with authoritarian governments, and stepped into the vacuum to prop-up the 
military junta economically and militarily. China‘s moves in Burma are widely regarded as 
having pushed Japan to rejoin the Burmese aid game, even at the risk atdeflecting from the 
ADB, which has continued the embargo.
949  Moreover, China has replaced Japan as the 
largest source of total economic assistance to Burma, including $1.4 billion to $2 billion in 
weaponry in 2003, and an additional loan of $200 million. By way of comparison, Japan 
provided a yearly average of $26 million in ODA to Burma, a fraction of China‘s offer. 
 
Another example of these tensions can be found in the Philippines – where the ADB itself is 
headquartered. While China has contributed aid in the past for disaster relief (such as in 
the case of mud slides), Chinese aid to the Philippines is increasingly involved in areas in 
which the Japanese aid and ADB had been dominant, such as infrastructure. In 2004, the 
China Export-Import Bank provided US$400 million to finance the construction of the first 
phase of the North Rail project at a highly concessional rate (3% over 20 years). The 
generosity of this offer prompted Presidential spokesperson Bunye to say, "What I know is 
that this is one of the most generous packages extended by any institution or country to the 
                                                                                                                                                     
station on Kiribati, with obvious military applications. But Kiribati again defected to Taiwan in November 2003 taking the 
station with it. See, Phillip C Saunders, "China's Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers and Tools," in Occasional Papers 
(Washington: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2006). 8 Fergus Hanson, "China; Stumbling through the Pacific," in 
Policy Brief (Sydney: Lowy Institute, 2009). and Purnendra Jain, "The World Cup, China and Cricket," Eye on Asia, April 
16 2007. 
946 There is growing concern that Chinese aid project do not facilitate development to the same extent as other, more 
transparent, programs.  
947 Jane Perlez, "China Competes with West in Aid to Its Neighbours," The New York Times 2006. 
948 Indeed, China continues to regard the details of its aid program as a state secret and publishes no annual reports. 
Fergus Hanson, "China; Stumbling through the Pacific," in Policy Brief (Sydney: Lowy Institute, 2009). p. 5 
949 Toshihiro Kudo, "Myanmar and Japan: How Close Friend s Become Estranged,"  IDE Discussion Paper 118(2007). 
Japan has made several attempts to restore its relationship with the Burmese and continues to provide humanitarian 
grant aid. 250 
 
Philippines.  This  [is]  more  than  competitive  [emphasis  added].‖
950  This  statement 
represented  an  indirect  criticism  of  Japan  and  ADB  which  had  moved  away  from 
infrastructure loans. In late 2006, China appeared to pledge over lunch a further $2 billion 
to  the  Philippines  every  year  for  the  next  three  years  over  lunch,  dwarfing  ADB  and 
Japanese loans.
951 While this later turned out to be clever ar ithmetic involving projected 
gains from the ‗early harvest‘ clause of a China-ASEAN FTA, the announcement itself sent 
shockwaves into Japan‘s ODA policy makers.   
 
China has also stepped up its aid to Laos, a country for which foreign aid represents really 
20% of GDP (although still only a mere $250 million). Loans from the ADB total roughly $80 
million of that amount in any given year, with Japan coming second at $65 million. However 
since  2001,  China  has  reportedly  become  the  second  largest  provider  of  aid  to  Laos, 
overtaking Japan. Moreover the high profile public works, such as a hydro power project 
worth  $178  million  and  $45  million  in  technical  cooperation  and  debt  forgiveness,  are 
clearly aimed a painting China in a positive light within Laos.  China has also become a 
large player in Cambodia, giving ten times as much as the ADB in FY2006.
952  
 
In  December  2006,  Beijing  halted  aid  to  Vietnam  in  response  to  the  Vietnamese 
government‘s formal invitation to Taiwan, a major investor in the country,  to attend the 
APEC November 2006 summit in Hanoi. Similar expansion of Chinese aid has occurred in 
Indonoesia; Hu Jintao and Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono signing in 
2005 a declaration of ―strategic partnership‖ that was accompanied by $300 million worth of 
concessional loans. Indeed, despite the fact that its mission is to lift Asian states out of 
poverty, the ADB now predominately lends not to the region‘s poorest, but to its middle 
income countries – allowing China to step into the gap left behind.
953  
 
China‘s  growing  aid  diplomacy  has  therefore  undermined  the  ADB‘s  operations,  and 
harmed Japan‘s interests in the region.  
 
   
                                                   
950 "China Loan for North Rail Most Generous -- Bunye," Manila Standard, Sept 11 2004., And in January 2007, a state 
water agency swapped outright its borrowing to the China Export-Import Bank from the ADB on the grounds that the 
Chinese were offering cheaper rates and faster approval. 
951 Jane Perlez, "China Competes with West in Aid to Its Neighbours," The New York Times 2006. 
952 The ADB‘s package was for roughly US$60m across all sectors, China gave US$600m mostly to infrastructure. 
Some have suggested a link between this aid and the ongoing Khmer Rouge trial under way in Cambodia, more likely is 
Cambodia‘s overall strategic value to China. One ADB official commenting off record that China‘s aid is degrading the 
improvements in governance in Cambodia.  Author's Confidential Interview with ADB Official, November 2008. Tokyo. 
953 Lincoln in "China's New Spring Role," South China Morning Post, 8 May 2002. 251 
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